The Nazi-Soviet Pact (Notes and Bibliography)

These are the notes and bibliography to accompany this blog post.


Notes:
1. The full text of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, including the appended secret protocols, can be found in Ronald Grigor Suny (ed.), The Structure of Soviet History: Essays and Documents, (Oxford, 2003), pp. 301-303. This same volume has the added attraction of the succinctly titled ‘Memorandum of a Conversation Held on the Night of August 23rd to 24th, Between the Reich Foreign Minister, on the One Hand, and Herr Stalin and the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars Molotov, on the Other Hand’, pp. 298-301.

2. During the Cold War, western historians tended to dismiss the Soviet negotiations with Britain and France in 1939 as a sign of Stalin’s deceitful recreancy as he manoeuvred to increase the pressure on the Germans. With almost characteristic Cold War contrariety, Soviet historians have argued that Stalin desired a covenant with the West but was unable to conclude an effective military alliance with them and was thus forced to align himself with the Führer. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Stalin’s place in the historiography has undergone a reversal of fortunes as ex-Soviet and Eastern Bloc historians have become free once again to criticise the Soviet regime. The first period where open, though limited criticism of Stalin was acceptable behind the ‘iron curtain’ was during the (so-called) Khrushchëv ‘thaw’ from the late 1950s to the early 1960s. See Fedor Burlatsky, trs. Daphne Skillen, Khrushchëv and the First Russian Spring, (London, 1991), passim.

3. See Geoffrey Roberts, ‘The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany’, Soviet Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1. (1992), pp. 57-78, here at pp. 57-58 & n. 1. See also Teddy J. Uldricks, ‘Soviet security policy in the 1930s’, in Patrick Finney (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War: A Reader, (London, 1997), p. 173.

4. A fine example of this shift in perspective is Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War, (Basingstoke, 1995). An opposing view, one that whilst sympathetic to the Soviet Union is unashamedly critical of Stalin, is Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power. The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941, (London, 1992).

5. Simon Sebag Montefiore, Stalin – The Court of the Red Tsar, (London, 2003), p. 268.

6. Meeting with German Sudeten Party leaders, Konrad Henlein and Karl Frank, in Berlin on 28 March, Hitler instructed the Sudeten Germans to make demands ‘which [were] unacceptable to the Czech Government.’ These demands, Henlein faithfully replied, would ‘so much that [they] could never be satisfied.’ See Documents on German Foreign Policy [hereafter DGFP], Series D, Volume ii, no. 107, pp. 198-202. Also extracted in Jeremy Noakes & Geoffrey Pridham (eds.), Nazism 1919-1945: A Documentary Reader, vol. 3: Foreign policy, war and racial extermination, (Exeter, 1988), p. 100.

7. The diplomatic affairs of Czechoslovakia had become something akin to a complicated junction box of European diplomatic agreements involving France, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. See Paul W. Doerr, British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, (Manchester, 1998), p. 225. Viscount Runciman’s ill-defined mission (he was going, as per his instructions from Lord Halifax, in a ‘personal capacity as a sort of representative of HMG’), was seen by many as a ‘last despairing attempt’ to avoid catastrophe by imposing British morality on the Czechs who were, in the judgement of British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Nevile Henderson, a ‘pig-headed race and Beneš not the least pig-headed among them.’ See John Charmley, Chamberlain and the Lost Peace, (London, 1989), pp. 82-91, quotes come from pp. 85 & 89 respectively. Whilst Halifax wrote to Runciman on 1 July outlining, somewhat vaguely, his mission, the French were only informed under strictest secrecy on 24 July. See John Harvey (ed.), The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey, (London, 1970), p. 165.

8. As the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, later noted, ‘it became steadily more certain that the French, who alone had direct contractual obligations in that quarter, were most reluctant to see affairs so develop as to involve them in their fulfilment.’ See The Earl of Halifax, Fulness of Days, (London, 1957), p. 197.

9. Quoted in R. A. C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement. British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War, (Basingstoke, 1993), p. 20.

10. For the state of British military preparedness see Keith Neilson, ‘The Defence Requirements Sub-Committee, British Strategic Foreign Policy, Neville Chamberlain and the Path to Appeasement’, The English Historical Review, Vol. 118, No. 477. (Jun., 2003). Britain’s industrial weaknesses as a limiting device on rearmament is most cogently explored in G. C. Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury, (Edinburgh, 1979), passim. but esp. pp. 160–167 & 179-180. There is a similar argument to be found in R. P. Shay, Jr, British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits, (Princeton, 1977).

11. Keith Robbins, Munich 1938, (London, 1968), pp. 337-346. Robbins’ account is particularly useful on the range of parliamentary opposition to the Agreement. Whilst Churchill was, and still is, regarded as the leading protagonist, Chamberlain’s detractors held many viewpoints that undermined any opportunity of creating a potentially more effective bloc with which to attack the Government. Even as late as May 1940, Chamberlain’s majority, although greatly decreased by a debate during 7 – 8 May on the failed Norway campaign, was still a majority of 81.

12. On 28 September, using the offered services of Radio Luxembourg, the British Government broadcast several messages from Chamberlain, Daladier, Beneš and Roosevelt appealing for peace. Chamberlain’s speech to Parliament of the same was broadcast on 29 September. Thus the image that all governments (except those of Germany and Italy) strongly desired peace was broadcast to those millions of Germans able to receive them through their Reichsvolksempfänger (‘people’s receivers’) which were marketed primarily as an instrument for receiving the words of the Führer. See Nicholas Pronay & Philip M. Taylor, ‘‘An Improper Use of Broadcasting...’ The British Government and Clandestine Radio Propaganda Operations against Germany during the Munich Crisis and after’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 19, No. 3. (Jul., 1984), pp. 357-384, here at pp. 358-360. For the Reichsvolksempfänger, see David Welch, The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda, 2nd edn., (London, 2002), pp. 38-43. Statistics can also be found in Noakes & Pridham (eds.), 2: State, Economy and Society 1933-1939, (Exeter, 1984), p. 386. See also Lothar Kettenacker, ‘Social and Psychological Aspects of the Führer’s Rule’, in Aspects of the Third Reich, ed. H. W. Koch, (Basingstoke, 1985), pp. 112-113.

13. Robbins, Munich, pp. 331-332.

14. In 1938, British rearmament consumed 7% of G.N.P., rising in 1939 to 18% and then 46% in 1940. See Peden, British Rearmament, p. 8.

15. The ‘May Crisis’ was the result of the Czech Government, acting in response to information that the German army was mobilising on the Czech border, partially mobilised and fortified the border. Both France and the Soviet Union reasserted their commitment to Czechoslovakia and Britain informed Germany that ‘there could be no guarantee that Britain would stand aside’ if force were resorted to. Sir Neville Henderson, The Failure of a Mission, (London, 1940), pp. 135-137. After much fuss in the press of Britain, France and Czechoslovakia, it transpired that Hitler had no ‘intention to smash Czechoslovakia … in the near future.’ Hitler’s reaction might possibly be gauged by the fact that only by the end of May had it become his ‘unalterable decision’ to do so. See Kietel to Hitler, 20 May 1938, and Hitler to Kietel, 30 May 1938, in DGFP, D, ii, nos. 175 & 221, pp. 299-303 & 358-362, quote taken from p. 358. See also Ian Kershaw’s account of the meeting between Hitler and Sir Horace Wilson (Chamberlain’s emissary) at the Reich Chancellery on 27 September 1938 when Hitler is noted as having stated ‘two or three times, ‘I will smash the Czechs.’’ Ian Kershaw, Hitler, vol. 2: 1936-1945: Nemesis, (London, 2000), pp. 118-119. This meeting, along with the many that surrounded it, is most lucidly described in Dr. Paul Schmidt, Hitler’s interpreter, (London, 1951), pp. 102-108.

16. The remainder of this paragraph is built upon Hitler’s four realisations as outlined in Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany, Hitler, and World War II – Essays in Modern German History, (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 118-120.

17. The peaceful resolution to the Sudeten crisis brought Hitler ‘almost legendary standing.’ Hitler’s standing became that of statesman of genius as a wave of gratitude and admiration was all the more emphasised after the preceding tension. The problem for Hitler was that this adulation was a reward for having brokered a peaceful solution rather than a military or aggressive action. There was, however, precedence to this affection. The remilitarization of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936, active intervention in the ‘ideological’ struggle in Spain from July of that year throughout 1937, and the successful Anschluß of Austria in March 1938 left Hitler at the height of his domestic popularity. As Ian Kershaw points out, the day the German army reoccupied the Rhineland was the day that Hitler began to believe in his own propaganda – the day that he himself succumbed to the Führer-myth. The reoccupation and Anschluß ‘with’ Austria placed the hated Versailles Treaty beyond repair and heightened his domestic popularity to its peak. The Spanish Civil War, on the other hand, was important due to the manner in which it was propagandised to demonstrate the threat of Bolshevism thus increasing the German’s dependence on the Nazis as a counter to this ‘threat’. The regime’s popularity was substantially reliant on the bloodless nature of these foreign policy successes; tension within the German populace was reported as being high at the time of the Anschluß and only placated once it became clear that Britain and France would not respond militarily. This view is based on intelligence gathered by the exiled Social Democratic Party (SPD or Sopade) agents. See Ian Kershaw, The Hitler-Myth – Image and Reality in the Third Reich, (Oxford, 1987), pp. 82, 111, 127-130, 137-139.

18. The war of 1914-1918 brought home to the German high-command the necessity of the total mobilisation of the economy and people, the utilisation of technology and its continued development, and the maintenance of national morale through effective propaganda. The promise of Volksgemeinschaft (‘people’s community’) and its societal potential to sustain ‘the spirit of 1914’ (both extremely intangible notions), convinced the army of the Nazi’s ability to ensure conditions vital for total and sustained mobilisation. See David Welch, ‘Nazi Propaganda and the Volksgemeinschaft: Constructing a People’s Community’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 39, No. 2. (2004), pp. 213-238. As Hitler stated to an assemblage of generals on 3 February 1933, ‘[my] organization will solely confine itself to the ideological education of the masses, in order to satisfy the army’s domestic and foreign-policy needs.’ See Meeting of Hitler and generals of the Reichswehr at General Kurt von Hammerstein’s house on the evening of 3 February 1933, quoted in David Irving, The War Path, (London, 1978), pp. 28-29. See also (and perhaps more cogently than Irving) Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany. Volume 1, Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933-36, (Chicago, 1970), pp. 26-28. For Hitler’s promise of Volksgemeinschaft to the generals and the attraction it held for them, see Manfred Messerschmidt, ‘The Wehrmacht and the Volksgemeinschaft’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, Military History. (Oct., 1983), pp.719-744.

19. Kershaw, Nemesis, p. 123.

20. The most prominent figure to fear that the Czech crisis would lead to war was Hermann Göring. Whilst recognising that force would be an essential ingredient of Nazi expansion, he was particularly concerned that ‘international conflict should be avoided.’ Quoted in Richard J. Overy, Goering – The ‘Iron Man’, (London, 1984), p. 81. Colonel-General Beck, Chief of the General Staff (1933-38), voiced strong concerns in increasingly outspoken memoranda – even to the extent of advocating a collective refusal from the generals to invade Czechoslovakia. See Klaus-Jürgen Müller, The army, politics and society in Germany, 1933-45. Studies in the army’s relation to Nazism, (Manchester, 1987), pp. 54-99, but esp. 74-79. See also Ian Kershaw, ‘Hitler and the Nazi Dictatorship’, in Mary Fulbrook, (ed.), Twentieth-Century Germany – Politics, Culture and Society 1918-1990, (London, 2001), pp. 99-120, here at pp. 111-112. In addition to Beck, Kershaw adds Generals Halder and Canaris as being ‘at the centre of the nascent conspiracy to have Hitler deposed’ should he order the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Later, during the trials at Nuremberg, Halder would describe the resistance to Hitler as idealistic and non-political. See Robert Gellately (ed.), The Nuremberg Interviews. Conversations with the Defendants and Witnesses, Conducted by Leon Goldensohn, (London, 2004), p. 289. See also Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin – Parallel Lives, 5th Impression, (London, 1992), pp. 636-643.

21. Andreas Hillgruber, ‘England’s place in Hitler’s plans for world domination’, Journal of Contemporary History, 9:1 (1974: Jan.), pp. 5-22, esp. pp. 5-6. According to a ‘structuralist’ interpretation of Hitler’s foreign policy, Hitler’s earlier delusional aspirations of an alliance with Britain, had changed by (about) 1937 to an actively hostile stance which was correspondingly reflected in many of his speeches. This interpretation fits with Hitler’s haughty diatribe in Mein Kampf whereby alliances with both Britain and Italy would be used to overcome France, the main enemy of the book. Hitler writes:

‘that there remains no other way of forming an alliance except to approach England. The consequences of England’s war policy were and are disastrous for Germany. However, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that, as things stand today, the necessary interests of England no longer demand the destruction of Germany. On the contrary, British diplomacy must tend more and more, from year to year, towards curbing France’s unbridled lust after hegemony [of Europe].’

Cf. Adolf Hitler, tr. Anon., Mein Kampf, (Mumbai, 1988), p. 552. Strangely, Hitler seemed to believe that Britain would allow Germany to dominate Europe as a means of preventing France from doing that exact same thing. This perhaps helped A.J.P. Taylor to refer to Mein Kampf as being akin to ‘day-dreams’ and one that should be correctly contextualised within the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. Cf. A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, (Middlesex, 1962), p. 69.

22. Schmidt, Hitler’s interpreter, pp. 75-78. Both Halifax and Chamberlain believed that the visit had been productive for Hitler rather blithely admitted the source of the problem: ‘Between England and Germany there was only one difference namely colonies. It was a difference of opinion.’ Hitler wanted a return to pre-Versailles status. See Enclose in Neurath to Ribbentrop, 20 November 1937, [Halifax’s] Conversation with Herr Hitler, 19 November 1937, DGFP, D, i, no. 31, pp. 54-67, here at p. 62. Critically, his colonial susurrations misdirected Chamberlain towards a false target. Nonetheless, the visit did, in Chamberlain’s somewhat flawed view, create ‘an atmosphere in which it was possible to discuss’ practical possibilities of a European settlement. See Neville Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 26 November 1937, in Robert Self (ed.), The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters: vol. 4, The Downing Street Years, 1934-1940, (Ashgate, 2005), p. 286. However, Churchill was undoubtedly closer to the mark when he noted (albeit later) that ‘[nothing] came of all this but chatter and bewilderment.’ See Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 1: The Gathering Storm, (London, 1948), p. 195.

23. Overy, Goering, p. 89-90. Overy points to Hitler’s belief that Britain and France would limit their reactions to some form of demonstration of their disapproval. He regarded their democratic systems ‘as more fragile than his own.’ This ties in with the diatribe that Halifax endured when he met Hitler in November 1937. Cf. Halifax, Fulness of Days, p. 186.

24. The Hoßbach Memorandum quoted Hitler as stating that Germany’s

‘relative strength would decrease in relation to the rearmament which would by then have been carried out in the rest of the world. If [Germany] did not act by 1943-45, any year could, owing to a lack of reserves, produce the food crisis, to cope with which the necessary foreign exchange was not available, and this must be regarded as a ‘waning point of the regime.’’

The cost of maintaining current Wehrmacht levels, the lowering of the standard of living and declining birth-rate, it remained the Führer’s ‘unalterable determination to solve Germany’s problem of space by 1943-45 at the latest.’ Reprinted in Nazism, eds. Noakes & Pridham, 3, no. 503, pp. 72-79.

25. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement allowed Germany a navy 35% that of the British. For an exposition of the thinking behind the agreement see Victor Rothwell, The Origins of the Second World War, (Manchester, 2001), pp. 58-59. The agreement undermined both Anglo-French relations and the armaments clauses of the Treaty of Versailles by its implicit acknowledgement of the validity of German rearmament. See Irving, War Path, p. 47. See also Sir G. Clerk (Paris) to Sir S. Hoare, 21 June 1935, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 2, xiii, (London, 1973), no. 363, pp. 447-456. Includes a record of two meetings between British and French officials where the French opposition to the Naval Pact are noted as having ‘caused great difficulties for the French Government. French public opinion was thoroughly aroused.’ Despite Hitler’s initial anger that the agreement was not about to allow him a free hand in Eastern Europe, the day the agreement was signed was apparently ‘the happiest day of his life.’ Cf. Ian Kershaw, Hitler, vol. 1: 1889-1936: Hubris, (London, 1999), pp. 556-558, quoted at p. 558. It provided a further encouragement to Hitler’s intentions by France’s understanding that any future co-operation with Britain had been severely undermined. Cf. Nicholas Rostow, Anglo-French Relations 1934-36, (London, 1984), pp. 172-174. See also P. M. H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe, (London, 1998). p. 221. Bell notes that the Naval Treaty, like the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of May 1934, left France feeling isolated. Mussolini was incensed at what he considered to be a ‘volte-face’ and, according to Italian reports, nearly went ‘through the roof’ when he heard of the agreement. Cf. Richard Lamb, Mussolini and the British, (London, 1997), p. 114. Not that Britain was to be distracted from this course by the reactions of her Stresa ‘partners’. They intended to negotiate further agreements with Germany, particularly on Air Force limitations, and reaped the rewards of an anti-war popular opinion at home. See Doerr, British Foreign Policy, pp. 173-174.

26. Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came – The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939, (London, 1989), p. 40.

27. Enclosure to Kietel to Ribbentrop, 30 November 1938, DGFP, D, iv, no. 411, pp. 529-533, quoted from p. 530.

28. Ribbentrop’s appointment to London was a personal defeat for him. After the death in June 1936 of the Secretary of State in the German Foreign Ministry, Bernhard Wilhelm von Bülow, Ribbentrop’s appointment to this post was likely until Constantin von Neurath’s (German Foreign Minister until 1938) interceded against this. Ribbentrop was consoled with the London post – a position he did not want. The London embassy, which had been vacant since the death of Leopold von Hoesch in April, did not receive the grace of Rippentrop’s presence until October; he came to London after a period of four months to present his credentials and then promptly returned to Berlin. Cf. Weinberg, Germany, Hitler, and World War II, pp. 87-88.

29. Ribbentrop’s Memorandum for the Führer on ‘The Possibilities of Agreement with Great Britain, 2 January 1938, DGFP, D, i, no. 93, pp. 162-168. He writes,

‘If England with her alliances is stronger than Germany and her friends, she will in my opinion fight sooner or later. Should Germany, however, be so successful in her alliance policy that a German coalition would be stronger than its British counterpart … it is possible that England would prefer to try for a settlement after all.’

Quoted from p. 165. Ribbentrop viewed Britain as inherently jealous of Germany’s rise and would permanently remain hostile and impotently limp in that hostility. See also Watt, How War Came, p. 37.

30. British appeasement policy was based on the assumption (possibly a very safe assumption) that Britain could not fight Japan and Germany at the same time. As Warren Fisher (Permanent under-secretary at the Treasury) wrote in 1934,

‘[t]he first essential … to our own safety is that we must be free to concentrate our strength where it is most needed … What, then is the prime condition for attaining this essential object of definitely relieving ourselves of any danger of being involved in a war with Japan? I suggest that the first and, indeed, cardinal requirement for this end is the disentanglement of ourselves from the United States of America.’

Thus, Fisher, and his close confidant Neville Chamberlain, set out to appease Japan in 1934 at the expense of Anglo-American relations. Cf. Memorandum by Sir Warren Fisher on defence requirements and naval strategy [N.C.M. (35)3] in Documents on British Foreign Policy, 2, xiii, Appendix I, pp. 924-930, quoted here from p. 929. Ciano noted that the anti-Comintern Pact was ‘anti-Communist in theory but in fact [was] unmistakably anti-British.’ Quoted in Brian R. Sullivan, ‘More than meets the eye. The Ethiopian War and the origins of the Second World War’ in Gordon Martel (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered – A.J.P. Taylor and the Historians, 2nd edition, (London, 1999), p. 181. See also Wolfgang Michalka, ‘Conflicts within the German Leadership on the Objectives of German Foreign Policy, 1933-9’, in Wolfgang J. Mommsen & Lothar Kettenacker (eds.), The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement, (London, 1983), pp. 56-58.

31. Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany, Volume 2, Starting World War II, 1937-39, (London, 1980), pp. 504-505.

32. The Easter Agreement was a straightforward trade off. The Italians promised to reduce their role in the Spanish Civil War and disclaimed any claims on Spanish territory. In return the British agreed to raise the issue of de jure recognition of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia at Geneva. Beginning negotiations on 10 March, they were quickly eclipsed by the Austrian Anschluß. Cf. Lamb, Mussolini and the British, pp. 205-211.

33. Cf. Anthony Adamthwaite, Grandeur and Misery: France 1914-1940, (London, 1995), p.218. The main bone of contention was that Mussolini wanted recognition of his African Empire. France was disinclined to respond owing, in part, to the upset Spanish situation, but also to the threat to French interests in the Mediterranean and North Africa as Italy laid claim to French territories in the region. The British offer of full staff-talks in February made the French even less inclined to appease Mussolini. See also Rothwell, Origins, p. 98.

34. Lamb, Mussolini and the British, p. 245. It should be noted that Albania had been an Italian satellite, so Mussolini’s rather haphazard occupation was not as drastic as Halifax’s reaction would suggest.

35. As Esmonde Robertson points out, Mussolini’s greatest fear was of an Anglo-German rapprochement as this might potentially undermine the Rome-Berlin ‘Axis’. See Esmonde M. Robertson, Hitler's pre-war policy and military plans, 1933-1939, (London, 1963), pp. 95-98.

36. The British Foreign Office, by 1938, were confident that Japan was not (at that time) a threat to British Far Eastern interests and, more importantly, that they were not enthusiastic about signing an agreement with Germany and Italy against Britain. See David Dilks, ‘Appeasement and ‘Intelligence’’, in David Dilks (ed.), Retreat from Power. Studies in Britain’s Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century, Vol. 1, (London, 1981), pp. 155-157.

37. Akira Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, (Harlow, 1987), pp. 60-62; Weinberg, Starting World War II, pp. 506-507. The Japanese did sign a rather innocuous Cultural Treaty with (the supremely racist) Nazi Germany on 25 November 1938.

38. Lamb, Mussolini and the British, p. 248; Robert Mallett, Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, 1933-1940, (Basingstoke, 2003), p. 225.

39. R. J. B. Bosworth, Mussolini, (London, 2002), p. 354.

40. These concepts are outlined and ably evaluated in Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship – Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, 4th Edition, (London, 2000), pp. 134-160.

41. Laurence Rees, The Nazis. A Warning from History, (London, 2005), pp. 85-86.

42. Watt, How War Came, p. 42.

43. Nazism, eds. Noakes & Pridham, 3, no. 530, p. 116. Memel had been taken from Germany by Lithuania in 1924 in retaliation for Poland having taken Vilna. Cf. Sally Marks, The Illusion of Peace; International Relations in Europe, 1918-1933, 2nd edition, (Basingstoke, 2003), p. 63.

44. Directive by the Führer for the Wehrmacht, 21 October 1938, DGFP, D, iv, no. 81, pp. 99-100. See also Directive by the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, 17 December 1938, idem., no. 152, pp. 185-186.

45. Nazism, eds. Noakes & Pridham, 3, no. 529, pp. 113-116.

46. Hácha (who had succeeded Beneš) was summoned to the Chancellery (a very large and austere structure) in the early hours of 15 March and informed by a Führer in sermonising mood that ‘for the security of the Reich, it was necessary for Germany to assume a protectorate over the remnant of Czechoslovakia.’ Cf. Schmidt, Hitler’s interpreter, pp. 112-127.

47. Danzig was one of the territorial loses imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles (1919). The German-majority area, was deemed a ‘free-city’ under League of Nations administration with Poland having preferential rights. The fact that Danzig was essentially German, in much the same that Memel (lost to Lithuania in 1923) was, completely undermined Wilson’s idealistic notion of ethnic self-determination. Cf. Bell, Origins in Europe, p. 17; Marks, Illusion of Peace, pp. 12-13. See also R. J. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, (London, 1994), pp. 39-40.

48. Report on the Führer’s conference with the heads of the armed forces, 23 May 1939, DGFP, D, vi, no. 433, pp. 574-580.

49. After the occupation of Prague, Czechoslovakia was dismembered. Slovakia became a German satellite and Bohemia and Moravia (formerly the Czech area) became a German protectorate. Cf. Fulbrook, Divided Nation, pp. 93-94, Fulbrook compliments her albeit brief account with three maps showing German territorial annexations from 1936-1939.

50. The validity of the guarantee was deemed questionable given The Times’ insistence that only the independence rather than the geographical integrity was subject to its terms. Alan J. Foster, ‘An Unequivocal Guarantee? Fleet Street and the British Guarantee to Poland, 31 March 1939’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 26, No. 1. (Jan., 1991), pp. 33-47. For the historical controversy see G. Bruce Strang, ‘Once More unto the Breach: Britain's Guarantee to Poland, March 1939’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Oct., 1996), pp. 721-752, esp. 721-722. Crampton asserts that Beck was confident that Germany would not fight for Danzig and that the British guarantee had saved Poland. See Crampton, Eastern Europe, pp. 55-56.

51. Rothwell, Origins, p. 107.

52. Anita J. Prazmowska, ‘Poland’, in Robert Boyce & Joseph A. Maiolo (eds.), The Origins of World War Two – The Debate Continues, (Basingstoke, 2003), pp. 155-164, here at p. 159.

53. Ciano took typically churlish delight in the fact that Beck was described as looking like a paedophile. See Robert L. Miller, Stanislao G. Pugliese, V. Umberto Coletti-Perucca & Hugh Gibson (eds. & tr.), Ciano’s Diary, 1937-1943, (London, 2002), 8 March 1938, p. 67. Tom Jones (in true busybody fashion) commented that ‘Beck’s reputation for integrity is not the highest and how far we can trust him … I don’t know.’ Cf. Tom Jones to Abraham Flexner, 2 April 1939, in Thomas Jones, A Diary with Letters, 1931-1950, (London, 1954), pp. 430-432.

54. Gerhard L. Weinberg, ‘The German Generals and the Outbreak of War 1938-1939’, in Adrian Preston (ed.), General Staffs and Diplomacy before the Second World War, (London, 1978), pp. 24-40, here at p. 37. This chapter is reproduced with some modification in Weinberg, Germany, Hitler, and World War II, pp. 129-145, but Weinberg seems to have seen fit to edit the quoted statement for reasons known only to himself.

55. The Germans were able to equip three armoured divisions with the vehicles granted them by the Czech capitulation that were used in the conquest of France in 1940. Cf. Wilhelm Deist, The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament, (London, 1981), pp. 88-89.

56. Cf. Overy, Goering, p. 90.

57. Henderson, Failure of a Mission, pp. 225-228; Overy, Ibid., pp. 90-91.

58. Andrew Roberts, ‘The Holy Fox’. A biography of Lord Halifax, (London, 1991), pp. 169-170.

59. G. Roberts, Soviet Union and the Origins, p. 9. Roberts describes the process as a decline in relations throughout 1933 to the point where all forms of ‘co-operation between the two states was liquidated.’

60. Ibid., pp. 21-23. See also Idem., ‘Infamous Encounter? The Merekalov-Weizsäcker Meeting of 17 April 1939’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 35, No. 4. (Dec., 1992), pp. 921-926.

61. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence. The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967, (London, 1968), p. 218.

62. Editorial, ‘Politika preirovaniya agressora’ [‘The Policy of Awarding Prizes to the Aggressor’], Izvestiya, 4.10.38, quoted in Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933-39, (London, 1984), p. 195. During the Soviet era, Izvestia (full name Izvestiya Sovetov Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR [Reports of Soviets of Peoples' Deputies of the USSR]) articulated the views of the Soviet government whereas Pravda was the official organ of the Party.

63. David Dilks, ‘‘The Unnecessary War’? Military Advice and Foreign Policy in Great Britain, 1931-1939, in General Staffs and Diplomacy, ed. Preston, p. 102.

64. Haslam, The Soviet Union and Collective Security, p. 22.

65. Ibid., p. 100.

66. Quoted in Silvio Pons, Stalin and the Inevitable War, 1936-1941, (London, 2002), p. 68.

67. Pons, Ibid., p. x. The civil war era is most ably covered by Evan Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War, (London, 1987). Stalin discovered his confidence during the conflict. It was in this period that he is reputed to have stated that ‘death solves all problems: no man, no problem.’ Cf. Robert Conquest, Stalin: Breaker of Nations, (London, 1991), p. 79. See also Sebag Montefiore, Stalin, pp. 27-29.

68. Ivo Banac (ed.), The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 193-1949, (Yale, 2003), 7 September 1939, pp. 115-116. In September 1941, during a meeting with British and American envoys, Beaverbrook and Harriman, in Moscow, Stalin reiterated this motive describing the Pact as ‘a last resort forced by Britain’s unwillingness to join an anti-Nazi alliance.’ Cf. Jonathan Fenby, Alliance, (London, 2006), p. 72.

69. Fears over the possible spread of Communism had prompted the British to intervene militarily to prevent the Bolsheviks consolidating their power in 1919. Austen Chamberlain, speaking as Foreign Secretary in 1926, noted that the Soviets regarded the British Empire as ‘the chief obstacle to the spread of revolutionary communism.’ Likewise, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office from 1930 to 1937, Sir Robert Vansittart’s portrayal of the Soviets as a ‘purely negative and destructive force … [and] wherever troubled waters exist, Russia is the compleat angler’ would have found common currency with the majority of the Conservative Party. These three separate instances are merely representative of the anti-Communism that existed within the British ruling elite throughout the inter-war period. Both quotes from Douglas Little, ‘Red Scare, 1936: Anti-Bolshevism and the Origins of British Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 23, No. 2, Bolshevism and the Socialist Left. (Apr., 1988), pp. 291-311.

70. Neville Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 24 October 1936, Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, ed. Self, 4, p. 214.

71. Idem., 20 March 1938, in Ibid., pp. 306-309, quoted from p. 307.

72. 1935 was the year of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. The British were keen to follow this up with a similar pact in relation to Airforces. See above n. 26. Anthony Eden’s visit to Moscow (in place of Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon) in April 1935 was a tentative move in the direction of a rapprochement. However, by early 1936, such a improvement in Anglo-Soviet relations was subdued by, as Robert Manne points out, Hitler’s will. Cf. Robert Manne, ‘The Foreign Office and the Failure of Anglo-Soviet Rapprochement’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 16, No. 4. (Oct., 1981), pp. 725-755.

73. Peter Deli, ‘The Image of the Russian Purges in the Daily Herald and the New Statesman’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 20, No. 2. (Apr., 1985), pp. 261-282.

74. The orthodox view, presented by Conquest, explains the bloodletting in terms of Stalin’s personal quest for power. The one fundamental element that Conquest sees carried through the purges ‘is the strengthening of his own position. To this, for practical purposes, all else was subordinate. It led him to absolute power.’ Cf. Robert Conquest, The Great Terror – A Reappraisal, (London, 2008), p. 67. Despite revisionist attempts to emphasise the various structural forces and to rationalise the violence within the revolutionary tradition (see J. Arch Getty, The Road to Terror: Stalinism and the Self-Destruction of the Bolheviks, 1932-9, (Yale, 2002)), recent research has restored the central, personalised component of the orthodox view. See Dmitri Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, (London, 1991), passim. but esp. p. 225.

75. Weinberg, Germany, Hitler, and World War II, p. 115. The French high command would not listen to their own military attaché in April 1938 when he reported that the Red Army was two million strong and well-recovered from the purges. See Michael J. Carley, ‘End of the ‘Low, Dishonest Decade’: Failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance in 1939’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2. (1993), pp. 303-341, here at p. 310.

76. Keith Neilson, ‘‘Pursued by a Bear’: British Estimates of Soviet Military Strength and Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1922-1939’, Canadian Journal of History, Vol. 28, No. 2. (Aug., 1993), pp. 189-221.

77. G. Roberts, Unholy Alliance, p. 225. The impression of this weak link, from embassy to foreign ministry, is also raised – but unfortunately left undeveloped – in Idem. ‘Infamous Encounter? The Merekalov-Weizsäcker Meeting’, op. cit..

78. The unfortunate mission of Sir Reginald Plunkett Ernle-Erle-Drax is well known and well documented. He left London on 5 August by boat (though some accounts say ‘slow-boat’) arriving in Leningrad five days later (which suggests that the boat was not all that slow). He arrived without plenipotential authority. See Haslam, Soviet Union and Collective Security, pp. 225-226.

79. Under the terms of the secret protocol, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Bessarabia came under the Soviet sphere. Included in this was the eastern half of Poland. In late September, Lithuania was included in the Soviet sphere. In 1945, these territories remained within the Soviet sphere with varying degrees of Soviet intervention. To these were added Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Bulgaria, initially through a ‘percentages agreement’ with Churchill in October 1944, these countries all became Communist after the war. See Vojtech Mastny, Russia’s Road to the Cold War. Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945, (New York, 1979), p. 207 for details of Churchill’s proposals.

80. R.J. Sontag and J.S. Beddie (eds.), Nazi-Soviet relations 1939-1941, (New York, 1948), p. 2, quoted in G. Roberts, ‘Infamous Encounter? The Merekalov-Weizsäcker Meeting’, p. 921.

81. G. Roberts, Ibid.; Soviet Union and Origins, pp. 68-71; Unholy Alliance, p. 128.

82. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 271.

83. Haslam, Soviet Union and Collective Security, p. 213.

84. Ibid., p. 214; Sebag Montefiore, Stalin, pp. 34, 269n.

85. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 272.

86. Watt, How War Came, p. 227.

87. In 1933, Hitler actively pursued a Non-Aggression Pact with Poland seeing the danger of his eastern neighbour in relation to Germany’s weakness. Signed on 26 January 1934, the Pact flew in the face of Hitler’s conservative allies and was a victory for direct diplomacy rather than working through the League of Nation (that Germany had left anyhow). See Christian Leitz, ‘Nazi Germany’, in Origins – The Debate Continues, ed. Boyce & Maiolo, pp. 11-12, and also Bell, Origins in Europe, pp. 219-220. This marked the beginning for Polish-German co-operation throughout the 1930s until Hitler denounced the Pact (along with the Anglo-German Naval Agreement) in 1939. Poland’s relations with the Soviet Union in 1920s and 1930s was dominated by the Russo-Polish war of 1919-1921. The Poles were effectively responsible for inhibiting the ‘westward spread of bolshevism which … [was] feared so much.’ See Crampton, Eastern Europe, pp. 39-40.

88. See Halifax’s comments that acceptance of the Soviet proposals were a ‘wide departure’ from previous British policy that would make war ‘more likely.’ Cf. Charmley, Lost Peace, pp. 184-185.

89. Voroshilov pointedly asked the western delegates: ‘[Will] the Soviet land forces … be admitted to Polish territory…?’ Cf. Haslam, Soviet Union and Collective Security, p. 226.

90. Iriye, Origins Asia, p. 77.

91. Teddy J. Uldricks, ‘The Icebreaker Controversy: Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler?’, Slavic Review, Vol. 58, No. 3. (Autumn, 1999), pp. 626-643. Uldricks confidently shows that the claims of Suvorov that Stalin planned an attack on Hitler are clearly mistaken.

92. Neville Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 27 August 1939, Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, ed. Self, 4, pp. 440-442.

93. Bullock, Hitler and Stalin, pp. 653-658; Kershaw, Nemesis, pp. 131-153; Nicholas Stargardt, ‘The ‘final solution’’ in Twentieth-century Germany, ed. Fulbrook, pp. 149-173, here at p. 157.

94. Bullock, Ibid., pp. 655-656.



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