Salah

I own a fair number of books about the Civil War. And almost every one of them uses the same word - "pugnacious" - when describing General Philip Henry Sheridan. The word seems to work well for this short, and short-tempered little Irish-American. He gained noteriety early on in his career, for attempting to bayonet a fellow cadet at West Point in 1849.

Sheridan already had a formidable reputation as a commander of cavalry in the West by May of 1864, when Ulysses Grant brought him to the East to serve as the commander of the Army of the Potomac's Cavalry Corps. During the Overland Campaign, Sheridan butted heads with perhaps the second most bull-headed and foul-tempered general in the Army of the Potomac, the 'Old Snapping Turtle' George Meade.

Sheridan was as beast of a man, full to the brim with violent, nervous energy as he glared at the world with squinty eyes. Short-legged and stocky, he may not have matched the traditional image of a cavalry commander, but he got the job done. His first independent operation in the Eastern Theater, the Richmond Raid during the Overland Campaign, was a great success. Sheridan defeated Rebel cavalry no less than four times during this operation, and at Yellow Tavern his men mortally wounded 'Jeb' Stuart. Sheridan became the living embodiement of the Union cavalry, which had now grown to maturity and was winning as many engagements as it was losing.

'Little Phil' spent the summer and fall of 1864 devastating the 'Breadbasket of the Confederacy' - the Shenandoah Valley. In addition to burning 2000 barns and 700 mills, and capturing over 15,000 horses and beef cattle, Sheridan also defeated the Rebels under Jubal Early several times. On October 19th of 1864, Early's army surprised that of Sheridan, who was absent at Winchester. The engagement at Cedar Creek would have probably been a defeat for the bluecoats, but Sheridan completed his famous ride from Winchester in time to rally his men and guide them to victory. It was the ferociously aggressive cavalryman's finest hour.

Sheridan fought in the Appomattox Campaign, blocking Lee's escape route at the Court House itself. During this campaign Sheridan had another explosive personality clash with a fellow Union general. Accusing G. K. Warren, commander of the V Corps of timidity, Sheridan's attacks succceed in destroying Warren's career and reputation.

It was perhaps fitting that the Union's most energetic general was given a sizeable task immediately after the surrender of Lee. In May of 1865 Sheridan was dispatched to the Rio Grande at the head of an army of 50,000 Union veterans - a show of force that would hopefully curb the amibitions of the French, who were attempting to carve out an empire in Mexico at the time.

Sheridan had a taste of peacetime governance after the War, governing both Texas and Louisiana for brief spells. President Johnson ended up recalling him - Sheridan governed like he fought, with a relentless and fearsome one-track mind, and he made himself many enemies. Later in the 1870s Sheridan was given a chance to project his fighting spirit on the Plains Indians.

In death, Sheridan bore some resemblance to his old commander Grant. Sheridan died just three years after Grant, in 1888, and like Grant, he died only a few days after completing his memoirs. It seems Sheridan had exhausted his legendary energy while fighting his last battle.

Viperlord

I very rarely criticize Salah's excellent posts, but I have a few nits to pick at this post, which I don't believe is a very modern assessment of Sheridan's generalship.

Actually, Sheridan had been a infantry division commander in the West. He had very little prior experience with cavalry.

I'm afraid this isn't a commonly accepted assessment anymore. I'll quote Gordon Rhea, Overland Campaign expert, and Eric Wittenberg, Eastern Theater cavalry expert, here. Rhea wrote this about Sheridan's raid.

"By taking his cavalry from Spotsylvania Court House, Sheridan severely handicapped Grant in his battles against Lee. The Union Army was deprived of his eyes and ears during a critical juncture in the campaign. And Sheridan's decision to advance boldly to the Richmond defenses smacked of unnecessary showboating that jeopardized his command."

Wittenberg is a harsh critic of Sheridan who summarizes most of his objections to him in this post. http://civilwarcavalry.com/?p=1543

Yellow Tavern is the only real victory Sheridan ever achieved against the AoNV's cavalry, and he heavily outnumbered and outgunned Stuart on a relatively open field, at the cost of depriving Grant of vital cavalry support. Stuart left half the cavalry with Lee when he went on his infamous ride; Sheridan left Grant with hardly anything, and the only real effect of his raid was to kill Stuart. Sheridan's cavalry had to take refuge with Union troops on the Peninsula for a time. Haw's Shop could be argued as a victory, but he failed in his objective. He got thrashed by an inferior Confederate force under Hampton at Trevilain.

Sheridan deserves credit for inspiring the men with the counterattack, but the Union forces had already been reorganized and reformed by Sixth Corps Commander Maj. Gen Horatio Wright, who probably would have launched the counterattack himself, Sheridan or no Sheridan. Sheridan's charismatic and inspiration presence was certainly an asset though. I find it remarkable that given his immense cavalry superiority, Sheridan allowed Early's army to escape again and again after defeating him.

Quoting from an essay by Gary Gallagher on Sheridan in the Valley, Grant wanted Sheridan to accomplish three things. First, to remove the Confederates from the Potomac River line and the lower Valley. Sheridan succeeded here. Secondly, Grant wanted the Shenandoah devastated as a logistical base. Sheridan also succeeded here. Thirdly, Grant wanted Sheridan to disrupt the Virginia Central Railroad, and then to move on Charlottesville and Gordonsville. While seemingly ideally positioned for such a task, Sheridan did not fulfill this goal. He told Grant he objected on the grounds that he would have to leave men to protect the Valley and the railroad. Grant pointed out that that so long as Sheridan merely forced the enemy to send forces to protect these targets, it was a strategic victory for him almost as great as the actual destruction of the targets. Sheridan had a meeting with Grant, Stanton, and Halleck in D.C. where his views apparently prevailed, and Grant didn't hold the affair against him. Sheridan's objections are difficult to understand today though. He demonstrated similar obstinacy when ordered to North Carolina to join up with Sherman's cavalry-deficient forces. Sheridan knew the glory lay in the imminent Virginia Campaign against Lee, and simply wouldn't budge to aid Sherman.

His energy seems lacking in the Valley to me. After defeating Early at Cedar Creek, he doesn't get around to finishing off Early's beaten army until next year. His finest performance was the Appomattox Campaign, as he had clearly learned quite a bit about coordinating cavalry and infantry by this time. Sheridan was a good and aggressive battlefield commander, but I question his performance outside the field itself. Generally speaking, he had an aggressive spirit which didn't always translate to his strategic actions as compared to his tactical ones. I admit to at least partly buying into Wittenberg's highly critical analysis of Sheridan.

One of the relatively few things I will unreservedly criticize Ulysses S. Grant for is rewarding Sheridan's blatant insubordination towards Meade following the Wilderness and Sheridan's very poor performance there. Grant was so happy to hear someone talking aggressively that he overlooked Sheridan's poor behavior towards Meade. Sheridan fired officers such as Torbert, Averell, and Warren for questionable reasons as well.

Rongo

I agree completely. And in so doing Grant deprived himself of his cavalry. It's always been a mystery to me why Grant did it. It also couldn't have made Meade or the other officers of the AoP very happy, which could have been partially responsible for some of the lack of enthusiasm and cooperation that would be seen later in the campaign.

Rongo

Sheridan's an example of one of the reasons why war is hell. People like him can rise to the top.

Hopeforus

Just a little blurb about Cedar Creek. General Early rolled up the Union Army and defeated them handily which was unexpected. Due to the supplies his men found and got into, he lost control of his men for a followup to drive them to the Potomac River.

http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/cedar-creek.html

Viperlord

While Early's performance was truly remarkable in the early phases of Cedar Creek, he didn't have the entire Union army beaten yet. Merrit's cavalry division and most of Sixth Corps were in good shape to continue fighting. Early was distracted by a determined defense from Getty's Sixth Corps division, which bought time for the rest of the Corps to reorganize as well. After dealing with numerous Union units making stands of their own, Early's momentum may have been nearly spent in any case.

Hopeforus

“This was the case of a glorious victory given up by my own troops after they had won it, and it is to be accounted for on the ground of the partial demoralization caused by the plunder of the enemy's camps, and from the fact that the men undertook to judge for themselves when it was proper to retire. “

eHistory at OSU | Online Books | Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Volume 4 Page 529

Viperlord

And there's the reason Early wasn't popular with his own men, unlike Sheridan. Blaming your own troops is never a sensible morale move.

Hopeforus

Then I would guess what I posted really didn't happen? Also, where did you get the notion the men and Early were at odds?

Hopeforus

Viper, you may be right. However, there is too much info that is supporting Early's report.

Early's troops, instead of following up their victory, fell out of ranks to plunder the yankee camp. Sheridan promptly reformed his troops and returned the same day and defeated Early, and caused him to lose all he had gained and more too. But if ever soldiers were excusable for such conduct Early's poor half famished men surely were. They had been marching and fighting from the first of May, at the Wilderness, at Cold Harbor, at Lynchburg, at Salem, West Va., and then to Washington and return. It is estimated that from June to September Early had marched his little army over four hundred miles.

Cedar Creek