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East Asian Tactics: Evolution of Late-Joseon-Dynasty Korean Linear Field Formations

Posted June 14th, 2018 at 08:38 AM by Guderian2nd
Updated June 14th, 2018 at 11:13 AM by Guderian2nd

Note: this blog post was originally a forum thread I made on another forum. Some minor edits have been made to accomodate this fact.

Introduction

So there was recently this thread on another forum, more specifically this post:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Panzerkraft
Or in other words: this is a Spanish tercio
Click the image to open in full size.
can we have the Ming equivalent ?
In which I realized that nothing immediately came to mind. Sure, there were some squad/platoon level stuff, and there were plenty of company/regiment+ sized formations depicted in military manuals, but they all tend to be infantry or cavalry squares rather than lines.

But the Ming clearly did have and utilize linear infantry formations, first because otherwise they probably couldn't have beaten the Japanese in the field during the Imjin War, and second post-Imjin War Korea rapidly restructured it's military to be more like the Ming's with the result being an army that heavily relied upon linear pike-and-shot formations. Yet no pictures or structures of an authentically Chinese primary source depicting a linear formation immediately came to mind for me.

So I decided to make a thread showcasing some of the linear formations used by late-Joseon-era Korea(17th/18th centuries), to see if it would offer any insight into what Chinese linear tactics may have been in the 16th or 17th century.

We need to begin by outlining the massive changes that the Korean Military underwent through the end of the 16th century during the Imjin War, and to a certain extent the 17th century as well during the Qing invasion.

History of Joseon-Dynasty Korea Military Reforms 16c~17c.

To say that there was a military revolution in late 16th century Korea is a massive understatement. The Japanese invasion transformed a primarily horse-archer based cavalry-centric army into an arquebus-based infantry-centric army. Most important in the restructuring of the army of the Joseon Dynasty was the armies of Ming China and their military theories. The Korean Royal Court was significantly impressed with the performance of the Ming Army in the field, and basically adopted their structure and tactics wholesale. In particular those books by Qi Jiguang, such as the infamous 『紀効新書』(Ji Xiao Sin Su, "New Book of Effective Techniques") or 『練兵實記』(Lian Bing Shi JI, "Veritable Record of Troop Drilling"), were significant resources from which the new Korean army was formed from the ashes of the old one.

In particular, the Koreans reached the conclusion that the arquebus/muskets were of extreme importance in the field. Initially the Japanese shots didn't concern the Koreans that much, because ultimately the decisive action that the Japanese used to smash apart Korean field armies were done through it's pike element. Thus early in the war, the Koreans believed that it was Japanese superiority in melee combat, with their katanas and yari, that humiliated the Joseon army. This assessment changed dramatically however when the Ming came into the spotlight. The Siege of Pyongyang was believed to be won primarily through superior firepower, both in the siege and the subsequent battle inside the city, and the Ming's heavy use of artillery greatly impressed the Korean Royal Court. In led the pendulum to swing in the other direction, leading to an overemphasis on personal firearms, ranged firepower and artillery over melee weaponry, and the Korean government hastily reformed it's army based on Ming input but with a particular excess of emphasis on Shot. While some Korean officials eventually recognized by the end of the Imjin War that it was not any particular weapon that was the cause of the Japanese land superiority, but the mutual complementary effects of Pike and Shot in a combined-arms fashion, this trend of thinking continued on into the 17th century after the war[1].

The result was that the Korean army found itself possessing a far greater amount of shot than pike(I should note that I mean "pike" in the broad sense. It's definitely true that some troops had pikes, but due to logistical difficulties more often than not troops would often also be armed with various kinds of spears and polearms much shorter than actual pikes. They should be understood as more closer to "general melee troops" than actual "pikes"; that said I'm calling them pikes because their battlefield use is intended to be based on pikes and, ideally speaking, should've used pikes). after the war. Even during the war, we can see a focus on ranged weaponry over close-combat in Korean army records. As an example, in 1596 the amount of troops reorganized in the fashion of Qi Jiguang's 束伍法 method of organization drafted from the Anju-county of the Pyeongan Province, consisted of 13 squads of melee troops, 25 squads of arquebus, and 43 squads of archers. The remains of the pre-war troop's focus on archery is still there, but 84% of the army is dedicated to ranged firepower, and the amount of shot outnumbers that of pike(or it's equivalent) by nearly a factor of two[2]. The situation is overall similar in most other counties; the archers still dominate, but of the parts that were re-equipped, most carry firearms, not pike.

This situation continues into the 17th century, especially under the reign of Prince Gwanghae(this guy doesn't get a regal name unlike most other Korean Kings, because he was dishonorably ousted from power by court factions&a relative; the consequence is that he's not even recorded as a legitimate or valid king in Korean records, leaving us with the official title of "Prince". But eh, that story's for another time). Despite the growing threat from the Jurchen/Manchus in the north - now calling themselves the Qing - and their heavy cavalry-centric forces, the Korean Military consensus of firepower-centric tactics still dominated. The occasional raids from this rapidly growing power could be easily repelled enough by coordinated volleys combined with field fortifications. Thus when the Ming asked it's tributary state for help in 1619, Korea sends an army of 13,000; of which ~10,000 can be estimated to be arquebusiers[3](the rest were mostly archers with very little pike; this is not to say this was a standard Korean army, since the original army the Korean Royal Court intended to send had a far more balanced ratio of pike, shot and archers, but the fact that they thought an army that was like 80% muskets was not a bad army to field around tells us about their tactical thought). Clearly, by 1619, the Korean military firmly believed in firepower.

This of coursed proved to be their undoing in the subsequent Battle of Sarhu; the arquebusiers were quickly overrun by Qing Cavalry when caught off guard and rudimentary field fortifications like wooden spikes proved insufficient. The subsequent focus of Korean military reforms took 3 large forms: first was to strengthen Korean's own cavalry arm, the second was to focus on re-emphasizing the pike to ward against cavalry, the third was even further increasing firepower by turning the archers into arquebusiers while also increasing fire discipline by professionalizing the military from a conscript army to a standing army[4].

The utterly terrible grand strategy in the subsequent Qing invasion did lead to the Korean defeat in the leading Qing invasions, but there were a few tactical victories here and there, showing that on some level these reforms had worked. This trend continued throughout the 17th century, with the Korean army moving towards more closely integrating pike, shot, cavalry and the occasional artillery. By the 18th century came along, the Korean army was back to having 60%~80% of it's army being composed of shot, the rest pike.

The Korean army still remained very heavily shot-based, but at least not it was not completely vulnerable to heavy cavalry.

Sources

This is where we can begin our analysis. The primary sources I'm going to use here are 『兵學指南』, and 『兵學通』.

The former is a Korean military manual allegedly written by Ryu Seong-Ryong immediately after the war in the form of commentary/modification of Qi Jiguang's 『紀効新書』; we don't have any actual evidence of this though, even if it's not that implausible a theory. The earliest manuscript we have dates back to 1704, and records indicating that it existed as far as the early 17th century[5]. This book was basically the most basic and universal of manuals used to reform the Korean army in the 17th century, which meant that a lot of local variations and versions popped up in various regions; there was one attempt to standardize it in 1694, and another attempt to do so in 1787. The version I'm using is the latter version published under the reign of King Jeongjo, but it's contents are roughly similar to those found in the 1694 version, which is again supposedly just an amalgation of the various versions that floated around in the mid 17th century and getting rid of commentaries that the editor thought superfluous, so I'm assuming it is reasonably representative of Korean tactics and formations in the 17th century.

The latter is a military manual published under the reign of King Jeongjo, re-published 3 times once in 1776, once in 1785, and lastly in 1790. The concern was that the tactics and formations indicated in 『兵學指南』, still the standard manual for most places, was increasingly distant from how the various different arms of the central army(Joseon Korea's professionalized Central Army was divided into 5 different arms, each with slightly different tasks and functions) actually organized and practiced formations. The 『兵學指南』 was published in the 17th century and was based on the 『紀効新書』, when firearms were not as prominent on the field, didn't give much indication as to the integration between cavalry and infantry, nor much advise on field artillery. It's also based on the Chinese army structures and organization.

Not only did Korean army organization and structure had evolved to be different to those originally laid out by Qi Jiguang, each various different type of arms and even smaller units in the central army had developed their own modifications and practical knowledge, updating their tactics such that they didn't really match up with what the 『兵學指南』 indicated, leading to much confusion among various different officers. King Jeongjo attempted to standardize these new tactics and updating the tactics contained within 『兵學指南』, and modify it as to be more fitting of actual Korean armies in the field by publishing the 『兵學通』. Thus we can say that 『兵學通』 is relatively reflective of Korean Military Theory on tactics by the late 18th century.

Some Notes on Terms and Army Structure

Quick tip on the structure and ranks of the 訓鍊都監(훈련도감, Hun Ryeon Do Gam) and the 束伍軍(속오군, Sok-o gun); as mentioned prior there are many different types of armies part of the Central Royal Army of the Joseon Court, of which the 訓鍊都監 was the most important(tasked with the defense of the capital primarily). I'll also be focusing on them and the local conscript army(束伍軍) for this analysis. The following structure/personnel count excludes the command staff of each formation; books like 『紀効新書』 do specify that you should have around X much command staff, but as is usual for early modern armies this isn't exactly set in stone and can vary depending on the commander and army[6]:

1 伍(오, o) is like a fireteam, and consists of 5 men.
1 隊(대, dae) is a squad, and consists of 12 men: 2 伍/fireteams, a 隊長(대장, daejang, squad commander) - and a 火兵(화병, hwabyeong), a non-combatant in charge of food/other logistical needs of the squad.
1 旗(기, gi) is a platoon, and consists of 37 men: 3 squads, and 1 旗摠(기총, gichong, platoon commander).
1 哨(초, cho) is a company, and consists of 112 men: 3 platoons, and 1 哨官(초관, chogwan, company commander).
1 司(사, sa) is a battalion, and consists of 561 men: 5 companies, and 1 把摠(파총, pachong, battalion commander).

For the local conscript armies(束伍軍) a 營(영, yeong) was the largest tactical unit that could be expected to perform individual tasks as an army; it numbered anywhere between 2,000~5,000 men and normally consisted of ~5 ish battalions, but as described previously could have a lot more or less than that[7]. In some cases there would be an intermediate structure called a 部(부, bu) commanded by a 千摠(천총, cheonchong), which would act as the regiment/brigade, consisting of around a 1,000~1,500 men composed of 2~3 battalions. Two or three of these regiment/brigades would then combine to form a 營, in this case a Division-equivalent[8].

In the case of the central 訓鍊都監 though, the structure above the battalion level was more consistent. 3 battalions would combine to form a regiment/brigade(部) commanded by a 千摠, and 2 of those plus some cavalry would form the full 訓鍊都監 or the 營/division, commanded by a 中軍[9][10].

In general, linear formations in these records are indicated by the name "列陣(Yeoul-Jin, 열진)"; literally translated that means "formation laid out in array".

17th Century: 『兵學指南』

So what we want to take a look here are the following formations[11a][12][13]:
Quote:
Originally Posted by 一路行遇警列陣圖
Click the image to open in full size.
Quote:
Originally Posted by 二路行遇警列陣圖
Click the image to open in full size.
Quote:
Originally Posted by 四路行遇警列陣圖
Click the image to open in full size.
(The enemy is to the top of the page in all of these diagrams - ie. the formation is facing the top of the page).

All of these formations have a basic structure in common: they consist largely of two layers of forces laid out in front and some parts held in the back in a square formation making camp as a reserve. Thus we'll only be observing one of them, the 一路行遇警列陣圖.

The name of the formation itself is a clue in regards to it's battlefield role and form; 一路行遇警列陣 literally translates to "Formation laid out in array when meeting a threat while marching in a single column"; ie. this is the formation you'll order your army when you meet an enemy while on the march. The other two pictures shown above are identical, except it's in the case of "two columns" or "four columns". The 『兵學指南』 also has diagrams for march formations unlike field formations, so one can say that each of these are based on the various different march formations with different number of columns.

Another striking thing to note is that this formation is huge. You can tell by the labels that this formation is for an army consisting of 5 營 or 5 regiments/brigades, numbering 13,000~14,000 men. This is a lot more solders than the size of the entire 訓鍊都監. Clearly, the size of the formation alone demonstrates the remaining Chinese legacy of Qi Jiguang and that the local armies of Joseon Korea still abided by it; and also shows that it was not quite appropriate for the 18th century professional standing armies of the royal court. The formation is also based on the assumption that each battalion contains 4 companies of pike and 1 company of shot(it offers an alternative method for organization for armies with a higher proportion of shot, but even then it's a 2:1 ratio with now there being 1 platoon of shot for every 2 platoon of pike); however, this was obviously not the case in 17th~18th century Korean armies, where shot dominated far more than that of pike.

There's also a distinct lack of any cavalry or mention of field artillery; the army consists solely of infantry. That's another indication as to the reliance this manual has on the 『紀効新書』 with a heavy reliance on infantry rather than cavalry. The legacy of the 16th century are still there.

To get to the details, it follows the structure of the local conscript armies, with 5 battalions per regiment. The army distinguishes it's 5 brigades the usual East Asian way: the 前營(전영, Jeonyeong, Forward Regiment), 右營(우영, Uyeong, Rightwards Regiment), 中營(중영, Jyungyeong, Central Regiment), 左營(좌영, Jyayeong, Leftwards Regiment), 後營(후영, Huyeong, Rearwards Regiment). Generally if there are 5 sub-units in a unit, they are distinguished by forwards, rightwards, central, leftwards, and rearwards, in that order. In the case of 3 sub-units, it's usually rightwards, central, and leftwards.

The frontal row consists of the Forward Regiment, and parts of the Leftward/Rightward Regiments. More specifically, each row consists of 40 companies; 20 companies from the Central Regiment, 10 from the Leftwards, and 10 from the Rightwards. Since the army was marching in single column, one of the battalions in the Leftwards/Rightwards Regiments have to be split up in a kinda weird way to match the frontages of each row.

But you know what they say, a picture is worth a thousand words[11b]:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Graphical Representation of a mid-17th Century Joseon Korean Linear Field formation for local conscript armies, 5 regiments
Click the image to open in full size.
Click the image to open in full size.
The image is turned 90 degrees counter clockwise such that the enemy is towards the left.

This particular graphic choose to place each platoon by column, such that 1 company would be a 3x3 grid of squads. The squads in each platoon are definitely laid out in line abreast, as explicitly indicated the 大隊 section[14]; each squad is in a Mandarin-Duck formation, 2 columns of 5 men each, and 3 such squads lined abreast would be 1 platoon.

This interpretation is probably based on the fact that platoons lined up in column is how they would've been marching[15], and the original manual that this is based off of in a similar section notes that the distance between each platoon is 3丈 viewed from the side[16]. That supports such an interpretation, but this probably isn't how they actually fought and is only looking at a partial picture. Ie. the graphic is partially incorrect. That's because later in the book we're told the process in which a each company deploys for battle; the distance of 3丈 between each platoon is an intermediate step for which the gunners(who were to the rear of the pike companies prior to deployment) gets to deploy to the front of the army, after which the platoons close ranks so that every squad is now only 1丈 apart[17a].

Not shown in the picture are the Central Companies of each 5-company battalion; that is because as mentioned prior the 『兵學指南』, the book assumes your army has 4 companies of pike and 1 company of shot for every battalion. The book says that the arquebusiers of each battalion should be arrayed 5步(around 6 meters) in front of the rest of your battalion in a single line abreast(alternatively, each squad grouped into a 5-row deep formation if counter-marching continuous fire is required, or if you have a high proportion of shot to pike)[17b], so just assume that they are there. This obviously conflicts with the actual composition of Korean conscript/reserve armies of the time, of which there would often be an completely inverted case of 4 companies of shot for every company of pike. Here we can see another case of a disconnect between theory and actual practice. This formation would fit right in on a 16th century battlefield; in the 17th century, ehhh not so much.

In real field battle situations, the chances are the shot companies would've been lined up with each squad abreast to countermarch, with the small amount of pike companies standing behind. How do we know this? We can infer from how the 18th-century manual 『兵學通』 depicts it's formations, which we will get to in a minute.

As for frontages and spacing, there's to be 1丈 or 3.33 meters of space between every squad[17c] after the gunners are deployed. No indication is given as regards to spacing between companies or battalions, but since this is a linear formation and the space between the squads are already quite spacious it's supposed to be roughly uniform. The space between the two main rows is to be 20步 or around ~24 meters.

The book tells us that the frontage of a squad(the distance between each man infact) is 5尺(approx. 151.5 cm)[18]; with a space of 3.33 meters between every squad, since the army has 120 platoons or 360 squads in each of it's two rows, that's a frontage of 360 * 1.51 + 359 * 3.33 = ~1,740 meters for the whole army. That's actually roughly comparable to 17th century European armies of similar size, AFAIK.

In terms of depth, that's a depth of 1~6+6+6+24+6 = 43~48 meters, a rather thin formation, though it is excluding the Rearwards Regiment square.

To summarize:
1) The formations displays many characteristics that are telling of it's 16th century Chinese origins.
2) As a result it's an example of the increasing disconnect between theory and practice in 17th century Korean militaries.
3) Taking it as a 16th~early 17th century formation it looks decent and pretty standard, aside from the lack of cavalry or artillery for an army of this size.

18th Century: 『兵學通』

Let's move on to the 18th century then[19]:
Quote:
Originally Posted by 一路行遇警列陣圖(兵學通)
Click the image to open in full size.
The formation's name is identical, but some immediate differences are obviously noticeable. First is that the regiment square/camp in the rear formed out of the Rearwards Regiment is gone; that's because it no longer exists. Infact, as a whole the formation is much smaller, using the the organization method involving the 部 level structure; 5 shot companies are combined to form 1 shot battalion, while only 3 pike companies are combined to form 1 pike battalion. This is because this formation is explicitly intended to be used by the central, professional 訓鍊都監, rather than the more general formation intended to be used by the local reserve 束伍軍 as depicted in the previous formation we just took a look at.

An interesting fact is that unlike the 17th century manual, this book provides guidelines for both cavalry placement and field artillery. The 訓鍊都監 infact had organic cavalry components, which are incorporated into the formation depicted above; they also had organic field artillery components by the time the book was published as well[20].

The 訓鍊都監 at the time was treated as 1 big division(營), divided into 2 regiments(部), Leftwards(左部) and Rightwards(右部), plus two cavalry battalions(別將, 별장, byeoljang) each battalion consisting of 3 cavalry companies, each with 119 horsemen; plus the artillery attachment, scouts, etc. Each regiment consisted of 3 battalions; the Leftwards and Rightwards Battalions were battalions of shot, with each 5 companies of shot as mentioned. The Central Battalion was the battalion of pike, again as mentioned consisting of 3 companies of pike.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Graphical Representation of a mid-18th Century Joseon Korean Linear Field formation for the Royal Central Army 訓鍊都監
Click the image to open in full size.
Click the image to open in full size.
Again the source for the graphic presents the formations as arranged in column when that's obviously probably not the case. That said, again, there are good reasons to believe that the companies of shot would've aligned their shot platoons in a column. While it does result in the conclusion that the Korean shot element had actually grown thicker throughout the 18th century compared to the 17th and now practiced 15-rank-deep countermarching, if we don't arrange them in a column then there's seems to be no way the 3 companies of pike behind would be able to reliably protect the 10 companies of shot against enemy cavalry or melee threats; the frontages just become too large.

On the otherhand, if we force the shot companies to be arranged line abreast in the traditional 5-rank deep countermarch formations but with a denser spacing to match the frontage, that poses difficulties when actually moving the rear pike companies to the front to protect the shot(as well as moving the pike companies in the rear rows or moving the shot in the rear rows forwards as well, as indicated in others parts of the book[21]).

I personally think it's more likely to be the latter. As we saw prior in the 17th century book, Korean formations aren't that dense. Even if the shot squads are arranged line abrest in a much tighter formation than usual, the distance between each solder is still 5尺 or around 150cm; that's enough space for the pike squads arranged line abrest behind to move forward to provide cover for the companies of shot.

This is also what I meant by "the chances are the shot companies would've been lined up with each squad abreast to countermarch, with the small amount of pike companies standing behind" in reference to the fact that even in the 17th century Korean armies had a lot more shot per pike than their doctrine suggested. The 『兵學通』 is a partly descriptive text taking into account how armies actually practiced formations to account for the disconnect between theory and reality, and given that they're shown placing densely placed shots in front of stretched out pikes, they probably did some degree of this in the 17th century as well.

The cavalry are depicted as facing the flanks rather than forwards; this may seems a bit strange and likely another mistake the graphic made, but it's actually how the book describes the cavalry should be positioned(the exact wording is "If the flag is waved inwards the cavalry are to turn right and left to face outwards")[22], so meh.

Also, the graphic doesn't display the field artillery. The 『兵學通』 mentions that any artillery pieces should be placed right infront of the front rank[23], like they would be in European formations of the 17th century.

That's actually a striking detail that comes up to me as I analyze the structure of this formation; because bayonets were never invented, Joseon Korea's tactics were still stuck in the Pike-and-Shot stage, but with the ratio of Shot : Pike increasing evermore to the very limit. It's clear that by the late 18th century, Korea's tactics can be said to be at least half a century if not more behind contemporary European powers.

Let's assume that the 10 companies of Shot are arranged line-abreast, but instead of there being ~3.33 meters of space between every squad, the squads are packed tightly such that the 5尺 or 150cm of frontage allocated to each squad is packed tightly together. There's 90 squads in a regiment, so that's a frontage of 1.5*90 = 135 meters. The pikemen behind them on the otherhand would be placed normally with 3.33 meters separating each squad; the 3 companies of Pike contain 27 squads, which arranged the way I described would have a frontage of ~127.08. It sorta fits, which was my hope.

It's difficult to say how much the depth of the cavalry formation adds to this; the book presents a variety of method to charge, some with 3-companies all arranged in column[24], some with line abreast[25], etc. so it's difficult to tell. Just taking a wild guess here, even if they were arranged 3-platoons deep, and assigning 3 meters of space to each horse, it's only around 45 meters deep. So at best, the formation is ~220 meters wide; the real value is likely between 130~220 meters and varying depending on the circumstances.

Depth can be calculated similarly; allocating around 6 meters of space to the field artillery, put 6 meters of space between them and the companies of shot, put 6 meters of depth for the 5-rank deep shot squads, put another 6 meters to put the 5-rank deep pike columns, followed by the 24-meters gap. Another 6 meters for the Pike companies of the Regiment forming the second row, 6 meters behind them are the 6 meter thick arquebusiers. That'll be 6+6+6+6+6+24+6+6+6 = 72 meters deep.

It's curious that for some reason the formation appears to have gotten thicker.

To summarize:
1) It's nice in that it actually takes into account actual field practices and organization of troops rather than their theorectical composition on paper.
2) It also integrates cavalry and artillery into it's formation, suggesting that Joseon Korea better understands combined arms in Pike-and-Shot warfare that it did in the 17th century.
3) It still shows it's limits as a Pike-and-Shot formation despite being the 18th century; it seems to try to extract as much as it can out of it's shot short of depriving them of any anti-cavalry or melee protection whatsoever, but that fundamentally poses limits on it's capability to deliver shock. Ex. the formation's still based around deep-rank countermarching continous fire rather than thin, linear volleys. They're also still using arquebuses instead of muskets, and matchlocks instead of flintlocks. This appears to result in oddities like the formation being thicker than it's 17th century counterparts.
4) I also personally think ~350 ish cavalry on either flanks is a bit too small for a formation this size(~3,000) but that could be just me.

Conclusion

Overall I think we can say that given the lack of threats after the Qing invasion, Joseon Korea's armies still did decently. Compared to their pre-Imjin war army of the early 16th century the modernization efforts of the early 17th century were clearly successful in modernizing them to be up to date. They took sensible measures in response to perceived deficiencies in their armies, which largely seems correct, but are limited by the lack of bayonets and thus had to stay within a Pike-and-Shot framework. They show increasing understanding of the importance of field artillery and cavalry and such combined-arms elements as time progresses and is shown adapting it's military doctrine to meet the actual real material conditions.

But it's also painfully obvious that such reforms lack any real battlefield experience, with some questionable choices like the (probably) overstretched pike companies of the 18th century, an even greater focus on firepower over shock, and lack of distributing any potential technological improvements(like flintlocks, which Joseon Korea did have access to through Qing China) en masse.

Korean Field Formations of the 17th century, both on paper and as they likely would've been on the field, may have been competetive on a contemporary European battlefield, if a bit outdated. But by the 18th century, it is clear that Korea is far behind it's European counterparts on the otherside of the globe, even if they were trying to get(and arguably largely suceeding at getting) the most bang for buck out of their army. Despite various improvements, reforms and attempts to extract more efficiency out of their forces as they could, their late-18th century tactics are still something that belongs in the 17th century, not 18th.


[1] 노영구.『朝鮮後期 兵書와 戰法의 硏究』Military tactical manuals and military strategies written and devised in the late Chosun dynasty. 학위논문(PhD. Thesis), 서울대학교 대학원 국사학과, 2002. 서울, 2002. 1-247. Accessed May 30, 2018. RISS ???? - ???? ????. p. 42-48.
[2] 노영구. 『조선후기의 전술 : 兵學通을 중심으로』. 서울특별시: 그물, 2016. p. 30-31.
[3] Ibid. p. 49.
[4] 노영구. 「인조초~丙子胡亂 시기 조선의 전술 전개」 "Joseon's military tactics from the early years of King Injo through the 2nd Manchu Invasion of 1636". 『한국사학보』 41 (November 2010): 203-35. p. 207-19.
[5] 노영구.『朝鮮後期 兵書와 戰法의 硏究』Military tactical manuals and military strategies written and devised in the late Chosun dynasty. p. 36.
[6] 「ㄴ. 남방보영(南方步營)」 in 『兵學指南』 丁未新刊 壯營藏板本. Translated by 김석형. 여강출판사, 2001. Accessed June 2, 2018. N2 OpenLink User Authentication.
[7] "진법에 등장하는 훈련기관안내 - 문화콘텐츠닷컴." 청화백자(靑華白瓷)의 발달 - 문화콘텐츠닷컴. Accessed June 02, 2018. 진법에 등장하는 훈련기관안내 - 문화콘텐츠닷컴.
[8] 문광균. 「조선후기 雙樹山城의 군사편제와 병력운영」 "Military Organization and Troops Management of 雙樹山城 in Late Joseon Period." 『사학연구』 121 (March 2016): 235-69. p. 255.
[9] "진법에 등장하는 훈련기관안내 - 문화콘텐츠닷컴." 청화백자(靑華白瓷)의 발달 - 문화콘텐츠닷컴. Accessed June 02, 2018. 진법에 등장하는 훈련기관안내 - 문화콘텐츠닷컴.
[10] "훈련도감(訓鍊都監) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴." 청화백자(靑華白瓷)의 발달 - 문화콘텐츠닷컴. Accessed June 02, 2018. 훈련도감(訓鍊都監) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴.
[11] "일로행우경열진도(기관 : 훈련도감 병법서 : 병학지남) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴." 청화백자(靑華白瓷)의 발달 - 문화콘텐츠닷컴. Accessed June 02, 2018. 일로행우경열진도(기관 : 훈련도감 병법서 : 병학지남) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴.
[12] "이로행우경열진도(기관 : 훈련도감 병법서 : 병학지남) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴." 청화백자(靑華白瓷)의 발달 - 문화콘텐츠닷컴. Accessed June 02, 2018. 이로행우경열진도(기관 : 훈련도감 병법서 : 병학지남) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴.
[13] "사로행우경열진도(기관 : 훈련도감 병법서 : 병학지남) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴." 청화백자(靑華白瓷)의 발달 - 문화콘텐츠닷컴. Accessed June 02, 2018. 사로행우경열진도(기관 : 훈련도감 병법서 : 병학지남) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴.
[14] 「大隊第十三」, 『兵學指南』 丁未新刊 壯營藏板本 券二 營陣正彀.
[15] "매기삼대형행도(기관 : 훈련도감 병법서 : 병학지남) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴." 청화백자(靑華白瓷)의 발달 - 문화콘텐츠닷컴. Accessed June 02, 2018. 매기삼대형행도(기관 : 훈련도감 병법서 : 병학지남) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴.
[16] 戚繼光. 『紀效新書』 朝鮮本. Edited by 李承勛 and 김좌명. Translated by 유재성. 券上. 서울: 국방부 군사편찬연구소, 2011. p. 341.
[17] 「小隊第十四」, 『兵學指南』 丁未新刊 壯營藏板本 券二 營陣正彀.
[18] 「列開小隊圖」, 『兵學指南』 丁未新刊 壯營藏板本 券三 營陣總圖上.
[19] "일로행우경열진도(기관 : 훈련도감 병법서 : 병학통) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴." 청화백자(靑華白瓷)의 발달 - 문화콘텐츠닷컴. Accessed June 02, 2018. 일로행우경열진도(기관 : 훈련도감 병법서 : 병학통) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴.
[20] 노영구. 『조선후기의 전술 : 兵學通을 중심으로』. p. 115.
[21] Ibid. p. 201.
[22] Ibid. p. 199.
[23] Ibid. p. 197.
[24] Ibid. p. 303.
[25] Ibid. p. 205.

References
Quote:
1. 戚繼光. 『紀效新書』 朝鮮本. Edited by 李承勛 and 김좌명. Translated by 유재성. 券上. 서울: 국방부 군사편찬연구소, 2011.
2. 노영구.『朝鮮後期 兵書와 戰法의 硏究』Military tactical manuals and military strategies written and devised in the late Chosun dynasty. 학위논문(PhD. Thesis), 서울대학교 대학원 국사학과, 2002. 서울, 2002. 1-247. Accessed May 30, 2018. RISS ???? - ???? ????.
3. 노영구. 「인조초~丙子胡亂 시기 조선의 전술 전개」 "Joseon's military tactics from the early years of King Injo through the 2nd Manchu Invasion of 1636". 『한국사학보』 41 (November 2010): 203-35. p. 207-19.
4. 노영구. 『조선후기의 전술 : 兵學通을 중심으로』. 서울특별시: 그물, 2016.
5. 문광균. 「조선후기 雙樹山城의 군사편제와 병력운영」 "Military Organization and Troops Management of 雙樹山城 in Late Joseon Period." 『사학연구』 121 (March 2016): 235-69.
6. 문종, 정조. 『兵學指南』 丁未新刊 壯營藏板本. Translated by 김석형. 여강출판사, 2001. Accessed June 2, 2018. N2 OpenLink User Authentication.
7. "매기삼대형행도(기관 : 훈련도감 병법서 : 병학지남) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴." 청화백자(靑華白瓷)의 발달 - 문화콘텐츠닷컴. Accessed June 02, 2018. 매기삼대형행도(기관 : 훈련도감 병법서 : 병학지남) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴.
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9. "진법에 등장하는 훈련기관안내 - 문화콘텐츠닷컴." 청화백자(靑華白瓷)의 발달 - 문화콘텐츠닷컴. Accessed June 02, 2018. 진법에 등장하는 훈련기관안내 - 문화콘텐츠닷컴.
10. "이로행우경열진도(기관 : 훈련도감 병법서 : 병학지남) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴." 청화백자(靑華白瓷)의 발달 - 문화콘텐츠닷컴. Accessed June 02, 2018. 이로행우경열진도(기관 : 훈련도감 병법서 : 병학지남) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴.
11. "일로행우경열진도(기관 : 훈련도감 병법서 : 병학지남) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴." 청화백자(靑華白瓷)의 발달 - 문화콘텐츠닷컴. Accessed June 02, 2018. 일로행우경열진도(기관 : 훈련도감 병법서 : 병학지남) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴.
12. "일로행우경열진도(기관 : 훈련도감 병법서 : 병학통) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴." 청화백자(靑華白瓷)의 발달 - 문화콘텐츠닷컴. Accessed June 02, 2018. 일로행우경열진도(기관 : 훈련도감 병법서 : 병학통) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴.
13. "훈련도감(訓鍊都監) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴." 청화백자(靑華白瓷)의 발달 - 문화콘텐츠닷컴. Accessed June 02, 2018. 훈련도감(訓鍊都監) - 문화콘텐츠닷컴.
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