Historum - History Forums - Blogs - markdienekes http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/ Historum History Discussion Forums en Sat, 25 May 2013 16:22:03 GMT vBulletin 60 http://cdn.historum.com/images/classic/misc/rss.jpg Historum - History Forums - Blogs - markdienekes http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/ Second Punic War - Carthaginian Navy http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/1614-second-punic-war-carthaginian-navy.html Thu, 02 May 2013 12:21:50 GMT (just a place for me to keep some easy to reference passages - when I find some more time, I hope to include all Carthaginian naval activity during... (just a place for me to keep some easy to reference passages - when I find some more time, I hope to include all Carthaginian naval activity during the war)

These are just some of the passages in Livy that reveal a number of naval operations and landings of forces from Africa during the war.

Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian commander, did not feel himself strong enough in either arm, and kept himself safe by taking up strong positions at a distance from the enemy; until, in response to his many earnest appeals for reinforcements, 4000 infantry and 1000 cavalry were sent to him from Africa. Then, recovering his confidence, he moved nearer the enemy, and gave orders for the fleet to be put into readiness to protect the islands and the coast. (23.26)

In the meanwhile the news was brought to Carthage that things had gone badly in Spain and that almost all the communities in that country had gone over to Rome. Mago, Hannibal's brother, was preparing to transport to Italy a force of 12,000 infantry, 1500 cavalry, and 20 elephants, escorted by a fleet of 60 warships. On the receipt of this news, however, some were in favour of Mago, with such a fleet and army as he had, going to Spain instead of Italy, but whilst they were deliberating there was a sudden gleam of hope that Sardinia might be recovered. They were told that "there was only a small Roman army there, the old praetor, A. Cornelius, who knew the province well, was leaving and a fresh one was expected; the Sardinians, too, were tired of their long subjection, and during the last twelve months the government had been harsh and rapacious and had crushed them with a heavy tax and an unfair exaction of corn. Nothing was wanting but a leader to head their revolt. "This report was brought by some secret agents from their leaders, the prime mover in the matter being Hampsicora, the most influential and wealthy man amongst them at that time. Perturbed by the news from Spain, and at the same time elated by the Sardinian report, they sent Mago with his fleet and army to Spain and selected Hasdrubal to conduct the operations in Sardinia, assigning to him a force about as large as the one they had furnished to Mago. (23.32)

The army sent to Sardinia was defeated there (Livy, 23.40) and shortly afterwards, a naval battle took place in which Hasdrubal was defeated by Titus Otacilius Crassus (23.41) as Hasdrubal was returning to Africa.

Very few were influenced by Hanno's speech. His well-known dislike of the Barcas deprived his words of weight and they were too much preoccupied with the delightful news they had just heard to listen to anything which would make them feel less cause for joy. They fancied that if they were willing to make a slight effort the war would soon be over. A resolution was accordingly passed with great enthusiasm to reinforce Hannibal with 4000 Numidians, 40 elephants, and 500 talents of silver. (23.13)

But they did not remain quiet long, for just after this battle an order was received from Carthage for Hasdrubal to lead his army as soon as he could into Italy. This became generally known throughout Spain and the result was that there was a universal feeling in favour of Rome. Hasdrubal at once sent a despatch to Carthage pointing out what mischief the mere rumour of his departure had caused, and also that if he did really leave Spain it would pass into the hands of the Romans before he crossed the Ebro. He went on to say that not only had he neither a force nor a general to leave in his place, but the Roman generals were men whom he found it difficult to oppose even when his strength was equal to theirs. If, therefore, they were at all anxious to retain Spain they should send a man with a powerful army to succeed him, and even though all went well with his successor he would not find it an easy province to govern. (23.27) (this passage is relevant to understand the one below)

Although this despatch made a great impression on the senate, they decided that as Italy demanded their first and closest attention, the arrangements about Hannibal and his forces must not be altered. Himilco was sent with a large and well-appointed army and an augmented fleet to hold and defend Spain by sea and land. As soon as he had brought his military and naval forces across he formed an entrenched camp, hauled his ships up on the beach and surrounded them with a rampart. After providing for the safety of his force he started with a picked body of cavalry, and marching as rapidly as possible, and being equally on the alert whether passing through doubtful or through hostile tribes, succeeded in reaching Hasdrubal. After laying before him the resolutions and instructions of the senate and being in his turn shown in what way the war was to be managed in Spain, he returned to his camp. (23.28)

Himilco, who had been for a considerable time cruising with his fleet off the promontory of Pachynus, returned to Carthage as soon as he heard that Syracuse had been seized by Hippocrates. Supported by the envoys from Hippocrates and by a despatch from Hannibal in which he said that the time had arrived for winning back Sicily in the most glorious way, and by the weight of his own personal presence, he had no difficulty in persuading the government to send to Sicily as large a force as they could of both infantry and cavalry. Sailing back to the island he landed at Heraclea an army of 20,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, and twelve elephants, a very much stronger force than he had with him at Pachynus (24.35)

After Marcellus' departure from Sicily a Carthaginian fleet landed a force of 8000 infantry and 3000 Numidian horse. (26.21)

In regards to strengthening Hannibal's brother Mago's position in northern Italy:

To Mago they sent not only instructions but also 25 warships, a force of 6000 infantry, 800 cavalry and 7 elephants. A large amount of money was also forwarded to him to enable him to raise a body of mercenaries, with which he might be able to move nearer Rome and form a junction with Hannibal. Such were the preparations and plans of Carthage. (29.4) ]]> markdienekes http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/1614-second-punic-war-carthaginian-navy.html ARK http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/1382-ark.html Wed, 20 Feb 2013 14:10:02 GMT Just made my website for my first novel I plan on publishing through Amazon Kindle soon. http://www.markdunstanark.com/ARK/the-world-of-ark/ ... Just made my website for my first novel I plan on publishing through Amazon Kindle soon.

http://www.markdunstanark.com/ARK/the-world-of-ark/

Take a look if you want. There isn't much there at the moment, but there is a blurb! ]]> markdienekes http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/1382-ark.html Hannibal vs Scipio http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/1381-hannibal-vs-scipio.html Wed, 20 Feb 2013 13:50:41 GMT These are some of my thoughts on the old debate made in this thread: ... These are some of my thoughts on the old debate made in this thread:

http://www.historum.com/ancient-hist...al-caesar.html ]]> markdienekes http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/1381-hannibal-vs-scipio.html Mago Barca http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/713-mago-barca.html Wed, 25 Jan 2012 11:15:28 GMT
Mago Barca
240/39 BC - 203 BC

Hannibal's youngest brother, Mago, was born in 239-240 BC and arrived in Spain at the age of thirteen. He probably accompanied Hannibal in his early Spanish campaigns between 221-219 BC, before setting off with his brother for the invasion of Italy in 218 BC.

Mago took part in Hannibal's early victories at the Ticinus, Victumulae, Trebia, Lake Trasimene and Cannae, and it was only after Cannae that we get to see Mago in command of his own armies. First I shall look at his actions in Hannibal's victories, as it does present a picture of a competent tactical commander using both infantry and cavalry. The first time he is mentioned by our principle source Polybius is during the winter of 218 BC, and just before Hannibal's first major conflict with the Roman army at the Battle of the Trebia. Livy gives us a little detail of actions beforehand, where Mago is the first to cross the river Po with a force of Spanish cavalry, proceeding towards Placentia ahead of the main body of Hannibal's army towards the enemy, no doubt to reconnoiter (Livy, 21.47). Polybius tells us that Mago was 'full of youthful enthusiasm, and had been trained from boyhood in the art of war' (3.71).

Mago, was given an important task by his brother at Trebia, and during the night before the battle, he set out with 1000 handpicked infantry and 1000 cavalry with the task to conceal himself within a watercourse between the two camps which had steep banks overgrown with brambles. Polybius tells us it was a perfect place for an ambush:

the place was admirably adapted for putting them off their guard; because the Romans were always suspicious of woods, from the fact of the Celts invariably choosing such places for their ambuscades, but felt no fear at all of places that were level and without trees...(3.71)

Mago successfully concealed his force during the night and awaited the time to strike. The next day Hannibal successfully lured the Roman army from it's camp with his Numidian cavalry, who feigned a retreat drawing out the Romans across a cold river (and without breakfast) to the ground of Hannibal's choosing. The Roman army, led by T. Sempronius Longus, consisted of 16-18,000 Roman infantry, 20,000 allied Latin infantry, 4000 cavalry, and a contingent of Celts from the Cenomani. As the armies lined up and the infantry lines closed and locked in combat, Mago attacked. His timing was perfect, and the charge into the rear of the Roman lines threw the whole Roman army into confusion (Polybius, 3.74). By the end of the battle, most of the Roman army had been destroyed, save some 10,000 Romans who had managed to cut through Hannibal's lines and fled towards Placentia.

The following year Hannibal broke winter quarters sometime around May 217 BC and began his march further into Italy. Hannibal probably crossed the Appenines through the Porretta Pass towards Etruria, we hear again of Mago in command of cavalry protecting the rear of Hannibal's column as they marched through the Arno marshes. Mago's job was also to deter any Celts from fleeing Hannibal's army (Polybius, 3.79, Livy, 22.2). Sadly, this is all we hear from Mago for that year in our principle sources of Polybius and Livy – his actions at Lake Trasimene are not recorded, but he was there somewhere, perhaps in charge of some of the Spanish cavalry he appears to have commanded often to this point under the overall command of Maharbal, which blocked the Roman armies escape to the rear and pressed the attack, or maybe he was among the infantry with Hannibal as he would aid command in the centre with his brother at Cannae the following year? Either way, Mago would have helped in the victory that saw the destruction of another Roman army (unless of course, he had some sort of illness or wound that kept him from the battle!)

The year 216 BC saw Hannibal's greatest victory. With his own supplies dwindling, he captured the valuable supplies depot for the Roman army at Cannae. It would lead to the destruction as an army of the largest Roman force put into the field at that point, which was reportedly around 87,000 strong. A force this size was meant for one thing;to confront and overwhelm Hannibal by force, a change of strategy from Fabius' which was designed to cut off Hannibal's army from supplies, thus destroying it in a slow, but inevitable manner. Hannibal's own army consisted of 40,000 infantry, and 10,000 cavalry.

Mago played an important part in the victory, aiding his brother in commanding the weakest point of the Carthaginian battle line, a crescent-shaped thin line, and a most vital one needed to trap the Romans. Mago found himself in command (along with his brother Hannibal) of Spanish and Celtic infantry, drawing them back in an organised and planned retreat thus encouraging the Romans into a trap. The African infantry had been placed on the flanks of this curved line, and as the Roman centre pushed the tip of the curve back, Hannibal and Mago encouraged the troops not to break and the Africans moved into action. The African infantry attacked the flanks of the Roman army, halting it as the Romans turned to face battle from an unexpected direction. With their momentum stopped, Mago would have had time to reorganise his men to attack again. The Roman rear was then attacked by Hannibal's heavy Spanish and Celtic cavalry led by a Carthaginian officer called Hasdrubal. The enemy was surrounded, the fight long and bloody, supposedly the bloodiest battle in all of European history, and modern estimates place the casualties at over 50,000 men including both armies. Whatever the true figures, Cannae was a devastating defeat for the Romans.

Next we have to follow Livy as Polybius' work here is lost, and we get to see Mago as a general in command of his own army. After the victory and looting of the Roman camps at Cannae, Hannibal set off for Apulia, invited to the territory of the Hirpini in Samnium by Statius Trebius who put into Hannibal's hands the town of Compsa. Mago was given orders by Hannibal to take over the towns of that part of Italy as they seceded from Rome, and to use force with those who resisted (Livy 23.1). Sadly, we are not informed of his actives here further in detail, though we do know other towns in Samnium joined the Carthaginian course at this point, though whether willingly or through force is not reported. He is next reported having been sent back to Carthage and delivering a speech to the adirim (the Carthaginian senate) in which he urges them to support the war in Italy. The senate agrees and a force of 4000 cavalry, forty elephants and a large sum of money are sent to Italy (these reinforcements are the only ones recorded that ever reached Hannibal from Carthage). Mago then left for Spain to enlist a force of 20,000 foot and 4,000 horse.

Events in Spain thwarted Hannibal's hopes of reinforcement when Hasdrubal Barca was defeated in 215 BC by the Scipios at the mouth of the Ebro river. Mago was preparing an army of 12,000 foot, 1,500 horse, twenty elephants and 1000 talents of silver and an escort of sixty warships which were to invade Italy from Carthage, but due to his brother's defeat, Mago's army was diverted back to Spain (Livy, 23.32). Another army of similar size was sent on to invade Sardinia, and we can assume that had Mago successfully raised the 20,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry as reported earlier, some of these perhaps made up Hasdrubal's (not Hannibal's brother!) force that was sent there.

For Mago's recorded actions from 215 BC to 211 BC, see the last few paragraphs of post 3 Hannibal Barca's brothers and the first two of post 4 Hannibal Barca's brothers of this thread.

With the destruction of the brothers Scipios armies in Spain in 211 BC, the Roman armies retreated north of the Ebro, with one Lucius Marcius being unanimously elected by the remnants of the armies to take over as general until reinforcements from Rome arrived (Livy, 25.37). Marcius would go on to win some rather romantic and likely fictitious victories against the Carthaginians, preventing them from making headway north of the Ebro to link up with Hannibal in Italy. Marcius supposedly inflicted heavy casualties on Hasdrubal Gisgo's army in a sudden sortie from his camp, followed up by burning the two camps of the Carthaginian commanders (Gisgo and Mago), stating Carthaginian losses at 37,000 men, 1830 prisoners. According to Valerius Antias, it was only Mago's camp which was captured with the loss of 7000 men, while Gisgo was beaten in battle shortly afterwards with a loss of 10,000 killed, 4330 captured, whilst the most plausible (though still exaggerated) record of Piso holds that only 5000 men died from Mago's force as he was ambushed conducting a disorderly pursuit of the Romans as they withdrew (Livy, 25.39). Whatever the truth of these engagements, Marcius successfully held off the Carthaginians, and that named in his honour, a piece of armour, called the Marcian shield hung from the Temple of Jupiter on the Capitol until the fire in 83 BC.

Next we hear of Mago is after Publius Cornelius Scipio had landed at Emporion and had marched to winter quarters at Tarraco sometime in the year 210/209 BC. In Scipio's plans over the winter, he discovered the three Carthaginian armies were separated and quarrelling across the peninsular, so Polybius reports at 10.7, in which we learn Mago 'was occupying an area east of the Pillars of Hercules in the country of the tribe known as the Conii' in southern Portugal. However, Lazenby (Hannibal's War, p.134) notes two possibilities here; that these people are thought to have lived in the extreme south of what is now Portugal, so they couldn't have been east of the Pillars, and suggests a copyists error, the other is that Polybius' Conii (Konioi in Greek) were the same as Appian's Kouneoi who lived near the lower Baetis (History of Spain, 57-8). As soon as it was possible to begin campaigning in 209 BC, Scipio made for the poorly defended and strategic location of the New Carthage, successfully capturing it and robbing the Carthaginians of vital war supplies and hostages.

A year later, and after another Roman success over Hasdrubal Barca at the Battle of Baecula, and Mago had failed to link up with his brother against Scipio, Mago marched his army to the Pyrennes where Hasdrubal had gone after his defeat, and so too did Hasdrubal Gisgo to consider the next step. It was decided that Hasdrubal Barca should march on to Italy to support Hannibal. Mago was to hand over his army to his brother, then recruit more men from the Balearic Islands and Hasdrubal Gisgo continued somewhere in Lusitania, with the aid of a replacement general for Hasdrubal, being an officer called Hanno (27.20, 28.1.) according to Livy. With all three armies to the north of Spain, leaving the rest of their territories undefended, this meeting seems suspicious to me, as this could have been decided beforehand, or by messengers. Also, Livy seems to have forgotten his mention of Mago being sent to the Balearic Islands, as he is back in Spain when next we hear him, apparently recruiting heavily from the Celtiberi with the new general, Hanno. This heavy recruitment caught the eye of the Romans, and Scipio quickly dispatched a force of 10,000 foot and 500 horse led by M. Iunius Silanius, who 'marched with the greatest of speed' and managed to arrive within ten miles of the enemy, 'outstripping even a rumour of his approach'. This is Livy's account of the following engagement:

When he was about ten miles distant he was informed by his guides that there were two camps near the road on which he was marching; the one on the left was occupied by the Celtiberians, a newly raised army about 9000 strong, the one on the right by the Carthaginians. The latter was carefully guarded by outposts, pickets and all the usual precautions against surprise; the Celtiberian camp was without any discipline, and all precautions were neglected as might be expected of barbarians and raw levies who felt all the less fear because they were in their own country. Silanus decided to attack that one first, and kept his men as much to the left as possible, so as not to be seen by the Carthaginian outposts. After sending on his scouts he advanced rapidly against the enemy.

He was now about three miles away and none of the enemy had yet noticed his advance, the rocks and thickets which covered the whole of this hilly district concealed his movements. Before making his final advance, he ordered his men to halt in a valley where they were effectually hidden and take food. The scouting parties resumed and confirmed the statements of the deserters, on which the Romans, after placing the baggage in the centre and arming themselves for the combat, advanced in order of battle. The enemy caught sight of these when they were a mile distant and hurriedly prepared to meet them. As soon as Mago heard the shouting and confusion he galloped across from his camp to take command. There were in the Celtiberian army 4000 men with shields and 200 cavalry, making up a regular legion. These were his main strength and he stationed them in the front; the rest who were lightly armed he posted in reserve. In this formation he led them out of the camp, but they had hardly crossed the rampart when the Romans hurled their javelins at them. The Spaniards stooped to avoid them, and then sprang up to discharge their own, which the Romans who were in their usual close order received on their overlapping shields; then they closed up foot to foot and fought with their swords. The Celtiberians, accustomed to rapid evolutions, found their agility useless on the broken ground, but the Romans, who were used to stationary fighting, found no inconvenience from it beyond the fact that their ranks were sometimes broken when moving through narrow places or patches of brushwood. Then they had to fight singly or in pairs, as if they were fighting duels.

These very obstacles, however, by impeding the enemy's flight, gave them up, as though bound hand and foot, to the sword. Almost all the heavy infantry of the Celtiberians had fallen when the Carthaginian light infantry, who had now come from the other camp, shared their fate. Not more than 2000 infantry escaped; the cavalry, which had hardly taken any part in the battle, together with Mago also got away. The other general, Hanno, was taken prisoner, together with those who were the last to appear in the field when the battle was already lost. Mago, with almost the whole of his cavalry and his veteran infantry, joined Hasdrubal at Gades ten days after the battle. (Livy, 28.1-2)

Mago's recently recruited Celtiberian forces soon scattered into the surrounding woods and made their way home. With the loss of the recent raised forces, it was difficult for the Carthaginians to conduct any major campaign against Scipio. No doubt they had received news of the war in Italy, and that Hasdrubal Barca had been killed at the Metarus. The war in Italy was probably thought as lost. Instead, throughout 207 BC, the Carthaginian commanders in Spain tried to simply maintain the war. Hasdrubal Gisgo split up his army to protect the various walled towns in southern Baetica. Regardless of this strategy, something changed in 206 BC. Perhaps they thought there was an imminent invasion of Africa planned based on Roman naval activities off the coast of Africa between 208-207 BC which involved the defeat of two Carthaginian fleets by Valerius Laevinus, and prolonging the war in Spain was no longer an option. A decisive action would have to take place, and if they could break Roman power in Spain, perhaps Hannibal could get his much needed reinforcements.

Hasdrubal and Mago raised a large army for 206 BC. Polybius estimates the number at 70,000 foot and 4000 horse, while Livy gives a figure of 50,000 foot and 4500 horse. Whatever the figures, Scipio was likely outnumbered – his force amounted to 45,000 infantry, and 3000 horse. In Spring 206 BC, Hasdrubal moved his army to Ilipa, while Scipio advanced to Castulo, sending out Silanus to collect promised troops from Spanish allies. Once Scipio received his Spanish contingent, he continued his advance towards the Carthaginians. The Carthaginians set up camp on a hill, and as Scipio did so on another, Mago led a cavalry attack with Masinissa against Scipio's forces, but was ambushed by Scipio's own cavalry he had hid behind a hill just in this event and Mago had to withdraw with some losses. After a few days of skirmishing and routine setup of the armies, Scipio attacked. The Carthaginian army was exhausted, having not eaten food on that particular day, and – with only half of it engaged (Scipio held back his own Spanish force) – and only the Carthaginian Spaniards against Scipio's Roman infantry, cavalry and skirmishers fought, the bulk of the Carthaginian army retreated back to camp unharmed, while the damaged Spanish flanks also managed to retreat accordingly, they escaped due to bad weather - perhaps a convenient Roman fiction to explain why Scipio failed to tie them down and destroy them on the field of battle - if true, the Carthaginians may likely of had a lucky escape. Over the night many soldiers deserted the army, and deeming it useless to attempt to defend the camp, Hasdrubal called a retreat the following evening. Scipio went in pursuit of the Carthaginian army and harassed them with his cavalry and skirmishers, eventually forcing them to fight a second battle and defeated them again. Some 6000 Carthaginians escaped and put up further stout resistance, but Hasdrubal, and some Carthaginian officers managed to escape by sea, abandoning their men on the hillock. Mago appears to have stayed with them as long as he could, but he too left the majority to their fate when Hasdrubal managed to get ships back to him. Mago escaped to the coast then sailed for Gades. Sadly, for these battles we have no indication for Mago's actions other than the cavalry attack, so it is almost impossible to consider his command here, other than the fact that his side lost.

This defeat broke Carthaginian power in Spain forever. Mago established himself at Gades and began recruiting a new force from what was left of Carthage's Spanish allies, and a force arrived from Africa led by an officer called Hanno. Scipio too was not one to rest on his laurels, and began to subdue the neighbouring cities, taking Castulo before marching back to New Carthage, leaving Marcius to continue operations in the area, who brought over a number of communities before he too retired back to New Carthage. Deserters from Gades came over to New Carthage and offered to betray Gades to Scipio, and Scipio decided to accept this offer. He sent Marcius by land with a force of infantry, while Laelius was to act in concert with him with a small fleet of seven triremes, and one quinquereme.

Mago had sent out Hanno to recruit from the Spanish tribes, who had successfully gathered a force 4000 strong, but Marcius assaulted his camp and annihilated them. Hanno managed to escape with but a handful of men.
Mago however, had discovered the plot to betray Gades to the Romans and rounded up and arrested the ring-leaders. He was determined to send them to Carthage as prisoners and handed them into the custody of the Carthaginian admiral, Abherbal, who put them on a quinquereme and left with a further eight triremes to Africa, and though Laelius' naval force attacked them as they left, most of the ships escaped to Africa. Laelius returned to Carteia where he learned that the plot had been foiled, and promptly returned to New Carthage along with Marcius' force. Livy tells us Mago's actions after their departure:

...and on receiving intelligence of the renewal of hostilities by the Ilergetes, (due to Scipio's sudden illness and mutiny among his own troops and some of the Spanish tribes) he once more entertained hopes of reconquering Spain. Messengers were dispatched to Carthage, to lay before the senate a highly coloured account of the mutiny in the Roman camp and the defection of the allies of Rome, and at the same time strongly urge that assistance should be sent to him in order that he might win back the heritage left him by his ancestors, the sovereignty of Spain. (28.31)

After the issue of the Roman mutiny and the Spanish revolt of the Ilergetes was crushed by Scipio at the Ebro, Mago began to lose hope for the recovery of Spain, and made preparations to leave for Africa with what forces he could. Before departing however, he received orders from Carthage to sail to Italy and recruit troops from the Ligures and Gauls and make an effort to join Hannibal. He received an unspecified amount of money in order to do this, and he also, according to Livy, 'wrung all he could could from the people of Gades, not only emptying their treasury but robbing temples and forcing every individual to contribute gold and silver as he possessed' (28.36). Before he left however, Mago made an attempt on New Carthage, sailing along the coast, first raiding the countryside and then making a further attempt on the town which is recorded by Livy as follows:

During the day he kept his men on board, and did not disembark them till night. He then took them to that part of the city wall where the Romans had effected the capture of the place; thinking that the city was held by a weak garrison and that there would be a movement amongst some of the townsmen who hoped for a change of masters. The country people, however, who were fleeing from their fields had brought news of the depredations and approach of the enemy. His fleet had also been seen during the day, and it was obvious that they would not have taken their station before the city without some special reason. An armed force was accordingly drawn up outside the gate which faced the sea. The enemy approached the walls in disorder, soldiers and seamen were mixed together, and there was much more noise and tumult than fighting strength. Suddenly the gate was thrown open and the Romans burst out with a cheer; the enemy were thrown into confusion, turned their backs at the very first discharge of missiles and were pursued with heavy loss down to the shore. If the ships had not been brought up close to the beach and so afforded a means of escape, not a single fugitive would have survived. On the ships, too, there was hurry and confusion; the crews drew up the ladders, lest the enemy should clamber on board with their comrades, and cut the cables and hawsers so as not to lose time in weighing anchor. Many who tried to swim to the ships could not see in the darkness what direction to take or what dangers to avoid, and perished miserably. The next day, after the fleet had regained the ocean, it was discovered that 800 men had been killed between the wall and the shore and as many as 2000 arms of different kinds picked up.(28.36)

This paints a fairly damning picture of the forces Mago had to work with at this point. With this failed effort, Mago sailed back to Gades, but discovered the gates were shut to him. He sailed to Cimbii not far from Gades, and sent representatives to the town with complaints about the gates being barred to a friend and ally. The reply he got was about people incensed at his soldiers recent property theft. Mago enticed them to a conference instead, inviting the sufetes of the town along with the treasurer and once they arrived at his location, had them scourged and crucified. He then left for the island of Pityusa (Ibiza) which was inhabited by a Carthaginian populace, where he was welcomed and was supplied generously, including men to supplement the ships crews. With this addition to his strength, Mago sailed for the Balearic Islands, but he did not receive a warm welcome and was thus forced to sail for Minorca, where Mago took possession of the town and adjacent lands, and sent 2000 troops back to Carthage before settling down for the winter. The main town of the island, according to tradition, still bears Mago's name – Mahon.

Mago spent the months leading to summer 205 BC readying an army for an invasion of Italy, and had a force of 12,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, along with 30 warships and a large number of transports. He left with this force and landed on the Ligurian coast unchallenged at sea by the Romans. His sudden appearance helped him capture Genoa. With Genoa now in his hands, he left to stir up more trouble in the hope of causing a rising against Rome, aiming at the coast at the foot of the maritime Alps, where he used the town of Savona as a base, forging an alliance with the Ingauni (a Ligurian tribe). He left ten warships to defend Savona, and sent the rest back to defend the African coast while he began hostilities with the Ingauni's northern Ligurian enemies, the Epanterii Montani. According to Livy, 'his strength grew daily, his name being sufficient to bring Gauls flocking to his standard from every side' (28.46). The Roman senate was alerted to the growing problems in northern Italy from despatches sent by Spurius Lucretius, and orders were given to Marcus Livius to march his slave volunteers from Etruria to Ariminum, whilst Marcus Valerius Laevinus marched the two City legions to Arretium.

Though Livy gives the reason for protecting the African coast for Mago sending his ships back, perhaps the real reason was to get more men, as Livy tells us in the same year (205 BC), Mago received Carthaginian envoys, twenty-five warships, 6000 infantry, 800 cavalrymen, seven elephants and a large sum of money in order to hire further mercenaries in order to meet up and support Hannibal (29.4). Livy reports his actions in trying to convince more of the Gauls and Ligurians to join him against rome at a conference he called after talking with the Carthaginian envoys:

When they were assembled he told them that his mission was to restore them to liberty, and as they could see for themselves reinforcements were being sent to him from home. But it depended upon them what numbers and strength would be available for the war. There were two Roman armies in the field, one in Gaul, the other in Etruria, and he knew as a matter of fact that Spurius Lucretius would unite his forces with M. Livius. A good many thousands of men must be armed if they were to offer an effectual resistance to two Roman generals and two armies. The Gauls assured him that they were perfectly willing to do their part, but as one Roman camp was on their territory and the other just within the frontier of Etruria, almost within sight of them, any attempt to assist the Carthaginians openly would subject their country to an invasion from both sides. Mago must ask from the Gauls only such assistance as they could furnish secretly. As for the Ligurians, the Roman camp was a long way from their cities, they were therefore free to act as they chose, it was right that they should arm their men and take their fair share in the war. The Ligurians raised no objection, they only asked for an interval of two months in which to raise their force. Mago in the meantime after sending the Gauls home began to hire mercenary troops secretly throughout their country, and clandestine supplies were sent to him from the different communities.(29.5)

The Romans meanwhile made preparations to oppose any movement by Mago, and Livius' force joined up with Lucretius' in Gaul. By 204 BC, Mago was clearly considered the main threat for the Romans, with four legions in Cisapline Gaul under the command of SP. Lucretius and Livius Salinator positioned against him, and Livy also reports much of Etruria was ready to switch sides (29.36). Mago advanced into Italy in 203 BC and was brought to battle in the territory of Insubrian Gaul. The following is Livy's account of the battle:

The praetor's legions formed the fighting line; Cornelius kept his in reserve, but rode to the front and took command of one wing, the praetor leading the other, and both of them exhorted the soldiers to make a furious charge on the enemy. When they failed to make any impression upon them, Quintilius said to Cornelius, "As you see, the battle is progressing too slowly; the enemy finding themselves offering an unhoped-for resistance have steeled themselves against fear, there is danger of this fear passing into audacity. We must let loose a hurricane of cavalry against them if we want to shake them and make them give ground. Either, then, you must keep up the fighting at the front and I will bring the cavalry into action, or I will remain here and direct the operations of the first line while you launch the cavalry of the four legions against the enemy." The proconsul left it to the praetor to decide what he would do. Quintilius, accordingly, accompanied by his son Marcus, an enterprising and energetic youth, rode off to the cavalry, ordered them to mount and sent them at once against the enemy. The effect of their charge was heightened by the battle-shout of the legions, and the hostile lines would not have stood their ground, had not Mago, at the first movement of the cavalry, promptly brought his elephants into action. The appearance of these animals, their trumpeting and smell so terrified the horses as to render the assistance of the cavalry futile. When engaged at close quarters and able to use sword and lance the Roman cavalryman was the better fighter, but when carried away by a frightened horse, he was a better target for the Numidian darts. As for the infantry, the twelfth legion had lost a large proportion of their men and were holding their ground more to avoid the disgrace of retreat than from any hope of offering effectual resistance. Nor would they have held it any longer if the thirteenth legion which was in reserve had not been brought up and taken part in the doubtful conflict. To oppose this fresh legion Mago brought up his reserves also. These were Gauls, and the hastati of the eleventh legion had not much trouble in putting them to rout. They then closed up and attacked the elephants who were creating confusion in the Roman infantry ranks. Showering their darts upon them as they crowded together, and hardly ever failing to hit, they drove them all back upon the Carthaginian lines, after four had fallen, severely wounded.

At last the enemy began to give ground, and the whole of the Roman infantry, when they saw the elephants turning against their own side, rushed forward to increase the confusion and panic. As long as Mago kept his station in front, his men retreated slowly and in good order, but when they saw him fall, seriously wounded and carried almost fainting from the field, there was a general flight. The losses of the enemy amounted to 5000 men, and 22 standards were taken. The victory was a far from bloodless one for the Romans, they lost 2300 men in the praetor's army, mostly from the twelfth legion, and amongst them two military tribunes, M. Cosconius and M. Maevius. The thirteenth legion, the last to take part in the action, also had its losses; C. Helvius, a military tribune, fell whilst restoring the battle, and twenty-two members of the cavalry corps, belonging to distinguished families, together with some of the centurions were trampled to death by the elephants. The battle would have lasted longer had not Mago's wound given the Romans the victory. (30.18)

Mago appears to be fairly competent here despite the loss - making good tactical use of his elephants and reserve. It also looks like his infantry were more-or-less well trained, and kept their discipline, until Mago, doing what a good commander should, was wounded whilst rallying his men. Mago managed to retreat back to Genoa, breaking away from the Romans at night, and from there he met recently arrived envoys from Carthage, who now ordered him back to Africa. Probably sometime in the autumn of 203 BC, Mago set sail from Italy. He died on the voyage, finally succumbing to his wound just as the fleet passed Sardinia (30.19). ]]> markdienekes http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/713-mago-barca.html Hasdrubal Barca http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/655-hasdrubal-barca.html Tue, 03 Jan 2012 20:24:50 GMT
Hasdrubal Barca - 244 BC to 207 BC

Hasdrubal Barca was one of Hannibal Barca's brothers, and is said to have been about three years younger than Hannibal, thus putting his date of birth around 244 BC. He came across from Africa with his brother-in-law, also called Hasdrubal, at probably around the age of ten or eleven to start training under his father Hamilcar's tutelage in the arts of warfare and leadership. By the end of 229 BC, Hasdrubal Barca was campaigning with his father and elder brother in Spain.

In late 229 or early 228, Hamilcar moved into the hinterland of Acra Leuce, accompanied by his sons Hannibal and Hasdrubal, while Hasdrubal the Elder commanded elsewhere. This was to be Hamilcar's last campaign.

He perhaps began in the Spring, and worked his way towards a town called Helice, starving out and storming Segisa, Ilunum and Turbola. When he reached Helice, he put it under siege. He must have been content to starve them into submission as when winter arrived, he sent the bulk of his army to winter-quarters in Arca Leuce to ease his own problems of supply. With his force weakened, Hamilcar was approached by the king of the Orissi, who had a large army with him who pretended friendship with Hamilcar in order to aid the besieged. Hamilcar was caught off guard when they betrayed him, and his army was defeated and put to flight. In order to save his sons, Hamilcar drew off the pursuit. Hannibal and Hasdrubal escaped, but Hamilcar perished as he plunged into a broad flooding river when he was about to be overtaken.

When Hannibal departed Spain at the outbreak of the Second Punic War, he left it in overall command of his brother, Hasdrubal Barca. The first action as a general we hear of Hasdrubal is in 218 BC, where he hastened to the aid of Hanno, who was attacked and defeated by Gnaeus Scipio who had landed at Emporion (a colony of Marseille and ally of Rome with a force of 25,000 men). Unable to help Hanno, Hasdrubal attacked the crews of Scipio's ships who were milling about the countryside, and then withdrew to Cartagena.

This is the only action we hear Hasdrubal undertaking in 218 BC (Livy reports a second intervention, but has likely misunderstood his sources, as Scipio had already gone into winter quarters at Tarraco by this point). Hasdrubal had failed to prevent the Roman army from overrunning much of the territory north of the Ebro to the Pyrenees.

Hasdrubal's next move took place the following year. Hasdrubal commanded a fleet of 40 quinqueremes and advanced to the Ebro with a Carthaginian army marching the coast alongside. It was a sound strategy intended to destroy the Roman fleet thus severing Scipio's communications with Rome. Hasdrubal could then attempt to crush the Romans on land. The Romans had originally had 60 quinqueremes for the war in Spain, but Polybius reports that he only had 35 ships with him (3.95). One explanation by Lazenby is that they were undermanned. Scipio had realised his land army needed bulking up, and had drafted them into it, and also Hasdrubal's attack the previous year may have been quite devastating to some crews. The Romans however, with the aid of warships from Marseille won and we have a tantalising glimpse of this naval battle from a fragment surviving from Hannibal's Greek historian, Sosylus (Jacoby, FGH 176 F 1):

they all fought outstandingly, but most of all the ships of the Massilians, who were the first to join battle and were wholly responsible for the success of the Romans. In sum, their leaders encouraged the others and made them bolder, while they themselves attacked the enemy with exceptional bravery. The Carthaginians suffered a two-fold defeat, because the Massilians knew their particular style of fighting. If the Carthaginians are facing some ships prow to prow, they advance as if they are going to attack, but instead of attacking immediately, they sail through the enemy line, turn round and ram the enemy's ships from the side.
The Massilians had found out about a tactic which is said to have employed at Artemisium by Heracleides of Mylasa, who was one of the cleverest men of his time. When they drew up their line, they ordered the front ships to face forwards, but to leave other ships waiting behind them at suitable intervals, which as soon as the first ships had been passed could take the opportunity to attack the enemy's ships as they were still advancing, without moving from their original formation. This is what Heracleides did in past times, and as a result he was responsible for the victory. And now, as we said, the Massilians followed the description of this ancient event. As the Carthaginians advanced in the anticipated fashion . . . they fought alongside . . . the Carthaginians turned to flight . . .
Book 4 of the Deeds of Hannibal, by Sosylus.

Hasdrubal's force fled to the shore having lost 6 warships in the process. They were followed by the Romans, who captured a further 19 warships. Hasdrubal had lost half of the Carthaginian Spanish fleet in one battle. Rome would remain unchallenged at sea in Spain for the rest of the war.

Livy goes on to say that Rome followed up this attack by taking a few Spanish towns south of the Ebro, and persuading no less than 120 tribes to join them. Scipio advanced to the pass of Castulo, and Hasdrubal retired to Lusitana by the Atlantic coast. When he moved next, according to Livy, was to aid the Ilergetes who had been fighting punitive forces of Scipio on their territory. Hasdrubal moved to the Ebro, but heard that Scipio's allies, the Celtiberes, had attacked Carthaginian Spain. Hasdrubal apparently hastened to meet them, and was twice defeated by the Celtiberes. However, this whole detailed account by Livy is perhaps unhistorical, as we do not hear of this in Polybius, who stated the Romans did not venture across the Ebro after their naval victory. Polybius says with the news of the naval victory, Rome dispatched his brother, Publius, to Spain with 20 warships. Livy adds 8000 men and supplies.

The brothers advanced to Saguntum with no challenge from Hasdrubal. Through treachery they managed to convince the Carthaginian commander Bostar into releasing hostages, which the Scipio's promptly returned to their homes to garner political support from the Iberian tribes.

In 216 BC, Hasdrubal's problems intensified. Unable to challenge the Romans until he received reinforcements, he was unable to take the offensive due to a serious uprising of the Iberian tribe called the Tartesii, which he crushed in some vicious fighting. After this he received word from the Carthaginian senate that he should advance to Italy and aid his brother there. Hasdrubal's response to this request is recorded by Livy:

Hasdrubal at once sent a despatch to Carthage pointing out what mischief the mere rumour of his departure had caused, and also that if he did really leave Spain it would pass into the hands of the Romans before he crossed the Ebro. He went on to say that not only had he neither a force nor a general to leave in his place, but the Roman generals were men whom he found it difficult to oppose even when his strength was equal to theirs. If, therefore, they were at all anxious to retain Spain they should send a man with a powerful army to succeed him, and even though all went well with his successor he would not find it an easy province to govern. (23.27)

The senate sent a considerable force to Spain under the command of an officer called Himilco, and Hasdrubal set off for Italy in late 216 BC early 215 BC.

Hasdrubal met the Romans at the mouth of the Ebro. Hasdrubal appears to have attempted a Cannae, and placed his Spanish infantry in the centre (without the curve), flanked by Phonei (likely Carthaginian and Phoenician levies from settlements in Spain) and on the right, Africans and mercenaries. On his flanks he set up his cavalry.

Just as at Cannae, the Phonei and Africans and mercenaries wheeled in at the Roman flanks as they chomped through the Spanish centre, but unlike Hannibal's victory, Hasdrubal's centre collapsed and the Romans were able to drive outwards and attacked the Phoeni, Africans and mercenaries. Hasdruba's army was destroyed, but he managed to escape. This was a critical time for the war. Had Hasdrubal managed to win, he would have arrived in Italy to reinforce his brother, along with reinforcements led by Hannibal's other brother, Mago, intended for Italy, which had to be diverted to Spain instead. With things going badly in Italy, this may well have been what Hannibal needed to win the war.

In 215 BC, Livy records further Roman victories in Spain. The first sees another massive Roman victory against Hasdrubal, who had been joined by two other Carthaginian armies led by Mago and Hamilcar son of Bomilcar. Hasdrubal lay siege to the Iberian town of Iliturgi (who had obviously joined Rome by this point). If we are to believe Livy, 16,000 Romans took to the field against Hasdrubal's 60,000 strong army. The Romans won an 'undisputed' victory, killing more than 16,000 Carthaginians, taking 3000 prisoners, capturing 1000 horses and seven elephants (along with killing 5 elephants). Apparently the Romans captured all three camps. The numbers here are ridiculous. He continues to say that Hasdrubal's defeated army made good their losses by recruiting heavily from a friendly province, and attacked Intibili. There was a second engagement against the Romans, who again beat Hasdrubal, killing more than 13,000, taking over 2000 prisoners, and nine elephants. According to Livy, due to these victories, nearly all of Spain allied with Rome (Livy, 23.48).

Livy records in 214 BC that Hasdrubal and his brother Mago destroyed a large Spanish army before the Romans could cross the Ebro to aid their allies. Publius Scipio continued across the Ebro, and encamped at White Fort (where the Barca's lost their father, Hamilcar years before), though his column was attacked and a few stragglers were killed. Publius moved his camp from White Fort and encamped by Mount Victory, and was joined by his brother, Gnaeus and his army. Hasdrubal received further reinforcements when he was joined by Hasdrubal Gisgo and his 'full' army. The Carthaginians set up position across the river and opposite the Roman camp. Hasdrubal almost managed to kill Publius Scipio as the Roman went out to reconnoitre 'with a party marching light', and had to hold up on a hill as he was surrounded by Carthaginians, being rescued later by his brother Gnaeus (Livy, 24.41).

Next, we hear from Livy a further attempt on Iliturgi, but Gnaeus came promptly to the town's aid, killing 12,000 Carthaginians in two engagements and taking 1000 prisoners. The town of Bigerra was also being attacked by Carthaginians, but was relieved by Gnaeus Scipio. A further battle ensued at Munda, where the Carthaginians lost 39 elephants (to pikes) 12,000 men and captured 3000. This was followed by another defeat with the Romans pressing their advantage from their previous victory, killing a further 6000 Carthaginians. After these defeats in a matter of days, Hasdrubal sent his brother Mago to raise fresh troops. Mago returned quickly with a force of Celts, but again the Romans defeated the Carthaginians, killing 8000, and capturing nearly 1000. After this victory, the Romans marched to Saguntum and captured the city.

For the next two years there appears little activity in Spain. The Romans did not further their offensive until 213-212 BC according to Livy, but as he asserts that they did nothing for two years, it must have been in 211 BC that the Scipio's made a move south of the Ebro. According to Appian (History of Spain, 15) Hasdrubal Barca was recalled to Africa during the years 213-212 BC to deal with a Numidian rebellion led by their king Syphax, who had apparently gone over to the Romans. Upon succesfully dealing with the sitaution, Hasdrubal returned to Spain with fresh reinforcements from Afica. Livy says that the Scipio's had formed an alliance with Syphax before their deaths in 211 BC, and sent him some centurions to help train his soldier's in infantry tactics. He also states that the Carthaginians allied themselves with a Numidian enemy of Syphax, called Gala (Massinissa's father) who helped them beat Syphax (Livy, 24.48).

In 211 BC, the Scipio brothers were faced by three Carthaginian generals (Hasdrubal and Mago Barca, and Hasdrubal Gisgo). They divided their forces in an attempt to crush the Carthaginian forces. Perhaps they had incorrect information about the Carthaginian army sizes, but one force made up of two-thirds of the total Roman and allied troops led by Publius Scipio went to deal with Mago and Hasdrubal Gisgo, who were joined leading one army, while Gnaeus went to hunt down Hasdrubal Barca with one third of his army, including 20,000 Celtiberian troops that had joined the Romans in the winter of 212 BC (Livy, 25.32). We now see Hasdrubal Barca intelligently dealing with the Roman army. Aware that Gnaeus was relying on his Celtiberian allies, he arranged secret conversations with the Celitberian leaders (Livy, 25.33). He paid them off at a high price to abandon the Romans and the Celtiberians returned home to their families. Whether this is a Roman fiction to explain Gaenus' defeat at the hands of Hasdrubal is unknown, but Livy's prejudice against barbarian cultures is quite evident. Gnaeus, now faced with a superior Carthaginian force, moved off, but Hasdrubal crossed the river hot on his heels. Before Gnaeus' retreat, Publius' force had also suffered defeat at the hands of Hasdrubal Gisgo and Mago Barca, and they met up with Hasdrubal Barca. Gnaeus Scipio and his outnumbered force took up position on a hill, making a rampart out of their pack-loads, but Hasdrubal's bolstered army made short work of them. Gnaeus was killed either in the fighting, or at a watch tower he had fled too.

Hasdrubal, through bribery and luck in regards to the Roman forces splitting up, averted catastrophe in Spain at a point when Rome was beginning to get a firmer grip on the land south of the Ebro river. Why Hasdrubal Barca did not press his advantage and attempt to cross into Italy at this point was said to be down to the actions of the remnants of the Scipios armies, some 8000 men who holed up at the Ebro river led by Lucius Marcius, a Roman knight nominated by the survivors to take over. Hasdrubal Barca appears to have withdrawn from the Ebro, leaving Hasdrubal Gisgo and Mago to hold the line there and try and finish the Romans (more on this in Mago's section!)

In late Autumn of 211, Lucius Marcius' beleaguered force who had managed to hold the line against both Hasdrubal Gisgo and Mago's attacks was reinforced from Rome. Claudius Nero arrived with 12,000 infantry and 1,100 cavarly, and took over in command from Marcius. Apparently, they managed to trap Hasdrubal Barca in a valley as he was encamped at a place called the Black Stones, in the country of the Ausetani between Iliturgi and Mentissa (this pass has been identified with the defile still called Monte Negro between Cabanes and Barriol). Hasdrubal entered negotiations with the Romans for safe passage of his army in return for parts of Spain, which Nero was delighted by. Hasdrubal used these negotiations to secretly evacuate his men from the pass, starting with the heavy troopers during the first night, and not in large numbers. This is what Livy has to say on this event:

He was careful to see that not very many went out that night, as a small body would make but little noise and be more likely to escape observation. They would also find their way more easily through the narrow and difficult foot-paths. The next day he kept the appointment, but so much time was taken up in discussing and writing down a number of things which had nothing to do with the matters they had agreed to discuss, that the whole day was lost and the business adjourned till the morrow. So another opportunity was afforded him of sending off a fresh body of troops by night. The discussion was not brought to a close the next day, and so it went on; several days were occupied in discussing terms, and the nights in despatching the Carthaginians secretly from their camp. When the greater part of the army had escaped, Hasdrubal no longer kept to the conditions which he had himself proposed, and there was less and less desire to come to terms as his sincerity diminished with his fears. Almost the entire force of infantry had now got out of the defile when, at daybreak, a dense fog covered the valley and the whole of the surrounding country. No sooner did Hasdrubal become aware of this than he sent a message to Nero begging that the interview might be put off for that day as it was a day on which the Carthaginians were forbidden by their religion to transact any important business. Even this did not arouse any suspicion of trickery. On learning that he would be excused for that day, Hasdrubal promptly left his camp with the cavalry and elephants, and by keeping his movements secret, emerged into safety. About ten o'clock the sun dispersed the mist, and the Romans saw that the hostile camp was deserted. Then, recognising at last the trick which the Carthaginian had played upon him and how he had been befooled, Nero hurriedly prepared to follow him and force him to an engagement. The enemy, however, declined battle; only a few skirmishes took place between the Carthaginian rear and the Roman advanced guard. (Livy, 26.17)

Next we hear of Hasdrubal Barca is in 210 BC. A new Roman commander had been appointed in charge in Spain to take over from Nero. Most likely in the summer of 210 BC, P. Cornelius Scipio, son of Publius and nephew to Gnaeus Scipio killed the year before, landed at Emporion with a force of 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, bolstering the Roman army in Spain to 28,000 infantry, and 3000 cavalry. He marched to Tarraco and spent the rest of the year garnering further support of the Iberian tribes and touring the areas under Roman control, congratulating the Roman troops there. He also spent time figuring out where the Carthaginian armies were. The information we have on Hasdrubal's whereabouts comes from Polybius, who has a very important source; a letter from Scipio to Philip V of Macedon on the capture of New Carthage. According to the letter, Hasdrubal Barca, Mago and Hasdrubal Gisgo had been quarreling and had separated into three respective armies. Hasdrubal Barca was besieging a city among the Carpetani in what is now the modern province of Toledo (Polybius, 10.7).

In only what can be described as a gross strategic error, and possibly one that lost Spain for Carthage, New Carthage was left vulnerable to attack. Why Hasdrubal Barca or no Carthaginian army was within easy reach of the most important city for their interests in Spain can not be known, or why the city was poorly garrisoned with 1000 men. Perhaps Hasdrubal Barca, whom Hannibal had left in overall command, had lost control of his younger brother Mago, and Gisgo, who appear to have now been operating separately if we are to believe Scipio's letter? Perhaps they couldn't believe capturing New Carthage could be done, as it was in a solid defensive position? Either way, Scipio boldly attacked in 209 BC, and with inside knowledge, a land and naval attack, succeeded in capturing the city. Livy presents us with a detailed description of the result of captured people, and materials, which had a huge impact on the ability of Hasdrubal Barca to maintain the war in Spain:

As many as 10,000 freemen were made prisoners. Those who were citizens were set free and Scipio gave them back their city and all the property which the war had left them. There were some 2000 artisans; these Scipio allotted to the public service, and held out to them hopes of recovering their liberty if they did their best in the tasks which the war demanded. The rest of the able-bodied population and the sturdiest of the slaves he assigned to the fleet to make up the complement of rowers. He also augmented his fleet by five vessels which he had seized. Besides all this population there were the Spanish hostages; these he treated with as much consideration as though they had been children of the allies of Rome. An enormous amount of munitions of war was also secured; 120 catapults of the largest size and 281 smaller ones, 23 of the heavier ballistae and 52 lighter ones, together with an immense number of scorpions of various calibre, as well as missiles and other arms. 73 military standards were also captured. A vast quantity of gold and silver was brought to the general, including 287 golden bowls, almost all of which were at least a pound in weight, 18,300 pounds of silver plate and coinage, the former comprising a large number of vessels. This was all weighed and counted and then made over to the quaestor C. Flaminius, as were also 10,000 bushels of wheat and 270 pecks of barley. In the harbour 63 transports were captured, some of them with their cargoes of corn and arms, as well as bronze, iron, sails, esparto grass, and other articles required for the fleet. Amidst such an enormous supply of military and naval stores, the actual city itself was regarded as the least important capture of all. (Livy, 26.47)

The next we hear of Hasdrubal Barca, it is 209/208, and it is more bad news. Two supposedly staunch allies of Carthage and powerful Spanish chieftains Andobales and Mandonius abandoned Hasdrubal's camp. Apprently, according to Polybius, they disliked the arrogance of the Carthaginians and were dissatisfied with their treatment by Hasdrubal, who had at some point demanded a large sum of money and that they hand over their wives and daughters as hostages (10.35). Aware of the increasing negative disposition of Carthage's Iberian allies, Hasdrubal Barca decided it was time to bring the Romans to battle. Hasdrubal's decision is told by Polybius:

Surrounded by such difficulties Hasdrubal was agitated by many conflicting emotions and anxieties. He was vexed by the desertion of Andobales; vexed by the opposition and feud between himself and the other commanders; and greatly alarmed as to the arrival of Scipio, expecting that he would immediately bring his forces to attack him. Perceiving therefore that he was being abandoned by the Iberians, and that they were joining the Romans with one accord, he decided upon the following plan of action. He resolved that he must collect the best force he could, and give the enemy battle: if fortune declared in his favour he could then consider his next step in safety, but if the battle turned out unfavourably for him, he would retreat with those that survived into Gaul; and collecting from that country as many of the natives as he could, would go to Italy, and take his share in the same fortune as his brother Hannibal. (10.37)

In the Spring of 208 BC, Hasdrubal Barca had moved to a town called Baecula, strategically blocking Scipio's advance to the Baetis Valley. Upon Scipio's arrival, and after a brief skirmish between his cavalry and Scipio's advance of light troops, Hasdrubal withdrew to a strong defensive position with a flat-topped hill with steep front and sides protected by a river at the rear. Hasdrubal was probably tempting Scipio to attack while he awaited for Mago and Gisgo's armies to arrive and whom were marching towards his position. The Battle of Baecula is another rare battle where we do actually have the tactical dispositions of Hasdrubal's army compared to Livy's sketchy years of battles and defeats between 217-212 BC.

Hasdrubal set up his Numidian cavalry and light armed Balearic and African troops on a slope surrounded by a wall-like rim in the front (Livy, 27.18), which Scipio attacked first with his skirmishers and a picked infantry force. Hasdrubal waited to see the outcome of the fight, and when his men became hard-pressed, he ordered forward his main forces to occupy the height above the slope to support his men, which was what Scipio had been hoping for. Scipio reinforced his attackers with the rest of his skirmishers, then quickly moved around the hill to the right while he order Laelius to move around the hill to the left. When Scipio attacked Hasdrubal's flanks, Hasdrubal had not yet deployed his whole force and had realised he had been outmanoeuvred. With haste, Hasdrubal withdrew, sacrificing his light troops as he moved away with the treasury, elephants, and perhaps up to two-thirds of his army. According to Livy he lost 8000 men. Hasdrubal had lost, but he had not lost his whole army. He now marched towards the Tagus River. Livy records a meeting between Hasdrubal and his fellow generals to discuss what the next move should be. It was decided to continue on to Italy to meet up with his brother:

A council of war was then held. Some of those present urged the immediate pursuit of Hasdrubal, but Scipio thought it hazardous in case Mago and the other Hasdrubal should join forces with him. He contented himself with sending a division to occupy the passes of the Pyrenees, and spent the remainder of the summer in receiving the submission of the Spanish tribes. A few days after the battle of Baecula, when Scipio had descended from the pass of Castulo on his return to Tarraco, the two Carthaginian generals, Hasdrubal Gisgo and Mago, came from Further Spain to join forces with Hasdrubal. They were too late to prevent his defeat, but their arrival was very timely in enabling them to concert measures for the prosecution of the war. When they came to compare notes as to the feeling in the different provinces, Hasdrubal Gisgo considered that as the distant coast of Spain between Gades and the ocean still knew nothing of the Romans, it was so far faithful to Carthage. The other Hasdrubal and Mago were agreed as to the influence which Scipio's generous treatment had had upon the feelings of all states and individuals alike, and they were convinced that the desertions could not be checked until all the Spanish soldiery had either been removed to the furthest corners of Spain or transported into Gaul. They decided therefore, without waiting for the sanction of the senate, that Hasdrubal must proceed to Italy, the focus of the war where the decisive conflict would be fought. In this way he would remove all the Spanish soldiers out of Spain far beyond the spell of Scipio's name. (Livy, 27.20)

Hasdrubal spent the rest of 208 BC in preparation for an invasion of Italy, and joining up with Hannibal. Marseille discovered his whereabouts in France when he arrived and sent word to Rome, along with Roman agents who passed on that Hasdrubal intended to cross the Alps in the spring. The Roman consul Salinator was given command of a consular army to face him, made up of two legions and their respective Roman allies, while they sent the other consul, Nero to face Hannibal with a further consular army. Further armies similar in size to the armies of the consuls were spread out across the Italian peninsular; one under the command of Terrentius Varro was in Etruria, another led by L. Porcius Licinus was positioned in ager gallicus. In the south of Italy, Q Fulvius Flaccus commanded two legions in Bruttium, Q. Claudius Flamen two legions in the region of Tarentum, and C. Hostilius Tubulus one legion at Capua. This is now what Hannibal and Hasdrubal would have face in Italy alone and along with the two freshly raised legions urbane, in all that year Rome had 23 legions in the field spread out across the various theatres of war! (Lazenby, Hannibal's War, p.181)

Hasdrubal set out of winter quarters having conscripted into his army 8000 Ligurians who would meet him when he arrived in Italy, forcing the consuls who had heard of this move to complete their levy quickly and leave for their provinces. Livy describes Hasdrubal's march through the Alps as rapid, that the Gallic, Averni and Aline tribes not only allowed him to cross their borders, but joined forces with him. Hannibal had helped Hasdrubal by rendering the route practical, and Hasdrubal emerged into Cisalpine Gaul much earlier than expected, and with his army intact and healthy. Livy, however goes on to say that Hasdrubal squandered what he gained by speed by laying siege to Placentia. There may well be a practical reason for this, and that Hasdrubal had hoped to attract more Gauls into his army my the attack of Placentia, and to give sufficient time for forage for his army, particularly for the cavalry.

Hasdrubal did not have many options available to him for movement from Cisapline Gaul: one through the Appenines leading to Etruria was blocked by Varro, while if he marched southeastwards that led to Ariminium and the coastal route south was blocked by Licinus. When he did decide to head for his brother, Hasdrubal moved eastwards towards the coastal route, sending out four Celts and two Numidian horsemen carrying letters for Hannibal, the letters saying they would meet up in Umbria. Perhaps this was an attempt to make the Romans believe he was going to cross the Appenines, and thus draw them away from his intended southern coastal route, otherwise it was quite naïve, and brings to question why he didn't tell the messengers verbally instead. However, whatever his intention, the Romans saw that he did not intend to croos the Appenine route, and thus two Roman armies (Salinator's and Porcius') converged and blocked Hasdrubal's march.

Meanwhile Hannibal was moving through Bruttium advancing towards Apulia, probably surprised by the speed of Hasdrubal's march through the Alps, Hannibal broke winter quarters quite late. His march was dogged by Nero and was he was forced into running fights as he moved. One of Hasdrubal's messengers, and thus, the letter fell into the Romans hands, and Nero handpicked 6000 of his best infantry, and 1000 cavalry and slipped away from his camp with Hannibal none-the-wiser, to join up with Salinator's force against Hasdrubal, sending messengers ahead to Salinator to tell him of his coming, and how best to join up forces.

Nero joined up with Salinator secretly and at night after a swift march, and slipped into the camp, his men sharing the tents of Salinator's army to not reveal new tents, as Hasdrubal's camp was quite close (about seven hundred metres away) and the precaution was thought of as necessary. They deployed for battle the next day, and Hasdrubal accepted the challenge, which leads me to believe that the forces were probably even. Hasdrubal wasn't to be fooled however, as Livy tells us:

Hasdrubal had ridden to the front with a handful of cavalry, when he noticed in the hostile ranks some well-worn shields which he had not seen before, and some unusually lean horses; the numbers, too, seemed greater than usual. Suspecting the truth he hastily withdrew his troops into camp and sent men down to the river from which the Romans obtained water, to catch if they could some of the watering parties and see whether they were especially sunburnt, as is generally the case after a long march. He ordered, at the same time, mounted patrols to ride round the consul's camp and observe whether the lines had been extended in any direction and to notice at the same time whether the bugle-call was sounded once or twice in the camp. They reported that both the camps-M. Livius' camp and that of L. Porcius-were just as they had been, no addition had been made, and this misled him. But they also informed him that the bugle-call was sounded once in the praetor's camp and twice in the consul's, and this perturbed the veteran commander, familiar as he was with the habits of the Romans. He concluded that both the consuls were there and was anxiously wondering how the one consul had got away from Hannibal. Least of all could he suspect what had actually occurred, namely that Hannibal had been so completely outwitted that he did not know the whereabouts of the commander and the army whose camp had been so close to his own. As his brother had not ventured to follow the consul, he felt quite certain that he had sustained a serious defeat, and he felt the gravest apprehensions lest he should have come too late to save a desperate situation, and lest the Romans should enjoy the same good fortune in Italy which they had met with in Spain. Then again he was convinced that his letter had never reached Hannibal, but had been intercepted by the consul who then hastened to crush him. Amidst these gloomy forebodings he ordered the camp fires to be extinguished, and gave the signal at the first watch for all the baggage to be collected in silence. The army then left the camp. In the hurry and confusion of the night march the guides, who had not been kept under very close observation, slipped away; one hid himself in a place selected beforehand, the other swam across the Metaurus at a spot well known to him. The column deprived of its guides marched on aimlessly across country, and many, worn out by sleeplessness flung themselves down to rest, those who remained with the standards becoming fewer and fewer. Until daylight showed him his route, Hasdrubal ordered the head of the column to advance cautiously, but finding that owing to the bends and turns of the river he had made little progress, he made arrangements for crossing it as soon as daybreak should show him a convenient place. But he was unable to find one, for the further he marched from the sea, the higher were the banks which confined the stream, and by thus wasting the day he gave his enemy time to follow him. (Livy, 27.47)

The night march was a disastrous attempt. Hasdrubal's army began to split up and blundered through the dark, and soon found himself being attacked by the Roman cavalry and skirmishers as light broke. Hasdrubal, in face of these attacks and in command of a ragged army that had lost men throughout the night march, tried to set up camp on a hill overlooking the river, but with the arrival of the main Roman host led by Salinator, set up for battle instead. Hasdrubal set up the Celts on the hill on his left, massed his Spaniards on the right, with the elephant corp in front of their right wing. This setup makes it apparent that he wanted to smash the Roman left while the Roman right struggled against his Celts setup on the hill. The struggle was even until Nero with a touch of inspired military genius, withdrew some of his men from the rear ranks of the right wing and marched them to the left wing, falling upon the elephants and Spaniards on the flank and rear. His Spaniards and elephants were annihilated, and Polybius says that Hasdrubal, having done all that a good general should, charged into the thick of the fight and perished. Hasdrubal's severed head would later be flung into an outpost of Hannibal's.

Bibliography:

Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, Penguin Classics

Livy, The War with Hannibal, Penguin Classics

Lazenby, J. Hannibal's War ]]> markdienekes http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/655-hasdrubal-barca.html The Aesthetics of Carthage http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/593-aesthetics-carthage.html Fri, 09 Dec 2011 13:38:43 GMT _*The Aesthetics of Carthage*_ Image: http://farm5.static.flickr.com/4040/4624046871_3087cc8488.jpg Mausoleum at Thugga (2nd Century BC)...
The Aesthetics of Carthage



Mausoleum at Thugga (2nd Century BC)

Recently, a thread began by our Guaporense questioned the aesthetics of Carthage, and suggested it was heavily hellenized and perhaps looked more like Athens: http://www.historum.com/ancient-hist...haginians.html

Though there were aspects that saw the influence of Hellenism on Carthaginian society, it appears that the architecture mainly followed their Phoenician roots. Any temples in the Greek form were few at best and have left no recognisable archaeological trace – were there any temples, they were most likely restricted to the area of the resident Greek community, and to Demeter and Kore whom the Republic adopted in 396 BC (Hoyos, p.78) Carthaginian temples were flat-roofed, and this is inferred by evidence from carvings on Stelae and other sculptures. They are usually presented with two columns aside a porch leading to the interior cella of the building. Entablature of temple roofs reveal they were carved in complex geometric patterns influenced by Egyptian motifs.

There is a structure still standing in Carthaginian influenced Libya, just below the hillside of Thugga. It is a mausoleum standing twenty-one metres high, dedicated to the Libyan lord of the Region Ataban 'son of Yofamit son of Filaw'. The inscription is in Punic and Libyan, and there are a few other Carthaginian names mentioned on it (the stonemason and specialist workers).This design appeared to be quite popular, as revealed in other Carthaginian influenced parts of Libya where similar 'towers' stand.

We have some other perhaps revealing insights to the aesthetics of Carthage at Kerkouane, a town that has been suggested was a Carthaginian settlement situated at Cape Bon. Inside the house and painted on the walls of a tomb is a crenellated walled city with square buildings besides a niche with the symbol of Tanit and a rooster (a symbol of the soul):






The homes were of the same Phoenician type also found in Spain. In Carthage then homes had flat-roofs with access by stairs and ladders. Many homes had interior courtyards reached through narrow corridors from the street. They had a drainage system feeding water into stone wells below. Some homes had stuccoed sandstone columns and Punic-style floor mosaics.



Entrance to a house in Kerkouane with a symbol of Tanit


Inside the walls of Carthage in the Megara area there developed a garden suburb and Appian describes it thus:

'planted with gardens and full of fruit-bearing trees divided off by low walls, hedges, and brambles, besides deep ditches full of water running in every direction (Appian, 117)

Megara was allowed to continue as a semi-rural district rather than follow planned urbanisation.

The walls of Carthage were fairly impressive structures, over five-meters thick, with a mighty double-gate opening onto the beach. The wall extended as far as the edge of the lagoons. Interestingly, no landward walls so far have been discovered, but it would not make sense had it been left open.




Artist rendition of the sea walls of Carthage, 400 BC

However, there have been some finds of building remains that are Greek influenced, like the surviving upper part of an Ionic sandstone pillar in the 'tophet', the remains of an Ionic column from the 'Hannibal quarter', along with the Ionic columns on the Thugga mausoleum (pictures above), however it must be stressed that Greek influence certainly did not push aside other forms. In fact, examples on surviving stele, and cippi show a mix of all three styles; Phoenician, Egyptian, and Greek!

Bibliography:


Appian's History of Rome: The Punic Wars (Appian's History of Rome: The Punic Wars)



The Carthaginians by Dexter Hoyos, 2010


Daily Life in Carthage at the Time of Hannibal, by Picard, 1961

(Will write in a bit more detail, and about the Harbor and other public buildings at a later date!) ]]> markdienekes http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/593-aesthetics-carthage.html The Battle of Zama http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/584-battle-zama.html Mon, 05 Dec 2011 14:27:47 GMT _*The Battle of Zama, 202 BC*_ A match up in history of arguably the two greatest commanders of their day, and among the best of the ancient... The Battle of Zama, 202 BC



A match up in history of arguably the two greatest commanders of their day, and among the best of the ancient world. The battle, fought in 202 BC, was the last battle of the Second Punic War, and one which began Rome's domination of the Mediterranean.



Number of troops and organisation




Hannibal's Forces and Deployment:



Hannibal's infantry were set up in three lines, each line generally agreed to have been made up of 12,000 men for a total of 36,000 infantry and 2000 Carthaginian citizen cavalry.

The Numidian Prince Tychaeus brought 2000 cavalry.

A force of 80 elephants (which has been doubted by Richard Gabriel who suggests as it takes up to 20 years to train war elephants to a sufficient standard, the Carthaginians had already used up their best in the war already. De Sanctis and Gabriel believe there was more likely only about 20 young and inexperienced elephants in Hannibal's army)

Total Strength: 40,000 (though Appian says 50,000, but this is generally rejected by modern historians)

Deployment: Hannibal drew up his infantry in 3 lines, each 12,000 strong (though it's possible his third line of veterans was made up of more, perhaps some 15,000 men). The first line were mercenaries: Ligurians, Celts, Balearic Islanders and Moors, and had been raised by Mago (who had died returning from Italy in 203 BC). In front of this line were light armed skirmishers and 80 elephants. At a certain distance behind the first line, the second consisted of native Libyans and Carthaginians. They were given orders not to support the first line, but to follow behind and keep their distance. The third line was at a greater distance from the second, more than a furlong, and were Hannibal's Old Guard, his veterans from Italy, thought to have been made up of mostly Bruttians, but no doubt some of the old survivors who had marched with him from Spain too, who would have been in their 40s at least by now. They were to act as an independent reserve, and halted when the first two lines advanced, creating an even bigger gap between them. Hannibal posted his cavalry on the wings, with the Numidians on the left, and the Carthaginians on the right.




Scipio's Forces and Deployment:



There are no solid figures for the size of Scipio's army, but it is usually reckoned to have been made up of about 30,000 infantry (including 6,000 Numidians) and over 6,100 cavalry (1,500 Roman and Italian, 4,600 Numidian)

Total Strength: 36,100

Deployment: Scipio deployed his troops in the usual three line formation – but instead of the principes covering the gaps of the hastati maniples, they were set up directly behind them, the triarii forming the final line. The intervals between the front maniples were filled with companies of velites. This created lanes, which he hid from Hannibal with the velites. Laelius' Italian horse was on the left wing, and Masinissa and all his Numidians on the right. (the Numdian infantry are fought to have either been placed with the velites, on the flanks of the Roman legionaries, or mixed in with the Numidian horse. I believe they were most likely mixed in with the velites, sadly it is impossible to determine – maybe just have them on the legionary flanks would be easier!)




The Battle:


Phase 1:

The skirmishers open up the battle in the plain between the two armies, but neither side gains an advantage.

Phase 2:

Hannibal orders his elephants to charge, hoping they will strike a hammer blow against the Roman infantry. The skirmishers on both sides disperse as the elephants charge forward.

Phase 3:

Hannibal orders his army forward following the elephant charge. Scipio orders the horns and trumpets to blast and panics the young elephants, causing some of them to stampede through Hannibal's Numdian cavalry on the Punic left flank.

Phase 4:

Masinissa charges Hannibal's Numdians, and sweeps them from the field. The elephants however have reached the main Roman line. Some are driven back, some are killed, while others are drawn through the lanes and killed. Roman losses are heavy, (thought to be mainly among the velites) but they hold their ranks. Some elephants stampede towards Hannibal's cavalry on the right flank, disrupting formations.

Phase 5:

Laelius charges the disrupted Carthaginian cavalry and routs them. The fight is now an infantry battle. Hannibal orders his first two lines forward and the Romans redress their ranks and advance to meet them.

Phase 6:

The mercenaries of the first rank are broken, Roman short swords and discipline gaining the upper-hand. The mercenaries flee but their path is blocked by the Carthaginian levies in the second line. Fighting breaks out amongst Hannibal's first two lines as the mercenaries try to cut their way through the levies ranks to freedom, (Gabriel belives this is a misunderstanding, and Hannibal ordered the second line forward to engage the Romans, trapping some of the mercenaries). Trapped between the second line and the Romans, the mercenaries are hacked to pieces and are destroyed.

Phase 7:

The Carthaginian line counterattacks and presses the hastati back and causing them some confusion. They rally only because the principes stand firm, and together drive back the Carthaginian levies and break them. Hannibal's third line rebuffs the broken second line's attempts to force through the line who are driven to the open plains on the flanks.

Phase 8:

Scipio redresses his formation, and lengthens his line so that the principes and triarii are on the hastati flanks. As Scipio was organising his men, Hannibal also reorganised his line, adding those that had survived and not ran from the field from the first two ranks - and deploying them onto the flanks of his veteran line.

Phase 9:

The lines meet, and the battle hangs in the balance, but the return of the cavalry tips the scales into Scipio's favour, and the cavalry charge into the rear of the Carthaginians. Hannibal's veterans put up a final stand but most are killed. Hannibal manages to flee.

Result:

Hannibal suffers his only serious defeat, and it is a crushing one. The Carthaginian losses are around 20,000, with nearly as many taken prisoner. Roman casualties are said to have been 1,500 to 2,500, though we are not told of Masinissa's losses other than they suffered greater losses than the Romans did.


Conclusions and notes:


Two thirds of Hannibal's infantry force were unreliable, a third completely freshly levied, only the third line made up of his veterans of Italy were an instrument of Hannibal's will. The rest were made up of disparate armies that had yet to gel. Scipio's infantry were a homogenous force and very experienced, made up of veterans who had seen constant service since at least 216 BC (made up of the remnants of Cannae, and the two battles of Herdonia, who continued to fight and campaign in Sicily and then in Africa) - Scipio's infantry had the advantage overall - not in numbers, but in organization and overall experience.

Hannibal is also thought to have devised a plan to level the playing field in regards to the cavalry. Both H.H Scullard and Richard Gabriel believe Hannibal gave them the order to give ground and drive the opposition off the field, which could explain the ease of the Roman victory here (though against this they may well have just perused too far, and Lazenby believes that it would have been very risky to expose his flanks like this). With the cavalry off the field, Hannibal's only chance of victory would be to break the Roman centre, thus he threw all his weight against the numerically inferior Romans, starting with the elephants, then three waves of infantry. The strategy almost worked, as we can see the hastati were exhausted after their struggles against the first two lines. It is also thought that Hannibal set up the third line to prevent Scipio's infantry flanking his first two lines,.

Scipio's own tactics were the set up of his maniples and the use of the lanes to funnel the elephants, and the extension of his line to engage Hannibal's veterans. Scipio's tactics relied on turning the phalanx into echelon, which he did by discarding the usual quincunx formation by placing the triarii and principes back from the front line making the last two lines capable of independent manoeuvre, which Hannibal nullified completely with the use of his third line, thus Scipio engaged in the normal Roman frontal slog rather than use his manoeuvres from earlier battles. Hannibal's third line also is considered the first true reserve in history. Gabriel believes out of the two plans, Hannibal's was the most sophisticated (Gabriel, p.199)

Scipio's legions were superior infantry and cavalry wise, disciplined to the degree that they responded very quickly and efficiently to re-calls and re-distributions. But they were stopped in their tracks by Hannibal and his veterans. (Thanks SpartanJKM!)

Strategically before the battle, both were considering the same objective, to reach their allies from the west (mainly for cavalry support); Scipio was searching for Massinissa, Hannibal for Vermina and both generals moved their armies towards them. It was a risk on both their parts as they had no control over it, but perhaps Scipio had more reliable information where Massinissa was. Massinissa arrived first at any rate. Vermina arrived just a few days too late to help Hannibal, and was bringing a large force to compliment the Carthaginian which Livy puts at 16,200 men. Livy's date that the battle against Vermina happened three months after Zama makes no sense as Vermina would not sally forth to Zama to fight Scipio's army unless he was there to support Hannibal.


The story of Hannibal being too far from water also appears suspicious. According to Gabriel (p.191):


Why Hannibal would have made such a basic mistake in not providing water for his army and animals in the obviously hot and dry climate is not explained...

It's interesting to wonder what just may have happened had Hannibal linked up with Vermina's force in time...


Bibliography:


Carey, Hannibal's Last Battle: Zama & the Fall of Carthage, 2007

Gabriel, Scipio Africanus: Rome's Greatest General, 2008

Gabriel, Hannibal, 2011

Lazenby, Hannibal's War, 1997

Scullard, Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician, 1970

 ]]> markdienekes http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/584-battle-zama.html <![CDATA[Hannibal's Invastion Force: By the Numbers]]> http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/581-hannibal-s-invastion-force-numbers.html Fri, 02 Dec 2011 20:04:14 GMT Hannibal's Invasion Force: By the Numbers




When Hannibal left New Carthage during the late Spring of 218 BC, according to Polybius his army amounted to 90,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry (Polybius, 3.35), while Appian adds 37 elephants to the number. Clearly, the size of his infantry and cavalry are exaggerated, and the true size of Hannibal's invasion force will not be known with certainty, but there are a few considerations – particularly logistical – to take into account when viewing these figures.


First we must discover the reported figures for the size of the Carthaginian army before Hannibal took over – when Hasdrubal the Fair was in charge. According to Diodorus, in retaliation for the betrayal and killing of Hannibal's father, Hamilcar in 225 BC, Hasdrubal moved against the Oretani with an army made up of 50,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and 200 elephants (Gabriel, Hannibal, p.72). Four years later, after his assassination and Hannibal took command, that number had increased to 60,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry - in a four year time period (225-221 BC) the number had risen 10,000 and 2000 respectively. It was with this army Hannibal conducted two successful campaigns against the Spanish between 221-218 BC, along with the siege of Saguntum before retiring his troops to winter quarters. If we take Polybius' numbers, we have to believe that Hannibal had just a matter of months to raise 30,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry to make up this number over the course of the winter.

Polybius tells us that Hannibal also left behind a force with his brother, Hasdrubal, made up of 12,650 infantry and 2550 cavalry to guard the Spanish coast. In order to do this Hannibal would have had to make up 42,000 new infantry and 6,550 new cavalry in the winter to be able to raise the force for Hasdrubal and still have 90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry declared by Polybius in the few months of winter. Gabriel believes new reinforcements could not have come from Carthage. The reported troop transfers were nothing more than swapping Spanish infantry for more reliable African infantry with no real gain of numerical strength. (Gabriel, Hannibal, pp.101-3).


Engels (Alexander the Great, pp.3-18)has estimated that there was one mule per 50 men for transport, and one camp follower for every three soldiers – which would increase the total number of people to 136,000 for Hannibal's march. Per day per man would need 3 pounds of rations. This would make it necessary that a total of 408,000 pounds of rations had to be obtained daily to feed the troops. Add to this the 120,000 pounds of grain needed for the horses per day. Around 2700 pack animals would be needed to carry this amount of food for a day, plus another 2000 or so for equipment and heavy baggage. To feed these pack animals, troops and horses for ten days, one would need 55,520 pack animals:






(Shean, Hannibal's Mules, p.171 Table 1)


Gabriel has calculated the length of Hannibal's column would have been more than 100 miles long based on American logistical calculations that an infantry brigade comprising 6310 men and 1021 animals occupied a road space of 4.8 miles, (Gabriel, p.103) – a column of Hannibal's length could not make the reported 80 stades (9 miles) a day that Polybius implies was Hannibal's rate of movement (Polyb. 3.50)


What then, were his numbers? We have to take into account of attrition during Hannibal's campaigns in Spain from 221-218 BC – but we have very little to estimate casualty figures. Gabriel assumes that we should look at a 10 percent casualty figure for these campaigns (including Saguntum) which would make the figure of Hannibal's army before he dispersed for winter around 54,000 infantry and 7000 horse. From this we can deduct the force given to Hasdrubal Barca leaving Hannibal's invasion force a much more manageable 40,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry.
With this force he supposedly fought four tribes north of the Ebro river; the Ilurgetes, the Bargusii, the Aerenosii and the Andosini, leaving Hanno in command of a force made up of 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry (along with his heavy baggage) to defend the region. The only tribe of significance were the Ilurgetes, and even coming up against token resistance Hannibal could not have marched an army 100,000 strong in the time Polybius and Livy imply Hannibal took to cover the distance from the Ebro to Emporion.


What then, was the purpose of Hanno's force? We have to question its historicity by the actions that followed. Hanno was reportedly more than 150 miles south of the only strategic location in the region; that of the Greek coastal city of Emporion, supposedly fighting rebels. Hanno did not attempt to lay siege to the city that would see Gnaeus Scipio disembark at the head of a Roman army a few months later. Hanno made no attempt to protect the Spanish coast. The answer was his force was unable to conduct offensive operations. It is more likely that Hannibal did not in fact leave such a force behind as it would have achieved nothing of significance in the region, being unable to defend the Spanish coast or capture the strategic Greek city of Emporion (Gabriel, p.105-6). Hannibal only had around 40,000 troops, and could hardly have afforded to leave such a pointless force behind. More likely, his plan was to defend and hold the line at the Ebro River, where Hasdrubal's main force was located, and where there was friendly tribes and well supplied magazines and solid interior lines linking up with New Carthage. Hannibal was well aware that he could not defend the area north of the Ebro sufficiently against Rome's superior numbers of warships and transports.

Naturally, any attempt to discover the true figure is impossible, and the above analysis is flawed due to the nature of reported ancient figures and ancient sources in general - but Gabriel's approach is certainly an interesting and fresh perspective of the numbers - despite the unreliability of the source figure of Diodorus' in regards to the size of Hasdrubal the Fair's army in 225 BC!
It's also flawed due to ultimately guess-work on ancient logistics, but it does give a good idea how supplying armies (especially stupidly large ones) would have been far from simple.

Essentially, Hannibal needed to get to Italy quickly. Dragging 90,000 soldiers (half of which would have been poorly trained and of little use on a long march, let alone battle), and tens of thousands of pack animals would have slowed him down a lot, and would have also presented a possible large danger to those whose country he was traveling through... Another point to consider, if Hannibal's army was so large, why did the Romans think they could deal with it with the reduced legions they sent to Spain under the consul P. Scipio?

Another explanation of the numbers which could explain such a high figure could be that that the numbers simply revealed Carthage's complete military strength they had in Spain by mid-year - this is a very plausible analysis.


IMPORTANT UPDATE: I've just come across some very interesting and important information that refutes Shean and Gabriel's logistics completely - I'll add this information soon - but essentially it suggests Hannibal could have supported an army as big as the ancient sources report - though I still remain unconvinced that Hannibal left New Carthage with 100,000 men.


Here's the link to the discussion I had with Hanny over on another forum:

http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showt...4#post11494894


Bibliography


Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, Penguin Classics, 1979


Gabriel, Hannibal, Potomac Books, 2011


Shean, Hannibal's Mules, 1996 ]]> markdienekes http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/581-hannibal-s-invastion-force-numbers.html <![CDATA[Why Didn't Hannibal March on Rome?]]> http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/530-why-didn-t-hannibal-march-rome.html Sun, 23 Oct 2011 12:12:53 GMT Hannibal and the Siege of Rome:

This is a series of replies to questions about why perhaps Hannibal didn't siege Rome that I posted in another thread:




Originally Posted by Cornelius
There are loads of people who absolutely adore Hannibal, claiming that he was the greatest general ever to have lived. These people absolutely refuse to admit that he had flaws. Well, not I. Someone said that "Hannibal knew how to gain a victory, but not how to use it". I think there may be some truth behind that; after Cannae, Rome's resources were exhausted(there is no way I buy Labienus's claim that "Rome could recruit up to an astonishing 700 000 men at the time" - I'd say a maximum of 300,000 men in normal cases, but most certainly not immediately after Cannae) and the Italian Allies were wavering in their loyalty to Rome. Had he known how to use a victory, Hannibal would've applied more pressure on the Italian Allies, which would have resulted in an Italy united against Rome. As for Hannibal not besieging Rome after Cannae, I think that proves he wasn't as flawless a general as some people claim him to be. Rome had very few troops left in the field after Cannae, and if Hannibal had marched immediately on Rome after Cannae, Rome couldn't have recruited more men. Instead, the Romans would've been stuck in their city. If he had done that, it is highly likely that the Italian Allies would have abandoned Rome. Now, Hannibal didn't have siege engines with him - so what? The Romans usually didn't bring siege engines with them - they were built on the spot, right outside the enemy walls. Didn't Hannibal know how to build siege engines then? Surely he could have found someone who knew(yes, much like the Mongols did in China). Didn't Hannibal dare march on Rome? That doesn't make sense - he dared march across the alps and face the Romans heavily outnumbered. So why didn't Hannibal march on Rome when the city was defenseless aside from a petty city militia? In my opinion, he didn't march on Rome because he wasn't a flawless commander - his weakness was siege warfare, and he probably knew it. Now, which Hannibal-lover is gonna jump at me first for saying this? :)


I don't think many would say he had no flaws. Being a man, he was prone to making mistakes. Perhaps not marching on Rome was one of them, but I don't think so. I'm not sure why you believe the Roman's couldn't recruit as they would be stuck in their city and that had he done so, all the allies would have abandoned Rome. The allies were fairly loyal in the long run, perhaps due to fear of Roman reprisals and suspicions on the motives of the Carthaginians themselves. The Romans have people connected to the senate outside Rome, and had the time to organise people to do such a thing, riding from Rome to other locations to begin the recruiting. It was very hard for a commander to make another go to battle if one side did not want it, so any fresh raised legions could have simply skirmished with Hannibal's foragers. Had Hannibal took to simply blockading the city his own lines of supply would have been at risk. With poor supply lines, he relied on movement across the Italian peninsular to acquire food (one of the main reasons he brought so many Numidian cavalry with him - to forage - most of Hannibal's shock cavalry were Iberian and Celts) he could also not sever Roman supply lines.

Being over 250 miles away, it would have taken three weeks for Hannibal to get there (not the 5 days suggested by Maharbal) which would have been ample time to shore up the cities defenses against Hannibal's weakened army (as suggested by Lancel, Lazenby, Shean, Daly and Goldsworthy). In the event of a protracted siege - the legions in the north, Sicily and elsewhere could have been called upon as relief forces (along with the freshly raised legions). Livy's words on the plight of Rome are rhetorical exaggerations. Rome had men to defend it's walls. Varro rallied his troops from Cannae, some 10,000 men who could have been put to use too.

(Apologies for re-posting this but from an old post) Immediately after Cannae Hannibal sent a delegation led by Carthalo to negotiate a peace treaty with the Senate on moderate terms. It would have made little difference if he had been outside Rome, he was a few weeks march away regardless, yet despite the multiple catastrophes Rome had suffered, the Roman Senate refused to parley.

In Hans Delbruck's Warfare in Antiquity he says: At Cannae then, he had beaten and wiped out only the smaller half of the Roman Legions (8 of 18), and the Romans soon replaced their losses through new levies; they did not even have the legions stationed overseas - in Sicily, Sardinia, Spain - return home. To have moved against Rome immediately after the battle with a view toward the terrorizing effect would therefore have served no purpose for Hannibal and, passing as a negative demonstration, would have nullified the other morale effects of the victory at Cannae. If the well-known statement by the cavalry leader, Marharbal, that Hannibal understood how to win but not exploit his victories, was actually said, it only proves that the brave general who said it was a simple fighter rather than a true strategist. During the lengthy butchery of the encircled legionaries the Carthaginian army had itself sacrificed 5,700 killed, and consequently in addition at least 20,000 wounded, who were not capable of marching again until days and weeks had passed. Had he started out immediately after battle, Hannibal would have arrived before Rome with hardly 25,000 men, and the Romans would not have given in to such a small force, even at the height of their terror. (p.337)

And onto besieging Rome:

Rome was a very large, well-fortified city: the Servian wall had a circumference of more than five miles. Large open areas within the walls could accommodate refugees from the countryside. Rome was also a large trading capital, richly provided by supplies of all kinds. Hannibal would have had to control the sea and taken Ostia first so he himself could be supplied by sea to make besieging Rome not impossible with 50-60,000 men. But we know the Roman's had superiority at sea, which is why Hannibal had gathered his forces in a land army. According to Delbruck again:

The siege army would, therefore, have had to be supplied by land. Gigantic supply lines would have had to be organised and made to function through a completely hostile countryside and passing by innumerable cities and strongholds that blocked the routes. A very large portion of the Carthaginian force would have had to be assigned to this duty, and every isolated unit would have been exposed at every turn to the legions and cohorts, both Roman and allied, which were still stationed in the country or were newly organised. The remainder of the army which would have been available for siege, divided by the Tiber River, would have withstood only with great difficulty sorties of the numerically far superior garrison. The principal arm of the Carthaginians, their cavalry, could not have been of any assistance. (p.338)

With what forces Hannibal had at his disposal after Cannae, he clearly couldn't achieve the above.

Adrian Goldsworthy writes:

It is difficult to see what more Hannibal could have done to attain victory. We can never know how close the Romans came to conceding defeat. Perhaps a march on Rome after Cannae would have broken the Roman's nerve, but we cannot be sure of this and such a move would have been a great gamble. One major problem for the Carthaginians was that they had one superb commander with an excellent army, whilst elsewhere they had poor commanders with average armies or average commanders with poor armies. From the beginning the Romans were able to produce in considerable quantity armies which were average in quality and the skill of their commanders, giving them an advantage over all but Hannibal. As the war progressed and Roman leaders and soldiers gained experience, their superiority over the other Punic armies became even more marked.
The Fall of Carthage by Adrian Goldsworthy, p.314


To be honest, there has been much consideration into Hannibal's actions after Cannae, and why he didn't march on Rome. Shean (in Hannibal's Mules) believes it was the consideration of supplying such a 250 mile march. Theoretically it was possible for pack animals to carry supplies to last for 19 days, and the number of animals would have been far too many available in his position, nor was a single region capable of providing fodder for the animals. If Hannibal had planned to attack Rome, he would have needed to march more than 15 miles a day to reach the wall in time and wanted a continuous march without foraging - for that they'd need 544,920 pack animals, and it was reckoned Hannibal had around 20,000 at any one time. Yes, his reason may well have been something as mundane as a lack of food!



I'm really not sure where people get the idea he had no siege equipment, as this is not backed up by a reading of the sources. There is abundant evidence that Hannibal used siege weapons throughout his Italian campaign, building them when needed. Appian mentions siege engines in Hannibal's attack on the town of Petilia shortly after the battle of Cannae (App. Hann. 5.29). Livy makes mention of various different siege machinery. One attempt at capturing Nola in 216 BC, Hannibal ordered his men to bring up the equipment needed for an assault of the town (Livy. 21.16.11-12). The assault failed, but he moved onto Acerrae, where he again made siege and assault preparations. The town was circumvalleted and the town was captured (Livy 23.17.4-6). Later that year Hannibal used mantelets and dug saps when he assaulted Casilinum (Livy. 23.18.8-9). The following year he had to wait for a day in his attempt to capture Cumae as he had to bring up the necessary equipment from camp (Livy. 23.36.5-8). When he assaulted the town, he made use of a high wooden tower against the wall. He also used artillery and siege engines against the citadel of Tarentum (Sheen, Hannibal's Mules, p.164*). His siege capability was not as bad as historians make out, and he did infact storm a few places, and it is only the ones he failed to take that gets attention.

*John F. Shean, Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte
Bd. 45, H. 2 (2nd Qtr., 1996), pp. 159-187



In fact, very few cities in the war were taken by assault and the capture of fortified places has always been extremely difficult. According to Goldsworthy, 'as we have seen, direct attacks on a large city were only successful when they combined surprise with treachery from the inside or special knowledge of a weakness in the defences.' (p.313)









Originally Posted by Cornelius
Why is that? Rome had basically no troops left after Cannae. Hannibal could have besieged Rome, and the Romans wouldn't have been able to do anything about it.


Two city legions, 1500 men under Marcellus at Ostia, the legion of marines at Teanum Sidicinum, Postumius' two legions and allies in Cisalpine Gaul, and the armies in Sicily and Sardinia which could have been transferred across to Rome by sea before Hannibal's arrival. 8,000 slave volunteers and 6,000 criminals were quickly raised and armed with foreign armour and weapons from past triumphs to bolster the defences, not to mention the civilian population of Rome itself which would have also defended itself - had Hannibal somehow managed to get into the city, it has been argued by Strauss and Ober (The Anatomy of Error: Ancient Military Disasters and their lessons for Modern Strategists, 1992, p.154-5) that his army could have become involved in vicious street fighting which would have made it far from certain Hannibal could keep a hold on the city (especially considering that Hannibal would have arrived there with at most 25,000 men). Rome was far from undefended. I'm not sure why I have to keep bringing this up when the sources reveal this! Had they known they had nobody to defend themselves, why dismiss Cartharlo without even admitting him into the city to discuss peace - apparently Hannibal's terms were moderate? To suggest they would have capitulated at the sight of Hannibal's army is unknowable - but given the information I've read, I'm more inclined to believe they would have defended their city to the death.










Originally Posted by Cornelius
markdienekes,

Like you say, there is no way of knowing whether Rome had surrendered if Hannibal had marched on Rome. On the other hand, I maintain that the petty forces Rome had left after Cannae would've been no match for Hannibal(let's face it, Rome's resources were exhausted after Cannae; it'd have taken too long for the Romans to recruit another army of sufficient size). If he had besieged Rome, it would have been very difficult for the Romans to recruit more troops, because A) they would be stuck in their city and B) the Italian Allies would realize that Rome stood no chance of winning. In fact, Hannibal didn't even need to take Rome by force; he could have surrounded the city and waited for the citizens to starve to death. That would most likely have forced the Romans to sue for peace. Regarding what you said about the Romans being able to forage Hannibal's supply lines if Hannibal had besieged Rome, well, then he could have sent troops to defeat the foraging parties. The Mongols were in pretty much the same situation outside Beijing; they had besieged the city, but the Chinese sent armies from the south to relieve it. But Djengis Khan, another military mastermind, defeated them - so why couldn't Hannibal have done the same thing in basically the same situation? I rate Hannibal higher than Djengis Khan, so... Then again, I'm sure it would have been possible to take Rome by force. The city of Carthage was also surrounded by formidable walls, and yet it only took Scipio Aemilianus one year to take it. Why couldn't Hannibal have done the same?

To summarize, I'm confident that not marching on Rome after Cannae was a huge mistake that costed the Carthaginians their victory in the Second Punic War. If Hannibal had known how to use a victory, he wouldn't have made that mistake.


They already had armies of sufficient size to defend the walls. The garrison of Rome has been worked out by Dodge to have been about 40,000 strong (Hannibal, p.387), almost twice as many men as Hannibal would have had if he left immediately after his victory at Cannae (the other half of his army wounded and unable to march the 250 miles to Rome, whilst he also lost 11 percent of his force, a staggeringly high casualty rate for a victor.) and that's not including Postumius's legions and those in Sardinia and Sicily which could have been quickly diverted to Rome by the use of the navy (and those in Spain if Hannibal had settled down for a long siege).

Carthage was in a completely different situation, being completely blockaded by the aid of the Roman navy, and the siege had already been going on for years before hand by the time Scipio took charge. Starvation was already taking its toll on the populace. They had no allies to call to for aid, whereas Rome had plenty without including the 30 Latin colonies. As I mentioned in post 27 Hannibal and Siege of Rome

In regards to Hannibal trying to lay siege and starve Rome out:

Rome was a very large, well-fortified city: the Servian wall had a circumference of more than five miles. Large open areas within the walls could accommodate refugees from the countryside. Rome was also a large trading capital, richly provided by supplies of all kinds. Hannibal would have had to control the sea and taken Ostia first so he himself could be supplied by sea to make besieging Rome not impossible with 50-60,000 men. But we know the Roman's had superiority at sea, which is why Hannibal had gathered his forces in a land army. According to Delbruck again:

The siege army would, therefore, have had to be supplied by land. Gigantic supply lines would have had to be organised and made to function through a completely hostile countryside and passing by innumerable cities and strongholds that blocked the routes. A very large portion of the Carthaginian force would have had to be assigned to this duty, and every isolated unit would have been exposed at every turn to the legions and cohorts, both Roman and allied, which were still stationed in the country or were newly organised. The remainder of the army which would have been available for siege, divided by the Tiber River, would have withstood only with great difficulty sorties of the numerically far superior garrison. The principal arm of the Carthaginians, their cavalry, could not have been of any assistance. (Delbruck, Warfare in Antiquity, p.338)

It simply wasn't an option with what Hannibal had after Cannae.









Originally Posted by Cornelius
I respectfully disagree. :) If Rome could muster 40,000 men to defend its walls, those troops would've been raw recruits - no match for Hannibals veterans. And didn't Hannibal prove at Cannae that he could defeat armies twice the size of his own? Also, I don't think the part of "hostile territory" is quite true. If Hannibal had marched on Rome, the Italian Allies would probably have joined Hannibal, thus making Italy friendly territory, thus making supply lines a very small problem. As for supplying Rome by the sea, Rome was only supplied by the sea through the Tiber. Hannibal could have blocked the Tiber or simply used archers to kill the crew of any vessel trying to bring food to Rome. So no, I don't think that taking Ostia first would've been necessary - not that doing so would've been very difficult after Cannae.


On a battlefield Hannibal's force would have the advantage, but even recruits could have put up a good defense on strong walls, much like Carthage's citizens did in the Third Punic war. Hannibal's veteran army in Spain struggled for 8 months against Saguntum, and they were mostly civilians without the backup of the legions Rome still had out in the field and allies to support her. The Italian allies would probably have joined Hannibal? That's a fairly big assumption, since most didn't when Hannibal had defeated Roman forces on the Peninsular and went around burning and looting, and clearly showed that Rome could not defend them (or even themselves). Overall, my position on this is with the majority of modern scholarship, that he couldn't have taken the city directly after Cannae. We'll have to agree to disagree :)
Whether or not he could have prevented supplies getting into Rome by river, Hannibal would have been surrounded by armies with his own supplies cut-off before Rome began to feel the effects of starvation.

Personally, I feel that had the Battle of Dertosa in 215 BC been won by his brother, and Hannibal had been reinforced by Hasdrubal and Mago's armies, then he could have perhaps made an attempt on Rome... but that wasn't to be.






Originally Posted by Cornelius
Quite a few did. The Samnites and the Campanians, for example. In fact, a large part of southern Italy joined Hannibal. Who knows how many would've joined him if he had besieged Rome? I mean, being able to besiege Rome sends quite the message, doesn't it?


So does the message that he can't take Rome. I don't believe that Rome's colonies would have abandoned her, nor many other cities who feared hegemonic aspirations of other cities they had age old rivalries with had they turned to Hannibal which had been put to rest by Rome. Carthage and Hannibal were still an alien quality whose motives were unknown. At least with Rome they knew where they stood. Rome still had 10 legions available in Italy, Spain, Sicily, Sardinia and Cisalpine Gaul and their allied contingents, plus plenty of hostages from the elite in many cities that could keep the cities from betrayal in fear of losing loved ones.

Not all of Campania (quite a few important cities) or all the Samnites, or in fact entire areas did not join him, instead, Hannibal had a checkerboard effect across Southern Italy. Essentially those who joined Hannibal thought they could gain something, mostly power over their regions. To lots of communities, this thought would have been very uncomfortable.

(apologies for digging this post out again, but I think it explains the point best!)
Fronda in his book Between Rome and Carthage: Southern Italy during the Second Punic War supposes the alliances to both Hannibal and Rome were dictated by centuries of interstate rivalries that determined what actions the cities and towns would take when faced by Hannibal - political factionalism within the cities governing elite and interstate rivalries hindered Hannibal's strategy - for example - gaining Capua turned a number of cities from ever joining Hannibal out of choice because of their fear of Capuan hegemony (who most likely didn't want to control all of Italy, but take back what had been stripped of them by Rome) - those in the past that had joined Capua in her policy decisions in war turned from Rome - and those that didn't had fought that very same Capuan league in the past, and their very survival depended on staying with Rome as they feared they'd lose out in an alliance with Hannibal. This was the case all over the South where he tried to turn allies from Rome. In Bruttium, centuries of warfare between the Greeks and the Bruttians made the Greeks hesitant of joining Hannibal when most of Bruttium joined him, which is true of Greek intercity rivalry too - when he captured Locri, who had previous interstate rivalry with Rhegion, the Rhegions turned to Rome for help fearing Locrian hegemonic aspirations. Likewise, the Bruttians also attacked Croton without Hannibal's knowledge, which shows they also expected more power - sadly - with Rome's reaction after Cannae to garrison cities that might sway in order to prevent such a thing (though this did not mean it would work - see Tarentum in 213/2) this limited Hannibal's success massively. The combination of long term conditions (local rivalries) and short term factors (Rome's military response) proved to much for Hannibal's strategy to overcome.

Theoretically, if all of Rome's 30 colonies and allies deserted her had Hannibal besieged Rome, then of course Hannibal would have won, but that strikes me as too easy, and a simple way of looking at all the problems of factional and interstate rivalries of the cities in question that scattered the Peninsular during this time.

Hannibal then, in my opinion, made a logical choice to begin to weaken Rome by playing on the morale affects of Cannae, perhaps in order to strike at Rome when he had his own supply lines secured and his reinforcements. Sadly, results in other theatres and the military response of Rome on the peninsular turned Hannibal's war into one of attrition. ]]> markdienekes http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/530-why-didn-t-hannibal-march-rome.html Hannibal: Reforms and Cities http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/319-hannibal-reforms-cities.html Sat, 07 May 2011 16:17:58 GMT Hannibal was much more than a general, and it is a shame his activities after Zama are not as well documented as his activities during the Second... Hannibal was much more than a general, and it is a shame his activities after Zama are not as well documented as his activities during the Second Punic War. He did much for Carthage after the war - remaining as a general after Zama for about two years (up to 200BC) and before he was a sufete, he spent his time reimposing Carthage's control over her Libyan subjects inland at least as far as Sicca and eastwards to the Gulf of Sirte.

He also started repairing the damage done by Scipio and Masinissa's campaigns, and began replanting olive trees. Not only would this restore state authority, it would keep his remaining troops usefully busy until they could be paid off.

Before Hannibal was a sufete, in 197 the treasury was close to collapse, due to the corruption of some members of the court of 104, they had even tried to fool the Romans by giving them serious adulterated talents in 199, strained relations with their own people, and even worse, Masinissa. Citizens had to pay out of their own money for the year's war-indemnity, making up for the self-enriched idiots of the court of 104.

In 196, Hannibal took office and acted swiftly, investigating the corrupt court, hauling the recalcitrant before the citizen assembly, and passing a new law that removed judges lifetime tenure, made membership annually electable and also banned re-election for a second consecutive year.

He next enacted reforms that cleaned up the treasury and recovered much of the stolen money. The special tax was dropped, enriching the public.

He oversaw the physical development of a new residential and commercial district which was built on unused ground on the southern slope of the Bysra hill. It had carefully laid out, well-drained streets lined by shops and apartments with Greek style peristyle courtyards. This area was named the 'quartier Hannibal' by archeologists and prospered until the fall of Carthage.

His reforms succeeded, and really, he achieved more for his country in one year than he did for the twenty he was in Spain and Italy.

When he was forced into exile, he even helped design and build a couple of cities:

It is said that Hannibal the Carthaginian, after Antiochus had been conquered by the Romans, left him and went to Artaxas the Armenian, to whom he gave many excellent suggestions and instructions. For instance, observing that a section of the country which had the greatest natural advantages and attractions was lying idle and neglected, he drew up a plan for a city there, and then brought Artaxas to the place and showed him its possibilities, and urged him to undertake the building. The king was delighted, and begged Hannibal to superintend the work himself, whereupon a very great and beautiful city arose there, which was named after the king, and proclaimed the capital of Armenia.
(Plutarch, Lucullus, 31,)

which has survived and is called Artashat today, lying 20 miles south of Yemen.

When in Bithynia, King Prusias too asked him to design and foresee the building of another city, which was named Prusa and today stands as Bursa, and is reminiscent of Artaxata.


Bibliography

Hannibal: Rome's Greatest Enemy by Dexter Hoyos ]]> markdienekes http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/319-hannibal-reforms-cities.html <![CDATA[Army of Carthage During Hannibal's Time continued]]> http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/281-army-carthage-during-hannibal-s-time-continued.html Wed, 27 Apr 2011 09:17:06 GMT *_War-Elephants:_* The Carthaginians are thought to have first come across war elephants when they fought Pyrrhos in Siciliy in 278 BC. By 262... War-Elephants:


The Carthaginians are thought to have first come across war elephants when they fought Pyrrhos in Siciliy in 278 BC. By 262 BC, the Carthaginians had ther own elephant corp, using primarily an extinct type of forest elephant from northern Africa called the Loxodonta africana cyclotis which stood only 7-8ft at the shoulder, much shorter than their African and Indian cousins.


It is believed that Egypt played a role in helping Carthage, providing the first mahouts and even Indian elephants (like Hannibal's Syrus 'the Syrian'). Mahouts included Negroes, Moors and may have included some Indians. According to Appian, Carthage had an elephant stable that could house up to 300 of them, though the largest employed by Carthage was in Sicily in around 252 BC when they used 140. Zama was the last battle Carthage employed elephants, and there Hannibal used a force 80 strong to try and damage Scipio's infantry.


There has been a debate raging on just exactly how the Carthaginian war-elephant was equipped. The age old view that they used large towers following the Indian pattern and indeed, many artists particularly during the renaissance period depicts Carthaginian elephants as carrying towers and men fighting from them has been more recently doubted after the suggestion that the Loxodonta africana cyclotis had been the actual elephant they used. Could the Loxodonta africana cyclotis actually carry such a burden as a tower and crew? It has been suggested it couldn't carry an armed contingent of men and the tower, which is perhaps backed up by Polybius and Livy's silence on the matter, but then that argument could be made for the use of a tower too. The best evidence we have on Carthaginian elephants not using towers is on the Barcid coinage, but then we also have coins from Campania struck during the Hannibalic war which have towers.


However, despite the smaller sized elephant, Stephenson believes the evidence points towards that Carthaginian elephants actually did use towers. He believes they employed smaller towers than the Selucids which took the form of crenellated towers with a single hoplite shield on the left and right sides of the tower. The tower may have been decorated to look like stone. The elephant had one mahout who sat at the front, while the tower is thought to have been capable of carrying two men to fight on both sides of the elephant armed with javelins and possibly sarissas. They weren't heavily armoured to reduce the weight, though they may have had helmets of some sort. The mahout appears to have been unarmoured.


Hamilcar Barca made great use of his elephants during the Mercenary War, while Hannibal used war-elephants in both Spain and Italy. On his march through the Alps they scared the Celts so much that they did not launch attacks on areas which had elephants. Hannibal put them to good use in the Battle of the Trebia, though it is believed he lost most of the initial 37 he brought across with him during the winter of 217. Only one is said to have survived, which Hannibal rode through the Arnus marshes. This was supposedly an Indian elephant named Syrus. He did use elephants again however, as the only reinforcements he received from Carthage in 215 came with a small contingent of elephants. He also used 80 at Zama, but they were apparently young and not very well trained and were spooked easily, causing more chaos than good. Hasdrubal Barca also made use of war-elephants, but again, they did more harm than good when employed on the battlefield. To counter the unpredictable nature of elephants, the mahouts used hammers to drive in nails into the elephant skull, but this may have been quite a tricky task indeed.



It is Hannibal and his elephants which are probably the most famous of Carthaginian history. If you ask the general public who Hannibal was, they'd either respond with - the cannibal, or the elephants and the Alps, and it is certainly an enduring image for the ages.




There is also the story Polybius and Livy tell of how Hannibal got them across the Rhone River:

They built a number of very solid rafts and lashing two of these together fixed them very firmly into the bank of the river, their united width being about fifty feet. To these they attached others on the farther side, prolonging the bridge out into the stream. They secured the side of it which faced the current by cables attached to the trees that grew on the bank, so that the whole structure might remain in place and not be shifted by the current. When they had made the whole bridge or pier of rafts about two hundred feet long they attached to the end of it two particularly compact ones, very firmly fastened to each other, but so connected with the rest that the lashings could easily be cut. They attached to these several towing-lines by which boats were to tow them, not allowing them to be carried down stream, but holding them up against the current, and thus were to convey the elephants which would be in them across. After this they piled up a quantity of earth on all the line of rafts, until the whole was on the same level and of the same appearance as the path on shore leading to the crossing.The animals were always accustomed to obey their mahouts up to the water, but would never enter it on any account, and they now drove them along over the earth with two females in front, whom they obediently followed. As soon as they set foot on the last rafts the ropes which held these fast to the others were cut, and the boats pulling taut, the towing-lines rapidly tugged away from the pile of earth the elephants and the rafts on which they stood. Hereupon the animals becoming very alarmed at first turned round and ran about in all directions, but as they were shut in on all sides by the stream they finally grew afraid and were compelled to keep quiet. In this manner, by continuing to attach two rafts to the end of the structure, they managed to get most of them over on these, but some were so frightened that they threw themselves into the river when half-way across. The mahouts of these were all drowned, but the elephants were saved, for owing to the power and length of their trunks they kept them above the water and breathed through them, at the same time spouting out any water that got into their mouths and so held out, most of them passing through the water on their feet. (Polyb. 3.46)




The Italians:

The years proceeding the First Punic War Rome spent bringing southern Italy under its control. After the Battle of Cannae, Hannibal spent the next few years marching about much of southern Italy, mainly in the regions of Apulia, Campania, Bruttium, southern Lucania, and eastern and western Magna Graecia trying to ferment rebellion against Rome. This was arguably his main strategy – to use Rome's own resources against her. Many regions joined Hannibal either through force or by choice – the most famous being the largest cities after Rome of Taras and Capua. The majority who fought for him however, were Bruttians, while the larger powers concentrated on extending their own hegemony. Indeed, Hannibal's own treaties with these powers seem to have been in exchange for complete independence, whereby they did not have to supply Hannibal with men. However, Southern Italy did supply Hannibal's army with fresh troops. Samnites, Lucanians, Apulians, Bruttians and Italian Greeks did fight in Hannibal's army. Through the years and the gradual loss of his veterans brought from Africa and Spain – Hannibal would come to rely much on these people, and it is reckoned that of his army of roughly 40,000 troops, the majority were Italians by 208 BC while the Lucanians alone provided Carthage with an army 20,000 strong led by the Carthaginian Hanno. It is likely Samnites provided Hannibal with heavy cavalry and were known to have to an excellent cavalry force.

They would have been armed most likely in a Roman fashion, equipped with Celtic style shields, Montefortino helmets, their body armour determined by wealth and status, and consisted of mail armour worn over padded undershirts, muscled cuirasses, and pectorales. For weapons they would have used double-edged Spanish style swords and pila. Samnites, Lucanians and Apulians upon reaching manhood were distinguished by broad bronze belts that were always worn. It is important to note the Greek influence on Southern Italy however, and some Greek armour may well have been worn, and it wouldn't have been uncommon to find soldiers wearing Attic and Etrusco-Corinthian helmets.

They are thought to have stopped fighting in phalanx by this time, and fought in lines and maniples instead, adopted from the Romans, though sadly we have no evidence on this account. When Hannibal returned to Africa in 203 BC, he brought some of his veterans with him, and the majority were Bruttians who formed the third and final line at Zama. These troops stood firm while the others crumbled, and were steady and reliable soldiers who fought to the death.


Conclusion:

As you can see from the list above, hardly any of Carthage's armies were made of ethnic Carthaginian troops. Instead, the national groups make it appear an unwieldy and diverse organisation. It was made up of many cultures, languages, combat styles, whose distinct national groupings had different reasons for fighting for Carthage. Polybius himself is fairly damning of it, particularly in regards to the mercenaries and allies whose loyalty was dubious compared to the Romans.

Hannibal's remarkable leadership appears to have dismissed these handicaps and they were remarkably effective under his command. Allowing them to fight in their diverse national styles, the armies of Carthage also built up an army with a high proportion of cavalry to infantry. Under Hannibal's leadership, they were a devastatingly efficient fighting force, one which had strong personal ties to him, particularly the original army that crossed the Alps which was made up of experienced Libyans, Numidians and Iberians. Indeed, they had chosen Hannibal in Spain to take command of the army after Hasdrubal the Elder's death, and their experience, skill and devotion to Hannibal gave Carthage the initiative in the Second Punic War.


Bibliography

Ancient Sources:

Polybius and Livy (Penguin classics)

Modern Sources:

Connolly, P. (1998) Greece and Rome at War

Cunliffe, B. (1997) The Ancient Celts

Daly, G. (2002) Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War

Head, D. (1982) Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars 359-146 BC

Stephenson, I. (2008) Hannibal's Army

Wise, T. (1982) Armies of the Carthaginian Wars 265-146 BC ]]> markdienekes http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/281-army-carthage-during-hannibal-s-time-continued.html <![CDATA[Army of Carthage During Hannibal's Time]]> http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/280-army-carthage-during-hannibal-s-time.html Wed, 27 Apr 2011 09:15:59 GMT
The Army of Carthage During Hannibal's Time

The Carthaginian army at the time of the Second Punic War is largely unknown, in-fact even less is known about it than the Roman army of the same period. Most historians agree in regards to its structure and organisation that 'it is impossible to say', though we are in a position to list the peoples who fought for and made up Carthage's army.

Our most reliable source on the armies of Carthage comes from Polybius, and even then that proves to be a tricky case. At a time when the Greeks were facing life under Roman rule, Polybius considered himself to be writing pragmatic history for mainly a Greek audience. Polybius' analysis of Carthage's constitution and military system is brief, and as a result they were intended purely as a contrast to what he regarded as a far superior Roman system.

Carthaginians entirely neglect their infantry, though they do pay some slight attention to their cavalry. The reason for this is that the troops they employ are foreign and mercenary, whereas those of the Romans are native of the soil and citizens... The Carthaginians depend for the maintenance of their freedom on the courage of a mercenary force but the Romans on their own valour and on the aid of their allies... Italians in general naturally excel Phoenicians and Africans in bodily strength and personal courage. (6.52.3-10)

His observations on Carthage's military institutions show's little respect for the Carthaginian army, and contains obvious bias in favour of the Roman system.

Nevertheless, Polybius does seem to be correct in his description for Carthaginian institutions. The Carthaginians themselves rarely took the field – only on occasions when the city itself was threatened would a citizen militia be assembled, and they largely relied upon allies and mercenaries led by Carthaginian officers to fight their wars. Carthaginians were thus found in positions of authority rather than the ranks, the bulk of their armies being made up of subject or allied levies and foreign mercenaries. (Daly, pp.83) Lower-ranking officers most likely shared the nationality of the men, made clear by Polybius as he records mercenary officers at Lilybaeum attempting to betray the town to the Romans during the first Punic War (Poly. 1.43)


With such a wide range of foreign troops serving in Carthaginian armies, such as Libyans, Numidians, Iberians and Celts, Moors, and Gaetulians, there appears to be no attempt made to standardise these troops into a uniformed fighting force. They appear to have been equipped and to have fought according to the customs of their respective nations. Balearians fought as infantry skirmishers armed with slings, while Numidian cavalry were armed with javelins and fought as skirmishers rather than shock cavalry (Daly, pp.83)


As it would have been impractical to deploy troops together who did not understand each other and their combat styles, or lacked similar weapons, they must have been organised on the basis of nationality.


After the Truceless War of 241-237 BC, Hamilcar Barca and his successors in Spain likely made changes to reform the army in order to prevent such revolts from happening again and the command structure perhaps changed to reflect this, removing elements of leadership from the nations under their command, though it is clear from Polybius that the Celtic elements in Hannibal's army had their own officers. (Polyb. 8.30.4)


I will analyse Hannibal's army in terms of nationality, starting with Africans soon! For this, I have used the ancient sources of Polybius and Livy (Penguin classics versions), and Hannibal's Army by Ian Stephenson, The Armies of the Carthaginian Wars 265-146 BC by Terrence Wise and Cannae by Gregory Daly. (I've used a few more and will include a full biography at the end)

AFRICANS

Hannibal's army contained many Africans from the Carthaginians themselves, to Libyans, Liby-Phoenicians, Numidians, Moors and Gaetulians. The first I shall look at are the Libyans.

The Libyans were the native subjects of Carthage and supplied the core of the Carthaginian army. They had served in Carthaginian armies from a very early date. During the sixth century, Carthage had stopped relying on a citizen levy and began to hire mercenaries and employ allied troops, many whom would have been Libyan.

The earliest Libyans to fight for Carthage were mercenaries, as those who fought at Himera in 480 BC were. After this defeat, Carthage began to acquire African territory, and the Libyans obliged to supply Carthage with troops once they had been conquered. The term, Libyan – was used to refer to lighter-skinned Northern Africans, though it is clear when Polybius mentions Libyans he does not refer to either the Numidians and Moors, but rather to the native subjects of Carthage. Libyans were of Berber stock with a possible Negro admixture who had their own language – though Punic would have been common among the elite (Daly, pp.85)

Libyans were known for their power and endurance, and were traditionally skirmishers armed with javelins, small daggers and small round shields– however, by Hannibal's day – they were line infantry, and were equipped accordingly. Evidence suggests they were armed by the Carthaginian state rather than themselves, if the report that 200,000 Carthaginian cuirasses were surrendered to Rome during the Third Punic War is historical, as that number far-exceeded the number of citizen combatants, and including women and children, the population of Carthage at that time probably did not exceed 400,000 people.

The Libyans once fought as Hoplites much in the fashion of their Carthaginian masters, wearing bronze helmets of Hellenistic style, iron breastplates and using large white shields, spears and swords, but whether they were armed and fought as hoplites in Hannibal's army is open to debate.
At the battle of Crimisus River, (fought in 341 BC according to Daly – 339 BC according to Ian Stephenson) the Carthaginians fielded a force of 10,000 heavy infantry, comprising citizen troops in the form of the 2500 strong Sacred Band, and the rest were predominately Libyan in makeup and fought in the fashion of hoplites.

During the First Punic War and Zama, they are described by Polybius as a phalanx, which perhaps suggests they had once fielded classical style hoplite, but had joined the trend and reequipped by the First Punic War in the fashion of Macedonian phalangites. (Stephenson, pp.87) The nature of their equipment however, is much disputed. Considering the developments in warfare throughout the Mediterranean world since the mid-fourth century, it is foolish to assume that Carthaginian and Libyan infantry were armed and fought the same way in 216 BC as they did in 341 (Daly, pp.87) Also, the term phalanx could also be used to simply describe a large body of men fighting en masse.



Carthaginian Citizen, Sacred Band

For the Libyans who fought for Hannibal, according to both Polybius and Livy (Polyb. 3.87.3, 114.1; Liv. 22.46.4) they were armed with the best Roman equipment looted from the battles of the Trebia and Trasimene. What exactly were they armed with – defensive items like shields, helmets and greaves, or did they also receive offensive weapons such as pila or gladii?

Livy mentions an episode where Libyans are mistaken for Roman soldiers at close range, which suggests they wore the panoply of scutums, greaves and helmets and even their tunics to pass themselves off as Roman.

As for being equipped with pila or gladii, this would suggest they were swordsmen, since it was highly unlikely Hannibal would take the risk to retrain his men during campaign, though Bagnell seems to think there would be no trouble retraining experienced soldiers. Daly seems to think they were almost certainly swordsmen, his hypothesis supported by the fact that at Lake Trasimene both Polybius and Livy report that the Carthaginians attacked from higher ground, charging downhill at numerous points to attack the Romans. It would have been much more difficult to do so with spears and armed as a phalanx, one trip possibly sending entire sections into disarray, (Daly, pp.90) and considering the style of Hannibal's tactics, I'm inclined to agree. It is highly likely also, that the Libyans adopted Spanish equipment having fought for the Barcids in Spain since 237 BC, much like the Romans adopted Spanish equipment from mercenaries serving in the First Punic War. Being efficient equipment, it would be strange if the Carthaginians did not equip the Libyans with it. This equipment consisted of large oval or oblong shields, short cut-and-thrust swords and throwing spears.

Liby-Phoenicians

Though there is no record of Liby-Phoenicians serving in Hannibal's army in Italy, it is likely that some went to Italy with him. The man Hannibal sent to Sicily to command the Numidians, Muttines, was a Liby-Phoenician which possibly reveals the scope for promotion of Liby-Phoenicians in the Carthaginian army.

Hannibal had a force of 450 Liby-Phoenician and Libyan cavalry stationed in Spain according to Polybius, (3.33.15) while Livy states they were all Liby-Phoenician (21.22.3).

Liby-Phoenicians could have been Phoenicians living in colonies, or Libyans who had adopted Phoenician culture. Livy says they are half Punic and half African, but this is too simplistic.

They are primarily thought to have served as heavy cavalry – but some believe they may have served as line infantry, mixed in with the Libyans, forming a Macedonian phalanx, organised into speirai (Connolly, p.148) though it is more probable they were heavy cavalry armed in the Hellenistic fashion, wearing mail coats or plated cuirass, armed with a lance and shield.

A figurine of a bareheaded cavalryman wearing a Hellenistic muscled plate cuirass carrying two light spears/javelins and a round shield with a rounded boss and raised rim has been identified by Duncan Head as a Liby-Phoenician cavalryman. (Daly, pp.91) If this is true, they would have also carried a curved slashing sword for use once their missiles had been cast.


(Forgot to mention this book as part of my bibliography - Greece and Rome at War by Peter Connolly, 1998)


Numidians


Probably the most famous of Hannibal's army (aside from elephants) are these light cavalry warriors of Berber stock. In the ancient world however they were generally victims of stereotyping – though their endurance was often remarked, so too were their cowardice and other vices. According to Polybius, Libyans and Numidians had a tendency to flee for days if defeated in battle (Polyb. 1.47.7), and Livy remarks on them being untrustworthy, and their undisciplined violent appetites – marking them as worse than other barbarians. (Liv. 25.41.4, 28.44.5, 29.23.4, 30.12.18).


The Numidians practiced a form of nomadic pastoralism rather than a settled form of agriculture – but again, this could be too simplistic a statement. They were not a single nation, but consisted of two main kingdoms – the Massaesyli in the west and the Massyli in the east, but there were also many small tribes with their own chieftains and domains.


They appear to have served in an allied capacity as opposed to being mercenaries. When they were led by their own princes or chieftains they were certainly allies – examples being Naravas, Tychaeus, Massinisa and Syphax. Appian names many chieftains who fought at Zama (App, Pun. 33,44).


There is a chance that the Numidians who served Hannibal did so out of loyalty to him, and not their own kings in Numidia, having served the Barcids for many years in Spain – the bond between commander and men being strengthened through marriage ties. In the Mercenaries War, the Numidian Prince Naravas had been betrothed to Hamilcar's daughter – which would have certainly secured his men under the Barcid banner. (Daly, pp.93)


The Numidians fought in small groups as we learn from Livy when he mentions them operating in turmae (Liv.25.17.3, 27.26.8) and darted back and forth hurling their javelins and using their speed and agility. They rode small hardy ponies, Barbary horses common in North Africa before the Arab invasions. From Trajan's Column we can see depicted Numidians riding small mounts, and from a passage from Livy we can see him praising their horsemanship but mocking their appearance (Liv. 35.11.6-11). They rode barebacked, without bit nor bridle for control, using only a neck strap to steer.





They were armed lightly, wearing tunics fastened at the shoulder, carrying light and round boss-less leather shields, slightly convex with a narrow rim, though some of course, did not carry shields. Their basic weapon was the javelin, of which they carried several and fought as mounted peltasts. Appian (Pun. 11) tells us they were trained day and night to hurl showers of javelins from horseback, an image reinforced by Caesar, Virgil, Livy and Arrian (Stephenson, pp.73) The javelins, called longchai had both round and square cross-sectional heads, and carried knives or short-swords with a blade approximately 60cm in length.

The Moors

The Moors, known also as the Mauri, lived in the lands west of the Numidians, and were of the same racial stock as the Libyans and Numidians. Polybius seems to have regarded them as another group of Numidians. King Baga ruled over all the Moorish tribes during the Second Punic War – forming a single nation. This nation seems to not have had any formal relationship with Carthage and there is no mention made of any alliance between the two.

At the battle of Zama, part of Hannibal's first line was made up of Moors, and Polybius classifies them as mercenaries (Polyb. 15.11.1). The best idea of how they were armed comes from Livy, when he mentions Hiero of Syracuse sent a force of archers to aid Rome, well adapted to cope with Moors and Balearians and any other tribes that fought with missiles (Liv. 22.37.8)They were then light-armed skirmishers. Polybius mentions longchophoroi, spearmen who made up the greater number of Hannibal's light-armed troops, of which the Moors most likely made up part of its number. The skirmishers were certainly of mixed nationality, unlike the rest of Hannibal's army, and they are never identified as separate racial groups by Polybius. Daly believes that most of the spearmen were Moors, and were mercenaries rather than allied troops (Daly, pp.108-9)

We have established that the skirmishers in Hannibal's army were of mixed nationality, so how were they equipped? Polybius describes the skirmishers as psiloi at one point, which suggests they were light-clad troops such as javelinmen, archers and slingers, armed with only missiles and unsuited for close combat. Livy states about the light-armed contingent in Hasdrubal's army in 209 - troops that are accustomed to skirmishing and, while avoiding the real battle by hurling long-range missiles, are protected by distance, but prove unsteady in the face of hand-to-hand combat (Liv. 27.18.14)

Moorish infantry were armed with javelins and a round boss-less leather shield, and probably carried swords or daggers for close combat once their javelins had been used. It is also thought that they may have been equipped with a stabbing spear rather than throwing spears alone (Daly, pp.110) but there must have been quite a diverse range of weapons, being highly unlikely Hannibal would have issued them standardised equipment (Daly. pp.111).

The Gaetulians

To the south of the Numidians and Moors lived the Gaetulians. They were of Libyco-Berber stock, who were separated into three main tribal groups by Pliny – who was no doubt simplifying things. The Autoteles lived in the west, the Baniurae in the east and the Nesimi lived in the desert south of the Atlas Mountains. We only have one mention of them being in Hannibal's army, and that comes from Livy – referring to an advance party sent on to Casilinum in 216, led by an officer named Isalcas. (23.18)

Though we have no numbers in regards to the strength of this national grouping in the Carthaginian army, the fact that Hannibal may well have expected them to storm the town if they could might reveal they had some numbers. Daly seems to think that Polybius simply mistook them for Numidians, and suggests that because their cavalry went without bridles and they were armed and fought like Numidians, Polybius classed them as such.

THE SPANIARDS:

The Spaniards formed an integral part of Carthaginian armies, coming from the Iberian peninsula. According to Polybius, Hannibal had 8,000 Spanish infantry when he descended the Alps, and most modern historians believe that out of the 6000 cavalry that made it, 2000 of that number were Spanish cavalry.

The majority of Spaniards in Carthaginian armies would have come from areas directly under Carthaginian control, namely from the southern half of the peninsular – though it did include Lusitanians and Celtiberians who were people of Celtic origin who inhabited the northern half. Despite lacking political unity, the Spanish appear to have had a common language and culture.

The Iberians:

Before the Punic Wars, Carthage had already employed Iberians in their armies. There is mention of them being led by an officer named Hamilcar in Sicily in 480 BC by Herodotus, while they were described to be among the best fighting material to be found in the Western Mediterranean by Alcibiades according to Thucydides. This indicates that they must have served in a purely mercenary role before Hamilcar Barca extended Punic control into the Iberian peninsular shortly after the First Punic War. This role had changed by the Second Punic War however, and Daly asserts they were indeed allied levies by this time(Daly, pp.95)

Iberian levies came from a number of Spanish tribes and old Phoenician colonies – Polybius tells us the Spanish troops that were sent to Africa came from the Thersitae, Mastiani, Iberian Oretes and Olcades tribes (Polyb. 3.33). The old Phoenician colonies that supplied troops were Gades, Malaca, Sexi and Abdera, while the Blasto-Phoenicians from the lower coastal area of Andalusia also supplied Carthaginian forces with men (Daly, pp.96) These had close links to Carthage.

Accordingly, the levy seemed an unpopular way to recruit troops, though some must have been generally willing to serve in Carthaginian armies. In 218, the Oretani and Carpetani were close to revolting because of the demands Hannibal had put on them. They had seized and retained Hannibal's recruiting officers and Hannibal had to act quickly to repress this revolt, swiftly taking them by surprise which made them abandon all thought of resistance (Livy. 21.11)

Following the sack of Saguntum, Hannibal maintained Spanish loyalty by granting them a leave of absence so they could be with their families before setting out for Italy in the Spring. He sent troops to both act as hostages and a garrison to Africa in 218, and he also released thousands of troops before crossing the Pyrenees.

Daly believes that the Iberian troops were, as a rule, loyal to Hannibal and it was of an extremely personal nature (Daly, pp96). Hannibal was possibly given a title the equivalent of strategos autokrator as Hasdrubal the Handsome had according to Diodorus (25.12) and it should be noted that Scipio had also been given a title – that of king - by the Spanish after his victories against the Carthaginians in which he asked them to call him by the term his own troops used – that of imperator. This giving of titles reveals that Iberian nobles recognised leaders such as Hannibal were more powerful than themselves (Daly, pp97)

The Iberians who fought for Carthage included skirmishers, line infantry and cavalry. The skirmishers also known as caetrati carried small round shields that were 0.3 m – 0.6 m (1-2 feet) in diameter made from hide with a central boss. They were most likely javelinmen who also carried falcata-type swords as sidearms. They wore caps made from sinew.

Iberian line infantry are thought to be have contained 'maniples' of about 100 men according to Connolly (Connolly, p187) and they are described by Polybius as having been deployed in speirai which is the same term he uses as maniple. The size and strength of these maniples is not clear, having been anything between 100 to 500 men (Daly, pp97) They were most likely formed into groups from individual settlements, their size according to how many men the tribe could supply which would have made for maniples of irregular sizes. They were organised by political units so that they fought alongside friends and relatives, forming a tight bond.

How then, were the Iberian line infantry equipped? According to Polybius:

The shields of the Spaniards and Celts were very similar, but their swords were entirely different, those of the Spaniards thrusting with as deadly effect as they cut... the Spaniards in short tunics bordered with purple, their national dress. (Polyb. 3.114.2-4)

The large oval shields they carried gave them their name – scutarii. The shields were flat rather than curved, and with the central handgrip parallel to the shield's long axis (Daly. Pp 97) They carried two basic types of swords, one in which the Roman gladius hispaniensis was modeled, perhaps 60 cm long with a point and two cutting edges, and the elegant, curved sword called the espada falcata commonly found among the tribes of the south of Spain. The falcata was sharpened on the the back edge near the point in order to enable it to thrust and cut, with a smaller blade of between 35-52 cm long. They most likely carried another weapon for a backup, like a knife which was also worn on the sword scabbard which was connected to the left hip suspended by a baldric. Some of the scabbards were highly decorated.

Daly believes they used heavy javelins and similar tactics to the Romans. There are several types of javelins known throughout Spain. A distinct type was a slim javelin called the saunion, which was about 1.6-2 metres long and was made entirely from iron, with a small barbed head and a pointed butt. Their throwing spears with iron heads of about 25 cm long are thought to have served as models for the Roman pilum. The most well known javelin was called the falarica:


The missile used by the Saguntines was the falarica, a javelin with a shaft smooth and round up to the head, which, as in the pilum, was an iron point of square section. The shaft was wrapped in tow and then smeared with pitch; the iron head was three feet long and capable of penetrating armour and body alike. Even if it only stuck in the shield and did not reach the body it was a most formidable weapon, for when it was discharged with the tow set on fire the flame was fanned to a fiercer heat by its passage through the air, and it forced the soldier to throw away his shield and left him defenseless against the sword thrusts which followed. (Livy 21.8)


Apparently they wore no armour, wearing only their belted tunics Polybius described as their national uniform, but some may have worn pectorales looted from the Roman dead. The tunics themselves may have been stiff enough to withstand cuts but this seems unlikely according to Daly (p.99) Sinew caps were popular throughout Spain at the time, some simple and unadorned, others may have had hoods covering the nape of the neck with horsehair crests.


Iberian Cavalry:

In all there was about 2000 Spanish cavalry in Hannibal's army, who were most likely both noblemen and allied troops. They were actually armed like their infantry for the most part, wearing white tunics trimmed with crimson, with sinew caps, though it is probable that Celtic balcksmiths produced Montefortinos for his army, and that they made use of the ones from the Roman dead. These helmets were conical, with cheek plates and a small neck guard and were decorated by horsehair plumes and feathers. They were equipped with a falcata sword which would have been perfect for slashing from a horse. Along with this infantry equipment, they also carried small round, central hand-grip shields much like the caetra and two javelins or spears with buttspikes.


Iberian Infantry - alongside skirmishers

These cavalry used horses to fight as platforms, and sometimes they rode into battle carrying an extra man who would dismount and fight on foot. At Cannae we see the Spanish and Celtic cavalry engage the Roman citizen cavalry with many men dismounting to fight on foot (Polyb. 3.115) however, the combat would have been begun by lots of grappling on horses as opposed to charging into the enemy which would have been mutually catastrophic, leading to a collapsed scrimmage of horses and men growing bigger as succeeding ranks collided with the leading ones. This would have led to numerous friendly-fire deaths being crushed or trampled by their own horses, or accidentally impaled by their comrades spears and javelins. The fighting would have been between small groups and individuals then as they allowed gaps to appear in the formation to penetrate lines (Daly, p.181)

Some however did appear to fight as shock cavalry, wearing scale cuirasses and carrying larger oval or round shields and a single long thrusting spear which they would have released just before impact to stop them from being thrown from the saddle because of their lack of stirrups, much like Alexander's shock cavalry.


Iberian cavalry wearing a Montefortino type helmet


The Celtiberians:

Diodorus remarked that the Celtiberes were a fusion of two peoples and that the combination of Celts and Iberes took place only after a series of long and bloody wars. The culture emerged from a 'proto-Celtic' substratum. When the Celtic-speaking people came to the peninsular has been a subject of much debate. One theory is that there were in fact two waves of Celtic settlers. The first arrived from the north of the Pyrenees in about 1000 BC, while another came a few centuries later in around the sixth century. Another theory is that they arrived in one single wave sometime around the eighth century. They regarded strangers as being under divine protection and were known for their hospitality as well as their military ferocity. Their homeland was in the north-eastern part of Iberia, from the southern flank of the Ebro valley to the Eastern Meseta, but their culture did expand into other areas of the country. They practised pastoralism – taking their flocks and herds to upland mountain pastures before the heat came, returning in autumn.

Because they did not fall into the area of Punic control, it is most likely that they served as mercenaries rather than allies, and were used by both Carthage and Rome during the Second Punic War in this capacity. There is little mention of them in Hannibal's army which suggests their may have been few of them, but we know they were raiding the north of Italy in 218 BC (Liv. 21.57), while Appian claims some fought at Cannae (App., Hann. 20)

They wore linen and mail cuirasses with leather straps hanging down to protect the abdomen. Some wore leather cuirasses reinforced with discs of metal. They wore helmets made from brass or copper with crimson plumes, most probably of Monterfortino type, though Wise admits we know next to nothing on this subject, and reckons simple metal or leather bascinets were used by the common soldier, the metal helmets of Celtic design by chieftains. A score of reliefs reveal that some wore greaves and short boots. (Wise, p.18) They used both the falcata and the straight swords like the gladius hispaniensis, and javelins, along with large oval and oblong shields of the scutum design. Diodorus says they wore black cloaks made from goat hair, but also says along with scutum type shields, they carried circular wicker shields as large as an aspis.

If there were any Celtiberian cavalry in the armies, Daly believes they probably wore mail shirts, and were armed with javelins, slashing swords and small round shields.



Lusitanians

Like the Celtiberians, the Lusitanians served as mercenaries in Carthaginian armies. Though we only have one reference to them in Hannibal's army operating on rough terrain, which suggests that they were likely light armed skirmishers (Livy 21.57). The Lusitanians were certainly known to fight in this style.

They were armed with the caetra – Diodoros presents it as dexterous as they whirled the shield round to parry blows (Head, p.148) and also carried javelins – notably the barbed iron saunion, and both the gladius hispaniensis and the falcata. Some may have carried bronze-headed spears as bronze weapons were still in use in the west of Spain. They wore sinew helmets and linen cuirasses that may have been hard enough to be protective, but both Head and Daly dismiss this idea, though Head believes some may have worn quilted linen cuirasses. Some had adopted the use of triple-crested Celtiberian helmets, greaves and iron mail shirts. According to Head, confusingly, their heavy weapons and armour suggest that some Lusitanian caetrati were close equivalents to other peoples' scutarri (Head, p.148)

If any Lusitanian cavalry served in the army, they favoured mail, and carried the round cavalry shield with a long spear used to thrust over or under arm. The spearhead was long and slender, up to 55cm in length, with long buttspikes.


The Celts



The Celts made up an important part of Hannibal's army – resupplying Hannibal's weary and battered force after the heavy toll through the Alps had reduced it. Hannibal's Celtic troops were from the two largest tribal federations in Cisalpine Gaul, the Insubres in the north and the Boii from the south. The Insubres were bigger than the Boii and controlled several other tribes, notably the Ligurian Laevi. They often appear to have suffered the brunt of Roman attacks in Hannibal's battles - and they were also depicted as drunk and unreliable - particularly stereotypical images of the barbarian compared to the civilized Romans. Instead of fighting for Hasdrubal Barca at the Metarus in 207 BC, a large number were slaughtered after the battle whilst drunk in their beds in camp.

The nature of their alliance with Hannibal is far from clear, but he did appear to have some sort of alliance with them which may have involved a sort of levy, but according to Daly it should be borne in mind that diplomacy was the best way to recruit mercenaries in the Hellenistic era, and that the first Celtic elements in Hannibal's army were likely mercenaries. Polybius mentions that at Tarentum in 212 BC, they were led by their own leaders as opposed to Carthaginian officers (Polyb. 8.30)

Celtic society was dominated by individual nobles with their own retainers and warbands. The chieftain's status would be based on ties of obligation and patronage, or of charisma, while status among the retainers was determined by relations with their leaders and their own skill as warriors which would earn them honour and prestige (Daly, p.102).

The nobles and their retainers mainly fought as cavalrymen, while amongst the infantry they would have fought closely packed, besides friends and family, the bravest and best equipped leading the charge in battle. Polybius refers to them deploying as speirai, which likely refers to irregularly sized tribal units who Connolly suggests were about 250-strong. (Connolly, p.187)

The Celts were generally taller than the Mediterranean peoples, and were muscled, fair-skinned and fair-haired. Men were prone to wearing long moustaches sometimes backed up by short beards. The hair was smeared with lime which bleached it and made it stiff and spiky, which they combed back to stick out like an animal's mane.

According to Polybius' account of the Battle of Telamon between the Roman Republic and the Insubres and Boii in 225 BC, the Gauls employed Celtic mercenaries from Transalpine Gaul – the Gaesatae – who fought naked. These warriors would have worn gold or bronze torcs and armlets like the majority of Celtic warriors. Fighting nude was a common method of battle among early Celts, but the majority of Celts in Hannibal's army would not have fought naked. The Insubres at Telamon and in Hannibal's army were described as fighting stripped to the waist, wearing trousers and cloaks. This clothing would have been usually made of wool and been brightly coloured. The trousers were often woven into striped or checked patterns. Both loose and tight trousers may have been worn which were tied at the ankles as well as wearing shoes. The heavy Celtic cloak, the sagnum, would have been made from wool and were usually dyed then fastened with a brooch on the right shoulder. Some of theses cloaks were hooded. They also wore short tunics with long sleeves.

The majority of warriors were armed with sword, shield and one or two throwing spears. The long slashing sword was common in the 3rd century, and despite the misconception that it was a slashing weapon, it also had a prominent point to thrust, though slashing would have been a more natural use of the long blade. These swords were 75-90cm long, and were of seemingly high quality despite Polybius mentioning them bending in battle and becoming useless, which Daly thinks spread from camp rumours to reassure nervous troops, or had been confused with the Celtic ritual of bending weapons for burial with their dead owners. Perhaps the quality of the swords varied.



Celtic Swordsman


Celtic infantry were also armed with throwing spears or javelins. These spears were up to 8 foot long, and the spearheads varied in size and shape; most were long and broad with curving sides between the broadest point and the tip. Diodorus describes one gruesome type of spearhead with a notched blade:

breaks throughout the entire length so that the blow not only cuts but also tears the flesh, and the recovery of the spear rips open the wound (Hist. 5.30)

From our archeological discoveries, the great variety of spearheads suggests a degree of specialisation in the use of the spear in the hunt and warfare. In fact, Celtic spears were well known in the ancient world and there were four terms to denote these weapons; lancea, mataris, saunion and gaesum.

The Celts are said to have invented mail armour in the 4th century BC, and Celtic nobles wore mail armour of interlocking iron rings over a padded undershirt. Bronze and iron helmets were more common than mail, and were worn by nobles and those ordinary infantry warriors who could afford one. The most common type of helmet was the Montefortino style, though other, more elaborate helmets were also worn. Celtic helmets were sometimes adorned by metal birds with flapping wings, or other animals like the boar.

Celtic shields were described by Diodoros as being decorated by bronze, and this is certainly true of ceremonial shields. Battle shields however, had painted decoration. They were oval shaped, though some had been squared-off at the ends and some had nearly straight sides. They were made from oak or linden planks covered by leather, doubled over the rim as they lacked metal reinforcement on the edges. They were much like Roman shields, but were flat instead of convex. The shields varied in length, but most were about a metre high and 55cm wide. They had spindle-shaped bosses with iron or bronze boss plates hollowed out to accommodate the handgrip running horizontally across the spine. The thickest part of the shield was at its centre, being about 13mm thick, while the edges were only 6mm. This provided strength and flexibility.

Celtic skirmishers were not common in Celtic armies, though some are mentioned in the army at Telamon in 225 BC. Most were javelinmen, armed with daggers instead of swords, and used a light shield. Archers and slingers were used in small numbers by the 1st century BC, so there may have been some numbers in Hannibal's army armed with these ranged weapons.

Celtic musicians usually carried horns, the most distinctive being the carnyx which had bronze heads with open mouths shaped like animals most commonly being a boar.



120-122 - Celtic Infantry, 123 Celtic Skirmisher, 124-5 Celtic Nobles, a-j Variety of Celtic helmets

Hannibal made great use of them, and turned them into a disciplined fighting force, best shown with the retreat and drawing in of the Romans at Cannae.


Celtic Cavalry




Celtic Cavalryman alongside infantry


The first Celtic elements in Hannibal's army were thought to be mercenary cavalry noblemen picked up on his descent from the Alps. By the time of Cannae, he had about 4000 Celtic cavalry who operated on the left flank by the Aufidus River against the Roman citizen cavalry.

The Celtic cavalry were mostly well armoured being made up of dominantly nobles and their retainers, wearing mail armour with possibly overhanging shoulder defences and helmets. They carried round shields, but sometimes oval ones too. They were equipped with a long thrusting spear and the traditional Celtic sword. They sat on four-horned saddles that offered added security, and they also used short prick spurs to urge on their mounts.

Though they operated as heavy cavalry, Daly believes that their strong warrior ethos led them to not fight as a single, centrally co-ordinated unit (Daly, p.105) certain individuals acting independently as revealed by the Insubres Ducarius at the Battle of Lake Trasimene who sought out the Roman consul Flaminius for revenge after the Consul had, a few years before, campaigned in Insubres territory.

For almost three hours the fighting went on; everywhere a desperate struggle was kept up, but it raged with greater fierceness round the consul. He was followed by the pick of his army, and wherever he saw his men hard pressed and in difficulties he at once went to their help. Distinguished by his armour he was the object of the enemy's fiercest attacks, which his comrades did their utmost to repel, until an Insubrian horseman who knew the consul by sight - his name was Ducarius - cried out to his countrymen, "Here is the man who slew our legions and laid waste our city and our lands! I will offer him in sacrifice to the shades of my foully murdered countrymen." Digging spurs into his horse he charged into the dense masses of the enemy, and slew an armour-bearer who threw himself in the way as he galloped up lance in rest, and then plunged his lance into the consul (Livy 22.6)


The Ligurians:

The Ligures once inhabited the rich plains of north-west Italy and south-eastern France, and spoke an Indo-European language that was related to both Celtic and Italic having absorbed the earlier inhabitants of these regions. The Celts however coveted their land and pushed them out to mainly modern Liguria, Piedmont and the northern Appennines. Livy mentions several tribes who supplied Carthage and Hannibal in particular with troops against Rome, namely the Ingauni, Ilvates, Celeiates and Cerdicates (Liv. 31.2, 10.2, 32.29)

They were a generally poor people who practiced hunting, herding and forestry, but also took to raiding and piracy. However, some places like the port town of Genoa were quite prosperous. The people were a short and slightly built and their harsh mountain life gave them a reputation as warlike, proud and tough, with more endurance than the Celts. They wore their dark hair fairly short, and sported short beards.

They wore round necked, long-sleeved tunics with slits at the side made of mostly wool, and went about with bare legs and feet, though some wore Gallic-syle leather shoes. They used furs which were also exported in exchange for richer foreign textures that the chiefs would make use of. Lightly armoured, they also carried shields similar in design to Celtic ones, and swords of medium length, though some did also use Celtic swords of longer length, usually hung from belts but occasionally baldrics. Their main weapon were 4 feet long javelins with three-wedged iron heads, of which they would have carried a bundle. The chiefs made use of Celtic or Etruscan helmets.

Ligurians were not known for their cavalry, and were primarily skirmishers and infantry who 'could fight doggedly hand-to-hand when necessary' (Head, p.158)

The Ligurians who were said to have aided Hannibal were possibly mercenaries according to Head (p.158) and also made up a small part of Hasdrubal's army in 218 (Polyb. 3.33) whilst certainly serving as mercenaries at the Battle of Zama making up part of Hannibal's first line. In the treaty between Hannibal and Phillip V of Macedon, the Ligurians were stated as allies of Carthage:

That King Philip and the Macedonians and the rest of the Greeks who are their allies shall protect the Carthaginians, the supreme lords, and Hannibal their general, and those with him, and all under the dominion of Carthage who live under the same laws; likewise the people of Utica and all cities and peoples that are subject to Carthage, and our soldiers and allies and cities and peoples in Italy, Gaul, and Liguria, with whom we are in alliance or with whomsoever in this country we may hereafter enter into alliance. (Polyb. 7.9)

The Balearian Slingers:

The Balearians were among the most famous of mercenaries of the ancient world, and specialised in the use of the sling. Hannibal did not make use of many of them, and Head estimates that he took under 1000 of them into Italy, though there is no evidence of this estimate. We hear from both Polybius and Livy that Hannibal sent 870 slingers to Africa and left 500 in Spain (Polyb. 3.33. Liv. 21.21. 22.2. Daly believes that 1000 is too low a number, and thinks it was substantially higher, but not as many as Dodge's estimate of around 2000.

Those working for Carthage were mercenaries, although Serge Lancel believes their islands were under Punic control, but it seems that Carthaginian power did not extend further than the coast of these islands, their limit of power trading ports and held no power over the natives. We don't know how they were paid by Hannibal's time, but they had at one point in the past been initially hired with wine and women as they did not use money.

The slingers were deadly, supposedly capable of shooting stones that weighed up to a mina (436g) with great accuracy. Strabo tells us that the slings were made from black tufted rushes, hair or sinew, and that they carried a variety of slings of various sizes designed for short, medium and long ranges. These were wrapped around the head and belt while the one in use was carried.

Apparently they did not use lead shots, preferring stone ammunition which was both easier to come by and was cheaper to get a hold of. How they carried the stones is still not known for certain, though we have seen a Balearic slinger on Trajan's column carrying his ammunition in his cloak, which may be the reality during the Second Punic War, though they may also have carried bags of some sort.

Daly believes it was possible that they carried small shields that were strapped to the forearm so it left the hands free to operate the sling.

(continued in following blog entry) http://www.historum.com/blogs/markdi...tml#comment698 ]]> markdienekes http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/280-army-carthage-during-hannibal-s-time.html Hamilcar Barca 3 http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/226-hamilcar-barca-3.html Tue, 05 Apr 2011 14:21:21 GMT Hamilcar Barca

Part 5: Sardinia Seized, Spain and Death
237 – 228 BC


At the close of the war against the mercenaries, the Romans launched an expedition to the island much to the objection of Carthage, who were making plans to punish those rebels who had betrayed them. Carthage was far too weak to oppose Rome at this juncture, and Rome felt that Sardinia posed a threat to her coastal cities and sea communications. Carthage's distress over Roman occupation of Sardinia led to Rome declaring war. Rome rejected any talks of negotiation and Carthage were forced to comply with Roman demands. Sardinia and Corsica were thus given up to the Romans and a further indemnity of 1200 talents was added to the treaty.

Sea trade that had once come to Sicily was now in Roman hands, and their monopoly of trading posts in the Mediterranean had been effectively broken. The war with Rome had also all but destroyed the navy, thus putting many prominent citizens involved with maritime activities out of work. (Bagnell, p.125) In dire times such as these, Hamilcar Barca proposed an expansionist policy overseas, Spain as the target. To recover Carthaginian power they would have to look elsewhere the Romans weren't. Trade was already well established in southern Spain, along with a measure of influence. Spain was a resource rich country, with precious metals in the south and east, silver and copper to the north and north-west. Gold dust could be found in the river Tagus, while the people had a prosperous agriculture. The people of southern and eastern Spain lived in small, well-organised communities centred on fortress towns or villages. Some of the communities were sophisticated with regular chosen officials and councils much like a senate; the foreign colonies like Gades and Iberian cities like Saguntum, but overall, the groupings of tribes lacked military and political cohesiveness and would make easier targets for Hamilcar's expansionist aims.

The elite and common people lent their support to Hamilcar after his efforts had saved the Republic, and as the political leader of Carthage, Hamilcar set in motion his plans. However, according to one Roman historical tradition he did not have the support of the ruling elite, but it is hard to believe this, nor, says Hoyos, should the story about them setting themselves up a Spanish principality or fiefdom virtually independent of the Carthaginian state (Hoyos, p.52) According to Nepos, the spoils of his victories enriched the whole of Africa.

According to tradition, before going to Spain a young Hannibal, then nine years old, was eager to join his father on the enterprise to Spain. Polybius describes it thus:

He said that at the time when his father was about to start with his army on his expedition to Spain, he himself, then nine years of age, was standing by the altar, while Hamilcar was sacrificing to Zeus. When, on the omens being favourable, Hamilcar had poured a libation to the gods and performed all the customary rites, he ordered the others who were attending the sacrifice to withdraw to a slight distance and calling Hannibal to him asked him kindly if he wished to accompany him on the expedition. On his accepting with delight, and, like a boy, even begging to do it besides, his father took him by the hand, led him up to the altar, and bade him lay his hand on the victim and swear never to be the friend of the Romans. (3.11)

Hannibal would go with his father to Spain, and learn the arts of war and diplomacy.

There are two possible ways he could have reached Spain. Bagnell believes Hamilcar was forced to take the land route, following the northern Numidian coast up to the Straits of Gibraltar because the navy had been decimated by the First Punic War. If this is true he would have used what few ships remained to transport the armies food, and the fodder for his elephants and cavalry. However, Hoyos trusts Diodorus' account that he sailed across the African coast to the Straits, then crossed to Gades, stating the land route would have taken far too long and he would have lost most of his first campaigning season. Whatever the case, his army could not have been very large, consisting of some 20,000 troops, 2-3000 of that number being cavalry with a corps of elephants. It would do for the start, and he was certain he could count on the Phoenician colonies to supply his army, and recruit Iberians when the time came.

Sadly, there are few events recorded in detail of Hamilcar's nine years spent in Spain. We know his first actions were to the north of Gades, where he confronted a coalition of Iberians and Tartessians and the Celts under Istolatius. The term Tartessus meant people in south-western Spain and Portugal. Sixty miles from Gades were silver and copper mines along the river now called Rio Tinto and Hamilcar's strategy to take these productive mines was a sound one. According to Diodorus, this coalition of tribes and mercenaries were confident facing Hamilcar's force, and that they outnumbered him. Whatever the truth of the matter, Hamilcar met them in battle, and was victorious, the chieftains of the coalition killed in battle. Hamilcar promptly recruited 3000 soldiers of the defeated tribes into his own army.

With victory, the land from Gades to the Tartessian mines fell under Punic control and shortly afterwards Gades began producing new, high quality silver coins. The Baetis valley stretched over 250 miles from the Atlantic coast to the mountains of south-eastern Spain. It was fertile, contained much wealth with silver mines to the north and east, and was well populated enough to offer tough resistance if the communities refused Punic control. The Baetis valley however, was the focus of his next campaign.

Hamilcar Barca first met an army 50,000 strong led by Indortes, whose resistance drew from the central and eastern districts of the valley, but he did not have to fight such a large army. We are not told how Indortes campaign floundered, but his force was reduced, Hamilcar perhaps enticing them to join his ranks or go home. What forces remained with Indortes took up position on a hill, where Hamilcar surrounded the enemy with trenches. When they tried to break out they were all killed or captured. Indortes himself was taken prisoner and was blinded and tortured and finally crucified as a horrific example to other chieftains should they resist him. To reassure the communities of Spain Hamilcar released 10,000 captives.

We are not offered a chronology of these events, but Hoyos places them between 236-235 BC. Afterwards, Hamilcar fought further campaigns and had a number of diplomatic successes but we are given no details other than Hamilcar brought many towns and cities under his control. From 235 onwards, Hamilcar's activities spread across the Baetis – his military strength growing while he consolidated the captured land. He used his son-in-law Hasdrubal as an able lieutenant, who, when many of the Numidians had risen against Carthage again, Hamilcar sent to take command. Hasdrubal brought them to battle and beat them, killing 8000 and capturing 2000. This success and Hamilcar's in Spain would have continued to reinforce Barcid prestige and popularity at home. On his return home, it is thought he brought Hamilcar's other sons, called Hasdrubal and Mago back with him to Spain to be groomed along with Hannibal in military matters.

During these years of expansion, Hamilcar would have kept a weary eye on Rome, and vice-versa. Dio tells us that in 231 BC the Romans sent over an envoy to Spain who Hamilcar received cordially. Hamilcar told them he was seeking means to pay the indemnity which the Romans did not criticise. Whatever the truth, this would have been the only recorded meeting between the two from 237 to 225 BC.

Hamilcar founded a city called Acra Leuce - White Cape or White Fort – but Diodorus does not state where, but is generally identified as the coastal city the Romans called Lucentum and formed a new power-centre on the eastern side of Carthage's new territory and was possibly treated as a new capital for Punic Spain. Archeological discoveries reveal the towns in Barcid control improved many of their features in both private homes and public structures like walls and sacred shrines. Improved urbanisation could help to make rule more effective winning over more Spanish communities. (Hoyos, p.63)

In late 229 or early 228, Hamilcar moved into the hinterland of Acra Leuce, accompanied by his sons Hannibal and Hasdrubal, while Hasdrubal the Elder commanded elsewhere. This was to be his last campaign.

He perhaps began in the Spring, and worked his way towards a town called Helice, starving out and storming Segisa, Ilunum and Turbola. When he reached Helice, he put it under siege. He must have been content to starve them into submission as when winter arrived, he sent the bulk of his army to winter-quarters in Arca Leuce to ease his own problems of supply. With his force weakened, Hamilcar was approached by the king of the Orissi, who had a large army with him who pretended friendship with Hamilcar in order to aid the besieged. Hamilcar was caught off guard when they betrayed him, and his army was defeated and put to flight. In order to save his sons, Hamilcar drew off the pursuit. Hannibal and Hasdrubal escaped, but Hamilcar perished as he plunged into a broad flooding river when he was about to be overtaken. Thus, in the winter of 228 BC Hamilcar Barca died at the age of 50 or 51.

His strategic plan can be reasonably inferred. He was to subdue the hinterland of Arca Leuce, and use Helice as a strong point to advance through the high country towards the eastern reaches of the river Anas... to round off control of the entire river north of the Sierra Morena. (Hoyos, p.69)

This would have given him a great start-off point for further annexations north of Castulo, safeguarding the Punic possessions and especially the silver mines.

His generalship was fairly careless at times where he placed himself in difficult positions like being surrounded by Spendius and Autaritus – saved only by the arrival of Naravas. He made promises to his men which he ultimately did not always keep – especially the promises he made to the mercenaries during the First Punic War which may, to a certain extent at least, have escalated some of the problems which led to the Libyan War. He was ruthless when he had to be as evidenced by the treatment of prisoners in both the Libyan War and the chieftain Indortes. He did however, have good leadership attributes, and he performed some talented tactical manoeuvres in battle and had a keen strategic mind. He also had a vision which the Carthaginians of the time desperately needed after their recent setbacks.

Hamilcar Barca essentially saved the republic and rebuilt its power so that it could compete with the top powers of the day turning Carthage into an imperialist power and creating a provincial system that would be eventually be taken over by the Romans. The mines and tribute revenues from Spain brought Carthage renewed prosperity and fresh opportunities to citizens willing to travel there. Widely regarded as attractive and enigmatic by some, the Romans judged him variously; Cato, put him on par with Pericles, Epaminondas, Themistocles and even the Roman hero Dentatus while others said he was ultimately responsible for Hannibal's war, fostering hatred in his children in order to destroy Rome. (Hoyos, p.71)

Whatever future he envisaged, he knew Carthage would have to be strong to deter the threat of its potential enemies like Rome. All things considered, these were great achievements for a man who will always live under the shadow of his son.


Bibliography:


Polybius, (Walbank, 1979) The Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire

Aristotle (Sinclair, 1992) The Politics

Bagnall, N. (1999) The Punic Wars: Rome Carthage and the struggle for the Mediterranean

Hoyos, D. (2003) Hannibal's Dynasty: Power and politics in the western Mediterranean, 247-183 BC ]]> markdienekes http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/226-hamilcar-barca-3.html Hamilcar Barca 2 http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/221-hamilcar-barca-2.html Sun, 03 Apr 2011 07:33:11 GMT _*Part 3: The African Revolt up to the Battle of the Macar*_ 240 BC With the end of the First Punic War, things seemed to go from bad to ... Part 3: The African Revolt up to the Battle of the Macar
240 BC


With the end of the First Punic War, things seemed to go from bad to worse for Carthage. The end of the war did not herald peace for either the Carthaginians or the Romans – in the gap between the end of the First and the start of the Second Punic War, Carthage saw war against its own mercenaries and Libyan subjects, and war in Spain, while the Romans fought against the Gauls and Illyrians.

With obvious difficulties facing Carthage in regards to paying the mercenaries, a rather clever plan was adopted by Gisco to manage the crisis. Gisco sent them to Carthage in groups over a period of several months, but this was soon discontinued by the republic. Carthage was now too impoverished to pay them, and too inept to fob them off. The 20,000 mercenaries made up of people from all over the western Mediterranean and Libyan conscripts had plenty of grievances, not to mention the fact they were armed and suspicious.

Through a series of disorders in the city of Carthage where the mercenaries had been staying, they were asked to move to Sicca which they accepted, but this soon led to boredom and dissatisfaction free from the constraints of discipline. With this inactivity came the desire to get what they deserved for their years of hard campaigning; arrears of pay, and the high rewards promised them by officers for the difficulties and dangers they had faced. Being responsible for affairs in Africa, Hanno the Great arrived at Sicca unable to pay the mercenaries and only offered them a settlement on greatly reduced terms. This resulted in an explosion of anger and the mercenaries took up arms, which ignited the discontented Libyans to join them. The lands around Carthage and her sister Phoenician colonies of Utica and Hippou Arca erupted in revolt (Hoyos, p.34). The mercenaries then marched on Carthage and set up position at Tunis.

The arrival of this army alarmed the Carthaginians, who immediately set about trying to placate the mercenaries with provisions of every kind being sent to the camp. The Senate itself consented to their demands, which simply increased the mercenaries confidence, who proceeded to ask unreasonable demands of Carthage. The Carthaginians asked them if they were willing to mediate with one of the generals they had fought with in Sicily, but they did not want to mediate with Hamilcar Barca, who some blamed for abandoning them so soon after the defeat, and showed a lack of interest in their fate, but they were willing to talk to Gisco who had handled affairs in Lilybaeum so well.

Sadly, affairs broke down and Gisco was retained by the mercenaries and met a horrible fate, being stoned to death. Hamilcar Barca, being only too aware of their irritation with him, had not shown during the mediations and had avoided such a fate. This may well be due to the mercenaries disposition towards him, but also because his political enemies had launched a prosecution against him; the charge was that of misconduct in his Sicilian command.

Hamilcar's case would have been before the tribunal of 104, and a guilty verdict would have no doubt led to crucifixion or flight into exile. Hamilcar Barca managed to win the support of the leading men however, and the case was dropped. We do not know who his enemies were or who accused him of misconduct but we hear of one rescuer of Hamilcar being Hasdrubal, who would later marry his daughter and become a son-in-law. Hanno is regarded by Hoyos as remaining neutral during the trial (Hoyos, p.36)

Despite his failure to negotiate with the rebels, Hanno the Great still had great repute and was given command to fight the rebels. Though he had success fighting Numidians and taxing Libyans, he met a good deal less success against the veterans. By early 240 BC, he had managed to get himself cut off from Carthage, on the far-side of Utica between the rebels besieging the town and those against Hippou Arca to the north. His army was destroyed, though Hanno managed to escape. Devoid of revenue and without an ally or friend the situation looked hopeless. The Carthaginians decided it was time to appoint a second general, and that man was Hamilcar Barca.

Hamilcar raised an army made up of mercenaries, rebel deserters and citizens that consisted of some 10,000 men with 70 elephants to face an army, according to Polybius, of some 90,000 men. This rebel army was led by two appointed generals called Spendius, a fugitive Roman slave, and Matho, an African, who divided their army between them. Matho mounted attacks on Utica and Hippou Arca, while Spendius set to siege Carthage, cutting the city off and confining the garrison within the city walls.

Hamilcar's decision was to strike without delay, but this was hampered by confinement. To the south was the route to the mainland made up of a range of hills guarded strongly by Matho's troops. He could not move to the north because the swift running river known as the Macar had only one crossing point that was guarded by a force of mercenaries 10,000 strong. His only option was to break out into the open countryside using surprise as a weapon, as his force was too small to face the mercenaries at Macar and on the southern hill passes.

This was the situation facing Hamilcar. He achieved the breakout by noticing a tide and westerly wind revealed a sand bar across the river mouth which enabled it to be forded. When this happened again, he was ready and led his men out of the city gate under the cover of darkness, and managed the crossing by dawn without detection. He then went inland and followed the course of the Macar, his goal to secure the bridge, advancing in extended line northwards across the plain with the elephants in front, followed by the light troops and cavalry, his heavy infantry bringing up the rear.(Bagnell, p116)

Spendius soon found out that Hamilcar had crossed however, and being joined by a further 15,000 men, advanced to meet Hamilcar 25,000 strong. Spendius felt confident of victory and extended his left flank to overlap and encircle Hamilcar's force, but Hamilcar had a trick up his sleeve. The Carthaginians wheeled off to their right flank, turned about and made to withdraw. Believing they were retreating and victory was at hand, the mercenaries rushed forward, only to discover that that was not the case and Hamilcar had in fact executed a great tactical manoeuvre.

Hamilcar had skillfully inverted his dispositions so that his leading troops withdrew only until the heavy infantry had marched forward into the van, and the elephants, cavalry and light troops then turned about to face their front and come into line alongside the heavy infantry. (Bagnell, p.116)

Spendius' left flank was now no longer overlapping the Carthaginian right flank, and the rush had disorganised the advance. They were no longer in a position to fight against the regular ranks of Hamilcar's force. They began to fall back in disorder, and the army was thrown into confusion, which Hamilcar took full advantage of. He set loose his elephants and cavalry, which rode down the enemy without mercy. The mercenaries lost about 6000 men with 2000 taken prisoner, while the rest fled to Utica and Tunis. With this victory, the morale of Hamilcar's army was high, itself a battle-winning factor. According to Bagnell, Hamilcar's battle on the banks of the Macar river 'provides a classic example of imaginative and skillful leadership' (Bagnell, p.117)

Part 4: The African Revolt
240-237 BC


Hamilcar's success against Spendius at the Macar allowed him to move inland where he raised the siege of Utica, freeing Hanno and the forces left after his earlier defeat, and assaulted and captured Libyan towns opposed to him while persuading others to submit peacefully. His actions threatened the rebel supply lines and future reinforcements. While Mathos continued his siege of Hippou Arca, he advised Spendius and another instigator of the revolt, a Celt known as Autaritus to harass the enemy, but to remain as best they could from level ground and avoid terrain best suited to elephants and cavalry. They set out with a force 8000 strong from Tunes, having sent ahead messengers to the Libyans and Numidians asking for assistance, much to the delight of Hamilcar, who must have realised the best way to win was to separate the rebel army.

They found Hamilcar on a plain surrounded by mountains and waited for reinforcements, who arrived to bolster their numbers, but Polybius does not say how long it took. Hamilcar was in a dangerous position, outnumbered, with Libyans in their front, Numidians in their rear and Spendius their flank.

Then a fortunate event happened, much to the initial distrust of the Carthaginian general. A Numidian prince called Naravas arrived shortly after the rebel reinforcements with a hundred horsemen, and dismounting and throwing down his weapons, walked unarmed into the Carthaginian camp. He expressed his admiration for Hamilcar and his desire to serve Carthage, in particular, the Barcas. Impressed by the man's courage and in order to gain his further loyalty, Hamilcar swore he would give him his daughter in marriage. With this alliance settled, Naravas left and returned with 2000 horsemen. With his force strengthened by the Numidian cavalry, Hamilcar offered battle, in which Spendius was all too happy to oblige. The battle was a bloody fight, but Hamilcar won, killing, according to Polybius, 10,000 men, and taking four thousand prisoners with the elephants once again wrecking havoc and the Numidians rendering excellent service. Spendius and Autaritus escaped. After the battle, Hamilcar pardoned the prisoners and told them they could go free. He also said they could also join his forces if they so wished. It was a much publicized policy. He warned those that were freed that if they were to fall into Carthaginian hands again, they would be severely punished.

While this happened in Africa, a chain of events in Sardinia reached exploding point, and the mercenaries stationed there rebelled and attacked the Carthaginians on the island, executing the commander Bostar and attacking Carthaginian towns. Carthage sent a force over led by an officer named Hanno, but this force quickly deserted and joined the rebels and crucified Hanno. What followed is described by Polybius:

devising the most exquisite torments, they tortured and murdered all the Carthaginians in the island, and when they had got all the towns into their power continued to hold forcible possession of Sardinia, until they quarrelled with the natives, and were driven out by them to Italy. Thus was Sardinia lost to the Carthaginians, an island of great extent, most thickly populated and most fertile. Most authors have described it at length, and I do not think it necessary to repeat statements which no one disputes. (Polybius, 1.79)

Worried by Hamilcar's magnanimity towards prisoners, Spendius and Autaritus devised a scheme to counter the pardon extended by Hamilcar. They spread word that it was a trick merely to disarm them, and once they were thus impotent, Carthage would exact terrible vengeance throughout the subject territories. They also spread the rumour that there were traitors in the army, plotting to free the prisoners they had captured like Gisco, who had yet to meet his horrible fate. The mercenaries suspicion and anger was roused, and they promptly murdered Gisco and a further 100 Carthaginian prisoners. Spendius then declared that this would be how they treated all future prisoners. In response to the rebels, Hamilcar decided to end his policy of leniency to prisoners, and began to execute them using extreme measures:

while those brought to him captive prisoners he threw to the elephants to be trampled to death, as it was clear to him that the rebellion would never be stamped out until the enemy were utterly exterminated. (Polybius, 1.82)

Hamilcar had persuaded Hanno to join his forces, but this resulted in much bickering and possibly began the mutual dislike of each other. They lost many opportunities to attack the rebels due to disagreements, while presenting the rebels with many. Things were so bad that Carthage ordered one general to remain and one to stay, the choice was given to the army who decided on Hanno retiring, and Hamilcar remaining in charge. Hamilcar was joined by a Carthaginian officer called Hannibal at this time.

Carthage suffered some major setbacks at this time. The fleet that was conveying supplies for their commissariat and other needs from Emporia was destroyed at sea in a storm, but the biggest blow of all was the defection of Hippou Arca and Utica:

their sympathies so suddenly changed, that they exhibited the greatest friendship and loyalty to the rebels, while beginning to show every symptom of passionate and determined hatred of Carthage. After butchering the troops the Carthaginians had sent to assist them, about five hundred in number, together with their commander, they threw all the bodies from the wall, and surrendered the city to the Libyans. They would not even give the Carthaginians the permission they requested to bury their unfortunate compatriots. (Polybius, 1.82)

Mathos and Spendius in the meantime, enthusiastic after these events, undertook the siege of Carthage once more. Hamilcar began to scour the country, intercepting supplies intended for Mathos and Spendius, making great use of Naravas' Numidians.

After a brief dispute between Rome and Carthage involving captured traders coming from Italy to Libya with supplies for the enemy, and diplomatically resolving the situation peacefully, setting even their own Carthaginian prisoners from the First Punic War free, Rome offered Carthage help. They stuck to the treaty engagements, and gave permission to their merchants to export all requirements for Carthage, but not for the enemy while refusing offers to occupy Sardinia and Utica (Polyb. 1.83). With this help, Carthage managed to continue to withstand the rebel siege while Hamilcar went about destroying Spendius and Mathos' supply lines until they were forced to give up the siege.

Spendius and Mathos then took a force fifty thousand strong, which included Zarzas the Libyan and resorted to former tactics, hounding Hamilcar, but staying away from level ground as they were afraid of the elephants and Naravas' horse. Instead, they tried to anticipate Hamilcar's movements, but were worsted in any assaults they tried on his forces:

Hamilcar, like a good draught-player, by cutting off and surrounding large numbers of the enemy, destroyed them without their resisting, while in the more general battles he would sometimes inflict large loss by enticing them into unsuspected ambuscades and sometimes throw them into panic by appearing when they least expected it by day or by night. All those he captured were thrown to the elephants. (Polybius, 1.84)

This game of cat and mouse finally ended when Hamilcar had taken the enemy force by surprise while encamped against a mountain barrier. Hamilcar went about entirely surrounding them with Carthaginian troops holding the peaks in the rear and entrenchments on the flank and front. According to Polybius, the rebels dared not risk battle, and facing starvation, some took to cannibalism.

Hamilcar was satisfied with starving them into submission and did not attack them. The rebels themselves expected no quarter, and refused surrender, relying on reinforcements promised them from Tunis. With no such arrival, the mercenaries grew frustrated with their leaders, and fearful that they may come to harm, Spendius, Autaritus and Zarzas gave themselves up, and hoped to discuss terms with Hamilcar. A herald was despatched to the Carthaginans, who told them to send ten envoys, which included the rebel leaders. Immediately once they had entered into camp, and thinking they had been betrayed, the rebel army rushed to attack – but weakened through starvation, Hamilcar's force of around 10,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, and his elephants annihilated them, leaving more than forty thousand rebels dead, and was named the Battle of the Saw. With this victory Hamilcar moved through the country, winning over many Libyan towns, while those that resisted he raised, before marching on Tunis and for Mathos.

When Hamilcar arrived at Tunis, he set up camp to the south, while Hannibal set up camp to the north. Hamilcar then took to intimidation, and took his prisoners, including the rebel leaders, and crucified them in sight of the town before retiring back to camp to await events. Mathos however, did not seek peace terms, but noticed Hannibal had neglected his post. Mathos attacked the northern camp with a sudden foray, and killed many of the Carthaginians, forcing many to flee abandoning the baggage. This was unfortunate timing, as a delegation of prominent Carthaginian citizens had come to Hannibal's camp to investigate the situation and were captured along with Hannibal. They were tortured and executed before being nailed in their place.

Hamilcar raised the siege and withdrew to the mouth of the Macar, while Mathos abandoned Tunis and headed to a town near Leptis Minor eighty miles to the south. Shortly afterwards, Hamilcar was joined by Hanno the Great and thirty senators who managed to convince them both to work together once more, and put behind them their petty squabbles. Hamilcar and Mathos mustered their forces to their full strengths and prepared for a final battle. There is no mention of the details of the battle, but Carthage carried the day and broke the back of the rebels and any effective resistance was over.

Utica and Hippou Arca held out for a while longer, but eventually surrendered. After three years of bitter costly fighting, the Mercenary War was over. Early in 237 BC Africa was once again at peace and Hamilcar Barca received public favour as saviour of the city. ]]> markdienekes http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/221-hamilcar-barca-2.html Hamilcar Barca http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/220-hamilcar-barca.html Sun, 03 Apr 2011 07:32:12 GMT _*Hamilcar Barca*_ 275-228 BC Image:... Hamilcar Barca
275-228 BC



Coin minted at Carthagena C.230 BC, showing the bearded head of Melqart, generally regarded as a portrait of Hamilcar Barca



In respect of individual courage the Romans were far superior, but the general who must be acknowledged as the greatest on either side, both in daring and in genius, was Hamilcar, surnamed Barca.
(Polybius, 1.64)

Part 1 – Birth, Family and Sicily
275 -244 BC


Hamilcar Barca was born in around 275 BC to a ruling elite family, both rich and socially prominent. The family was said to have descended from a brother of Dido, the exiled princess of Tyre who, according to legend, founded Carthage in 814 BC. His father was called Hannibal, and in traditional custom, would also be the name of Hamilcar's first born son. We do not know if they were related to the other numerous Hamilcars and Hannibals in Punic history.

By the late 250s he had already become a father, and by 238 one of his daughters was already married to a Numidian prince, while a few years later another was married to Hasdrubal, a political ally. It is thought that his wife was expecting a child when he left for Sicily in 247 BC, a child that would be his first born son, Hannibal. To be appointed at a young age in command of Sicily reveals Hamilcar had strong political connections. Aristotle says that in order to attain Punic office, one was chosen because of birth and wealth.

After the Roman naval disaster of the Battle of Drepana in 249 BC, which brought about the lowest ebb for the Romans during the First Punic War (264-241 BC), they once again focused on their land forces. From 255 to 249 BC, Roman losses at sea were 550 ships and around 200,000 men. Despite Carthaginian success at sea, this victory had been nullified by their impotence on land. They could not break the sieges of Lilybaeum and Drepana nor Roman mastery of the countryside.

When Hamilcar Barca was appointed command in Sicily in 247 BC, he was in an unenviable position. He had limited funds due to Carthage's expensive maintenance of the navy, her efforts of subduing the Numidians and extending their Libyan conquests. He had limited forces and only two surviving strong points in which to face a well supplied Roman force which consisted of two consular armies amounting to some 40,000 Romans and allied troops. The force in which Hamilcar had to work with is thought to have been around 10,000 infantry, and a few hundred cavalry, while the garrisons of Lilybaeum and Drepana also reached about 10,000 men. With such little to work with, he could not directly raise the siege of Drepana, nor mount an attempt to capture Panormus. Large scale battles and campaigns were simply not doable, and he would have to make do with simply fighting to keep the war effort going, and not lose the war. At best, he could wear them down to make peace.

In Sicily, he found widespread disaffection amongst the mercenaries in Carthage's employ who, under the passive command of Carthalo, had been trapped in the defence of the towns of Lilybaeum and Drepana. In order to gain control, he quickly set about punishing the malcontents using very harsh measures, cutting many down in one night and throwing others into the sea. Through this and his leadership, injecting a sense of purpose into the men, he won the loyalty of the mercenaries throughout the remainder of the war.

According to Zonaras, he then tried to recapture an islet just outside the harbour of Drepana, but was drawn off by a Roman attack on the town, which reveals Hamilcar's problems with manpower and may explain his coming strategy.

With Roman naval power extinguished, he began to ravage the southern Italian coast, devastating the territory of Locri and the Brutti. Hiero of Syracuse, Rome's recent ally, made no move to stop them with his own fleet. After his ravaging, which the Romans countered by founding three new colonies and garrisoning them with local troops, Hamilcar crossed to Siciliy and found the sieges of Lilybaeum and Drepana had continued, while the Roman consul Buteo had captured the island of Pelias at the mouth of the Drepana harbour and held it firmly. Hamilcar landed on the north coast and took possession of a stronghold near Heircte which Polybius describes as the best situation to establish a well-protected and permanent camp. (Polybius, 1.56) The heights of Heircte were most probably the broad mountains five miles west of the city of Panormous, with the fort laying in a pass to the south.

After establishing his base here, Polybius says he left and ravaged the coast of Italy as far north as Cumae at the Bay of Naples before returning to harass the Romans encamped in front of Panormus with a variety of attacks and offensive patrols that lasted three years, involving ambushes, sorties and counter-attacks, but Polybius does not go into any detail here, but does describe the encounter as a boxing match: Hamilcar's campaign in Sicily against the Romans might be compared to a boxing match in which two champions, both in perfect training and both distinguished for their courage, meet to fight for a prize. (Polybius. 1.57) Diodorus adds he attacked Italium, a fort of Catana's near Longon, thought to be the town of Longane held by the Marmertines. Hoyos believes he may have, from time to time, sailed over to the besieged towns on the coast to keep up the defence and occasionally to Carthage as he had another son in the 240s and it is not plausible that his wife was with him in his mountain camps. (Hoyos, p.14)

His sound strategic aims of occupying Heircte were to obstruct Roman forces and supplies moving to the sieges of Lilybaeum and Drepana. His position by Panormus had already prevented the Romans from using the coast road while the inland route was mountainous and zigzagging and perfect for ambushes. The alternative route would have been a long detour via Agrigentum and the south coast. Hamilcar hit at ships too, preventing the Romans supplying them from the sea.

It is thought that this guerilla warfare strategy earned him his nickname of Barca, the Punic word for lightning, and one can imagine his swift sorties from sea and land garnering him this name. Sadly, despite all his efforts, the war was still a stalemate. He could not lift the sieges, and the Romans could not take the towns either. In 244 BC however, Hamilcar made an audacious move to capture Mt Eyrx, and the Romans awoke one morning to find Hamilcar's camp at Heircte deserted, his ships gone. He had struck like a lightning bolt near Drepana.



Part Two: Mt Eyrx and Rome victorious
244 – 241 BC


Mt Eyrx was said by Polybius to be the second highest mountain in Sicily. Upon the crest stood a famous temple of the goddess known to Phoenicians as Astarte, while a little town below was also named Eyrx. The Romans had captured it in 249 BC, and marked their only success of that year. Hamilcar sailed at night to a small bay north of the mountain, then led his men towards the town, slaughtered the garrison and seized Eyrx. The captured townsfolk he sent to Drepana. The summit however, had a garrison of Roman troops. If Hamilcar made plans to capture the summit, he failed, as it remained in possession of Rome.

Hamilcar's capture of Eyrx is puzzling, as the advantages he had in Heircte were now lost, but perhaps he deemed Heircte too remote and Drepana too hard pressed. If he could not get replacements for his losses it would lead to a loss of impact of his actions. We hear no more of naval raids and by 242 BC, there were no Carthaginian ships in Sicilian waters. Whatever his reasons for abandoning Heircte, at Mt Eyrx he was now wedged half-way up a mountain, between two enemy garrisons with only one route to the anchorage. It is clear that the Romans on the summit could be supplied and reinforced, while on the plain below a consular army was encamped. Hamilcar's fleet was also recalled from Sicily and no effort was made to replace them which proved costly indeed. However precarious his new position was, Hamilcar would now operate here for the next two years while the wheel of fortune turned in Rome's favour.

From Mt. Eyrx he still managed to give the besiegers plenty of trouble. We hear of a likely attack on a Roman siege-camp from an excerpt of Diodorus in 243-2. He mentions an action by a Punic officer named Vodostor followed up a victory by allowing his men to plunder against the orders of Hamilcar, which led to the Carthaginans suffering heavy losses. Hamilcar managed to save the total loss of his infantry only by the discipline of his 200 horse. Hamilcar sought a truce with the Roman consul C. Fundanius to bury his dead, conceding defeat, a request the consul refused. Fundanius however, was forced to make a similar request shortly afterwards following heavy losses in which Hamilcar accepted by stating 'he was at war with the living, but had come to terms with the dead.' (Hoyos, p.15-16)

There is mention of a certain number of Celts deserting Carthage and plotting the betrayal of the town of Eyrax to the Romans, but the plot was foiled and the Celtic deserters were sent to reinforce the Roman garrison on the summit. This further reduced Hamilcar's shrinking force by about a thousand men.

No Roman consul could match Hamilcar Barca's tactical skills however and it had become apparent that the war could not be won by a military land campaign alone. The Senate then, decided upon building a new fleet whose goal would be to aid in starving out the tenacious Carthaginian towns into submission. This would be difficult with little funds however. Instead of a new levy of taxes on the population, they would loan money from the wealthiest families, to be paid back with the war indemnity. With this money, they raised a new fleet of 200 light and manoeuvrable quinqueremes. In 242, the consul C. Lutatitius Catulus arrived with the fleet on the western coast of Sicily and apparently, this was the first the Carthaginians had heard of the renewed Roman naval effort. If that is so, it really does suggest a shutdown on overseas contact. With the fleet, Catalus gained control of the ports of Lilybaeum and Drepana, before pressing the siege at Drepana hard. The Roman fleet had cut off all supplies to Sicily, and the only way to regain it would be to take control of the water.

For the last four years, Hamilcar had been denied supplies from Carthage, and only now, with this new naval threat did Hanno hastily assemble ships and supplies to attempt to achieve maritime supremacy. The position of Hamilcar and the besieged towns was truly desperate. This hastily assembled force was an enormous undertaking, and they built many new ships and recruited about 75,000 rowers that needed training, which proved costly as Catalus had not wasted his time and had been training his rowers extensively. This new Carthaginian fleet sailed towards Sicily eight months later.

Hanno's intentions were to drop off supplies at Eyrx and pick up Hamilcar with some of his best troops and sail back to engage the Roman fleet at Drepana. However, all did not go to plan. After putting in at Hiera, a small island of the Aegates group waiting for a favourable wind so he could dodge a Roman blockade to reach Eyrx, the consul Catalus got wind of Hanno's movements and sailed to an island that lay opposite Lilybaeum.On the morning of 10 March 241 BC, Hamilcar Barca watched from his mountain stronghold as the Romans decisively beat the Carthaginian fleet. The Romans sank or captured 120 ships, and took 10,000 prisoners and lost only about a dozen vessels. Hanno escaped with 50 ships back to Carthage and met a grisly fate, being crucified for his failure.

This defeat made the war impossible to win, despite many writers maintaining Hamilcar's romanticised determination to maintain the struggle. He could see from his position the hopelessness of Carthage's war in Sicily. He is said to have fought off a Roman attack on his fort, but shortly after the defeat of Hanno's fleet, the Carthaginian's sought peace, with Hamilcar appointed to negotiate with full powers, which he no doubt approached with mixed feelings. He had commanded for a longer period than any other officer in Sicily and had caused the Romans such grief that he earned their respect – all this achieved with a small budget and soldiers that had not been paid for years.

The Roman terms were Punic withdrawal from Sicily, the return of all Roman prisoners without ransom while Carthage would have to pay ransom for theirs, a guarantee not to make war on Hiero of Syracuse and an indemnity of 2,200 Euboric talents to be paid over the course of twenty years. Nothing was mentioned of the Punic fleet or Sardinia, which may well have come as a surprise to Hamilcar.

This treaty however, was not ratified by the Senate who sent a commission of ten senators to examine the whole question. However, on arrival they made no major changes and only introduced a few minor alterations that would impose a few harsher conditions on Carthage. They reduced the time to repay the indemnity to ten years instead of twenty and added a further 1,000 talents to the total, along with the removal of Carthaginian power from the islands between Sicily and Italy.

With the treaty ratified and accepted, Hamilcar led his veteran troops from Mt. Eyrx, picked up the garrison from Drepana and marched to Lilybauem, where he left about 20,000 troops in the care of the Lilybaeum commandant Gisco to organise transport to Africa, while he set sail ahead of them to face official scrutiny at home for having not won the war and achieving no particular major success. His political situation at home was weaker than it had been when he set sail to Sicily in 247 BC, but, according to Hoyos, he had picked up valuable lessons on leadership, politics and resources that would be useful to an ex-general in his prime (Hoyos, p.20) These lessons would have been put to the test in the coming struggles with the Mercenary Revolt that was to follow Carthage's loss of the First Punic War.

(couldn't fit it all in here, continued in part 2 http://www.historum.com/blogs/markdi...r-barca-2.html
and 3
http://www.historum.com/blogs/markdi...r-barca-3.html) ]]> markdienekes http://historum.com/blogs/markdienekes/220-hamilcar-barca.html