The Long Run Economic Performance of China from 1000 BC to 1800 AD
The Long Run Economic Performance of China from 1000 BC to 1800 AD
Data regarding the economic conditions of China is generally scarcer than for the West. And, as in all civilizations, the further back in time that we go, the scarcer reliable data becomes. However, based on all the information that I have access regarding the economic performance of China I think that I am able to provide a broad outline of the economic performance in an aggregate and per capita basis of Chinese civilization from the invention of writing to the First Opium War, the date where one could say that the Chinese civilization became a part of a wider world wide system of international relations. Note that all my assertions in the text are my opinion on the matter and they can change considerably in areas where information is scarcer and new discoveries are being made.
While popularly being considered one of the oldest civilizations on the planet, in fact Chinese civilization is only the oldest civilization that didn’t emerge from the area that spans the Indus River to the Aegean. While proto writing is thousands of years older, actual writing in China is dated from the Shang period, from 1200 BC to 1050 BC and this is where I start the narrative. Little is known about this period, however we can say a few things: First, China was already a well-developed agrarian culture by the year 1000 BC and had already developed several cities, some reaching tens of thousands of inhabitants. While some say that all (or nearly all) pre-modern societies were Malthusian subsistence economies, the archaeological evidence demonstrates that such assertion is unfounded: with the invention of agriculture it become possible for people to settle in one place for long periods of time. As result, it became possible for people to accumulate many more material goods and also for people to form long standing systems of division of labor, enabling gains in productivity. As result, living standards of the general population in terms of material possessions surely increased with the development of agriculture and of urban culture. Archaeological excavations in China show that while in pre-agrarian times the population lived in tiny huts of 4-6 square meters (that’s about 45 to 70 square feet), with the development of agriculture the population could accumulate much larger material possessions and already in 3000 BC, the average size of houses increased in size to 30 to 40 square meters (~350 to ~450 square feet), indicating a large increase in the per capita endowments of material goods, refuting the Malthusian assertion that living standards were always at the “subsistence level” before the 19th century.
In terms of population, Chinese civilization exhibited a remarkable capacity for supporting huge populations in a tiny area. The reason is that Chinese civilization was similar to Egypt and Mesopotamia in the sense that it was a river valley civilization: a civilization where large scale irrigation provided high yields per unit of land. What’s impressive is that Chinese population became much larger in a short amount of time, reaching much higher levels than the populations of other civilizations at the same time after invention of writing: In 2000 BC, Mesopotamian civilization was as old if not older than Chinese civilization in 1 AD, however the population of China in 1 AD was 60 million while Mesopotamia in 2000 BC didn't have more than 5 million inhabitants. I think that this difference can be explained in terms of non-desertic land, while in Mesopotamia the amount of land to support the population was 50,000 km^2 and in Egypt it was 34,000 km^2, in China it surely was at least in the order of hundreds of thousands of square kilometers.
Chinese population was probably in the range of a few million in 1200 BC, let’s say 3-4 million, increasing at rates of 0.2% over the next centuries would mean that by 500 BC, at the beginning of the warring states period, the population of Sinitic civilization would have been 12 to 16 million. Continuing with this rate of increase over the next 280 years, Chinese civilization would have reached a population of between 21 million to 28 million by the time of it’s unification by the Qin, in 221 BC. Increasing it to 0.25% a year would have implied in a population of 24 million to 32 million. Note that the population of China in the 3rd century BC is generally estimated at 20 to 40 million, so 24 to 32 million is probably in the right range. Chinese population continued to expand over the next 220 years, at probably faster rates, perhaps 0.3% a year, implying in a total population of 46 to 62 million in 1 AD, similar to the population measured in the 2 AD census, of 57,671,400.
Economic progress from 1200 BC to 1 AD is hard to measure. I am not aware of any indicator of aggregate market activity such as the shipwrecks, lead and copper pollution evidence for the Mediterranean. However, given the steady increase in population at least the means for supporting such increasing population existed and in the warring states period the capacity to mobilize hundreds of thousands of soldiers indicated that they could support large populations not performing agricultural work, while the emergence of Chinese philosophy and scholarship over the 1st millennium BC also supports the hypothesis that there existed a large population free from agricultural work in China from the Warring States to the Western Han. Other scholars have estimated, very roughly, based on perceptions of archaeological remains of iron objects and on the demand of copper to produce coins, that per capita annual iron consumption was in the order of 100 grams and consumption of copper in the order of 15 grams in Han China, not higher than those estimated for other ancient and medieval civilizations. I would guess that China’s economic performance over the 1st millennium BC represented perhaps an increase in per capita income in the order of 20-25%, from 450 dollars in 1000 BC to about 550 dollars in 1 AD (where 400 dollars would be the “minimum subsistence level”) over the whole Sinitic civilization, while in some regions income levels were perhaps significantly higher than this average. Implying in an average rate of per capita growth of 0.02%. Though this is a guess, and we don’t have enough information to known exactly If there was economic growth or not.
One possible indicator of living standards is the size of housing, the two rural house plans posted by HackneyedScribe show houses probably above the typical size of ancient and medieval societies, which were 40 to 50 square meters and 1 or 2 rooms. These houses had 3 and 5 roofed rooms, respectively, indicating houses in the 70 to 120 square meter range, similar in size to the houses excavated in Mycenaean Greece. But the sample size of two is too small for anything substantial to be said, other than that at least some Chinese farmers were wealthy enough to live in substantial houses, paintings of later periods, however, depict generally smaller houses in the countryside and in later periods, where economic conditions were probably better, according to Morris typical houses were still of 1-2 rooms like the houses in other ancient and medieval societies:
In the 1st millennium AD our information regarding China improved significantly as we approach our own time. Now we can say with much more certainty the demographic trajectory of China and we also can say with certainty that per capita growth occurred in the turn of the 1st to the 2nd millennium in Song period China. Population stagnated from the 60 to 50 million range during the first 600 years of the first millennium, the massive decrease in measured population during the periods of warfare were mostly due to the lack of capacity of the existing governments to actually measure the total population and not to actual population decline. By the 7th century AD, with the political unification of Sinitic civilization achieved by the Sui dynasty, the total population was similar to the Han levels, of around 50 million people. From 650 AD to 1100 AD, however, Chinese population experienced a general trend of increase, from 50 million to 100 million, reaching levels that would be only surpassed in the 16th century.
In terms of economic performance I would guess that from 1 AD to 620 AD per capita output declined a little, to 500 dollars in 620 AD, implied by the lack of population growth and political instability and that during the Tang Dynasty the level of incomes probably increased at slow rates, let’s say 0.05% a year or perhaps 0.1% a year, from 500 dollars in 620 AD to 575 to 650 dollars in 900 AD, however we have little evidence that real living standards for this whole period. Real economic growth, however, occurred in the Early Song period, as documented in the archaeological record of the Greenland ice caps: from the 8th century AD to the year 1080 AD, the global levels of copper emissions from smelting increased from 300 tons per year to 2,100 tons per year. Chinese population was probably about one quarter to one third of world population in the 8th century and if Chinese levels of copper pollution were 100 tons in the 8th century that would imply that the rest of the world produced 200 tons of copper emissions, and since the bulk of increase in copper pollution came from Song China where in the rest of the world the increase was small in aggregate, would mean that in 1080 AD Chinese emissions were 1,800 to 1,900 tons while in the rest of the world emitted 200 tons to 300 tons, so Chinese levels of copper production would be 85% to 90% of world levels. In terms of iron production, Chinese output levels were perhaps around 75,000 to 150,000 tons by 1080 AD, the average of 112,500 tons which would mean in per capita consumption of 1,113 grams of iron, over 11 times the Han levels. It is estimated that Chinese iron production levels increased by 12 times from 850 AD to 1080 AD, from circa 6,000 to 12,000 tons to the 75,000 to 150,000 tons levels. Considering that in 11th century Western Europe and the Middle East per capita levels of metal consumption declined greatly relative to Roman levels and that population levels were in the order of 35 million in Western Europe and 25 million in the Middle East, would suggest that as with copper Song iron production was the vast majority of world output: if Europe consumed 100 grams of iron per capita and the more developed Middle East consumed 200 grams, their aggregate iron consumption would be 8,500 tons of iron, 9 to 17 times smaller than Song Chinese levels of iron consumption, so Song China consumed perhaps 85% to 90% of the world’s iron, as with copper. This clearly imply that in 1080 AD, the Song Economy was vastly more advanced than those of any other existing civilization. Though the difference was certainly not as great as the early 20th century Europe & North America relative to the rest of the Early 20th century world as the West consumed 99% of the world’s supply of metals and fossil fuels (the other 1% was Japan). According to Morris:
Note that even in the 8-9th centuries AD the estimated levels of iron and copper consumption appear to be consistent with the Han levels, supporting the general picture of stagnation of average incomes across the Sinitic civilization. However, from 900 AD to 1080 AD there was certainly a very significant increase in per capita incomes, with high rates, of perhaps 0.2% to 0.3% a year, increasing incomes from 575 to 650 dollars to perhaps 900 dollars to 1,050 dollars, that increase occurring across the whole Sinitic civilization, meaning that in some regions income could have been significantly higher, in the order of 1,200-1,300 dollars, perhaps.
By 1080 AD China reached it’s all time peak in economic prosperity for the period considered (1000 BC to 1800 AD). From this point onwards, I strongly suspect that the long run trajectory was only downwards in terms of per capita income, though there may have been short periods of improvements in living standards. I make this assertion based on the tax revenues per capita and on the research of economic historians relative to the levels of development achieved by China in the Early Modern period. Per capita tax revenues have a very strong correlation with per capita income among modern countries, in pre-modern countries it is important to understand that states could be much weaker and hence could extract larger or smaller fractions of the total output of society, however, states that extracted a large proportion of total income were actually states of more sophisticated societies that could pay higher taxes (for example, the Netherlands in the 17th century), the exception would be Mughal India, whose high levels of tax revenues can be understood due to the fact that the taxes were also used to support a class of rentiers, i.e. it was rental income not tax incomes to support the state. Among modern countries Sweden, with a slightly smaller per capita income than the US, has higher tax revenues per capita, but the difference is small and overall the ranking of per capita tax revenues have a near one to one correlation with income. In 1085 AD the Song Dynasty had total tax revenues of 72,102,000 Shi of rice or 6.49 million tons of wheat in calorific equivalent terms, implying in about 60 kg of per capita tax revenues in terms of wheat. By the late 16th century Ming, tax revenues declined to 42,185,000 Shi of rice, or 3.79 million tons of wheat in calorific equivalent terms, or per capita levels of 20-25 kg, given a population of 150 to 180 million, 30-40% of the per capita tax revenues achieved by the Song. And by the late 18th century Qing, tax revenues declined to 36,620,000 Shi of rice, or 3.3 million tons of wheat, yielding per capita tax revenues of 10 kg, 6 times smaller than Song levels.
By the 18th century Qing China had become one of the poorest societies of all human history, when understood in per capita terms while in terms of aggregate wealth controlled by the Qing court it was still a hugely wealthy state: in terms of wheat, the tax revenues of the Qing government were still larger than of any other state in the world. The low living standards of 18th century China are revealed by wages, while in the 16th century daily wages for unskilled laborers were in the 4-5 kg of wheat range, by the 18th century wages had fallen to miserable 2.3 kg of wheat, lower than the wages recorded in any part of Europe or in any wage data regarding Classical antiquity: When Athens was sieged by Sparta and they had to evacuate the whole population inside the walls, those that lost their land, job and property outside the walls received government welfare of 3.0 kg of wheat a day, 40% higher than 18th century wages! And that was government welfare, wages for unskilled labor were 3 times higher than welfare payments, wages for skilled labor, 5-6 times higher. Though Athens was an exceptionally wealthy pre-modern society, but even in 18th century Spain, a below average Western European economy, had wages of 4.8 kg of wheat, over twice as high as in 18th century China. Spanish per capita tax revenues in terms of wheat were 58 kg, 6 times higher than Chinese and about the same level as Song China.
Overall I would say that Song China in 1080 AD was comparable to Southern Europe in the 18th century in terms of economic development, an astonishing achievement for a medieval economy. However, Qing China was not Song China but in fact was much poorer and as result the thesis that Qing China was comparable to 18th century Western Europe in terms of economic development cannot be supported: Here 6 datasets indicate clearly that 18th century China was poorer than those 4 Western European countries, data on iron production also supports this thesis: in 1790's France produced 5 kg of iron per capita, about 10 times the estimated levels for China, while England produced 8kg, 16 times.
Overall, Chinese economic performance would be characterized by:
1000 BC to 1 AD - Slowly increasing incomes
1 AD to 620 AD - Stagnation or slowly declining incomes
620 AD to 900 AD - Slowly increasing incomes
900 AD to 1080 AD - Rapidly increasing incomes
1080 AD to 1800 AD - Slowly decreasing incomes
Chinese incomes would be perhaps significantly above world average from 500 AD to 1500 AD, 500 AD because of the decline of the Roman Empire would have lowered world average incomes and 1500 AD after burning their Song fat, Chinese incomes would have declined enough while the incomes of the rest of the world would have increased enough for China to fall again to the world average or below. By 1800 AD, in terms of per capita levels of economic development, China would be poorer than Russia and the Ottomans, which were poorer than Spain, which was poorer than France which was poorer than England.
I would give a GDP per capita of around 500 dollars for China in 1800 AD, lower than Han, Tang, Song and Ming levels of per capita income. Also notice the correspondence between my guesstimate of Song China's per capita income, it's per capita tax revenue and the per capita income and tax revenues of Spain circa 1800 AD. And a per capita income around 700 dollars for the Late Ming, yielding the following per capita incomes for China:
1000 BC -- 450 dollars
1 AD ----- 550 dollars
620 AD --- 500 dollars
900 AD --- 610 dollars
1080 AD -- 970 dollars
1550 AD -- 700 dollars
1800 AD -- 500 dollars
China was at it's low point of relative economic development from the 18th to 1980 AD. By 1980 AD China started to converge on the leading economies, after centuries of relative decline meant that it's per capita income fell to 1.5% of the incomes of the US and Germany. Today it is 12% and growing.
Appendix
Taxes and incomes:
There is a very, very strong correlation between tax revenues per capita and income per capita in contemporary countries. Also, richer countries tend to pay more taxes per unit of product, a natural consequence of the fact that a rich man is able to consume a smaller proportion of his income.
Country --- taxes per capita --- GDP per capita
Netherlands - 16,789 ---------- 42,183
Germany ---- 15,386 ---------- 37,897
Italy -------- 12,977 ---------- 30,464
Hungary ----- 7,307 ----------- 19,591
Poland ------- 6,873 ---------- 20,334
Russia ------- 6,175 ---------- 16,736
Romania ----- 3,506 ---------- 12,476
Guatemala --- 603 ------------ 5,070
India -------- 654 ------------ 3,694
We obtain per capita tax revenues by multiplying per capita GDP by the proportion of the income that is taxed
From: [ame=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_tax_revenue_as_percentage_of_ GDP]List of countries by tax revenue as percentage of GDP - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia[/ame]
For pre modern countries, we already have the data for 5 countries in the late 18th century:
Country ------ silver taxes per capita --- silver wages
Netherlands -- 170.7 ------------------- 9.2
England ------ 158.4 ------------------- 8.3
France ------- 66.4 -------------------- 5.2
Spain -------- 63.1 -------------------- 5.2
China -------- 4.2 --------------------- 1.2
Country --- wheat taxes per capita --- wheat wages -- GDP/cap
Netherlands -- 178.1 ------------------- 9.6 --------- 1,838
England ------ 133.6 ------------------- 7.0 --------- 1,706
France ------- 75.3 -------------------- 5.9 --------- 1,135
Spain -------- 58.2--------------------- 4.8 --------- 1,008
China -------- 8.5 ---------------------- 2.3
Notice the same effect: rising incomes generate higher taxes per unit of income.
Maddison's GDP per capita estimates:
Maddison's
1 AD ------ 450 dollars
900 AD ---- 450 dollars
1280 AD --- 600 dollars
1500 AD --- 600 dollars
1780 AD --- 600 dollars
Maddison's estimates are simple: he though that before the Song period the Chinese economy never achieved significant growth in per capita incomes. While he believe that during the Song Chinese increased by about one third and that after the Song period the economy only grew in aggregate basis. I noticed that Maddison doesn't seem to believe that income levels can decrease though time: that if a society achieves a income of X it becomes very difficult for any decrease to happen, I think that his only data showing regression in income levels would be due to the fall of the Roman Empire, where incomes in Italy declined by half while in the rest of Western Europe incomes declined by one third. And these were extreme conditions, besides this example he didn't produce any estimates of declining incomes.
However, one should understand that the level of civilization attained at one point of time is not given. To even maintain the existing standards of income and productivity require constant adjustment (innovation) of the economic system due to the natural dynamic changes in the data facing society. The higher the level of division of labor and economic complexity, the higher the rate of innovation required to simply maintain the existing level of economic complexity.
The case of China from 1100 AD to 1800 AD stand as an example. The institutional framework that enabled the economic growth of the early Song period didn't exist by the Yuan dynasty. As result the capability of the economic system to maintain the existing degree of economic complexity was not more. As result economic activity per capita declined, already in the 14th century, global levels of copper pollution declined by 85% from their peak three centuries earlier.
These would be my guesstimates of the long run trends of per capita income of China:
1000 BC -- 450 dollars
1 AD ----- 550 dollars
620 AD --- 500 dollars
900 AD --- 610 dollars
1080 AD -- 970 dollars
1550 AD -- 700 dollars
1800 AD -- 500 dollars
With incomes in 1800 AD being the lowest for the last 2,500 years. Like Maddison, incomes jump during the Early Song period, but also exhibited growth previously and regression later.
Our dear Sinophyle, heaveanlykagan, has provided us with Chinese productivity statistics regarding farming, I have converted the values to 1990 dollars according to Maddison:
Han: 344 dollars
Age of Fragmentation: 332 dollars
Early Tang: 432 dollars
Later Tang: 399 dollars
Song: 455 dollars
Southern Song: 399 dollars
Yuan: 390 dollars
Ming: 535 dollars
Qing: 530 dollars
They show similar development to Maddison's numbers. Though I would doubt that such estimates would be useful for computing general trends.
Data regarding the economic conditions of China is generally scarcer than for the West. And, as in all civilizations, the further back in time that we go, the scarcer reliable data becomes. However, based on all the information that I have access regarding the economic performance of China I think that I am able to provide a broad outline of the economic performance in an aggregate and per capita basis of Chinese civilization from the invention of writing to the First Opium War, the date where one could say that the Chinese civilization became a part of a wider world wide system of international relations. Note that all my assertions in the text are my opinion on the matter and they can change considerably in areas where information is scarcer and new discoveries are being made.
While popularly being considered one of the oldest civilizations on the planet, in fact Chinese civilization is only the oldest civilization that didn’t emerge from the area that spans the Indus River to the Aegean. While proto writing is thousands of years older, actual writing in China is dated from the Shang period, from 1200 BC to 1050 BC and this is where I start the narrative. Little is known about this period, however we can say a few things: First, China was already a well-developed agrarian culture by the year 1000 BC and had already developed several cities, some reaching tens of thousands of inhabitants. While some say that all (or nearly all) pre-modern societies were Malthusian subsistence economies, the archaeological evidence demonstrates that such assertion is unfounded: with the invention of agriculture it become possible for people to settle in one place for long periods of time. As result, it became possible for people to accumulate many more material goods and also for people to form long standing systems of division of labor, enabling gains in productivity. As result, living standards of the general population in terms of material possessions surely increased with the development of agriculture and of urban culture. Archaeological excavations in China show that while in pre-agrarian times the population lived in tiny huts of 4-6 square meters (that’s about 45 to 70 square feet), with the development of agriculture the population could accumulate much larger material possessions and already in 3000 BC, the average size of houses increased in size to 30 to 40 square meters (~350 to ~450 square feet), indicating a large increase in the per capita endowments of material goods, refuting the Malthusian assertion that living standards were always at the “subsistence level” before the 19th century.
In terms of population, Chinese civilization exhibited a remarkable capacity for supporting huge populations in a tiny area. The reason is that Chinese civilization was similar to Egypt and Mesopotamia in the sense that it was a river valley civilization: a civilization where large scale irrigation provided high yields per unit of land. What’s impressive is that Chinese population became much larger in a short amount of time, reaching much higher levels than the populations of other civilizations at the same time after invention of writing: In 2000 BC, Mesopotamian civilization was as old if not older than Chinese civilization in 1 AD, however the population of China in 1 AD was 60 million while Mesopotamia in 2000 BC didn't have more than 5 million inhabitants. I think that this difference can be explained in terms of non-desertic land, while in Mesopotamia the amount of land to support the population was 50,000 km^2 and in Egypt it was 34,000 km^2, in China it surely was at least in the order of hundreds of thousands of square kilometers.
Chinese population was probably in the range of a few million in 1200 BC, let’s say 3-4 million, increasing at rates of 0.2% over the next centuries would mean that by 500 BC, at the beginning of the warring states period, the population of Sinitic civilization would have been 12 to 16 million. Continuing with this rate of increase over the next 280 years, Chinese civilization would have reached a population of between 21 million to 28 million by the time of it’s unification by the Qin, in 221 BC. Increasing it to 0.25% a year would have implied in a population of 24 million to 32 million. Note that the population of China in the 3rd century BC is generally estimated at 20 to 40 million, so 24 to 32 million is probably in the right range. Chinese population continued to expand over the next 220 years, at probably faster rates, perhaps 0.3% a year, implying in a total population of 46 to 62 million in 1 AD, similar to the population measured in the 2 AD census, of 57,671,400.
Economic progress from 1200 BC to 1 AD is hard to measure. I am not aware of any indicator of aggregate market activity such as the shipwrecks, lead and copper pollution evidence for the Mediterranean. However, given the steady increase in population at least the means for supporting such increasing population existed and in the warring states period the capacity to mobilize hundreds of thousands of soldiers indicated that they could support large populations not performing agricultural work, while the emergence of Chinese philosophy and scholarship over the 1st millennium BC also supports the hypothesis that there existed a large population free from agricultural work in China from the Warring States to the Western Han. Other scholars have estimated, very roughly, based on perceptions of archaeological remains of iron objects and on the demand of copper to produce coins, that per capita annual iron consumption was in the order of 100 grams and consumption of copper in the order of 15 grams in Han China, not higher than those estimated for other ancient and medieval civilizations. I would guess that China’s economic performance over the 1st millennium BC represented perhaps an increase in per capita income in the order of 20-25%, from 450 dollars in 1000 BC to about 550 dollars in 1 AD (where 400 dollars would be the “minimum subsistence level”) over the whole Sinitic civilization, while in some regions income levels were perhaps significantly higher than this average. Implying in an average rate of per capita growth of 0.02%. Though this is a guess, and we don’t have enough information to known exactly If there was economic growth or not.
One possible indicator of living standards is the size of housing, the two rural house plans posted by HackneyedScribe show houses probably above the typical size of ancient and medieval societies, which were 40 to 50 square meters and 1 or 2 rooms. These houses had 3 and 5 roofed rooms, respectively, indicating houses in the 70 to 120 square meter range, similar in size to the houses excavated in Mycenaean Greece. But the sample size of two is too small for anything substantial to be said, other than that at least some Chinese farmers were wealthy enough to live in substantial houses, paintings of later periods, however, depict generally smaller houses in the countryside and in later periods, where economic conditions were probably better, according to Morris typical houses were still of 1-2 rooms like the houses in other ancient and medieval societies:
Quote:
From: Morris, Social Development, page 84
Houses may also have become more substantial,
and in 12th-century Hangzhou two-story buildings were the norm, in striking contrast to older Chinese cities (Kuhn 2009: 205). Most people, however, probably still lived
on in one- and two-room wooden huts (Ruitenbeek 1993).
Houses may also have become more substantial,
and in 12th-century Hangzhou two-story buildings were the norm, in striking contrast to older Chinese cities (Kuhn 2009: 205). Most people, however, probably still lived
on in one- and two-room wooden huts (Ruitenbeek 1993).
In terms of economic performance I would guess that from 1 AD to 620 AD per capita output declined a little, to 500 dollars in 620 AD, implied by the lack of population growth and political instability and that during the Tang Dynasty the level of incomes probably increased at slow rates, let’s say 0.05% a year or perhaps 0.1% a year, from 500 dollars in 620 AD to 575 to 650 dollars in 900 AD, however we have little evidence that real living standards for this whole period. Real economic growth, however, occurred in the Early Song period, as documented in the archaeological record of the Greenland ice caps: from the 8th century AD to the year 1080 AD, the global levels of copper emissions from smelting increased from 300 tons per year to 2,100 tons per year. Chinese population was probably about one quarter to one third of world population in the 8th century and if Chinese levels of copper pollution were 100 tons in the 8th century that would imply that the rest of the world produced 200 tons of copper emissions, and since the bulk of increase in copper pollution came from Song China where in the rest of the world the increase was small in aggregate, would mean that in 1080 AD Chinese emissions were 1,800 to 1,900 tons while in the rest of the world emitted 200 tons to 300 tons, so Chinese levels of copper production would be 85% to 90% of world levels. In terms of iron production, Chinese output levels were perhaps around 75,000 to 150,000 tons by 1080 AD, the average of 112,500 tons which would mean in per capita consumption of 1,113 grams of iron, over 11 times the Han levels. It is estimated that Chinese iron production levels increased by 12 times from 850 AD to 1080 AD, from circa 6,000 to 12,000 tons to the 75,000 to 150,000 tons levels. Considering that in 11th century Western Europe and the Middle East per capita levels of metal consumption declined greatly relative to Roman levels and that population levels were in the order of 35 million in Western Europe and 25 million in the Middle East, would suggest that as with copper Song iron production was the vast majority of world output: if Europe consumed 100 grams of iron per capita and the more developed Middle East consumed 200 grams, their aggregate iron consumption would be 8,500 tons of iron, 9 to 17 times smaller than Song Chinese levels of iron consumption, so Song China consumed perhaps 85% to 90% of the world’s iron, as with copper. This clearly imply that in 1080 AD, the Song Economy was vastly more advanced than those of any other existing civilization. Though the difference was certainly not as great as the early 20th century Europe & North America relative to the rest of the Early 20th century world as the West consumed 99% of the world’s supply of metals and fossil fuels (the other 1% was Japan). According to Morris:
Quote:
From: Morris, Social Development, page 83
Fifty years ago the economic historian Robert Hartwell reanalyzed Song tax receipts and argued that 11th-century iron production
had been 20 to 40 times greater than historians had previously recognized. He calculated that in 1078 total taxed output was 75,000 to 150,000 tons, a 12-fold increase over Chinese production in 850 CE. Moreover, Hartwell
pointed out, Chinese output in 1078 was roughly 2.5 times higher than that of England and Wales in 1640, more than half as much as was produced in Europe in 1700, and about the same as was produced in China each year between 1930 and 1934 (Hartwell 1962: 155; cf. Hartwell 1966, 1967).
Hartwell’s analysis of the texts has been criticized, and in his volume of Science and Civilisation in China, Peter Golas (1999: 170 n. 475) suggested that his iron output figures were off by an entire order of magnitude. More recently, however, Donald Wagner has concluded in his own volume of Science and Civilisation in China (2008: 279-80; cf. Wagner 2001) that while Hartwell’s readings of the difficult texts are flawed, his numbers must be
roughly right. The Chinese historian Qi Xia has independently concluded that the enormous expansion of iron tools in farming meant that the needs of 11th-century peasant households must have accounted for 70,000 tons p.a.
(cited from Kuhn 2009: 307-308 n. 36); and the state’s demand for iron coins and weapons may have been even larger. Copper production was equally extraordinary, increasing fivefold from 2,420 tons in 997 to 12,982 tons in 1070—more than the entire world would be producing in 1800 CE (Golas 1999: 376-83; Kuhn 2009: 231).
Fifty years ago the economic historian Robert Hartwell reanalyzed Song tax receipts and argued that 11th-century iron production
had been 20 to 40 times greater than historians had previously recognized. He calculated that in 1078 total taxed output was 75,000 to 150,000 tons, a 12-fold increase over Chinese production in 850 CE. Moreover, Hartwell
pointed out, Chinese output in 1078 was roughly 2.5 times higher than that of England and Wales in 1640, more than half as much as was produced in Europe in 1700, and about the same as was produced in China each year between 1930 and 1934 (Hartwell 1962: 155; cf. Hartwell 1966, 1967).
Hartwell’s analysis of the texts has been criticized, and in his volume of Science and Civilisation in China, Peter Golas (1999: 170 n. 475) suggested that his iron output figures were off by an entire order of magnitude. More recently, however, Donald Wagner has concluded in his own volume of Science and Civilisation in China (2008: 279-80; cf. Wagner 2001) that while Hartwell’s readings of the difficult texts are flawed, his numbers must be
roughly right. The Chinese historian Qi Xia has independently concluded that the enormous expansion of iron tools in farming meant that the needs of 11th-century peasant households must have accounted for 70,000 tons p.a.
(cited from Kuhn 2009: 307-308 n. 36); and the state’s demand for iron coins and weapons may have been even larger. Copper production was equally extraordinary, increasing fivefold from 2,420 tons in 997 to 12,982 tons in 1070—more than the entire world would be producing in 1800 CE (Golas 1999: 376-83; Kuhn 2009: 231).
Quote:
For the Han period I have suggested elsewhere that iron production might have been on the order of 0.1 kg per capita per year (Wagner 2001a: 73). Since, as Hartwell has shown, the uses of iron had broadened greatly between the Han and the Song one might well be justified in supposing an increase in production by an order of magnitude in the intervening thousand years. Therefore his suggestion, 114,000 metric tonnes, amounting to about 1.2 kg of iron per capita per year, is quite plausible, but there appears to be no direct quantitative evidence for it.
SOURCE: Wagner, Donald B.: "The Administration of the Iron Industry in Eleventh-Century China", ''Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient'', Vol. 44, No. 2 (2001), pp. 175–197 (175f., 191)
SOURCE: Wagner, Donald B.: "The Administration of the Iron Industry in Eleventh-Century China", ''Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient'', Vol. 44, No. 2 (2001), pp. 175–197 (175f., 191)
By 1080 AD China reached it’s all time peak in economic prosperity for the period considered (1000 BC to 1800 AD). From this point onwards, I strongly suspect that the long run trajectory was only downwards in terms of per capita income, though there may have been short periods of improvements in living standards. I make this assertion based on the tax revenues per capita and on the research of economic historians relative to the levels of development achieved by China in the Early Modern period. Per capita tax revenues have a very strong correlation with per capita income among modern countries, in pre-modern countries it is important to understand that states could be much weaker and hence could extract larger or smaller fractions of the total output of society, however, states that extracted a large proportion of total income were actually states of more sophisticated societies that could pay higher taxes (for example, the Netherlands in the 17th century), the exception would be Mughal India, whose high levels of tax revenues can be understood due to the fact that the taxes were also used to support a class of rentiers, i.e. it was rental income not tax incomes to support the state. Among modern countries Sweden, with a slightly smaller per capita income than the US, has higher tax revenues per capita, but the difference is small and overall the ranking of per capita tax revenues have a near one to one correlation with income. In 1085 AD the Song Dynasty had total tax revenues of 72,102,000 Shi of rice or 6.49 million tons of wheat in calorific equivalent terms, implying in about 60 kg of per capita tax revenues in terms of wheat. By the late 16th century Ming, tax revenues declined to 42,185,000 Shi of rice, or 3.79 million tons of wheat in calorific equivalent terms, or per capita levels of 20-25 kg, given a population of 150 to 180 million, 30-40% of the per capita tax revenues achieved by the Song. And by the late 18th century Qing, tax revenues declined to 36,620,000 Shi of rice, or 3.3 million tons of wheat, yielding per capita tax revenues of 10 kg, 6 times smaller than Song levels.
By the 18th century Qing China had become one of the poorest societies of all human history, when understood in per capita terms while in terms of aggregate wealth controlled by the Qing court it was still a hugely wealthy state: in terms of wheat, the tax revenues of the Qing government were still larger than of any other state in the world. The low living standards of 18th century China are revealed by wages, while in the 16th century daily wages for unskilled laborers were in the 4-5 kg of wheat range, by the 18th century wages had fallen to miserable 2.3 kg of wheat, lower than the wages recorded in any part of Europe or in any wage data regarding Classical antiquity: When Athens was sieged by Sparta and they had to evacuate the whole population inside the walls, those that lost their land, job and property outside the walls received government welfare of 3.0 kg of wheat a day, 40% higher than 18th century wages! And that was government welfare, wages for unskilled labor were 3 times higher than welfare payments, wages for skilled labor, 5-6 times higher. Though Athens was an exceptionally wealthy pre-modern society, but even in 18th century Spain, a below average Western European economy, had wages of 4.8 kg of wheat, over twice as high as in 18th century China. Spanish per capita tax revenues in terms of wheat were 58 kg, 6 times higher than Chinese and about the same level as Song China.
Overall I would say that Song China in 1080 AD was comparable to Southern Europe in the 18th century in terms of economic development, an astonishing achievement for a medieval economy. However, Qing China was not Song China but in fact was much poorer and as result the thesis that Qing China was comparable to 18th century Western Europe in terms of economic development cannot be supported: Here 6 datasets indicate clearly that 18th century China was poorer than those 4 Western European countries, data on iron production also supports this thesis: in 1790's France produced 5 kg of iron per capita, about 10 times the estimated levels for China, while England produced 8kg, 16 times.
Overall, Chinese economic performance would be characterized by:
1000 BC to 1 AD - Slowly increasing incomes
1 AD to 620 AD - Stagnation or slowly declining incomes
620 AD to 900 AD - Slowly increasing incomes
900 AD to 1080 AD - Rapidly increasing incomes
1080 AD to 1800 AD - Slowly decreasing incomes
Chinese incomes would be perhaps significantly above world average from 500 AD to 1500 AD, 500 AD because of the decline of the Roman Empire would have lowered world average incomes and 1500 AD after burning their Song fat, Chinese incomes would have declined enough while the incomes of the rest of the world would have increased enough for China to fall again to the world average or below. By 1800 AD, in terms of per capita levels of economic development, China would be poorer than Russia and the Ottomans, which were poorer than Spain, which was poorer than France which was poorer than England.
I would give a GDP per capita of around 500 dollars for China in 1800 AD, lower than Han, Tang, Song and Ming levels of per capita income. Also notice the correspondence between my guesstimate of Song China's per capita income, it's per capita tax revenue and the per capita income and tax revenues of Spain circa 1800 AD. And a per capita income around 700 dollars for the Late Ming, yielding the following per capita incomes for China:
1000 BC -- 450 dollars
1 AD ----- 550 dollars
620 AD --- 500 dollars
900 AD --- 610 dollars
1080 AD -- 970 dollars
1550 AD -- 700 dollars
1800 AD -- 500 dollars
China was at it's low point of relative economic development from the 18th to 1980 AD. By 1980 AD China started to converge on the leading economies, after centuries of relative decline meant that it's per capita income fell to 1.5% of the incomes of the US and Germany. Today it is 12% and growing.
Appendix
Taxes and incomes:
There is a very, very strong correlation between tax revenues per capita and income per capita in contemporary countries. Also, richer countries tend to pay more taxes per unit of product, a natural consequence of the fact that a rich man is able to consume a smaller proportion of his income.
Country --- taxes per capita --- GDP per capita
Netherlands - 16,789 ---------- 42,183
Germany ---- 15,386 ---------- 37,897
Italy -------- 12,977 ---------- 30,464
Hungary ----- 7,307 ----------- 19,591
Poland ------- 6,873 ---------- 20,334
Russia ------- 6,175 ---------- 16,736
Romania ----- 3,506 ---------- 12,476
Guatemala --- 603 ------------ 5,070
India -------- 654 ------------ 3,694
We obtain per capita tax revenues by multiplying per capita GDP by the proportion of the income that is taxed
From: [ame=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_tax_revenue_as_percentage_of_ GDP]List of countries by tax revenue as percentage of GDP - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia[/ame]
For pre modern countries, we already have the data for 5 countries in the late 18th century:
Country ------ silver taxes per capita --- silver wages
Netherlands -- 170.7 ------------------- 9.2
England ------ 158.4 ------------------- 8.3
France ------- 66.4 -------------------- 5.2
Spain -------- 63.1 -------------------- 5.2
China -------- 4.2 --------------------- 1.2
Country --- wheat taxes per capita --- wheat wages -- GDP/cap
Netherlands -- 178.1 ------------------- 9.6 --------- 1,838
England ------ 133.6 ------------------- 7.0 --------- 1,706
France ------- 75.3 -------------------- 5.9 --------- 1,135
Spain -------- 58.2--------------------- 4.8 --------- 1,008
China -------- 8.5 ---------------------- 2.3
Notice the same effect: rising incomes generate higher taxes per unit of income.
Maddison's GDP per capita estimates:
Maddison's
1 AD ------ 450 dollars
900 AD ---- 450 dollars
1280 AD --- 600 dollars
1500 AD --- 600 dollars
1780 AD --- 600 dollars
Maddison's estimates are simple: he though that before the Song period the Chinese economy never achieved significant growth in per capita incomes. While he believe that during the Song Chinese increased by about one third and that after the Song period the economy only grew in aggregate basis. I noticed that Maddison doesn't seem to believe that income levels can decrease though time: that if a society achieves a income of X it becomes very difficult for any decrease to happen, I think that his only data showing regression in income levels would be due to the fall of the Roman Empire, where incomes in Italy declined by half while in the rest of Western Europe incomes declined by one third. And these were extreme conditions, besides this example he didn't produce any estimates of declining incomes.
However, one should understand that the level of civilization attained at one point of time is not given. To even maintain the existing standards of income and productivity require constant adjustment (innovation) of the economic system due to the natural dynamic changes in the data facing society. The higher the level of division of labor and economic complexity, the higher the rate of innovation required to simply maintain the existing level of economic complexity.
The case of China from 1100 AD to 1800 AD stand as an example. The institutional framework that enabled the economic growth of the early Song period didn't exist by the Yuan dynasty. As result the capability of the economic system to maintain the existing degree of economic complexity was not more. As result economic activity per capita declined, already in the 14th century, global levels of copper pollution declined by 85% from their peak three centuries earlier.
These would be my guesstimates of the long run trends of per capita income of China:
1000 BC -- 450 dollars
1 AD ----- 550 dollars
620 AD --- 500 dollars
900 AD --- 610 dollars
1080 AD -- 970 dollars
1550 AD -- 700 dollars
1800 AD -- 500 dollars
With incomes in 1800 AD being the lowest for the last 2,500 years. Like Maddison, incomes jump during the Early Song period, but also exhibited growth previously and regression later.
Our dear Sinophyle, heaveanlykagan, has provided us with Chinese productivity statistics regarding farming, I have converted the values to 1990 dollars according to Maddison:
Han: 344 dollars
Age of Fragmentation: 332 dollars
Early Tang: 432 dollars
Later Tang: 399 dollars
Song: 455 dollars
Southern Song: 399 dollars
Yuan: 390 dollars
Ming: 535 dollars
Qing: 530 dollars
They show similar development to Maddison's numbers. Though I would doubt that such estimates would be useful for computing general trends.
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