Alcibiades

Excellent post,Mark.Thanks.

I have a question.How much troops approximatelly did Romans lost in the 218-208 BC period(in all theaters combined)?
Alcibiades

markdienekes

Let's see...

By the end of 216, something like 120,000 men had been killed or taken prisoner through Hannibal's actions. In 215 they lost a further 2 legions and allies in Cisalpine Gaul (so we'll just add a further 20,000), 15,000 at Silarus River, 16,000 at the First Battle of Herdonia, between 7-13,000 men at second Battle of Herdonia, not to mention a few more legions here and there and badly mauling Marcellus and other commanders on several occasions, the Scipios defeats in Spain... we're probably looking at around 200,000.

pixi666

Wow. What's that as a percentage of the male population of Rome?

markdienekes

Quite heavy on the Romans. Livy says there were problems with the levy in 212, 207, and the census of 209-208 BC only 137,108 citizens were recorded (Livy 25.22; 27.38; 27.36). It's possible that at some point during the war, the wealth qualification for service n the army by Roman citizens had to be lowered by over 60%. (Second Punic War a Reappraisal, ed. Cornell, Lazenby, Was Maharbal Right?, p.45)

Cicero'sSilverTongue

I do agree with some of the things you said and that this quote said, but I still rate Scipio Africanus as a greater strategist and at least Hannibal's tactical equal. To answer some of the things the historian you quoted said: The reason Scipio was delayed in going to Africa was because the Senate, including people like Fabius Maximus, who deemed it unnecessary and not in the interests of Rome. He also had to train an army of volunteers, completely from scratch (coincidentally, many of which contained the disgraced veterans of Cannae). When he was finally permitted to land in Africa, he positioned in the heartlands of Carthage, by besieging Utica. His goal was to lure Hannibal out of Italy by threatening his homeland. However, Scipio was not able to follow through with this until later due to the presence of King Syphax (a Numidian king and ally of Carthage) and his army. Scipio showed both his creativity and brutal efficiency by burning the encampment of the larger of army of Syphax and slaughtering those who tried to escape. By killing Syphax he was able to provide Masinissa (another Numidian king) with Syphax's throne and ensure his alliance with Rome (thus displaying a keen strategical mind as Masinissa's cavalry were key to his victory at Zama). After Hannibal landed in Africa, Scipio let him come to him and to a ground of Scipio's choosing where Hannibal couldn't utilize his tactical creativeness to gain to ambush or trap Scipio. And there's no need for me to go into the battle of Zama as you probably know what happened and the creative way Scipio dealt with Hannibal's elephants and how the Roman/Numidian cavalry attacked Hannibal's rear.
As for Caesar, he was the greatest strategist of the three, and hence the greatest politician, Scipio was a nice combination of the great tactician and great strategist (thus the greatest general of the three), and Hannibal was the greatest tactician of the three, and the second best general of the three.

markdienekes

The majority were veterans with at least 10 years experience - and also included those survivors from the two battles of Herdonia too, but yes, it did include a sizable amount of volunteers - the majority of which had probably seen service during the war - he did have to train them to work together however! Livy remarks that they were the most experienced soldiers in the Roman army (29.24.13)


Right from the beginning of the war invasion of both Spain and Africa was on the cards - Scipio's father and uncle were sent and kept in Spain to do exactly this - and spent many years garnering Spanish support and causing trouble amongst those tribes still allied to Carthage, and beating Carthaginian armies. The Senate's handling of the war was superb, and from 211 onwards, it is hard to find much fault with anything they did. Scipio's invasion of Africa is often credited to Scipio's strategic genius... but it was, ultimately sanctioned by the Senate and was no more than a reversion to the strategy originally adopted by that body in 218.


It was a great move, and reveals his careful planning and the high standard of training of his army, but ultimately the deception rested on convincing Syphax and Hasdrubal they were sincerely discussing peace, which makes it legally questionable by the standards of the day. (Adrian Goldsworthy, The Fall of Carthage, p.294). Ironically, it was certainly more 'Punic perfidy' than anything Hannibal committed!

Syphax actually managed to escape from the fire, but was turned away from the majority of his towns and cities, but he did manage to raise another army which was defeated by Scipio's Lieutenant Laelius east of Cirta or near Ampsaga. Syphax's horse was shot under him and he was captured (which then furthers the tragic romance of Sophonisba). Syphax was sent with other prisoners to Italy with Laelius, where he was imprisoned in Alba and then Tibur where he died.

Onto a keen strategical mind:

According to Richard Gabriel in his book, Scipio Africanus: Rome's Greatest General:

It is difficult to escape the impression that Scipio was not at his best in the months after the invasion and may have made a number of mistakes. His siege of Utica, for example, seems to have been a strategic error, and even with skilled forces, boats, and siege machinery, he failed to take the city. If his point was to break the political will of the Carthaginian leadership, then attacking Utica brought Scipio no closer to his goal. He should have simply bypassed the city. Stopping to lay siege to Utica squandered whatever operational momentum the invasion and the small early victories had afforded the Romans. Scipio had wanted to turn Utica into a logistics base, but as his winter encampment proved, he already had sufficient supplies and did not need Utica at all. Equally troubling is that Scipio seemed to have forgotten his history. The key to Carthage was not Utica, but Tunis. (Gabriel, pp.161-162)

The time spent trying to capture Utica left his Carthaginian opponents time to recruit, train and equip an army and gave Syphax the time to put down a rebellion!

Hannibal's westward advance may have been designed to sever Scipio's communications base on the coast and to get between Scipio and Masinissa, thus forcing Scipio to either retreat to the coast, which could have allowed Hannibal to turn and deal with Masinissa separately or force Scipio to fight without aid of the Numidian king. (Lazenby, Hannibal's War, p.218) Hannibal's advance to within 5km of Scipio may well indicate he believed Masinissa had still not met up with Scipio! But overall I do agree with what you wrote here. Scipio's force was also closer to the water!

Cicero'sSilverTongue

Excellent points! On a kind of side note:
One of the things which I still don't understand, and the reason I have never considered Hannibal the be a great strategist (though still and adept one), is why after Cannae Hannibal didn't take a threatening posture towards Rome (that is besiege the city, ravage the countryside of Latium, etc.). After the battle, many of Rome's allied cities deserted her (such as Capua), and I believe it would have been more advantageous if Hannibal had followed up this great victory with some kind of finishing blow rather than languishing in southern Italy for some 13 more years. Now of course I realize that several factors were against him, such as Rome's stubborn attitude not to capitulate, Hannibal's lack of siege weapons, and that Hannibal's strength lay in his mobility. However, the thing that still gets is why he didn't utilize this victory and actually encamp his army outside Rome. Hence the widely known and used quote by one of Hannibal's lieutenants, Maharbal, "Hannibal knew how to gain victory, but not how to use it." For this reason, I still rate Hannibal as a lesser strategist than Scipio Africanus.

gaius valerius

Actually the issue was precisely that so few cities in the Roman heartland, such as Latium, did not desert her, the reputation that Rome had created in the many decades prior to this event actually paid off in the most dire moment. The only territories that defected were the most recent acquisitions and Capua, due to resentment over not having political rights (but being Roman citizens and thus...) but sharing in the military burden, the actual core of Roman power, her heartland, remained unscathed, moreso, when Hannibal was campaigning he was under the impression that he could not shake the allegiance of the heartland allies of Rome and brutally ravaged their lands as well. I don't think camping out of Rome would have amounted to that much necessarily. He tried that a few years later to relieve Capua and it didn't amount to much.

markdienekes

You can read thoughts on this here on Alci's thread:

http://www.historum.com/ancient-hist...iege-rome.html

While this is my opinion on the matter:

http://www.historum.com/ancient-hist...0?postcount=27

Delenda est Roma

Hannibal
Caesar
Scipio