The Battle of Zama

The Battle of Zama, 202 BC



A match up in history of arguably the two greatest commanders of their day, and among the best of the ancient world. The battle, fought in 202 BC, was the last battle of the Second Punic War, and one which began Rome's domination of the Mediterranean.



Number of troops and organisation




Hannibal's Forces and Deployment:



Hannibal's infantry were set up in three lines, each line generally agreed to have been made up of 12,000 men for a total of 36,000 infantry and 2000 Carthaginian citizen cavalry.

The Numidian Prince Tychaeus brought 2000 cavalry.

A force of 80 elephants (which has been doubted by Richard Gabriel who suggests as it takes up to 20 years to train war elephants to a sufficient standard, the Carthaginians had already used up their best in the war already. De Sanctis and Gabriel believe there was more likely only about 20 young and inexperienced elephants in Hannibal's army)

Total Strength: 40,000 (though Appian says 50,000, but this is generally rejected by modern historians)

Deployment: Hannibal drew up his infantry in 3 lines, each 12,000 strong (though it's possible his third line of veterans was made up of more, perhaps some 15,000 men). The first line were mercenaries: Ligurians, Celts, Balearic Islanders and Moors, and had been raised by Mago (who had died returning from Italy in 203 BC). In front of this line were light armed skirmishers and 80 elephants. At a certain distance behind the first line, the second consisted of native Libyans and Carthaginians. They were given orders not to support the first line, but to follow behind and keep their distance. The third line was at a greater distance from the second, more than a furlong, and were Hannibal's Old Guard, his veterans from Italy, thought to have been made up of mostly Bruttians, but no doubt some of the old survivors who had marched with him from Spain too, who would have been in their 40s at least by now. They were to act as an independent reserve, and halted when the first two lines advanced, creating an even bigger gap between them. Hannibal posted his cavalry on the wings, with the Numidians on the left, and the Carthaginians on the right.




Scipio's Forces and Deployment:



There are no solid figures for the size of Scipio's army, but it is usually reckoned to have been made up of about 30,000 infantry (including 6,000 Numidians) and over 6,100 cavalry (1,500 Roman and Italian, 4,600 Numidian)

Total Strength: 36,100

Deployment: Scipio deployed his troops in the usual three line formation – but instead of the principes covering the gaps of the hastati maniples, they were set up directly behind them, the triarii forming the final line. The intervals between the front maniples were filled with companies of velites. This created lanes, which he hid from Hannibal with the velites. Laelius' Italian horse was on the left wing, and Masinissa and all his Numidians on the right. (the Numdian infantry are fought to have either been placed with the velites, on the flanks of the Roman legionaries, or mixed in with the Numidian horse. I believe they were most likely mixed in with the velites, sadly it is impossible to determine – maybe just have them on the legionary flanks would be easier!)




The Battle:


Phase 1:

The skirmishers open up the battle in the plain between the two armies, but neither side gains an advantage.

Phase 2:

Hannibal orders his elephants to charge, hoping they will strike a hammer blow against the Roman infantry. The skirmishers on both sides disperse as the elephants charge forward.

Phase 3:

Hannibal orders his army forward following the elephant charge. Scipio orders the horns and trumpets to blast and panics the young elephants, causing some of them to stampede through Hannibal's Numdian cavalry on the Punic left flank.

Phase 4:

Masinissa charges Hannibal's Numdians, and sweeps them from the field. The elephants however have reached the main Roman line. Some are driven back, some are killed, while others are drawn through the lanes and killed. Roman losses are heavy, (thought to be mainly among the velites) but they hold their ranks. Some elephants stampede towards Hannibal's cavalry on the right flank, disrupting formations.

Phase 5:

Laelius charges the disrupted Carthaginian cavalry and routs them. The fight is now an infantry battle. Hannibal orders his first two lines forward and the Romans redress their ranks and advance to meet them.

Phase 6:

The mercenaries of the first rank are broken, Roman short swords and discipline gaining the upper-hand. The mercenaries flee but their path is blocked by the Carthaginian levies in the second line. Fighting breaks out amongst Hannibal's first two lines as the mercenaries try to cut their way through the levies ranks to freedom, (Gabriel belives this is a misunderstanding, and Hannibal ordered the second line forward to engage the Romans, trapping some of the mercenaries). Trapped between the second line and the Romans, the mercenaries are hacked to pieces and are destroyed.

Phase 7:

The Carthaginian line counterattacks and presses the hastati back and causing them some confusion. They rally only because the principes stand firm, and together drive back the Carthaginian levies and break them. Hannibal's third line rebuffs the broken second line's attempts to force through the line who are driven to the open plains on the flanks.

Phase 8:

Scipio redresses his formation, and lengthens his line so that the principes and triarii are on the hastati flanks. As Scipio was organising his men, Hannibal also reorganised his line, adding those that had survived and not ran from the field from the first two ranks - and deploying them onto the flanks of his veteran line.

Phase 9:

The lines meet, and the battle hangs in the balance, but the return of the cavalry tips the scales into Scipio's favour, and the cavalry charge into the rear of the Carthaginians. Hannibal's veterans put up a final stand but most are killed. Hannibal manages to flee.

Result:

Hannibal suffers his only serious defeat, and it is a crushing one. The Carthaginian losses are around 20,000, with nearly as many taken prisoner. Roman casualties are said to have been 1,500 to 2,500, though we are not told of Masinissa's losses other than they suffered greater losses than the Romans did.


Conclusions and notes:


Two thirds of Hannibal's infantry force were unreliable, a third completely freshly levied, only the third line made up of his veterans of Italy were an instrument of Hannibal's will. The rest were made up of disparate armies that had yet to gel. Scipio's infantry were a homogenous force and very experienced, made up of veterans who had seen constant service since at least 216 BC (made up of the remnants of Cannae, and the two battles of Herdonia, who continued to fight and campaign in Sicily and then in Africa) - Scipio's infantry had the advantage overall - not in numbers, but in organization and overall experience.

Hannibal is also thought to have devised a plan to level the playing field in regards to the cavalry. Both H.H Scullard and Richard Gabriel believe Hannibal gave them the order to give ground and drive the opposition off the field, which could explain the ease of the Roman victory here (though against this they may well have just perused too far, and Lazenby believes that it would have been very risky to expose his flanks like this). With the cavalry off the field, Hannibal's only chance of victory would be to break the Roman centre, thus he threw all his weight against the numerically inferior Romans, starting with the elephants, then three waves of infantry. The strategy almost worked, as we can see the hastati were exhausted after their struggles against the first two lines. It is also thought that Hannibal set up the third line to prevent Scipio's infantry flanking his first two lines,.

Scipio's own tactics were the set up of his maniples and the use of the lanes to funnel the elephants, and the extension of his line to engage Hannibal's veterans. Scipio's tactics relied on turning the phalanx into echelon, which he did by discarding the usual quincunx formation by placing the triarii and principes back from the front line making the last two lines capable of independent manoeuvre, which Hannibal nullified completely with the use of his third line, thus Scipio engaged in the normal Roman frontal slog rather than use his manoeuvres from earlier battles. Hannibal's third line also is considered the first true reserve in history. Gabriel believes out of the two plans, Hannibal's was the most sophisticated (Gabriel, p.199)

Scipio's legions were superior infantry and cavalry wise, disciplined to the degree that they responded very quickly and efficiently to re-calls and re-distributions. But they were stopped in their tracks by Hannibal and his veterans. (Thanks SpartanJKM!)

Strategically before the battle, both were considering the same objective, to reach their allies from the west (mainly for cavalry support); Scipio was searching for Massinissa, Hannibal for Vermina and both generals moved their armies towards them. It was a risk on both their parts as they had no control over it, but perhaps Scipio had more reliable information where Massinissa was. Massinissa arrived first at any rate. Vermina arrived just a few days too late to help Hannibal, and was bringing a large force to compliment the Carthaginian which Livy puts at 16,200 men. Livy's date that the battle against Vermina happened three months after Zama makes no sense as Vermina would not sally forth to Zama to fight Scipio's army unless he was there to support Hannibal.


The story of Hannibal being too far from water also appears suspicious. According to Gabriel (p.191):


Why Hannibal would have made such a basic mistake in not providing water for his army and animals in the obviously hot and dry climate is not explained...

It's interesting to wonder what just may have happened had Hannibal linked up with Vermina's force in time...


Bibliography:


Carey, Hannibal's Last Battle: Zama & the Fall of Carthage, 2007

Gabriel, Scipio Africanus: Rome's Greatest General, 2008

Gabriel, Hannibal, 2011

Lazenby, Hannibal's War, 1997

Scullard, Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician, 1970