Alexander and Hyphasis Mutiny - Historum

**Alcibiades** · April 14th, 2012, 10:04 AM

I will present here excerpts from a book by Waldemar Heckel,one of the most distinguished and respected of Alexander scholars,called The Conquests of Alexander the Great.He proposed a theory about the so-called "Hyphasis Mutiny",which was initially treated as something akin to heresy,but which has started to gain currency among professionals.It is still very far from entering mainstream history,so probable none (or almost none) of you heard about it.

These excerpts will deal with precisely this theory,and what the Professor from Calgary University said about it.

All the quotes are from the aforementioned book.These emphasis are mine,these are those of an author.Words (in brackets) are mine comments.

Quote:

Hence, I make no apology for repeating my view on Alexander at the Hyphasis - which some have rejected as heretical - because it is, to my mind, what the evidence suggests rather than the theory that confirms a subjective preconception of the king. In the opinion of Professor E. A. Fredricksmeyer: "Alexander was in truth so much a product of the ancient cult of the hero, which placed martial honor and personal glory above all ethical considerations,...that the notioon of him as the deceiver who contrived to be defeated by his own men at the Hyphasis is not easy to countenance. What of his pride?" If the aim of introducing proskynesis was, as a majority of scholars contend, an attempt to recognize Alexander' divinity, would not the rejection of this experiment have been an even greater blow to his pride? Such assumptions about Alexander's psychology are best avoided.

Preface

Quote:

Alexander's actions after the defeat of Porus and the founding of cities of Bucephala and Nicaea have been the subject of conssiderable debate. The traditional view, which sees Alexander as a man marching to the ends of the earth and the eastern ocean, simply assumes that his continuing eastward across the Punjab was the natural consequence of the victory over Porus. ... This view, however, has little to commend it, and in fact the ancient evidence argues strongly against it.

Page 121

Quote:

Military historian David Lonsdale has commented; "When we shift our attention to India, it is more difficult to identify Alexander' operational art. This is mainly due to the fact that Alexander had lost some of his strategic focus. Aside from searching for an ocean frontier, the campaign did not appear to have clear and definable objectives. Without clear strategic objectives, operational art had no hook to hang on."

In fact, nothing could be further from the truth, and it is only modern scholars' preconceptions about Alexander's desire to push into the unknown that have blinded them to what was a highly sensible, and well-executed, strategy. Porus' kingdom was clearly intended to form a buffer zone on the fringe of the empire. The extent of Achaemenid control in Tatagus had always been limited, and Alexander was content to acknowledge Porus as a vassal in the hope of protecting the stability of Taxila and Gandhara.

Page 122

Quote:

Alexander had allowed Porus to keep his kingdom. Significantly, there is no mention of a satrap, a strategos or a garrison - and he had sought to establish a friendly relations between Porus and Taxiles. The founding of two cities on either bank of the Hydaspes is also typical of Alexander' frontier policy, and there is litle doubt that Bucephala and Nicaea were intended to control the limits of his empire. ... These (tribes to the east of Porus' territories) were, significantly, annexed to Porus' kingdom, and the garrisons planted there comprised Porus' own troops. In effect Alexander had renounced all claims to conquests east of the Hydaspes (even before the "mutiny").

Page 122

Quote:

The attraction of this theory (the orthodox, mainstream one) is that it conforms to Alexander' attested ability to improvise in the light of new developments. Such ability is essential on the battlefield but less so for the formulation of grand strategy. Indeed, to deviate from a well-formulated plan on the basis of a whim is unsound; nor is it in keeping with Alexander' previous actions when he reached the edges of the Persian Empire. Elsewhere (Danube, Jaxartes), he had not pushed mindlessly into the unknown, and there is no reason to assume that he wished to do so now. Was his longing to unravel the mysteries of India and his obsession with the eastern Ocean any greater than his interest in other regions? Only in the minds of modern writers.

Page 123

Quote:

There is, furthermore, the question of leadership to be considered. First there is the curious fact that an experienced commander presented in full detail the strength and superior numbers of the enemy to a group of demoralized men. In effect, he confirmed the very rumours that were causing them distress, in a speech that was hardly inspirational or motivational. Second, even though one of the chief arguments presented by the soldiers' spokesman, Coenus, was the poor condition of the men' military equipment, Alexander never indicated that new armour for 25.000 men was on its way, along with substantial reinforcements. He neither mentioned them, nor indicated that he was prepared to await for their arrival. Instead, these were waiting for him when he led the the army back to the Hydaspes to begin their journey downriver. ... In fact, his approach was such that the only reasonable conclusion is that he wanted to incite the men to mutiny. And this can only mean that he had no serious intention of proceeding but wanted the blame for turning back on the shoulders of his men.

Page 123

Quote:

This brings us back to Lonsdale' comment that Alexander had no "clear strategic objectives". The king made these objectives more than clear when he began the construction of the Hydaspes fleet. He had consistently advanced to borders of the Persian Empire, and confirmed them by strenghtening their defences. ... He had avoided prolonged conflict with the Getae north of the Danube and the Scythians beyond the Iaxartes; nor was he tempted to venture into the lands of the Ethiopians or conduct an expedition against the Amazons. In fact, he rejected the offer of the Chorasmian king to join in a campaign against the Amazons on the ground that he had to give his attention to the task at hand. ... Nor indeed, would it have made sense for Alexander to strenghten the position of Porus, whom he would have had to leave, unfettered, astride his lines of communications.

Page 124

In essence,Professor Heckel argues that Alexander never intended to venture further that Hyphasis, that he intended to make Hydaspes his border and Porus' kingdom (who would be vassal, but under no direct authority or censorship of Macedonian officers and officials) to be a buffer zone. In support of this, he cites the building of the Hydaspes fleet immediately after the Battle of Hydaspes, that speech at Hyphasis has a whole bunch of holes if you hold the theory of pothos for Easten Ocean, AS WELL AS Alexander' previous border policies, all of which are identical with the ones done on Hydaspes EVEN BEFORE the "mutiny" (rather than Hyphasis,or not at all,as should have been the case).Also, many instances where Alexander was not interested in blindly pushing through to the "edges of the world".Because,surely there cannot be an edge in only one direction (East),right?

Well,what do you think of all this?I bet that vast majority of you have never heard most of these facts before (which Professor brings forward to support his theory)?But,its all true.You can check it for yourself,if you dont believe it.

If you have any questions about the details of Heckel' theory which I may have missed,I'll try to answer them to the best of my knowledge.

Alcibiades

**M.E.T.H.O.D.** · April 14th, 2012, 10:53 AM

Quote:

Military historian David Lonsdale has commented; "When we shift our attention to India, it is more difficult to identify Alexander' operational art. This is mainly due to the fact that Alexander had lost some of his strategic focus. Aside from searching for an ocean frontier, the campaign did not appear to have clear and definable objectives. Without clear strategic objectives, operational art had no hook to hang on."

I totally agree with Lonsdale.

Alexander's actions after the Battle of Hydaspes seems to me more geographical explorations(similar to the actions during the retreat) than military actions and I consider the theory of Porus' buffer state as pretty plausible(since Alexander's task was not only conquering lands, but also to help the flourishing of the empire)

My personal idea is that Alexander, by the time of the Indian Campaign, was already captivated by other extraordinary feats(Arabia?), Alexander's desire pushed him to conceive the "impossible";this is also the main reason that got me interested in his figure(besides his military actions).
Of course his troops didn't possess his vision and dream, that's why I cannot discard mutiny as a possible cause; despite that Alexander's desire to move on to conquer another lands is far more interesting.

**Brisieis** · April 14th, 2012, 11:52 AM

I think his theory is very plausible indeed.

In my opinion, it goes without saying, that many historians who make claims of Alexander can sometimes be wrong. Especially when speculating what the man was thinking, we can only put the evidence together like a puzzle, yet, this does not mean every assumption is correct, especially in regards to motives and personal feelings on a matter.

Alexander was not just a conqueror, we was an explorer too, this cannot be denied, his fascination with other cultures and his eagerness to explore unknown places is clear.

Don't forget, that when Alexander saw the crocodiles and the plants growing on the river banks, he believed that India was the source to the River Nile. Because the geography of the time was inaccurate, it is no wonder such thoughts came to mind. Imagine how they all felt, wondering if India was the source that flowed all the way back to the land of Egypt, it must have been an amazing idea.

I find it interesting that he mentions the ships being ordered to be built before the mutiny. Remember, India was was full of luxuries like gold, silver, salt, precious stones, numerous spices, ivory, and cotton. For Alexander to grow the empire into India and then create a good trade route to bring such luxuries back to Greece, would have been another good reason imo.

I find Waldemar Heckel's theory plausible. He certainly makes some interesting points.

Publius Aelius Hadrianus · April 14th, 2012, 02:24 PM

It would make sense to establish a maritime rote to India since, as Keith Hopkins demonstrates, trade by sea was 50 to 60 cheaper than trade over land nd 6 times cheaper than trade by river.

**Midas** · April 14th, 2012, 09:01 PM

This is definitely interesting. I will add up to METHOD's post. What he did with Porus in my mind is pure ingenuity! Basically, he used Porus as a buffer and as a safety zone. He gained Porus trust which means that a territory unknown to him would not bother him with rebellions or sudden attacks from deeper zones. Porus was guarding for him the eastern borders against the unknown. He could now concentrate in his current annexed lands and setup a plan on how to protect them. Maybe, later conquests was in his mind, but it was surely not the right time to do them. He was not 18 anymore, he had a matured mind that would tell him when to take a break.

On the other hand, try to think yourself in his position as well. He youth was spent on the battlefield. Not a single moment of relaxation. I would personally would have some other things in mind as well around my 30s.

Ephialtes · April 15th, 2012, 02:42 AM

I've always imagined Alexander would've spoken with the locals and the chiefs about how far it was until that imagined ocean, only to hear in response that all of their knowledge and their ancestor's knowledge spoke only of the endless nightmarish tropical forest.

Such world shattering news surely would have left everyone demoralised, before or after Porus. Was mutiny forced by their king so as for him to save face? Hugely interesting. Surely the son of Zeus could only go on so far as the lesser men..

**Brisieis** · April 16th, 2012, 04:20 AM

Another thing we know about Alexander is his ability to be able to give fantastic speeches, he knew just how to rile his men up. It is reasonable imo to think that he could have riled up his men on purpose in a negative way, I believe he would have been capable of such a task.

Pythagoras · April 16th, 2012, 04:20 AM

Very interesting thread Alcibiades. I have to say, this theory seems quite plausible and there are some significant points that indicate you are right.

Firstly, I find it very peculiar that Alexander gave up so easily his Indian campaign. One may wonder why didn't he retreat somewhere close (like in Taxila or Arachosia) and wait until there are enough reinforcements with new troops. While being there, he could organize his intelligence network, gather all available informations about Nanda's strategic positions and initiate a new Indian campaign with a larger and fresh army. Instead of doing so, Alexander had already instructed the construction of a fleet, which indicates that his intention was not to conquer the vast Nanda Empire.

So here comes the question: Why couldn't Alexander retreat somewhere close and wait for the reinforcements? I think that the answer in this question is exactly what Alcibiades implies: Alexander never intended to push himself over the limits. Despite what many scholars think, he was extremely realist and pragmatic. He would never chase an impossible dream but rather set actual goals and targets.

In order to support this argument, one has to look back in his Afghan campaign. Alexander did not attempt to conquer the barbaric lands over the Jaxartes river once he realized that there was no point in doing so. Instead, he preferred to secure the borders by ordering the construction of some cities in order to protect his Empire from the barbaric hordes of the North.

**Brisieis** · April 16th, 2012, 04:35 AM

Another thing is, when Alexander took his men through the Gedrosian desert, his men did not rebel there, the desert was reknown for being inhospitable, yet the men went along, well prepared, they gathered food supplies from Pattala and even waited for the correct moment to cross as they saw fit. Why did the men not rebel here? If they were fed up at Hyphasis why on earth would they be fine with crossing the Gedrosian desert? Why if the men did not rebel here, would they have rebelled at the Hyphasis? Some claim Alexander was punishing his men by travelling through the desert, yet, they crossed the desert well prepared, as though they did not truly understand how bad it really was. Also, why would such a great conqueror who had 'acheived' so much want to be remembered for killing thousands of his own men or making a massive blunder? It may well be that his men did not mutiny because they were fed up, but because Alexander coaxed them into it. He sent home 10,000 men before crossing the Gedrosian desert too.

There are many ways we could look at this scenario.

**Alcibiades** · April 16th, 2012, 05:03 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Brisieis

Another thing we know about Alexander is his ability to be able to give fantastic speeches, he knew just how to rile his men up. It is reasonable imo to think that he could have riled up his men on purpose in a negative way, I believe he would have been capable of such a task.

Yes,well said,Bri.We know that he was an excellent orator,both through the heights of endurance and effort he managed to push them through without them breaking or rebelling in 335-326 period,as well as if you accept the view that the sppech at Opis is,if not verbatim,than at least very close to what he really said on that occassion (which was,ironically,another mutiny occassion,this time much more serious,and if we accept Heckel' theory,the only legitimate one in Alexander' turbulen and eventful reign).
Alcibiades