Hereword

For a while I have thought about Boudica's tactics in ad61 which largely employed ambush (and siege?) as a winning strategy until the end, in which she seems to have ditched that winning strategy and opted for a disastrous pitched battle?

This has been excused over time as over-enthusiasm due to being flushed with victory, losing control of her vast army or the geographical terrain at that last battle which necessitated a head-on assault only?

But in order to take on Paulinus in that last doomed pitched battle, why didn't Boudica send a large force of local foot warriors to ambush, or harass, the Roman rear?
Ambush was a tactic which had served the Britons well against Roman armies under Caesar and Scapula, and latterly the IXth Legion under Cerialis?

It didn't have to be a full-blooded and serious attempt to cut through the Romans in a true pincer attack, but with overwhelming numbers it would serve to distract Paulinus's comparatively tiny army, or perhaps spread fear as a psychological factor?
Boudica had the vast numbers to do this and, no matter where the battle was actually fought, some of her inter-tribal army would have known the terrain very well- hunting, etc? Examples where ambush or psychological panic routed armies were;

* Pharsalus - the sudden revealing of Caesar's charging infantrymen behind his cavalry routed Pompey's cavalry under Labienus? Similarly, Hannibal used ambush twice in his battles of 218-7bc?
* Hastings - the effect upon the indomitable Normans when the word spread that 'William had fallen'? Then later in the same day, Harold!
* Agincourt- the effect of near-panic upon the English when word of their baggage train in the rear was being raided by the French? It actually wasn't in huge numbers, but the effect galvanised the desperate English, fearful of losing a desperate battle on two fronts?

If the woods and shrub were as dense as Tacitus and some scholars suggest, making the use of throwing weapons awkward (hindered by woods and trees), then why not at least do it for fear value?
It's not so much the actual firepower (or lack of) from the woods behind the Roman lines, but the sheer psychological effect upon the opposing force's ability to function/focus when suddenly presented with the enemy to the rear, even if tactically it is not threatening?

Surely not ALL tactical command had totally broken down by the time Boudica and her chieftains had sacked Colchester, London, St.Albans (and Staines and Silchester?)?
Or, as many before me have suggested, was Paulinus's ravaging of British sacred groves/sites so successful that it made the furious British 'hoarde' lose their military sense?

Hereword

Did Paulinus move off West from the then lesser commercial trading town of London, or N.West up Watling Street as traditionally thought by scholars?

If the former, did Boudica follow him and sack the walled Silchester and other towns?

unclefred

My memory seems to suggest that Celtic bravado along with a good tactical concealment of the true size of the Roman force, and a good choice of battle ground were the main ingredients. That's probably simplistic.

Hereword

I think you have it about right, given that we know so little about the chronology of events and the geography involved?

We don't know where the battle was even, but for Paulinus to 'lure' Boudica to him, the site must have been very wide, open and tempting to the Britons?

unclefred

I think it is believed that the Romans held the high ground of a steep and wide field, which had been done with stakes etc. in the usual fashion, and that at the top the flanks held unseen Roman forces that pounced at the proper time. It's been awhile since I read that. you're right though, they don't, or didn't really know the actual spot of the battle.

AlpinLuke

Well Hereword, as for historians have reported, it seems that it was the other way round: Romans weren't many, this was the temptation for the Britons, but the Latin generals put the Army in a natural strict valley, with the chivalry on the sides of the infantry.

Boudicca thought to get an easy victory charging using the chariots, but Romans used pilas to stop them and then the hand to hand fight saw the Britons using their long sword with difficulties. And the Roman chivalry [which was on the sides] had the opportunity to charge the enemy forces.

Edgewaters

Guerrilla warfare doesn't lend itself easily to decisive outcomes. If the enemy is persistant and won't budge in the face of attrition, a guerrilla campaign eventually has to be ramped up to a more conventional conflict, after building up its strength while weakening the enemy.

I think Boudicca was simply premature in moving from the one to the other. Given her success to that point, and the apparent weakness of Roman forces, the mistake is understandable.