Russian Army - Arms and munitions in 1914
Posted June 13th, 2011 at 02:38 PM by bartieboy
Russian army arms and munitions in 1914
according to pre war estimates made within the general staff, production of 300,000 shells per month would sustain the Russian artillery in combat this worked out to about 1.5 rounds per gun per day clearly inadequate under the conditions of the first world war, where usage ran about 80 shells per gun per day from the outset and could be as high as 700-800 shells per gun per day during an offensive.
In december 1914 the Russian supreme commander, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaiovich, revealed that the Russian artillery had exhausted its ammunitions reserves, having fired 6,5 million shells since August. Confronted by this French ambassador Maurice Paleologue and by British Major General Alfred Knox, General Mikhail Beliaev of the Russian War Ministry confessed that Russian industry was capable of producing only 1,300 shells a day (about 35,000 a month) while the army was consuming at about 45,000 a day. Russian shell production did not even attain the proposed, still inadequate production level of 300,000 shells per month until march 1915, and the manufacture of munitions continued to lag well behind demand through 1916. at the end of that year, two out of every three shells and the same proportion of bullets fired by Russian guns had been produced outside Russia.
In the early months of 1914, the Russian state rifle factory in Tula was producing no more then 5 rifles a month, though it had the capacity to produce 50,000. Supposedly, the army already had enough rifles at hand to supply 4,5 million men at that time; however according to Lieutenant General Nikolai N. Golovine, who served on the Russian general staff during the war, in 1915 the entire Russian army disposed of only 650,000 rifles. On average, he claimed, the number of rifles supplied fell short by an average of some 35% over the course of the war. The Russian quartermaster general, Iuri N Danilov, reported that during peacetime instruction, soldiers were ordered to return their rifles to a comrade or non-commissioned officer if wounded so that another soldier might be armed.
Things only got worse with the onset of the war. By December 1914, even the tsar was well aware that reinforcements were being sent into the front lines without rifles, and Knox noted in early 1915 that the Russians had only 50,000-70,000 rifles to supply the 1.4 million recruits entering service that year. Only one in ten recruits was issued a rifle during training, and even these were outdated models left over from the Russo Turkish war of 1877-1878. Even in January 1916 when the situation had improved partly because Sukhiomilov had been replaced by General Aleksei Polivanov the French ambassador reported that while Russia had mobilized some 5 million men in 1915, the Russian army had only 1,2 million rifles at the front with another 700,000 in reserve
Had there been enough rifles though, it would only have made the munitions shortage worse. In August 1914, the Imperial Russian army had about 2,5 billion rounds of small arms in stock. During the opening campaigns of 1914 , Russian industry produced about 59 million bullets per month. Yet a single regiment used 800,000 rounds (about 1.5 percent of the nation's monthly production) in a single day of fighting in one instance. Given that the army contained 236 regiments, monthly production was hardly sufficient for a week's hard fighting -much less a sustained campaign- and what Russian planners had thought what a vast reserve was in reality hopelessly inadequate.
Communications, transportation equipment, and technology of almost every kind were also sorely lacking. The Russian Second Army, for instance, had only 25 telephones and a few Morse coding machines available in 1914.
according to pre war estimates made within the general staff, production of 300,000 shells per month would sustain the Russian artillery in combat this worked out to about 1.5 rounds per gun per day clearly inadequate under the conditions of the first world war, where usage ran about 80 shells per gun per day from the outset and could be as high as 700-800 shells per gun per day during an offensive.
In december 1914 the Russian supreme commander, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaiovich, revealed that the Russian artillery had exhausted its ammunitions reserves, having fired 6,5 million shells since August. Confronted by this French ambassador Maurice Paleologue and by British Major General Alfred Knox, General Mikhail Beliaev of the Russian War Ministry confessed that Russian industry was capable of producing only 1,300 shells a day (about 35,000 a month) while the army was consuming at about 45,000 a day. Russian shell production did not even attain the proposed, still inadequate production level of 300,000 shells per month until march 1915, and the manufacture of munitions continued to lag well behind demand through 1916. at the end of that year, two out of every three shells and the same proportion of bullets fired by Russian guns had been produced outside Russia.
In the early months of 1914, the Russian state rifle factory in Tula was producing no more then 5 rifles a month, though it had the capacity to produce 50,000. Supposedly, the army already had enough rifles at hand to supply 4,5 million men at that time; however according to Lieutenant General Nikolai N. Golovine, who served on the Russian general staff during the war, in 1915 the entire Russian army disposed of only 650,000 rifles. On average, he claimed, the number of rifles supplied fell short by an average of some 35% over the course of the war. The Russian quartermaster general, Iuri N Danilov, reported that during peacetime instruction, soldiers were ordered to return their rifles to a comrade or non-commissioned officer if wounded so that another soldier might be armed.
Things only got worse with the onset of the war. By December 1914, even the tsar was well aware that reinforcements were being sent into the front lines without rifles, and Knox noted in early 1915 that the Russians had only 50,000-70,000 rifles to supply the 1.4 million recruits entering service that year. Only one in ten recruits was issued a rifle during training, and even these were outdated models left over from the Russo Turkish war of 1877-1878. Even in January 1916 when the situation had improved partly because Sukhiomilov had been replaced by General Aleksei Polivanov the French ambassador reported that while Russia had mobilized some 5 million men in 1915, the Russian army had only 1,2 million rifles at the front with another 700,000 in reserve
Had there been enough rifles though, it would only have made the munitions shortage worse. In August 1914, the Imperial Russian army had about 2,5 billion rounds of small arms in stock. During the opening campaigns of 1914 , Russian industry produced about 59 million bullets per month. Yet a single regiment used 800,000 rounds (about 1.5 percent of the nation's monthly production) in a single day of fighting in one instance. Given that the army contained 236 regiments, monthly production was hardly sufficient for a week's hard fighting -much less a sustained campaign- and what Russian planners had thought what a vast reserve was in reality hopelessly inadequate.
Communications, transportation equipment, and technology of almost every kind were also sorely lacking. The Russian Second Army, for instance, had only 25 telephones and a few Morse coding machines available in 1914.
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there production was pitiful to say the least and can be attributed in part to the arrogance and stupidity of many of Russia leaders, particularly the last two tsars, alexander III and nicholas II who both reversed westernization and isolated russia believing that europe's ways of doing things were too revolutionary. peter the great must have been spitting in his grave to see it all happen!Posted November 19th, 2011 at 07:05 PM by irishcrusader95
