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Old September 26th, 2016, 05:28 AM   #111
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Quote:
Originally Posted by bedb View Post
Learned tonight that MacArthur and Eisenhower were both opposed to dropping the A bombs on Japan.
True, but MacArthur wanted to use them in North Korea against the Chinese.
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Old September 27th, 2016, 03:57 PM   #112
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Originally Posted by Wenge View Post
My assertion shows no highly questionable grasp of the historiography of the war of northern invasion.

If Jackson isn't given his due across the board then something is amiss in the historiography.
Well, calling it "the war of northern invasion" is prima facie evi;dance of a slightly tilted view of history. LOL!
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Old September 28th, 2016, 07:07 AM   #113

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Getting back to 20th century battles now....


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Originally Posted by Lowell2 View Post
originally, they were coaling stations.


whatever one may think of MacArthur, it was important from a long term and immediate military value that there be someone to manage control and defend American interests in this area of the world. .
The real question in my mind about PI was: What was Mac instructed to do, and did he carry it out?

Was the task that he was given realistic?
Did he draw up the "retire to Bataan" plan, and did his superiors approve it?
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Old October 1st, 2016, 09:08 PM   #114
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Sorry but i consider Mac Arthur as a sort of mediatic clown of the american military legend .
He was a very bad tactician and strategist.
He was ridiculous in the Philippines campaign in 1942, he was nicknamed by his soldiers "double hidden".
He left his soldiers alone preserving his image trough the famous "i'll come back"
I think he was a very carrierist general with a very, very big ego of spoilt little boy (by his mother).
It's very surprising that he wasn't fired afer such a disaster werehas he was warned after Pearl Harbor .
How to explain Air force deployement by december the 8 1941? how to justify his behaviour? (no respects of orders)....

For the Philippines campaign of 1944, sure it wasn't a good idea and he wanted to come back in "his Philippines".
But most part of the U.S staff was in favour of this useless and bloody campaign (Marshall for instance).
Useless because no doubt that Philippines would surrender as Malaysia did it and for the same reasons.
But Philippines was a former american colony (no still completely independant) captured by Japanese and leaded by the general Mac Arthur
Better srategists like Nimitz were opposed to Philippines campaign (even if officially he supported Leyte landing but only with the idea to provoke and destroy restant of japanese fleet) .
U.S had a close shave in Leyte cause problems of leadership about the Navy (Halsey Under authority of Nimitz and Kincaid leaded by Mac Arthur therefore 2 differents srategy: to protect landing or to search and destroy japanese fleet ).

I don't know if Mac Arthur was seen as a propaganda symbol by political managers, then Under a mediatic protection (for instance, like Rommel for Nazi Germany )

On the other hand, he was an excellent adminisrator in the Philippines and Japan and had the excellent idea of Inchon landing he promoted alone (with a mediocre strategic exploitation).
For the rest of the Corean war, he wasn't very good and understimated chinese threat even if he wasn't responsible of the crossing of the 38th (but he was about the move to the Yalu river too much close to chinese border but CIA thought that chinese wouldn't move).
After being fired by Truman, he tried a politic come-back but it was his last and definitive failure.

Last edited by phil1904; October 1st, 2016 at 10:22 PM.
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Old October 1st, 2016, 10:42 PM   #115

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I have to disagree completely with the liberation of the Phillipines being an error.

Sure, if looked at from purely a military perpective it could have been bypassed. But war is never just about the military perspective. War is after all "the continuation of politics by other means."

You can't ignore the political considerations, and retaking the Phillipines was a political imperative. It had been the site of the worst defeat in American military history, and thus needed to be avenged, and the Phillipine Commonwealth was tied to the U.S. in the same way that Canada or Australia were part of the British Empire. Allowing its people to languish under Japanese military occupation a day longer than necessary was simply unacceptable. Thousands of American and Filipinos were also being held in prison camps there, both military and civilian.

In short, the invasion of the Phillipines would have occurred with or without MacArthur. And rightly so.

Finally, it would have done irreparable harm for the U.S. in the region to allow the Phillipines to remain a Japanese possession till war's end. Britain's reputation took a similar blow for not liberating Malaya before war's end. To a certain extent a nation's power and influence also rely on perception. The U.S. would have appeared weaker had it not liberated the Phillipines, not to mention an untrustworthy ally, not willing to shed blood for a nation it was duty bound to protect.

Last edited by Scaeva; October 1st, 2016 at 10:49 PM.
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Old October 1st, 2016, 11:10 PM   #116
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Yes, but what about the complete ravage of Manilla and thousands and thousands deaths?
It was a massacre (100 000 deaths, one month of fight).
Singapore had more luck....
Plus Mac Arthur was a very mediocre srategist and tactician in this second Philippines campaign too.
Lucon's landing was a good idea (even if there was Relationship problems with Kincaid) but strategic exploitation was bad along the campaign.
More than 52 landings (were they all usefull?) in Philippines and japanese still resisted in july 1945.
A better srategist would has avoid to engage the army in Manilla, this bloody battle helped Yamashita who didn't want defend the capital city because he thought that Mac Arthur would move his armies in order to isolate it (Yamashita thought like a good srategist).
Plus prisoners camps and the usefull Clarkfield airport weren't into inhercity but outside of the city then it was useless to attack (and destroy!) in a direct manner the capital city .
To bypass the city would has allowed the liberation of the city (and the capture of the Harbour) with minimal losses and less desructions (Yamashita already gave order of retreat to japanese general in charge of the defense ).
i suspect that Mac Arthur ego had, probably, a big importance in this human disaster, because there were no real and usefull reasons to engage such a battle in such a situation (for a good military leader of course) .

Last edited by phil1904; October 2nd, 2016 at 12:12 AM.
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Old October 2nd, 2016, 07:51 PM   #117

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The role of the American reconquest of the Philippines in the Pacific War, can be analogized with the liberation of Italy during the European War. Both campaigns delivered (at best) only ancillary military benefits in terms of contributing to the downfall of Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany, and they were both excessively costly in casualties (both geography and poor generalship contributed to the latter). Despite this, anyone who suggests that the United States blundered by participating in these campaigns is wrong, because they fail to adequately appreciate the effect these campaigns had on postwar geopolitics.

Just as the occupation of Italy helped ensure that country ended up on the right side of the Iron Curtain (with fateful consequences for subsequent European history) the return of the Americans to the Philippines was necessary to preserve that country as an outpost of American power in the Pacific after the defeat of Japan. Had the U.S. bypassed the archipelago, there was a high probability that the communist Hukbalahap would have swept into the vacuum left when Japan surrendered. This would have been an unacceptable outcome for America, which needed a friendly government in Manila prepared to lease military bases.

MacArthur fixated on recapturing Manila not because of its military value, but because of the political value of restoring the government-in-exile to control of the capital. (For much the same reason, during the Korean War he opted to land at Inchon over safer options because it represented the speediest route to liberating Seoul.) There was no way of anticipating that the Japanese, acting contrary to the wishes of Yamashita, would see the city reduced to ruins rather than let it fall peaceably back into the hands of the Americans.
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Old October 3rd, 2016, 12:49 AM   #118
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@DIVUS IVLIUS
According me ,you find many excuses to Macarthur.
For example, when you write that "there was no way of anticipating that the japanese, acting contrary to the wishes of Yamashita, would see the city reduced to ruin rather than let it fall back into the hands of the Americans".

Seriousely, U.S troops and notably the 1st cavalery division fought and had intelligences with Philippinos résistants, they were informed and they couldn't ignore that there were more than 15 000 japanese soldiers plus philippinos pro-japanese milicians ready to fight up to the death since the 3 february, when they arrived in the suburb of the city and they liberated about 5 000 prisoners.

About political objective: no doubt that if he was good strategist, he should has bypassed the city.
Eventually, japanese general iwibuchi sanji would has been obliged to obey to Yamashita and would has retreated.
Taking account the importance of U.S forces and philippinos resistance, communists wouldn't has been a great threat and Macarthur could captured Manila and proclaimed Commonwealth of Philippines in a much better manner and maybe, sooner.

You mentionned campaign of Italy, then you can compare with the liberation of Rome.
Communist resistance also existed in Italy, i bet that if a "Macarthur" would has liberated Rome in the same "style", maybe anti-americanism would has been a lot reinforced and could lead to a hard guerilla, like in the Philippines after WWII.
Actually, Macarthur was a very bad military leader unable to manage "the continuation of Politic by another way".

Your admiration of Macarthur leads you to a biased vision about the big incompetence of "dugout Doug" as general.
He leaded the campaign of the Philippines with a big clumsiness and the battle of Manila was a big blunder which played against his political goal.

He was a hero when he was soldier but a zero like general excepted rare exceptions (Inchon landing).
The way he leaded campaign of Philippines is a good example of one of the 4 screw-ups mentionned in the subject of the thread.

Last edited by phil1904; October 3rd, 2016 at 02:04 AM.
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Old October 4th, 2016, 03:40 PM   #119

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The following links are relevant to the discussion of the
invasion of the Philippines. Basically they say that logistically,
the whole of the Philippines were needed to support the
invasion of Japan.

Chicago Boyz » Blog Archive » History Friday: MacArthur?s Southern Philippines Campaign

Chicago Boyz » Blog Archive » History Friday: MacArthur ? A General Made for Convenient Lies.

This is backed up by an earlier link I posted:

Luzon Versus Formosa

In which it states that General Somervell, the Army CO
in charge of logistics was in favor of taking the whole of the Phillippines.


In my view, the evidence presented so far overwhelming supports
the argument that the invasion of the Philippines was the right thing
to do. The counter argument seems very weak, with no evidence,
no sources, and only unsupported assertions.

That is not to say that there is not support for the counter argument.
I have not checked the sources for the above links. So if
someone can show that these were misinterpreted, or they
ignored important source, I would be very interested.

But please provide evidence and sources, and not unsupported assertions.

And always remember:

“Amateurs talk tactics while professionals talk logistics.”


Incidentally, the author of the first 2 links above has a lot
of interesting WWII posts. They are under:

Chicago Boyz » Trent Telenko

and more - replace the 1 at end with 2, 3, etc. It is polluted
with a lot of politics I don't care for, but I found many of the

WWII posts fascinating.

Somewhere in this is something germane to this discussion:


The Philippines vs Formosa argument -

Mac was right and King/Nimitz were wrong. And it isn’t even close.

The following are the 13 Feb 1945 Effective combat strengths of US Army units in Luzon.

37th Div 95%
40th Div. 88%
1st Cav Div 85%
32nd Div. 81%
43rd Div. 71%
158th RCT 66%

These strength shortages were due to the absolute priority for infantry replacements for the Hurtgen Forest (The First Army had suffered 24,000 dead, wounded, captured or missing in action, plus another 9,000 disabled by other nonbattle injuries in the 5-month fight there.) and Battle of the Bulge depleted US Army in Europe.

The SWPA got only 5,000 infantry replacements for the whole of the 6-month (Jan – June 1945) Luzon campaign.
This shortage of US Army rifleman was made up by over 30,000 armed Filipino guerillas that rose up when the American Army liberated the Philippines.

Now imagine an invasion of Formosa without those 30,000 Filipino guerillas on the American side with likely triple that number of Japanese supporting civilians on the Japanese Army’s side.

















































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Old March 23rd, 2017, 08:29 AM   #120
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Quote:
Originally Posted by phil1904 View Post
Yes, but what about the complete ravage of Manilla and thousands and thousands deaths?
It was a massacre (100 000 deaths, one month of fight).
Singapore had more luck....
Plus Mac Arthur was a very mediocre srategist and tactician in this second Philippines campaign too.
Lucon's landing was a good idea (even if there was Relationship problems with Kincaid) but strategic exploitation was bad along the campaign.
More than 52 landings (were they all usefull?) in Philippines and japanese still resisted in july 1945.
A better srategist would has avoid to engage the army in Manilla, this bloody battle helped Yamashita who didn't want defend the capital city because he thought that Mac Arthur would move his armies in order to isolate it (Yamashita thought like a good srategist).
Plus prisoners camps and the usefull Clarkfield airport weren't into inhercity but outside of the city then it was useless to attack (and destroy!) in a direct manner the capital city .
To bypass the city would has allowed the liberation of the city (and the capture of the Harbour) with minimal losses and less desructions (Yamashita already gave order of retreat to japanese general in charge of the defense ).
i suspect that Mac Arthur ego had, probably, a big importance in this human disaster, because there were no real and usefull reasons to engage such a battle in such a situation (for a good military leader of course) .
Agree. Mac should have avoided Manila entirely. It Yamashita's doing, however, It was the Japanese Rear Admiral who refused to leave the city. Even so, it was a very bad move to go into Manila which resulted in horrrendous casualties.

The best argument for avoiding landings in the Philippines is that the Japanese would eventually have surrendered anyway. The best argument for not avoiding the Philippines is that the Japanese fleet needed to be crushed and Leyte Gulf decided that even though it was a very close run thing because of Halsey's bad mistake of taking the bait dangled in front of him.

I dont have a very high opinion of Macarthur.
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