Gettysburg: Pickett's Charge

Pickett's charge was a last ditch effort in the Battle of Gettysburg. All previous attacks on the flanks had failed and Lee resolved that the best way was to send 12,500 Confederate infantry from 9 brigades on a charge right into the Union's center. The plan was to make a break through in the Union line and separate the two halves of the Potomac Army.

The decision was very controversial in the ranks of the Army of Northern Virginia. Longstreet and Lee butted heads on the plan to execute it or not. Lee being in favor of it, Longstreet strongly against it. At long last, Lee had the final say in it and Longstreet was ordered to obey. Although this infamous attack was named after Maj. Gen. Pickett, there were actually three other commanders in coordination of the plan. These being; Brig. Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew, Maj. Gen. Isaac R. Trimble, and Gen. James Longstreet.

The day, July 3rd, 1863, was the day of the attack. Longstreet and Lee had decided upon attacking in the early AM, before sunrise. But typical delays postponed the attack until late morning. The target of the Confederate assault was the center of the Union Army of the Potomac's II Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock. All Confederate units were ordered to diverge on a clump of trees at the center of the union line of Cemetary Ridge, (A slight rise in the earth, not much to make a difference in combat though.) In conjunction with the infantry assault, Lee planned a cavalry action in the Union rear. Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart led his cavalry division to the east, prepared to exploit Lee's hoped-for breakthrough by attacking the Union rear and disrupting its line of communications (and retreat) along the Baltimore Pike.


The beginning of the attack opened with an artillery barrage from both sides, however the Union army outnumbering the Confederate cannon. Little was achieved on both sides and the Union breastworks still stood tall. This unfortunate beginning of the battle somewhat foreshadowed what was to come, although no one had imagined how devastating it was to be.

A view from the Confederate Army facing the Army of the Potomac.

As you can see, the ground is level for the most part. The Federal forces having a slight hill advantage along with breastworks and greater numbers gave them the upper hand. The Confederate forces, meanwhile about a mile away from the Union line on Seminary Ridge also had an excellent defensive position. The Rebels had compiled breastworks of great strength along the forest out of stone and wood which provided superb defense. The problem in this battle for the Confederates was, the Union had taken the high ground on the flanks of the battlefield which enabled them to have excellent artillery positions fixated on the Confederate forces as well. The previous two days were spent fighting over Culp's Hill and Little Round Top, but ending in vain for the Confederates.

The entire force that stepped off toward the Union positions consisted of about 12,500 men. Although the attack is popularly called a "charge", the men marched deliberately in line, to speed up and then charge only when they were within a few hundred yards of the enemy. The line consisted of Pettigrew and Trimble on the left, and Pickett to the right. The nine brigades of men stretched over a mile-long (1,600 m) front. The Confederates encountered heavy artillery fire while advancing across open fields nearly a mile to reach the Union line, this mile long march covered completely open ground with no cover whatsoever. On the left flank of the attack, Brockenbrough's brigade was devastated by artillery fire from Cemetery Hill, as I stated before, the Union forces had taken this key artillery position in the first stages of the battle. The Confederates were also subjected to a surprise musket fusillade from the 8th Ohio Infantry regiment. The 160 Ohioans, firing from a single line, so surprised Brockenbrough's Virginians—already demoralized by their losses to artillery fire—that they panicked and fled back to Seminary Ridge, crashing through Trimble's division and causing many of his men to bolt as well. The Ohioans followed up with a successful flanking attack on Davis's brigade of Mississippians and North Carolinians, which was now the left flank of Pettigrew's division. The survivors were subjected to increasing artillery fire from Cemetery Hill. More than 1,600 rounds were fired at Pettigrew's men during the assault. This portion of the assault never advanced much farther than the sturdy fence at the Emmitsburg Road. By this time, the Confederates were close enough to be fired on by artillery canister and Alexander Hays' division unleashed very effective musketry fire from behind 260 yards of stone wall, with every rifleman of the division lined up as many as four deep, exchanging places in line as they fired and then fell back to reload.


A view from the Union line on Cemetary Ridge


As the Confederate forces drew closer to the Union line, the Federal commanders ordered the artillery to switch to canister shot. A very deadly type of cannon ammunition that sprayed like a shotgun at close range, devastating rows upon rows of Confederates advancing in an orderly fashion. A few gaps were made in the Union line as Longstreet's divisions poured over the breastworks. At a divine moment, it seemed as though the plan was going to work. The Confederates had successfully broken the Union Army in half, however not for long, as fresh Union forces came to support the melee fight. The gap vacated by most of the 71st Pennsylvania, however, was more serious, leaving only a handful of the 71st, 268 men of the 69th Pennsylvania, and Cushing's two guns to receive the 2,500 to 3,000 men of Garnett's and Armistead's brigades as they began to cross the stone fence. The Irishmen of the 69th Pennsylvania resisted fiercely in a melee of rifle fire, bayonets, and fists. Webb, mortified that the 71st had retreated, brought the 72nd Pennsylvania (a Zouave regiment) forward, stabilizing the line. During the fight, the severely wounded Cushing was killed as he shouted to his men, three bullets striking him, the third in his mouth. The Confederates seized his guns and turned them to face the Union troops, but they had no ammunition to fire. As more Union reinforcements arrived, the defensive line became impregnable and the Confederates began to slip away individually, with no senior officers remaining to call a formal retreat.

The Confederates were brutally beaten back and shattered. Pickett's Charge was a bloodbath. While the Union lost about 1,500 killed and wounded, the Confederate casualty rate was over 50%. Pickett's division suffered 2,655 casualties (498 killed, 643 wounded, 833 wounded and captured, and 681 captured, unwounded). Pettigrew's losses are estimated to be about 2,700 (470 killed, 1,893 wounded, 337 captured). Trimble's two brigades lost 885 (155 killed, 650 wounded, and 80 captured). Wilcox's brigade reported losses of 200, Lang's about 400. Thus, total losses during the attack were 6,555, of which at least 1,123 Confederates were killed on the battlefield, 4,019 were wounded, and a good number of the injured were also captured. Confederate prisoner totals are difficult to estimate from their reports; Union reports indicated that 3,750 men were captured.

I visited Gettysburg last summer and I highly recommend it to any American Civil War fans out there. It is much more than just a battlefield, there are monuments dedicated to each division and brigade, cannons, and much more etc. People generally do the audio tour in which you drive around the battlefield and visit checkpoints where you listen to what happened at that point in the battle. That is what I did, and it was fascinating climbing Little Round Top and walking around Devil's Den and Culp's Hill.

Here's the situation according to historian Bevin Alexander;

In the first two days of the battle, for once the Confederates suffered from the same poor coordination, hesitancy, and bad leadership the Union cause had experienced. The Confederates lost the battle after failing to take the south flanking hills and after failing to press their advantage when the Union center had been almost breached.

General Longstreet pleaded with Lee disengage from the Union forces' strength on the high ridges and to turn the Confederate forces south and east threatening Washington, D.C. and drawing the Yankees to battle at a more favorable place. Lee refused. He knew where the enemy was and wanted to fight them where they were. Just as choosing Gettysburg as a battlefield was a mistake, his ordering 13,000 troops to a frontal attack over a half a mile of open territory was an even bigger mistake.

Robert E. Lee ordered Pickett's charge up Cometary Ridge out of anger and frustration. He knew of the Confederacy's absolute need to gain a major victory to bring the war to a negotiated end and was impatient with the progress of the battle and the performance of his subordinates Ewell, Longstreet, and Stuart.

Lee was frustrated by his generals' reluctance on the first two days' fighting at Gettysburg, his own struggle with poor knowledge of the battlefield and his initial lack of intelligence over enemy strength and disposition.

Lee simply lost his patience. He also suffered the deadly flaw of his contemporary military leaders. When they ran out of ideas, they resorted to frontal assault, despite their repeated experience in the failure of such tactics. These tactics dated back to the Mexican War era, where troops were clumped together in formations and fired their muskets at 100 yards of the enemy, and followed with a bayonet charge. When the frontal assault was tried against well-entrenched riflemen backed up by deadly artillery, it invariably failed. Two previous Yankee commanders learned this at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. Grant would learn this to his grief at Cold Harbor.