Knights, Ribats and Chivalry: Women under the Almoravid I
Posted April 13th, 2012 at 04:16 PM by jehosafats
Updated September 21st, 2012 at 04:51 PM by jehosafats
Updated September 21st, 2012 at 04:51 PM by jehosafats
Knights, Ribats and Chivalry: Women under the Almoravid I
Draa Valley, Morocco
"... women of the Almoravid period were so significant on the political scene that the enemies of the dynasty ... accused that empire of being perverted because they gave power to their women." - Maria Jesus Viguera Molins (167)
A Case Study
Moorish Spain was undergoing seismic changes by the mid-eleventh century. As the independent principalities that arose after the fracturing of the Ummayyad dynasty, it's capital Cordoba, naturally fell within the rigid topography of the Iberian Peninsula. And their respective kings, princes and governors frequently took up arms against each other. A fundamentally Spanish civil war ensued, in an era known as the Taifa Period.
In these times (1008-1086 CE) one was prepared to smite an opponent even of their own kith and kin. Alliances of the Taifa Period (from the Spanish reyes de taifa) were strategically convenient with respect to geography and often unfolded across religious lines. Yusuf ibn Hud, the Muslim prince of Lerida, for example, was forced to pay the Christians in the north in exchange for protection against his own family in neighboring Zaragoza. Of Granada, Almeria, Seville, Jaen, Malaga, Murcia and all the domains of Muslim Iberia, the emirs showed such laxness, perhaps even the opulent princes of the east risked pontificating on their moral decay.
To keep up with the lifestyles of royalty in the Mashriq (Middle East) these emirs, with little exception, levied burdensome taxes on their subjects. Each royal court competed for regional prestige. In attempts to expand their authority, noted royals such as the Abbadid king of Seville, al-Mu'tamid, launched aggressive wars for rather insignificant gains. In 1025, for instance, he raised an army solely to seize a pair of castles in Viseu (Present day NW Portugal). Or his symbolic annexing of Cordoba 40 years past its glory. A hopeless romantic, al-Mu'tamid indulged his beloved, composed his poetry and patronized the arts. But this was all at the expense of responsible governance.
In Granada the sitting emir granted extraordinary powers to Jewish administrators. His stewardship, suffice to say, was in question. Worse, the Muslim royalty were forced to pay tribute or parias to Alfonso VI the Brave, the Christian king of emerging Leon-Castile. And naturally some sought his protection from other Muslims.
The Lamtuna-Sanhaja Berber kingdom in northwest Africa, commanded by Yusuf ibn Tashfin, on the surface was a natural ally against Alphonso. They were well armed, devout Muslims, with strategic advantage in the western Mediterranean. In response to the desperate pleas of Moorish royalty such as al-Mu'tamid - Yusuf thwarted what were the early stages of the Reconquisita. And he had this to say concerning the king of Sevilla:
Founded by the Maliki scholar Ibn Yasin in the first half of the eleventh century, quickly a thousand man stalwart on the banks of the Senegalese River, preaching a puritanical form of Islam, accumulated thousands more from the vast terrains of heretic Africa. There was still a deep animus for Arab rule throughout the Maghreb. But the expansion of the al-Murabitun accelerated conversions, directly and indirectly. From what began as quaint exchanges when Dula traders extolled the Prophet, had suddenly sprang a zealous movement.
This marked a new era of fortune for all the region. The uncharted capacity of this dynasty, in it's propagation of Islam, its social, economic and military significance, is to this day understudied. More shockingly, the dynasty's love of love and the flowering of chivalry has received almost no scholarly treatment.
The al-Murabitun, the Spanish corruption being "Almoravid," represented a case study to scholars as early as the fourteenth century. In the Muqaddimah for example, the famous polymath Ibn Khaldun, in every way Machiavelli before Machiavelli, saw this obscured empire as the "perfect example" of his conflict theory. This was the earliest known empirical-based, systematic hypothesis to the passage of history. But, specifically, to the face of Islamic history: "to which periodic nomad invasions from the desert to the settled areas are inevitable ... they come to sweep away the decadence of sedentary life before succumbing to it's temptations" (Encyclopedia of Islam).
Enter the 'Desert Flower'
To unravel the story of chivalry is to understand the pivotal nature of this dynasty. Certainly to understand the ribat, the battle of al-Zallaqa, the seeds of Sufism and western philosophy, is not to say this motley crew of Africans were the most refined of men. On the contrary. Fletcher cites one historian who describes their flash-in-the-pan control of the lands of Andalus as an "extended looting expedition."
We'll address this later.
Yusuf's kingdom, before it was "Empire of the Two Shores," was known at its height by 1086 as the "Desert Empire." At the apogee of the Desert Empire they did not yet have the emirs and governors of al-Andalus in their sights. Having pacified the Zenata strongholds to the north, with the tribes of those lands and those of the southern frontier under their sway, their king was content.
Tall, slender, stern, pointy nose, brown skinned, wooly haired, he would have donned the litham, the veil of the Sanhaja Berbers.
Roman geographers painted these veiled warriors as mouthless, mythical creatures, roaming their southern frontier. Berbers were known for attacking the caravan routes headed towards the Mediterranean, trouncing camps then disappearing like locust. Later they came under the pressure of Arab hordes from the east. Who they confronted, resented, but ultimately came to identify with.
In accordance with Maliki doctrine any garments made of silk, or any dyed-red fabric, especially worn by the Persians, would have been forbidden at Yusuf's court. I point this out because it is true, al-Murabitun soldiers in al-Andalus wore silk and gold when left to their own devices.
His temperament as a general and administrator reveals a highly ascetic personality. He spoke Arabic poorly but his faith was never questioned. He would have worn an imama (turban) wrapped like that of his officers. Perhaps a finer embroidered tunic - a kaftan, under a blotched blue striped haik (outer wrap) - reeking of camel.
Who knows the kind of shoes this man wore. Perhaps bound with the finest Kanem leather we should suppose. But nobody could fill them. He took up the reins after his illustrious cousin Abu Bakr ibn-Umar (Ibn Yasin's second general). Both Yusuf and Abu Bakr followed in the footsteps of Yahia ibn Ibrahim, the military complement to Ibn Yasin's spiritual conquest.
This two pronged approach of militarism and spiritualism would come to influence Yusuf profoundly. But more importantly it did not manifest itself in any one figure before him - not in the Maghreb. Abu Bakr was closest but was killed in a Saharan revolt in 1087, like his brother Ibn Yahia before him in 1056 and Ibn Yasin, the founder, in 1059. Yusuf, in contrast, retired and preached the word, and died supposedly at 100 years old.
His cousin Abu Bakr left him more than a rapidly expanding empire. Prior to dislodging on that fateful expedition in the Sahara - along with all his northern territory (including Zenata controlled Sus, and it's capital, Aghmāt) - he left his pious cousin his wife, Zaynab an-Nafzawiyyat.
In an anonymous twelfth century text entitled Kitab al-Istibsar the author assures us "there was none more beautiful or intelligent or witty" than Zaynab. Indeed, this Zaynab, a name meaning "desert flower," was a woman of wealth and standing. In Lagardère's Les Almoravides he says of her:
She saw herself as the key to the Maghreb. And she was choosy towards suitors. Luqūt proved to be too weak to protect her. She required someone shrewd and fearless. Now that Abu Bakr was the keeper of Aghmāt, he would take her as a wife. The fortune of Luqūt being a major incentive.
They consummated their marriage in the fall of 1068. However, that resolve that attracted her to Abu Bakr was precisely why he left her two and a half years later. He saw the folly in suggesting she depart with him, leave the life of luxury, to suppress the upheaval at the nucleus of Lamtuna-Hajja power, the Sahara.
Abu Bakr as king and general was remarkably shrewd, fair and just. He recognized Zaynab's leadership qualities. He could do nothing but recommend his cousin take her hand in marriage. And that he did: "Marry her. She's a woman of genius."
"Sometimes a woman will be accompanied by her husband," observed Ibn Battuta of similar creatures in imperial Turkey, and "anyone seeing him would take him for one of her servants." Conditions had long suited powerful female personages coexisting with imposing military men. Africa was no exception, though by no means was Yusuf the Desert Flower's shrinking violet.
As it goes with this dynasty and in many ways their Masmuda successors: highly disciplined military men conceded relatively more powers to women. Yusuf, once a lieutenant for Abu Bakr, adopted a sophisticated attitude toward governing. Undoubtedly under the influence of his twice widowed wife, he even ceased participating in his own campaigns (a promise she had to know he wouldn't keep).
When Abu Bakr returned from his Saharan campaigns - having victoriously re-opened important trade routes shortly before returning and fighting to his death - it was Zaynab who coaxed Yusuf to trust in his cousin's faculty of reason.
(Reason, as it happens, was held in such stately regard that the prayer room inscription in the Koubba tower - the Almoravid's last surviving architectural monument in Morocco - reads: "I was created for science and prayer, by the prince of the believers, descendant of the prophet, Abdallah, most glorious of all Caliphs. Pray for him when you enter the door, so that you may fulfill your highest hopes.")
The age of Abu Bakr, after all, was over. He saw his cousin expand the empire over the plains of Morocco and secure territory of vital importance. Knowing the likely result, but to satisfy his supporters, he did attempt to reclaim his throne half-heartedly. According to The Bayan, Zaynab said to Yusuf:
Yusuf's style of governing was clearly pragmatic. And this trickled down at least to his more trusted officers. When one of his generals confronted the remnants of Abu Bakr's power - his son, the governor of Sijimasa, he reasoned with him, to dissuade the proud prince, who from the very beginning frowned upon his father abdicating the throne. The prince marched forth to Aghmāt with his army, demanding his father be restored as king (mind you without his consent). But ultimately he deferred to reason.
Gifts were seemingly a prerequisite for negotiating with hostile parties. This could have had only a marginal effect on the prince who was more than familiar with the revelry of the Mediterranean. With distractions such as these with great potential for damage, Yusuf's emphasis on law and order (as opposed to tribal division) and Zaynab's injection of 'reason' - managed to solve problems beyond their immediate control.
The aristocracy called him Amir al-Mu'minin (Commander of the Faithful), a title he refused. That name was reserved for the Caliph of Baghdad (although the Caliph himself said it suited him). Yusuf instead came to take Amir al-Muslimin (Prince of the Faithful). Though he was unofficially recognized as the Caliph of the western Islamic empire.
His court at Marrakesh, at the height of the tumultuous Taifa period, represented last refuge for Islam in the entire region. In this was apparent a desperation on the part of the Party Kings. The commitment they asked of him (as defectors poured over the Straits of Gibraltar into his kingdom) put him in a delicate position. One of the more important decisions Yusuf had to make turned out to be one of the most important in human history. If we consider the ramifications, particularly the lasting impressions of identity as resultant, it is indeed one of those decisions.
Our al-Mu'tamid, the principal party king of Moorish Spain - the empathetic and at times sinister poet of Seville - loved by everyone "for his chivalric brilliance and romantic misfortunes," made direct appeal to Yusuf in the fall of 1086 (a year before Abu Bakr's death was a signal to his authority).
The Castillian and Leonese troops carved a straight path from their kingdom in the north, down to the tiny town of Tarifa, just across the straits from Yusuf. Their paramount king Alphonso VI then stated: "This is the border of Andalus."
His treasury bolstered by the tribute of the princes, exacting monetary pain as he and his father had done for 80 years, suffice to say did not quench the power thirsty Castillian king.
Al-Mu'tamid failed to hasten his annual tribute. And Alphonso took exception when paid with degraded coinage. Al-Mu'tamid made matters worse when he murdered the Castillian ambassador to Seville. War was inevitable. His kingdom was the grandest of all the Taifa principalities. He was successful up to this point driving from her premises all the armed bands of outsiders, Christian and Muslim.
But these newfound tensions forced him to weigh outsiders like Yusuf as the solution.
Alphonso sent out two small contingents after his ambassador's death to ravage the Sevillian hinterlands and disrupt what little serenity that kingdom enjoyed. Yusuf's pivotal decision was thus presaged by a more animated call by the king of Seville.
The poet-king was warned by his eldest son Rashid, his request was dangerous: inviting a foreign army of orthodoxy would be the death knell for the Abbadid, even on the grounds Yusuf's troops leave after battle. Then al-Mutamid replied, in a stage of grief: "I would rather be a cameldriver in Africa than a swinheherd in Castile."
Yusuf complied as the maintenance of his kingdom in Africa permitted.
History calls the ensuing war in the fall of 1086 The Battle of al-Zallaqa. The battle took place on the Zallaqa plains west of the Taifa city of Badajoz. The resulting carnage was said to have had left the terrain slick with blood.
Yusuf sent a letter to the Christian king, as was custom and courtesy of Muslim rulers, extending to him the options of converting, paying tribute (jizya), or meeting for battle. Alphonso, of course, anxious to test his mettle, agreed to battle, and set up his camp alongside the Guadiana River. At the other side a Moorish contingent awaited.
He must have known Alphonso the Brave would choose battle. He crossed the straits too quickly for him to respond. In fact, this was Yusuf's first trip across the straits. After he secured his strategic obsession, Ceuta, and eliminated his Zanata rivals. He crossed the straits, made his rounds and prepared for war. At the same time, he was greeted as a dignitary, showered with gifts and courtesies. He had the blessings of the most stalwart Maliki jurists of Andalusia, who saw in him deliverance.
Before arriving in Seville as al-Mu'tamid's guest, he first saw to the fortification of Algerciras just outside the quaint town of Tarifa (to which Alphonso had penetrated from the north dangerously close to his kingdom). Yusuf arrived with roughly 15,000 men primarily from the Western Sahara. Notably those on horseback were recognized as knights of the ribât.
The ribât
Dar al-Islam (the abode of faith) is ultimately where we get the term al-Murabitun. Yusuf's actions in the eleventh-twelfth centuries is perhaps the only reason "marabout" appears even in English lexicon, describing "one who is garrisoned.” The fort from which the al-Murabitun conquered the Maghreb and Andalus was called Ribat al-Fath ("The camp of victory"). These were soldiers bound to religious duty, both men of arms, but also reciters of the Qu'ran (qurra) and jurists (fuqaha). And mingled amongst them saints and hermits.
Mastery over the esoterica of Sufism for instance, in Morocco, occurred a full 250 years after it flowered in the Mashriq, a century after it appeared in Moorish Spain. This speaks to a certain strain of radical isolationism at the time, since those we know as Moors were quite resistant to Arab rule and, by extension, the Muslim faith (again, up until the al-Murabitun campaigns). For the term "Africa," a corruption of Ifriqiyya - either of Berber, Phoenician or Greek origin - meaning "hermit" or "cavedweller," had for a long period determined the character of a continent.
The term ribât is from where we get al-Murabitun (al-mu-rabitun), "a verbal noun derived from râbata, yurâbitu, meaning "to station and stay in place..." Explained by the Islamic Encyclopedia:
The sense of duty among the residents was never so clearly defined. And more often than not poets, mystics and kettle-drummers could be seen marching in lock step behind an armed cavalry - Yusuf's battles being no exception.
Interestingly, "tethering a horse in enemy territory" enhances our understanding. The ribât and the zawiyya combined were equivalent to the monasteries springing about feudal Europe. But they had not effectively taken shape in the Maghreb (nor did Sufism in Spain) until the mid-thirteenth century. The zawiyya housed the religious clergy, fed the needy, and encouraged literacy; while the ribât remained for the purpose of military operations and specifically cavalry. While these housing distinctions had not yet appeared in full during Yusuf's time, his administrative style reflected them.
Manifest in Yusuf's hosts was the al-Murabitun's success in pacifying the west African plate and getting otherwise warring factions to comply to a cause greater than themselves (namely abolishing unfair taxes).
Soldiers came everywhere from the corners of Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Burkin Faso, Guinea and Wagadu. Their iron pikes raised to the challenge. From Sanhaja in Timbuktu to the Zanata cohorts, whose appellation explains present day "Senegal." 2,000 Senegalese cavalrymen, each with a fine-white Arabian steed, served as Yusuf's personal guard. His hosts no doubt consisted of scores of chevaliers. But to this day nothing has come down to us accounting for soldiers on foot. Chances are they were mostly infantry.
With cuirasses of the finest Kanem leather, still issuing the protection of their hearts to god, they were installed as infantry from the various independent sultanates between them (independent kingdoms were a defining characteristic of African Islam). They were joined by 10,000 fighters from Seville, Badajoz, Granada and Almeria. An estimated 25-20,000 Arabs, Moors and Mozarabs total, challenging Alphonso's formidable 70,000.
Encamped a mere three miles apart, the agreed upon date was certain to be ignored by Alphonso the Brave. Having seen his reply to Yusuf, reading:
In his memoir, Abd Allah, the party king of Granada, captures what appears to be a rather tepid Yusuf. Yusuf wasn't used to being unprepared for battle. What they witnessed was the first 'real' representation of a European host. Alphonso attracted soldiers from the surrounding lands of Christendom. Mounted Gauls and Italians in decorative armor, with swords of fine steel. Alphonso's ruthless reputation preceded him.
Legend has it in a wager over a game of chess between Alphonso and Seville's prime minister, Ibn Ammar, Seville itself was at stake. Luckily Ibn Ammar was a master of the game. They were spared the specter of witnessing their kingdom raised to rubble right then and there. This however would have been before the Sevillian king murdered Alphonso's ambassador. A munificent excuse for the Castillians to strike first.
Al-Mu'tamid led the initial company against Alphonso. By the end of the battle at least three horses were killed under him. Wounded himself on the head and torso, amid the calm of battle, he still dared to commandeer the remnants of his cavalry and successfully staved off the Christians. In effect, for them to be obliterated by the second and third Moorish divisions summoned by Yusuf. His elite Senegalese cavalry, their expressions veiled, advanced with stealth. First they attacked the Castillian camp along the Guadiana, and then advanced on Alphonso from the rear.
On sturdy Arabian horses, with raised instruments, galloping, swooping down and breaching their armor, severing limbs to the familiarity of the kettle drum - this threw the Castillian forces into chaos. Alphonso suffered an injury as well, to his leg, permanently crippling him. Far from his kingdom, his rankings in disarray, he was forced to accept defeat and escape with a handful of men. For who did not escape with him, the urgency of retreat befell them, and surely only the most fortunate were given quarter.
Implied avarice
The territory under al-Murabitun hegemony consisted of all the areas and trade routes surrounding Fez (1075 CE), Tangier (1079 CE), Tlemcen (1080 CE), Ceuta (1083 CE), Algiers, Tenes and Oran (1082-83). Yusuf's authority by 1096, at least for the factional kings, went down like castor oil.
The much bandied-about laxness of the emirs, the courts of Malaga, Almeria, Badajoz, Granada, Murcia, Jaen and Seville included, emboldened their Marrakeshian ally. Yusuf found their neglect of office repugnant and dangerous. Tensions remained percolating ten years after the Battle of al-Zallaqa. And the prince of the faithful took umbrage with their frequent appeals for aid.
This era of Andalusian history was marked by it's military weakness. While the arts and sciences flourished with special luster, the ease with which the Christians continued to exact tribute from the emirs changed the trajectory of the conflict.
The disunity and distrust on part of these factional kings assured Yusuf instability on his northern frontier. They were always up for holy war but could barely raise armies. So it followed, Yusuf, as a figure of the orthodoxy, received a legal decree (fatwa) from the Caliph of Baghdad. And taking the legitimacy of his actions even further, he had the blessings of the famous Persian jurist himself, al-Ghazali.
Why Yusuf chose to conquer the Muslim principalities of Spain and Portugal and exile their rulers was a contentious question from the outset. That he made this pivotal decision for less than wise and strategic reasons has largely gone unchallenged. It's the stuff of history that put the honor of his cousin Abu Bakr into question. By his son marching up to Aghmat demanding his father be restored as king, this created an alternative storyline that could be harped upon in the annals. In the story I find most ideal, but more importantly, true, as Basil Davidson put it: "Abu Bakr became the perfect knight of medieval chivalry."
For instance, al-Marrakushi's says in his thirteenth century account of the al-Murabitun dynasty, a little over a century after Yusuf's death:
Abd Allah, when recounting the events of the Battle of al-Zallaqah, at one point before the battle described "news" that Yusuf was "waiting because of some lassitude that had overtaken him and, but for that, he would have been in Christian territory subjugating it."
Yusuf being taken by surprise by a well-staffed Christian army notwithstanding, there is little reason to believe this struck an audible degree of fear in an experienced general. This "news" which can only be described as hearsay, seems woefully inconsistent and specifically designed to to portray his majesty as a coward.
The grateful overtures of the jurists and taxpayers across the peninsula made him an envy of the princes. What may affirm my suspicion of Abd Allah and his given influence over historians that succeeded him, in this regard, is his quoting the poet-king al-Mu'tamid, when introducing this "Almoravid business" to the military narrative of al-Andalus:
But in al-Marrakushi's account, he quotes Yusuf as repeatedly saying "we took the affairs of this Peninsula seriously until we saw it, and now that we have seen it, it has sunk beneath all description." By this, however, al-Murrakushi felt "he was as one happy to drink the froth," as if to say, secretly, the ascetic leader had his cake and was dying to eat it too.
Its hard not to get the impression that the degree to which Yusuf was sedentary, plus singularly focused on bureaucracy, as opposed to division and filiation, astounded his contemporaries. In ways that are both negative and positively powerful. Even though he expressed no nefarious motivations for annexing al-Andalus; even though he never once settled there after its conquest.
It appears their rare and successful orthodox movement (though their Anti-Atlas successors -the Monotheists - accused them of anthropomorphism) spoke to the real dysfunction of the taifa principalities and their collective disdain for the prince of the faithful.
Al-Mu'tamid was exiled to Morocco in 1096. The last sovereign king of al-Andalus. Though heroic and of noble blood, he was still of questionable character - questions Abd Allah never once raised. He murdered the Christian ambassador. By the time of his exile he had conspired with the Castillians against the orthodoxy. He even strangled his dear friend, Ibn 'Ammar' of Silves - the naive, destitute poet-turned-governor of Murcia, with his bare hands. Yusuf's fiercest foe was not The Cid but al-Mu'tamid. If anything the conjecture in The Tibyan as to Yusuf's motivations reflect the bitter cabal of petty rulers who invited him in the first place. Which, only in that respect, counts as sound history.
What can be gleaned from Yusuf's administrative style is the ever-divine resiliency of bureaucracy. He managed to quell tribal divisions, at least during his tenure. He was warned that dealing with every one from al-Mu'tamid to Alphonso VI was risky. Even petty kings seeking his allegiance in private were powerful motivators. Abd Allah's brother, for instance - not the king of Seville - was first to summon the prince of the faithful to Spain.
Extending courtesies to the unknown and untrustworthy, while seemingly a sign of a weakness, is more so - dare I say - a softer prong of his government. For the deserts he came from, while familiar to him as a child and soldier especially, were full of 'unknowns'; veiled men who judged trustworthiness by degrees of culture and commodity.
Whether it was sedition or allies proven untrustworthy, few of his foes could say they were treated unfairly. Yusuf may lend, in fact, less credence to the Khaldunian dialectic. He succumbed to sendentism the moment he came under the spell of the Desert Flower. In reality, so long as they shared power, the Taifa left his northern frontier vulnerable to attack. That he mobilized forces, crossed the straits personally, participated in siege after siege - only to delegate powers to trusted parties and return to Africa every time - is a powerful counter-even chivalric narrative. He governed as no one did before him. Not as vassal to Phoenicians, Greeks or Romans. He kept together a confederation of Sanhadja (resolving differences with others). Plus he pacified their southern frontier and weakened Wagadu's monopoly irreversibly. This wasn't a case of nomadic radicals exposing sedentary corruptions then cyclically succumbing to them. Rather, something even stranger than the Khaldunian dialectic:
Nascent Matrifocalism
M.V.J Molins remarks in the epigraph how the Almoravid regime was seen as especially deferential to women. Not only as political operatives were they significant - as educators, doctors, and singing girls, too. It is said that in Spain, upon their arrival and the exile of al-Mu'tamid: “Young girls dropped their veils, clawed their faces, and ripped their clothes."
Could it be a kind of spirit of the seer Dihya? She who led the resistance against Arab invaders? A nascent matrifocalism "tethered" to ancient tactics?
In part 2 we'll explore this possibility ...
Sources:
Moorish Spain by Richard Fletcher
Les Almoravides by Vincent Lagardère
The Tibyān: Memoirs of ʻAbd Allāh B. Buluggīn, Last Zīrid Amīr of Granada by ʻAbd Allāh ibn Buluggīn, Amin T. Tibi
Writing the Feminine: Women in Arab Sources by Randi Deguilhem, Manuela Marin
http://www.moorishmaiden.org/assets/veils.pdf
http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issu...of.seville.htm
Draa Valley, Morocco
"... women of the Almoravid period were so significant on the political scene that the enemies of the dynasty ... accused that empire of being perverted because they gave power to their women." - Maria Jesus Viguera Molins (167)
A Case Study
Moorish Spain was undergoing seismic changes by the mid-eleventh century. As the independent principalities that arose after the fracturing of the Ummayyad dynasty, it's capital Cordoba, naturally fell within the rigid topography of the Iberian Peninsula. And their respective kings, princes and governors frequently took up arms against each other. A fundamentally Spanish civil war ensued, in an era known as the Taifa Period.
In these times (1008-1086 CE) one was prepared to smite an opponent even of their own kith and kin. Alliances of the Taifa Period (from the Spanish reyes de taifa) were strategically convenient with respect to geography and often unfolded across religious lines. Yusuf ibn Hud, the Muslim prince of Lerida, for example, was forced to pay the Christians in the north in exchange for protection against his own family in neighboring Zaragoza. Of Granada, Almeria, Seville, Jaen, Malaga, Murcia and all the domains of Muslim Iberia, the emirs showed such laxness, perhaps even the opulent princes of the east risked pontificating on their moral decay.
To keep up with the lifestyles of royalty in the Mashriq (Middle East) these emirs, with little exception, levied burdensome taxes on their subjects. Each royal court competed for regional prestige. In attempts to expand their authority, noted royals such as the Abbadid king of Seville, al-Mu'tamid, launched aggressive wars for rather insignificant gains. In 1025, for instance, he raised an army solely to seize a pair of castles in Viseu (Present day NW Portugal). Or his symbolic annexing of Cordoba 40 years past its glory. A hopeless romantic, al-Mu'tamid indulged his beloved, composed his poetry and patronized the arts. But this was all at the expense of responsible governance.
In Granada the sitting emir granted extraordinary powers to Jewish administrators. His stewardship, suffice to say, was in question. Worse, the Muslim royalty were forced to pay tribute or parias to Alfonso VI the Brave, the Christian king of emerging Leon-Castile. And naturally some sought his protection from other Muslims.
The Lamtuna-Sanhaja Berber kingdom in northwest Africa, commanded by Yusuf ibn Tashfin, on the surface was a natural ally against Alphonso. They were well armed, devout Muslims, with strategic advantage in the western Mediterranean. In response to the desperate pleas of Moorish royalty such as al-Mu'tamid - Yusuf thwarted what were the early stages of the Reconquisita. And he had this to say concerning the king of Sevilla:
"It strikes me that this man is throwing away the power which has been placed in his hands. Instead of giving his attention to the good administration and defence of his kingdom, he thinks of nothing else than satisfying the cravings of his passions."The case of the eleventh century reformist African dynasty that usurped power in Muslim Spain, under the auspices of the Abassid Caliph of Baghdad, is too compelling a history to ignore.
Founded by the Maliki scholar Ibn Yasin in the first half of the eleventh century, quickly a thousand man stalwart on the banks of the Senegalese River, preaching a puritanical form of Islam, accumulated thousands more from the vast terrains of heretic Africa. There was still a deep animus for Arab rule throughout the Maghreb. But the expansion of the al-Murabitun accelerated conversions, directly and indirectly. From what began as quaint exchanges when Dula traders extolled the Prophet, had suddenly sprang a zealous movement.
This marked a new era of fortune for all the region. The uncharted capacity of this dynasty, in it's propagation of Islam, its social, economic and military significance, is to this day understudied. More shockingly, the dynasty's love of love and the flowering of chivalry has received almost no scholarly treatment.
The al-Murabitun, the Spanish corruption being "Almoravid," represented a case study to scholars as early as the fourteenth century. In the Muqaddimah for example, the famous polymath Ibn Khaldun, in every way Machiavelli before Machiavelli, saw this obscured empire as the "perfect example" of his conflict theory. This was the earliest known empirical-based, systematic hypothesis to the passage of history. But, specifically, to the face of Islamic history: "to which periodic nomad invasions from the desert to the settled areas are inevitable ... they come to sweep away the decadence of sedentary life before succumbing to it's temptations" (Encyclopedia of Islam).
Enter the 'Desert Flower'
To unravel the story of chivalry is to understand the pivotal nature of this dynasty. Certainly to understand the ribat, the battle of al-Zallaqa, the seeds of Sufism and western philosophy, is not to say this motley crew of Africans were the most refined of men. On the contrary. Fletcher cites one historian who describes their flash-in-the-pan control of the lands of Andalus as an "extended looting expedition."
We'll address this later.
Yusuf's kingdom, before it was "Empire of the Two Shores," was known at its height by 1086 as the "Desert Empire." At the apogee of the Desert Empire they did not yet have the emirs and governors of al-Andalus in their sights. Having pacified the Zenata strongholds to the north, with the tribes of those lands and those of the southern frontier under their sway, their king was content.
Tall, slender, stern, pointy nose, brown skinned, wooly haired, he would have donned the litham, the veil of the Sanhaja Berbers.
Roman geographers painted these veiled warriors as mouthless, mythical creatures, roaming their southern frontier. Berbers were known for attacking the caravan routes headed towards the Mediterranean, trouncing camps then disappearing like locust. Later they came under the pressure of Arab hordes from the east. Who they confronted, resented, but ultimately came to identify with.
In accordance with Maliki doctrine any garments made of silk, or any dyed-red fabric, especially worn by the Persians, would have been forbidden at Yusuf's court. I point this out because it is true, al-Murabitun soldiers in al-Andalus wore silk and gold when left to their own devices.
His temperament as a general and administrator reveals a highly ascetic personality. He spoke Arabic poorly but his faith was never questioned. He would have worn an imama (turban) wrapped like that of his officers. Perhaps a finer embroidered tunic - a kaftan, under a blotched blue striped haik (outer wrap) - reeking of camel.
Who knows the kind of shoes this man wore. Perhaps bound with the finest Kanem leather we should suppose. But nobody could fill them. He took up the reins after his illustrious cousin Abu Bakr ibn-Umar (Ibn Yasin's second general). Both Yusuf and Abu Bakr followed in the footsteps of Yahia ibn Ibrahim, the military complement to Ibn Yasin's spiritual conquest.
This two pronged approach of militarism and spiritualism would come to influence Yusuf profoundly. But more importantly it did not manifest itself in any one figure before him - not in the Maghreb. Abu Bakr was closest but was killed in a Saharan revolt in 1087, like his brother Ibn Yahia before him in 1056 and Ibn Yasin, the founder, in 1059. Yusuf, in contrast, retired and preached the word, and died supposedly at 100 years old.
His cousin Abu Bakr left him more than a rapidly expanding empire. Prior to dislodging on that fateful expedition in the Sahara - along with all his northern territory (including Zenata controlled Sus, and it's capital, Aghmāt) - he left his pious cousin his wife, Zaynab an-Nafzawiyyat.
In an anonymous twelfth century text entitled Kitab al-Istibsar the author assures us "there was none more beautiful or intelligent or witty" than Zaynab. Indeed, this Zaynab, a name meaning "desert flower," was a woman of wealth and standing. In Lagardère's Les Almoravides he says of her:
"Zaynab bint Ishaq al-Nafzawiyya was a noble and beautiful woman of princely blood who captivated the entire world, as much as by her imposing beauty as by her intelligent perspicacity. Our sources state that some claimed she was a sorceress or a magician. People said that she controlled the jinn. According to one legend, she had the keys to underground treasures from which the happy mortal who won her affection and married her would be able to gain. In short, she was the subject of many fables."In her lifetime, Zaynab would wed two emirs and make one of another. Starting with Luqūt al-Maghrāwi, the emir of Aghmāt. Upon his death in battle against the emerging al-Murabitun, the ambitious Zaynab found herself extravagantly wealthy. She saw in this fortune a counterpart, a strong arm, shielding her rich coffers.
She saw herself as the key to the Maghreb. And she was choosy towards suitors. Luqūt proved to be too weak to protect her. She required someone shrewd and fearless. Now that Abu Bakr was the keeper of Aghmāt, he would take her as a wife. The fortune of Luqūt being a major incentive.
They consummated their marriage in the fall of 1068. However, that resolve that attracted her to Abu Bakr was precisely why he left her two and a half years later. He saw the folly in suggesting she depart with him, leave the life of luxury, to suppress the upheaval at the nucleus of Lamtuna-Hajja power, the Sahara.
Abu Bakr as king and general was remarkably shrewd, fair and just. He recognized Zaynab's leadership qualities. He could do nothing but recommend his cousin take her hand in marriage. And that he did: "Marry her. She's a woman of genius."
"Sometimes a woman will be accompanied by her husband," observed Ibn Battuta of similar creatures in imperial Turkey, and "anyone seeing him would take him for one of her servants." Conditions had long suited powerful female personages coexisting with imposing military men. Africa was no exception, though by no means was Yusuf the Desert Flower's shrinking violet.
As it goes with this dynasty and in many ways their Masmuda successors: highly disciplined military men conceded relatively more powers to women. Yusuf, once a lieutenant for Abu Bakr, adopted a sophisticated attitude toward governing. Undoubtedly under the influence of his twice widowed wife, he even ceased participating in his own campaigns (a promise she had to know he wouldn't keep).
When Abu Bakr returned from his Saharan campaigns - having victoriously re-opened important trade routes shortly before returning and fighting to his death - it was Zaynab who coaxed Yusuf to trust in his cousin's faculty of reason.
(Reason, as it happens, was held in such stately regard that the prayer room inscription in the Koubba tower - the Almoravid's last surviving architectural monument in Morocco - reads: "I was created for science and prayer, by the prince of the believers, descendant of the prophet, Abdallah, most glorious of all Caliphs. Pray for him when you enter the door, so that you may fulfill your highest hopes.")
The age of Abu Bakr, after all, was over. He saw his cousin expand the empire over the plains of Morocco and secure territory of vital importance. Knowing the likely result, but to satisfy his supporters, he did attempt to reclaim his throne half-heartedly. According to The Bayan, Zaynab said to Yusuf:
"Your cousin is much too pious to spill blood. When you meet him, leave out all marks of deference and humility which he expects from you. Pretend to be full of pride and to have a taste for autocracy as if you wished to be his rival. Nevertheless, flatter him by giving him rich gifts, robes of honour and other precious gifts of the Maghrib. Offer him a lot of these, because he lives in the Sahara and thinks of all that is brought to him from here are rare and curious items."Inside the Struggle
Yusuf's style of governing was clearly pragmatic. And this trickled down at least to his more trusted officers. When one of his generals confronted the remnants of Abu Bakr's power - his son, the governor of Sijimasa, he reasoned with him, to dissuade the proud prince, who from the very beginning frowned upon his father abdicating the throne. The prince marched forth to Aghmāt with his army, demanding his father be restored as king (mind you without his consent). But ultimately he deferred to reason.
Gifts were seemingly a prerequisite for negotiating with hostile parties. This could have had only a marginal effect on the prince who was more than familiar with the revelry of the Mediterranean. With distractions such as these with great potential for damage, Yusuf's emphasis on law and order (as opposed to tribal division) and Zaynab's injection of 'reason' - managed to solve problems beyond their immediate control.
The aristocracy called him Amir al-Mu'minin (Commander of the Faithful), a title he refused. That name was reserved for the Caliph of Baghdad (although the Caliph himself said it suited him). Yusuf instead came to take Amir al-Muslimin (Prince of the Faithful). Though he was unofficially recognized as the Caliph of the western Islamic empire.
His court at Marrakesh, at the height of the tumultuous Taifa period, represented last refuge for Islam in the entire region. In this was apparent a desperation on the part of the Party Kings. The commitment they asked of him (as defectors poured over the Straits of Gibraltar into his kingdom) put him in a delicate position. One of the more important decisions Yusuf had to make turned out to be one of the most important in human history. If we consider the ramifications, particularly the lasting impressions of identity as resultant, it is indeed one of those decisions.
Our al-Mu'tamid, the principal party king of Moorish Spain - the empathetic and at times sinister poet of Seville - loved by everyone "for his chivalric brilliance and romantic misfortunes," made direct appeal to Yusuf in the fall of 1086 (a year before Abu Bakr's death was a signal to his authority).
The Castillian and Leonese troops carved a straight path from their kingdom in the north, down to the tiny town of Tarifa, just across the straits from Yusuf. Their paramount king Alphonso VI then stated: "This is the border of Andalus."
His treasury bolstered by the tribute of the princes, exacting monetary pain as he and his father had done for 80 years, suffice to say did not quench the power thirsty Castillian king.
Al-Mu'tamid failed to hasten his annual tribute. And Alphonso took exception when paid with degraded coinage. Al-Mu'tamid made matters worse when he murdered the Castillian ambassador to Seville. War was inevitable. His kingdom was the grandest of all the Taifa principalities. He was successful up to this point driving from her premises all the armed bands of outsiders, Christian and Muslim.
But these newfound tensions forced him to weigh outsiders like Yusuf as the solution.
Alphonso sent out two small contingents after his ambassador's death to ravage the Sevillian hinterlands and disrupt what little serenity that kingdom enjoyed. Yusuf's pivotal decision was thus presaged by a more animated call by the king of Seville.
The poet-king was warned by his eldest son Rashid, his request was dangerous: inviting a foreign army of orthodoxy would be the death knell for the Abbadid, even on the grounds Yusuf's troops leave after battle. Then al-Mutamid replied, in a stage of grief: "I would rather be a cameldriver in Africa than a swinheherd in Castile."
Yusuf complied as the maintenance of his kingdom in Africa permitted.
History calls the ensuing war in the fall of 1086 The Battle of al-Zallaqa. The battle took place on the Zallaqa plains west of the Taifa city of Badajoz. The resulting carnage was said to have had left the terrain slick with blood.
Yusuf sent a letter to the Christian king, as was custom and courtesy of Muslim rulers, extending to him the options of converting, paying tribute (jizya), or meeting for battle. Alphonso, of course, anxious to test his mettle, agreed to battle, and set up his camp alongside the Guadiana River. At the other side a Moorish contingent awaited.
He must have known Alphonso the Brave would choose battle. He crossed the straits too quickly for him to respond. In fact, this was Yusuf's first trip across the straits. After he secured his strategic obsession, Ceuta, and eliminated his Zanata rivals. He crossed the straits, made his rounds and prepared for war. At the same time, he was greeted as a dignitary, showered with gifts and courtesies. He had the blessings of the most stalwart Maliki jurists of Andalusia, who saw in him deliverance.
Before arriving in Seville as al-Mu'tamid's guest, he first saw to the fortification of Algerciras just outside the quaint town of Tarifa (to which Alphonso had penetrated from the north dangerously close to his kingdom). Yusuf arrived with roughly 15,000 men primarily from the Western Sahara. Notably those on horseback were recognized as knights of the ribât.
The ribât
Dar al-Islam (the abode of faith) is ultimately where we get the term al-Murabitun. Yusuf's actions in the eleventh-twelfth centuries is perhaps the only reason "marabout" appears even in English lexicon, describing "one who is garrisoned.” The fort from which the al-Murabitun conquered the Maghreb and Andalus was called Ribat al-Fath ("The camp of victory"). These were soldiers bound to religious duty, both men of arms, but also reciters of the Qu'ran (qurra) and jurists (fuqaha). And mingled amongst them saints and hermits.
Mastery over the esoterica of Sufism for instance, in Morocco, occurred a full 250 years after it flowered in the Mashriq, a century after it appeared in Moorish Spain. This speaks to a certain strain of radical isolationism at the time, since those we know as Moors were quite resistant to Arab rule and, by extension, the Muslim faith (again, up until the al-Murabitun campaigns). For the term "Africa," a corruption of Ifriqiyya - either of Berber, Phoenician or Greek origin - meaning "hermit" or "cavedweller," had for a long period determined the character of a continent.
The term ribât is from where we get al-Murabitun (al-mu-rabitun), "a verbal noun derived from râbata, yurâbitu, meaning "to station and stay in place..." Explained by the Islamic Encyclopedia:
"The idea of the ribat moved to North Africa, Andalusia, and Sicily by means of Harthama ibn A'yan, who was the first to found a ribat in North Africa when he fortified the first ribat in 179 AH. The term ribat is used in Spanish in the form rebato, rápita and rávita, which indicates "a sudden attack carried out by a body of horsemen in accordance with Muslim tactics."This is confirmed by any number of Islamic scholars. "Holding fast to outposts of the Islamic lands in order to protect the Muslims therein," as defined by thirteenth century philosopher Ibn Rush'd (Averroes). His description is consistent with the varying functions of these fortifications. The ribât, therefore, is a hub or garrison; symbols of both brute and intellectual hegemony, nestled on high foundations beside rivers and lakes if at all possible, or in the desert, atop the highest peaks.
The sense of duty among the residents was never so clearly defined. And more often than not poets, mystics and kettle-drummers could be seen marching in lock step behind an armed cavalry - Yusuf's battles being no exception.
Interestingly, "tethering a horse in enemy territory" enhances our understanding. The ribât and the zawiyya combined were equivalent to the monasteries springing about feudal Europe. But they had not effectively taken shape in the Maghreb (nor did Sufism in Spain) until the mid-thirteenth century. The zawiyya housed the religious clergy, fed the needy, and encouraged literacy; while the ribât remained for the purpose of military operations and specifically cavalry. While these housing distinctions had not yet appeared in full during Yusuf's time, his administrative style reflected them.
Manifest in Yusuf's hosts was the al-Murabitun's success in pacifying the west African plate and getting otherwise warring factions to comply to a cause greater than themselves (namely abolishing unfair taxes).
Soldiers came everywhere from the corners of Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Burkin Faso, Guinea and Wagadu. Their iron pikes raised to the challenge. From Sanhaja in Timbuktu to the Zanata cohorts, whose appellation explains present day "Senegal." 2,000 Senegalese cavalrymen, each with a fine-white Arabian steed, served as Yusuf's personal guard. His hosts no doubt consisted of scores of chevaliers. But to this day nothing has come down to us accounting for soldiers on foot. Chances are they were mostly infantry.
With cuirasses of the finest Kanem leather, still issuing the protection of their hearts to god, they were installed as infantry from the various independent sultanates between them (independent kingdoms were a defining characteristic of African Islam). They were joined by 10,000 fighters from Seville, Badajoz, Granada and Almeria. An estimated 25-20,000 Arabs, Moors and Mozarabs total, challenging Alphonso's formidable 70,000.
Encamped a mere three miles apart, the agreed upon date was certain to be ignored by Alphonso the Brave. Having seen his reply to Yusuf, reading:
“Friday is your [Holy Day]. Saturday is the Jews'; they are our ministers and scribes, and make up the majority of the servants in the army and we cannot do without them. Sunday is our [Holy Day]. So Monday would be the best day to begin operations”Al-Mu'tamid advised Yusuf not to take Alphonso at his word. But Yusuf out of piety - if not to keep up with impressions - dressed appropriately for Friday prayer. And was caught off guard that morning by a most daunting sight. Upon seeing Alphonso and his troops aligned for battle, Yusuf turned to al-Mu'tamid: "I didn't realize that this pig - may God curse him, had grown to such proportions."
In his memoir, Abd Allah, the party king of Granada, captures what appears to be a rather tepid Yusuf. Yusuf wasn't used to being unprepared for battle. What they witnessed was the first 'real' representation of a European host. Alphonso attracted soldiers from the surrounding lands of Christendom. Mounted Gauls and Italians in decorative armor, with swords of fine steel. Alphonso's ruthless reputation preceded him.
Legend has it in a wager over a game of chess between Alphonso and Seville's prime minister, Ibn Ammar, Seville itself was at stake. Luckily Ibn Ammar was a master of the game. They were spared the specter of witnessing their kingdom raised to rubble right then and there. This however would have been before the Sevillian king murdered Alphonso's ambassador. A munificent excuse for the Castillians to strike first.
Al-Mu'tamid led the initial company against Alphonso. By the end of the battle at least three horses were killed under him. Wounded himself on the head and torso, amid the calm of battle, he still dared to commandeer the remnants of his cavalry and successfully staved off the Christians. In effect, for them to be obliterated by the second and third Moorish divisions summoned by Yusuf. His elite Senegalese cavalry, their expressions veiled, advanced with stealth. First they attacked the Castillian camp along the Guadiana, and then advanced on Alphonso from the rear.
On sturdy Arabian horses, with raised instruments, galloping, swooping down and breaching their armor, severing limbs to the familiarity of the kettle drum - this threw the Castillian forces into chaos. Alphonso suffered an injury as well, to his leg, permanently crippling him. Far from his kingdom, his rankings in disarray, he was forced to accept defeat and escape with a handful of men. For who did not escape with him, the urgency of retreat befell them, and surely only the most fortunate were given quarter.
Implied avarice
The territory under al-Murabitun hegemony consisted of all the areas and trade routes surrounding Fez (1075 CE), Tangier (1079 CE), Tlemcen (1080 CE), Ceuta (1083 CE), Algiers, Tenes and Oran (1082-83). Yusuf's authority by 1096, at least for the factional kings, went down like castor oil.
The much bandied-about laxness of the emirs, the courts of Malaga, Almeria, Badajoz, Granada, Murcia, Jaen and Seville included, emboldened their Marrakeshian ally. Yusuf found their neglect of office repugnant and dangerous. Tensions remained percolating ten years after the Battle of al-Zallaqa. And the prince of the faithful took umbrage with their frequent appeals for aid.
This era of Andalusian history was marked by it's military weakness. While the arts and sciences flourished with special luster, the ease with which the Christians continued to exact tribute from the emirs changed the trajectory of the conflict.
The disunity and distrust on part of these factional kings assured Yusuf instability on his northern frontier. They were always up for holy war but could barely raise armies. So it followed, Yusuf, as a figure of the orthodoxy, received a legal decree (fatwa) from the Caliph of Baghdad. And taking the legitimacy of his actions even further, he had the blessings of the famous Persian jurist himself, al-Ghazali.
Why Yusuf chose to conquer the Muslim principalities of Spain and Portugal and exile their rulers was a contentious question from the outset. That he made this pivotal decision for less than wise and strategic reasons has largely gone unchallenged. It's the stuff of history that put the honor of his cousin Abu Bakr into question. By his son marching up to Aghmat demanding his father be restored as king, this created an alternative storyline that could be harped upon in the annals. In the story I find most ideal, but more importantly, true, as Basil Davidson put it: "Abu Bakr became the perfect knight of medieval chivalry."
For instance, al-Marrakushi's says in his thirteenth century account of the al-Murabitun dynasty, a little over a century after Yusuf's death:
"Al-Mu'tamid met him with the leading men of his state, and displayed more reverence and deference towards him than the Amir al-Muslimin had expected. [Al-Mu'tamid] presented him with kingly gifts, presents and riches such as Yusuf could not imagine a king possessing. It was this that first kindled a longing for the kingdom of al-Andalus in Yusuf's heart."Forced into exile first, Abd Allah, the emir of Granada, along with his brother Tamim, the emir of Malaga, both became residents of Aghmāt. In his memoirs, Abd Allah happened to produce what is seen as the most authoritative contemporary history of Moorish Iberia, The Tibyan. Abd Allah describes his sentiment upon the arrival of Yusuf:
"I [...] proceeded without delay to meet him and was pleased to do so. With men and money I made whatever preparations I could for the jihad. I presented the Amir of the Muslims with a gift and, the moment he informed me of his arrival in the Peninsula, I ordered that drums be beaten and that plans for rejoicing be made. I thought his arrival in al-Andalus a blessing from God which was particularly important for me, especially in view of our blood relationship and of widespread reports of their good deeds, their zeal for the hereafter and their justice. I, therefore, decided to devote my life and property to the cause of the jihad by taking my place at his side every year so that those who lived might live with honour in safety and protection, and those who died might die as martyrs. During that campaign, the remarkable thing was that our intentions were so noble and our minds sincere that it seemed as though our hearts were united in our endeavour."
Abd Allah, when recounting the events of the Battle of al-Zallaqah, at one point before the battle described "news" that Yusuf was "waiting because of some lassitude that had overtaken him and, but for that, he would have been in Christian territory subjugating it."
Yusuf being taken by surprise by a well-staffed Christian army notwithstanding, there is little reason to believe this struck an audible degree of fear in an experienced general. This "news" which can only be described as hearsay, seems woefully inconsistent and specifically designed to to portray his majesty as a coward.
The grateful overtures of the jurists and taxpayers across the peninsula made him an envy of the princes. What may affirm my suspicion of Abd Allah and his given influence over historians that succeeded him, in this regard, is his quoting the poet-king al-Mu'tamid, when introducing this "Almoravid business" to the military narrative of al-Andalus:
"If a man is not succoured by God, The greater will be his suffering as a result of his own striving."Not to say they had no right to be suspicious. Fletcher's "extended looting expedition" is harsh but essentially true. The Party Kings had long feared Yusuf as a threat to their security, knowing any time he could usurp their authority.
But in al-Marrakushi's account, he quotes Yusuf as repeatedly saying "we took the affairs of this Peninsula seriously until we saw it, and now that we have seen it, it has sunk beneath all description." By this, however, al-Murrakushi felt "he was as one happy to drink the froth," as if to say, secretly, the ascetic leader had his cake and was dying to eat it too.
Its hard not to get the impression that the degree to which Yusuf was sedentary, plus singularly focused on bureaucracy, as opposed to division and filiation, astounded his contemporaries. In ways that are both negative and positively powerful. Even though he expressed no nefarious motivations for annexing al-Andalus; even though he never once settled there after its conquest.
It appears their rare and successful orthodox movement (though their Anti-Atlas successors -the Monotheists - accused them of anthropomorphism) spoke to the real dysfunction of the taifa principalities and their collective disdain for the prince of the faithful.
Al-Mu'tamid was exiled to Morocco in 1096. The last sovereign king of al-Andalus. Though heroic and of noble blood, he was still of questionable character - questions Abd Allah never once raised. He murdered the Christian ambassador. By the time of his exile he had conspired with the Castillians against the orthodoxy. He even strangled his dear friend, Ibn 'Ammar' of Silves - the naive, destitute poet-turned-governor of Murcia, with his bare hands. Yusuf's fiercest foe was not The Cid but al-Mu'tamid. If anything the conjecture in The Tibyan as to Yusuf's motivations reflect the bitter cabal of petty rulers who invited him in the first place. Which, only in that respect, counts as sound history.
What can be gleaned from Yusuf's administrative style is the ever-divine resiliency of bureaucracy. He managed to quell tribal divisions, at least during his tenure. He was warned that dealing with every one from al-Mu'tamid to Alphonso VI was risky. Even petty kings seeking his allegiance in private were powerful motivators. Abd Allah's brother, for instance - not the king of Seville - was first to summon the prince of the faithful to Spain.
Extending courtesies to the unknown and untrustworthy, while seemingly a sign of a weakness, is more so - dare I say - a softer prong of his government. For the deserts he came from, while familiar to him as a child and soldier especially, were full of 'unknowns'; veiled men who judged trustworthiness by degrees of culture and commodity.
Whether it was sedition or allies proven untrustworthy, few of his foes could say they were treated unfairly. Yusuf may lend, in fact, less credence to the Khaldunian dialectic. He succumbed to sendentism the moment he came under the spell of the Desert Flower. In reality, so long as they shared power, the Taifa left his northern frontier vulnerable to attack. That he mobilized forces, crossed the straits personally, participated in siege after siege - only to delegate powers to trusted parties and return to Africa every time - is a powerful counter-even chivalric narrative. He governed as no one did before him. Not as vassal to Phoenicians, Greeks or Romans. He kept together a confederation of Sanhadja (resolving differences with others). Plus he pacified their southern frontier and weakened Wagadu's monopoly irreversibly. This wasn't a case of nomadic radicals exposing sedentary corruptions then cyclically succumbing to them. Rather, something even stranger than the Khaldunian dialectic:
Nascent Matrifocalism
M.V.J Molins remarks in the epigraph how the Almoravid regime was seen as especially deferential to women. Not only as political operatives were they significant - as educators, doctors, and singing girls, too. It is said that in Spain, upon their arrival and the exile of al-Mu'tamid: “Young girls dropped their veils, clawed their faces, and ripped their clothes."
Could it be a kind of spirit of the seer Dihya? She who led the resistance against Arab invaders? A nascent matrifocalism "tethered" to ancient tactics?
In part 2 we'll explore this possibility ...
Sources:
Moorish Spain by Richard Fletcher
Les Almoravides by Vincent Lagardère
The Tibyān: Memoirs of ʻAbd Allāh B. Buluggīn, Last Zīrid Amīr of Granada by ʻAbd Allāh ibn Buluggīn, Amin T. Tibi
Writing the Feminine: Women in Arab Sources by Randi Deguilhem, Manuela Marin
http://www.moorishmaiden.org/assets/veils.pdf
http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issu...of.seville.htm
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