Caracalla

The Mamertines were Italian mercenaries who had been hired by Agathocles of Syracuse. When Agathocles died in 289 BC the mercenaries were left idle and unemployed in Sicily. The peaceful town of Messana on the north-eastern tip of the island welcomed the mercenaries into their homes.

A common problem with soldiers in peacetime is that idleness breeds restlessness and soon enough the Mamertines plotted the capture of the city. In one night they betrayed and murdered their hosts and threw the survivors out of the city. Their property and women were divided amongst the conquerors.

Over the course of the next twenty years Messana changed from a bustling trade centre into a base for raiders and pirates. The Mamertines, named after the Campanian war-god Mamers (Mars to the Romans), looted nearby settlements and captured passing trade ships. They struck coins in this period and became rich and powerful.

In 275 BC Pyrrhus of Epirus departed from Sicily. Syracuse was not a kingship at this time due to the actions of the previous king, Agathocles, who left democracy in his place after realising that his potential heirs were not worthy of replacing him. The Syracusan army and citizens appointed as their commander Heiro II. His position was strengthened when he married the daughter of the leading citizen, Leptines.

Word of the Mamertine's exploits reached Syracuse at about this time and Heiro began to mobilise an army of citizens and mercenaries. As the Mamertines neared Syracuse, Heiro marched his troops out for battle. He sent his front line of undisciplined mercenaries forward with the intention of allowing them to be butchered. With the unruly part of his army disposed of Heiro set to work on training the citizens and drilled them to fighting condition. With a suitably disciplined and confident army Heiro marched north in search of the Mamertine troops. He encountered them at the Longanus River and confronted them in a pitched battle on the plain of Mylae. Since the Mamertines were overconfident from their earlier engagement with the Syracusans and because they were not accustomed to this style of battle they were easily defeated and their leaders captured.

In 265 BC Heiro returned to Messana to besiege the city and eradicate the threat of pirate raids in the area. Unknown to the Syracusan forces a fleet of Carthaginian ships were moored up in the harbour of Messana. The Mamertines requested help from the Carthage and Heiro, not wanting to come into conflict with the Carthaginians, retreated.

Unhappy with the idea of a Carthaginian garrison in their city the Mamertines appealed to Rome for protection. Rome's senate debated on the Mamertine question and were not impressed with the Mamertine's actions in stealing Messana from it's rightful possessors. They were also recovering from insurrection in Rhegium and were reluctant to enter another war so soon, which seemed almost inevitable if they sided with the Mamertines. However, they were mindful of the increasing Carthaginian presence on Sicily and feared her growing power. Unable to decide through debate the Romans put the decision before the popular assembly. They voted in favour of an alliance with the Mamertines. The Roman consul Appius Claudius Caudex, an avid supporter of the Mamertine cause motivated by the very Roman virtue of personal glory, was given command of the invasion of Sicily.

In response, Syracuse, fearing Mamertine retribution with Roman support, allied herself with Carthage.
A military tribune, Gaius Claudius, uncle to the consul, was sent in advance to Rhegium with a few ships. Gaius Claudius began negotiations with Hanno, the commander of the garrison occupying the citadel of Messana, but talks broke down and Gaius retreated back across the strait where the pursuing Carthaginian fleet captured some Roman triremes.

Hanno, not wanting to be responsible for starting a war with Rome, returned the triremes in a gesture of good will. Gaius ignored the gesture and successfully sailed back to Messana. The Mamertines persuaded Hanno down from the citadel to continue negotiations with Gaius. Again talks failed. Hanno was forced to leave Messana with his army. He was crucified by the Carthaginians on charges of cowardice.

The First Punic War had begun.

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Straight away both major players had a problem: Neither Rome nor Carthage had a base of operations on Sicily from which to receive reinforcements and communications from the mainland. For this reason the war would mostly be fought at sea and any land battles would be waged with the end goal of improving naval domination on Sicily. For Rome, the problem was increased by the fact that they were fighting against a superior navy.

With the expulsion of Hanno from Messana Appius Claudius Caudex was allowed to land two legions at Messana which was under siege from the combined forces of Carthage and Syracuse. The Romans broke the siege and defeated the two armies before marching south and besieging Syracuse.

The siege was brief and, with no help from the Carthaginians seeming to arrive, Syracuse sued for peace. According to the terms of the treaty Syracuse would become an ally and help supply the Roman army in Sicily. They also had to pay a light indemnity of 100 talents. This solved Rome's provisions problem. Shortly afterwards several other Carthaginian allies switched allegiance.

With a superior navy Carthage was able to set up a base of operations in Africa where they could ship their mercenary army to Sicily. The army, composed of Ligurians, Celts, and Iberians and numbered 50,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and 60 elephants.

Agrigentum was a city rich from the trade of sulphur and potash. It was also strategically important and would have been used as a base of operations from which Carthage could easily move its troops along a main route along the southern coast of Sicily as well as roads north and east which led to other cities. For this reason Rome attacked Agrigentum in 262 BC.

The Roman consuls for this year were Lucius Postumius Megellus and Quintus Mamilius Vitulus. Together, with a combined force of 40,000 men, they marched towards Agrigentum.

The Carthaginian commander, Hannibal, son of Gisgo, combined his mercenaries with the local population to increase his number to 50,000. The Romans offered themselves to battle, but Hannibal refused to leave the city walls thus forcing the Romans to set up camp and begin harvesting local crops.

It was during one of these foraging missions that Hannibal made the first move. He sent a force out to harass the foragers and to disrupt the Roman's supply. The outnumbered and unarmed Roman soldiers fled to camp. It was the camp guards and watchmen who successfully repelled the Carthaginian assault.

Hannibal realised that he could not afford to lose any more men on such missions again and increasingly became reluctant to attack. The Romans, for their part, realised that they had underestimated the enemy.

One of Agrigentum's strengths as a strategically placed city was it's natural barriers: the river Hypsas to the west, the river Akragas to the east. It also sat atop a plateau surrounded by steep slopes on all sides except the west. This was also it's weakness. The Romans blockaded the city from the outside world with the intention of starving the population and forcing their surrender.

The consuls divided their armies and stationed one force near the temple of Asklepios to the south, and the other force was stationed on the road leading to and from the city in the west. Agrigentum held out for five months before supplies began to run out. Hannibal managed to get a message to Carthage appealing for help. In response Carthage sent Hanno, possibly the son of Hannibal, with reinforcements consisting, according to Polybius, of elephants, Numidian cavalry and mercenaries.

Hanno landed his troops on the south of the island at a city called Heraclea Minoa and quickly captured Herbesos, a Roman supply base. The Roman troops quickly ran short of supplies and disease soon followed. The capture of Herbesos also severed Rome's communication lines. Hanno, with the use of his Numidian cavalry, managed to trick the Roman cavalry into pursuing them and led them directly into the Carthaginian column. The losses for Rome were many. Hanno set up camp on a hill about a mile away from the Roman camp where skirmishes continued between the two armies for two months.

Morale and health must have been low in the Roman camp. With no supplies coming in from Syracuse they were at risk of starvation. The consuls had no choice but to offer battle.

Hanno refused. He intended to defeat the Romans by hunger. They would not have as much supplies as Agrigentum, yet the city had been under siege for seven months at this point and Hannibal was getting desperate. Communicating with smoke signals, Hannibal urged Hanno to relieve them from their desperate situation. Hanno had no choice but to accept battle.

The Romans defeated the Carthaginians and forced Hanno to retreat. Hannibal escaped Agrigentum by night, his rear guard harassed by Roman cavalry. Rome plundered the city and sold 25,000 (more-than-likely most, if not all, of the population) inhabitants into slavery. Though his was the Roman way at the time it proved counterproductive. Nearby cities who were wavering in their allegiances hardened their attitude towards Rome.

With this battle Rome controlled most of Sicily and secured the grain harvest for her own use. Despite the success the two consuls were denied a triumph because they allowed Hannibal to escape.

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The consuls for the year 260 BC were Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio and Gaius Duilius. Scipio was the senior consul and boasted a family heritage that was as old as the Republic. Duilius was a new man, or novus homo, to the Roman senate. Quality of lineage did not, however, translate to quality of man.

After the battle of Agrigentum had strengthened Rome's position on Sicily they soon realised that they needed to capitalise on their position by controlling the surrounding sea. With that goal in mind they proceeded to build 100 quinqueremes and 20 triremes (supposedly copied from Carthaginian ships that had beached on Roman shores) as well as train the necessary crew in an astonishing two months. Scipio was given command of the first seventeen ships built and sailed to Messana where he would have prepared for the arrival of the remaining ships as they crossed to Sicily.

On his way he received word that Lipara, the largest island in what is today known as the Aeolian Islands, that he garrison there was willing to defect to Rome. Scipio, being a member of a proud and distinguished patrician family, needed his moment of glory that was the staple of Roman virtue and would not settle for Lipara giving in without a fight.

As Scipio led his brand, spanking new ships into Lepara harbour a Carthaginian fleet commanded by a recently defeated Hannibal Gisco and a Carthaginian senator named Boodes waited in ambush. Boodes blocked the exit trapping the Romans in the harbour. The inexperianced Romans put up little resistance as they panicked and were soundly defeated. Scipio was captured and was forever named Scipio Asina, or Scipio the Ass.

Enter Duilius. He was given command of the fleet while the foot soldiers were turned over to military tribunes. He quickly realised that Rome's infant navy was no match for Carthage's superior experience and that Rome's strength had always been with her soldiers. With the help of an unknown inventor they devised a way for the legions to fight on the sea: the corvus. The corvus was a plank attached to the prow of the ship with a large spike designed to pin enemy ships in place ready for boarding.

Mylae was a town on the northern coast of Sicily and Duilius met Hannibal off it's shore. The Carthaginians sailed into battle with 130 ships. After the defeat of the Lipara Islands Rome was left with 103. Confidence was high with Carthage: they had experience and numbers. What could go wrong?

The corvus worked a charm, completely taking Hannibal by surprise. Duilius took the first thirty ships that came near enough for his secret weapon to be effective. Hannibal issued orders that the Roman's were to be taken from the side, or from the rear, yet Duilius and his unknown inventor had foreseen this and had equipped the corvus with a rotating axle and were still able to attack the Carthaginian ships. Hannibal lost a further twenty ships before sounding the retreat, leaving Duilius with a decisive victory.

Duilius, instead of letting success get to his head and forcing him into a rash decision, decided not to follow the retreating army, but instead returned to Sicily where he saved the city of Segesta which was under siege by a Carthaginian named Hamlicar. Duilius returned home and received the first naval triumph in Rome's history. He never held high office again.

Rome pursued Hannibal to Sardinia where he suffered yet another defeat. He was arrested at this point and crucified for incompetence.

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After Duilius' success at Mylae the Romans felt secure in the north of the island. The navy advanced toward Thermae. Under the command of Hamlicar the Carthaginians defeated the Romans and followed up this victory by seizing the city of Enna in the centre of Sicily. By taking Enna Hamlicar had not only divided the northern and southern territories of Rome but had put himself and his army within striking distance of Syracuse. He made a move on Camarina, a city under Syracusan rule: a blatant reminder to Syracuse to what could happen to them if they did not switch allegiance.

Hamlicar could have been a thorn in Rome's side if he had consolidated his position in Enna, but by taking Camarina he stretched himself too thin and the following year, in 258 BC, Rome retook both cities as well as Mytistraton: a small, but strongly fortified town.

In the north the Romans attempted to take Panormus, but were forced to withdraw.

There seems to have been a lull in the fighting during 257 BC. Presumably Rome enjoyed it's domination of Sicily and continued to consolidate it's forces and to strengthen it's position. Also Carthage must have continued to needle and harass the Roman troops as they still held outposts on the island. What is more certain is that Rome was not sitting on her laurels. Since the capture of Agrigentum Rome had been building and training a fleet of ships and crew for a specific purpose: to take the war to Africa.

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Like hungry sharks the Carthaginian fleet patrolled the coasts of Sicily. Rome needed to transport her army to and from the island and were forced to use triremes and quinqueremes as ferries. These boats, however, were inadequate for moving troops and cargo due to limited space. The Romans countered this problem with a simple solution: They built more boats. Two hundred ships were built with the aim of safely moving the army across the Mediterranean. This was in addition to roughly one hundred and thirty ships they already had.

The consuls for the year 256 BC (the eighth year of the war) were Marcus Atilius Regulus and Lucius Manlius Vulso Longus. They were given command of the fleet. The Carthaginians increased the number of ships in their navy to match the Romans and gave command of their ships to Hanno the Great and Hamilcar.

Roman naval tactics had advanced sufficiently that they managed to advance around the Sicilian coast in battle formation. They arranged themselves in a wedge and divided the warships into three flotillas. The two flotillas that made the point of the wedge were commanded by the two consuls. The third flotilla defended the rear with the transport ships protected in the middle.

The Carthaginians met the Romans at the southern coast of Sicily off Mount Ecnomus. The Carthaginian navy presented itself in the traditional long line with slightly advanced flanks. The centre was commanded by Hamilcar. The right flank was commanded by the same Hanno who was defeated at Agrigentum.

The point of the Roman wedge advanced on the Carthaginian centre. The transport troops were the main objective of the Carthaginian navy and Hamilcar faked a retreat thus creating a gap between the vanguard and his target. The Carthaginian flank continued to advance and attacked the remaining ships from the side to avoid the effect of the corvus. The transport ships were forced backwrds towards the Sicilian coast, while the reinforcements were forced to enter battle.

After a long and drawn out fight the Carthaginian centre was finally defeated. They fled the battle. The two consuls then turned their flotillas around to relieve the rear. Consul Vulso pursued the Carthaginian left flank which was pushing the transport ships perilously close to disaster. Consul Regulus launched an attack on Hanno. Without support the remaining Carthaginian fleet was heavily defeated. Half of Carthage's navy was either captured or sunk.

The Romans returned to Sicily for rest and repairs. The prows of the captured Carthaginian ships were sent to Rome where they became permanent fixtures on the rostra in the Forum.

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The consular armies set sail for Africa once more. This time they landed and took the town of Clupea, just east of Carthage. They set up defences and gathered slaves and cattle effectively making Clupea the Roman military headquarters in Africa. Soon afterwards Vulso was recalled to Rome. He set sail, taking most of the fleet and all the transport ships with him. Regulus was left with 15,000 infantry and 500 cavalry.

In the meantime Carthage had recalled Hamilcar from Sicily. Alongside the generals Hasdrubal and Bostar they organised their defence in a city called Adys, just 40 miles south of where the Romans were settled. As the Romans advanced the Carthaginians took up position on a hill overlooking the surrounding plains. The undertrained and mostly meranary army of the Carthaginians consisted of African militia, light infantry, cavalry, and elephants.

Under cover of darkness the Romans surrounded the hill and attacks the Carthaginians from two sides. For a while the Carthaginians held the advantage and began to push back the legions, but after the cavalry and elephants escaped their spirits began to wane and they were eventually crushed. They Romans pursued and looted the camp.

For Carthage this was more than a military defeat. The Numidians rose up against their overlords. Refugees from the ravaged countryside sought protection in the city. The sudden population boost and the effects of the ravaged countryside brought about a food crisis and the threat of disease.

For Regulus his chance to achieve fame and glory was running out. His consulship was nearly over. His two legions were also too small to take the city. Negotiations would have to take place if he were to get any credit for winning the war which had been raging for nine years by this point. Regulus demanded that Carthage surrender Sicily, Corsica, and Sardinia, disown their navy, pay an indemnity, and become a vassal.

Carthage refused.

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Desperate, but not so desperate as to refuse a crippling peace treaty, Carthage turned to a mercenary Spartan general in their hour of need. That general was Xanthippus: a man who turned the tide of the war. In command of the Carthaginian army Xanthippus retrained and reorganised the troops. He then presented his army on the battlefield with a hastily raised phalanx of citizen militia in the centre of the formation; mercenary infantry were presented on the right with a line of elephants in front; he split the cavalry in two and positioned them one on each flank.

Consul Regulus had camped his legions at Tunis and he still had the hunger for glory. It was a hunger that clouded his senses. The war could end here and now and Regulus would be the name on everybody's lips back at Rome. To delay would allow the replacement consul the chance at victory. Regulus deployed his troops.

Xanthippus sent forward the elephants to occupy the Roman infantry. The outnumbered Roman cavalry was defeated quickly. The Roman left faced the Carthaginian right and defeated the mercenary force, chasing them back to camp. In the centre the legionaries had withstood the onslaught from the elephants but only a handful of units remained. The militia phalanx made short work of them. The Carthaginian cavalry closed in from both sides and destroyed what was left of the Roman army. Only the Roman left escaped: 2,000 men from a starting line-up of 12,500.

The 2,000 survivors were picked up by a new Roman fleet which subsequently became caught up in a storm that nearly destroyed the fleet entirely. 90,000 men died.

Regulus was captured and had his eyelids removed. He was later killed by an angry elephant.

The Carthaginians took advantage of this and successfully attacked and regained Agrigentum. Realising that they were unable to hold the city they burned it and moved on.

Lilybaeum was under siege from the Romans. Xanthippus stopped off in the city and inspired courage amongst the local population. Leading an attack on the Romans the Spartan defeated them. Instead of celebrating their saviour the people of Lilybaeum became jealous of his celebrity and betrayed him. They gave him a leaky ship for his voyage home.

Exit Xanthippus.

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Rome was on the back foot. Their invasion of Africa had failed. But, Rome was not yet beaten. The Romans rebuilt their navy to a strength of 140 ships and attacked Lilybaeum and raided the African shoreline. The attack on Lilybaeum failed and the African expedition was caught in another storm and was destroyed.

Meanwhile, in the north of Sicily, the Romans met with more success. In quick succession the cities of Thermae, Panormus and Kephalodon fell to the legions. After the port city of Panormus fell large parts of western Sicily fell with it. Ietas, Petra, Solous, and Tyndaris agreed peace terms with Rome.

On a high Rome attempted to take Lilybaeum again. The consuls for that year, 249 BC, were Publius Claudius Pulcher and Lucius Junius Paullus. The commanded the fleet and blockaded the Carthaginian stronghold. Despite the leaps and bounds the Romans had made during the course of the war in naval warfare, the Carthaginians were still the better seamen. In broad daylight a small flotilla sailed through the blockade to deliver supplies to the beleaguered garrison inside the city. That night the same small flotilla left the city with the cavalry – the horses would have needed feeding and were useless in a siege and would have used up valuable supplies – and sailed for the harbour of Drepana. The Romans looked on helplessly and looked useless.

If the Romans thought this was a single act of bravado by a single general they were mistaken. The Carthaginian navy repeated the stunt several times, making a mockery of the Roman blockade. As if that was not humiliation enough, one brave sailor, known as Hannibal the Rhodian, sailed around the Roman fleet in a single quadreme and succeeded in spying on the town and feeding vital information back to the Carthaginian senate about the goings on inside the city. Not so much a blockade as a farce.

Consul Pulcher decided that decisive action needed to be taken. By cover of darkness under a moonless sky he sent the fleet north from Lilybaeum towards Drepana. The Carthaginian scouts missed the passing ships, but then so did the Romans. With poor visibility the Roman fleet became disorganised and by sunrise the formation was scattered with the consular flagship somewhere at the rear. Carthaginian scouts raised the alarm.

That morning Pulcher performed the religious ceremony of inspecting the omens for battle. He studied the feeding behaviour of the sacred chickens. If the chickens ate the offered grain then the gods looked favourably on the upcoming battle. On this particular morning the chickens refused the grain. The crew began to panic. The omens were bad. Pulcher, enraged by the chickens refusal to eat, and desperate to calm the superstitious crew threw the chickens overboard and said: “If the chickens will not eat, let them drink instead.”

Meanwhile, as the parody of naval command continued to plague the Romans, the Carthaginians, led by Ad Herbal, evacuated the harbour before a blockade was completed. They sailed, unmolested, from Drepana, past the Romans and their chickens, around two small islands to the west of Sicily and faced the Romans ready for battle.

Pulcher regrouped his fleet into battle formation, but it was all against him by this point. With Sicily behind him he was unable to retreat, with an advancing enemy he did not have the time to properly set up formation. Ad Herbal attacked the Roman rear with his left flank and the Roman fleet was utterly defeated.

Publius Claudius Pulcher returned to Rome in shame. He faced charges of treason based, not on his incompetence, but rather of sacrilege over the chicken incident. He was found guilty and sent into exile.

The remaining Roman fleet, commanded by the other consul Lucius Junius Paullus, and still blockading Lilybaeum was destroyed in yet another storm. Rome was either unwilling or unable to finance the construction of another fleet. However, the Romans made a gain by taking Eryx.

In Carthage the faction opposed to the naval war with Rome won power. Hanno II the Great preferred conquering territory in Africa and considered the war against Rome all but over. He demobilised the Carthaginian navy.

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Rome lacked a navy following the disaster at Drepana. Carthage, weary from the drawn-out war, focused her attention away from Rome. Almost as an afterthought Hamilcar Barca was sent to Sicily to help what little territory remained on the west of the island to harass the enemy. His main objective was to keep the port of Drepana safe as this was his main resupply point. For seven years small-scale fighting and guerilla tactics plagued the area successfully pinned the Romans down until in 242 BC Rome decided to rebuild her navy.

Like Carthage, the finances of the Roman Republic were at a minimum after twenty years of war. The Romans answer to this problem was a pure patriotism in action: a mixture of the wealthiest citizens and syndicates of wealthy citizens financed the construction of one ship each. The new fleet totalled around 200 ships all paid for by private investors and without government expense.

The men responsible for this new fleet were consul Gaius Lutatius Catulus and praetor Quintus Valerius Falto. The Romans had learned from past mistakes: gone was the corvus – so instrumental to early naval victories, but a hindrance thereafter – and the crews of the ships were drilled in manoeuvres and exercises much as the legions were.

In stark contrast the Carthaginians built a fleet of 250 ships, but had not the manpower to use them effectively and gave command to Hanno, the very same general who had been defeated at Agrigentum and Cape Ecnomus.

Once again Lilybaeum and Drepana were blockaded. Hamilcar's line of communication and his supply route had been broken. Catulus now waited for a Carthaginian response. He was granted a proconsulship for the following year and remained in his post.

Hanno arrived in the spring with his fleet. They stopped at the Aegates islands and waited for favourable winds. Upon hearing word from his scouts of the Carthaginian presence Catulus abandoned the blockade and sailed out to meet his enemy.

March 10. Morning. Hanno had found his wind and set sail. That was unfortunate for Catulus. He decided to attack anyway. The alternative was to let Hanno land in Sicily and relieve the Carthaginian forces there. The proconsul ordered his ships to be stripped of all unnecessary equipment, including masts and sails, and prepared for battle. Catulus, injured in a previous engagement and unable to fight, left command to Falto.

With quicker ships, and better trained and disciplined soldiers the Romans quickly gained the upper hand. Half the Carthaginian fleet was destroyed or captured. The rest fled the battle after the wind changed direction. The Romans were unable to pursue due to discarding the masts and sails earlier.

After the battle Catulus finally captured Lilybaeum. Hamilcar Barca was isolated and scattered. With no way of getting reinforcements Barca was forced to admit defeat and he signed a peace treaty with Rome. The First Punic war had ended.

As a result of the peace treaty Carthage were forced to leave Sicily and the Aegadian Isalnds: to return all prisoners of war without ransom while paying ransom for their own: to refuse to make war with Syracuse and her allies: to transfer the Aeolian Islands and Ustica to Roman control: to leave Pantelleria, Linosa, Lampedusa, Lampioe, and Malta: to pay sixty-six tons of silver indemnity in ten annual instalments, plus an extra thirty tons of silver immediately. Further clauses stated that the allies of each side would not be attacked by the other and both sides were not allowed to hire mercenaries from the others territory.

Belisarius

Changed your title from "First Ounic War" as I'd never heard of that one.

Nice OP