The Industrial Revolution Myth - Page 6 - Historum

**Guaporense** · May 7th, 2012, 06:27 PM

Link to the paper that pretty much killed thesis of the California school:

http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webf...e211-gupta.pdf

their conclusions:

Quote:

Originally Posted by Broadberry & Gupta

This paper has attempted a quantitative assessment of the recent claims of Pomeranz (2000) and other “world historians”, that the “Great Divergence” between Europe and Asia occurred only after 1800. An examination of data on wages and prices on the two continents suggests that the prosperous parts of Asia between 1500 and 1800 look similar to the stagnating southern, central and eastern parts of Europe rather than the developing northwestern parts. In India and China, grain wages were comparable to those in northwestern Europe, but silver wages were substantially lower. This is exactly the pattern observed in the less developed parts of Europe. Essentially, then, world historians are generalizing the findings of the long-running debate over the standard of living in Europe to encompass the continent of Asia. It is now widely accepted following the work of Crafts and Harley (1992) that British economic growth during the Industrial Revolution was substantially slower than was once thought, which means that gains in the standard of living were slower to materialize for the masses. We know now that in northwestern Europe (1) the amount of food consumed by laborers was slow to rise (2) gains in living standards occurred primarily through the falling relative price of manufactured goods. However, there is no revisionist school of European economic history claiming that Poland or Spain were as likely as Britain to have an Industrial Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century, and it is no more appropriate to make such a claim for the Yangzi delta region of China or for southern India.

It is important not to forget that the revisionist work of Crafts and Harley (1992) had another strand, emphasizing structural change. In addition to highlighting the modest nature of the growth acceleration during the Industrial Revolution, Crafts and Harley (1992) pointed out that the extent of the shift of labor out of agriculture in Britain was more radical than had previously been thought, and also occurred earlier than was once thought. Generalizing this beyond the British experience, a key feature of the pattern of development in northwestern Europe was a structural shift out of agriculture, accompanied by an extensive urbanization. The existence of sufficient grain to feed the population at a reasonable standard of living in southern, central and eastern Europe was the result of a high share of the economy’s resources being devoted to agriculture, and this shows up in relatively low levels of urbanization.

Similarly, in Asia, the high grain wages of the most prosperous parts of India and China can be attributed to the high share of agriculture in economic activity, combined with the natural advantage of the high yield of rice relative to wheat. This is a long way from the development of a large, specialized, high value added structure above the subsistence agrarian system that characterized northwest European countries such as Britain and the Netherlands. The “Great Divergence” between Europe and Asia, in other words, was already well underway before 1800.

To close this "great divergence" detour on the topic of the tread.

**Guaporense** · May 7th, 2012, 07:36 PM

I would also like to present some examples of pre-19th century cases of fast economic growth. Indeed, there were several cases of fast economic growth before modern times.

Perhaps the first processes of sustained economic growth occurred in Egypt and especially in the Mesopotamian city states: in fact the first attested mention of the word "liberty" is dated from 5th millennia BC Mesopotamia and the first mention of "democracy" is also dated from 5th millennia BC Mesopotamia. Liberty and democracy are closely associated with economic growth for several reasons, both are causative factors of growth and also are caused by growth.

But the case of pre-modern economic growth that I know best is Ancient Greece. In ancient Greece the archaeological evidence has shown indeed that there was a vast increase in population and a dramatic improvement in living standards.

Population density, some Greek sites, according to field surveys:

Koressos on Kea

900 BC to 700 BC - 100
480 BC to 323 BC - 1,020-1,455

Southern Argolid

750 - 650 BC - 1,100
480 - 200 BC - 10,855

So field survey evidence shows that there was a massive population explosion in Greece from 700 BC to about 340 BC. Population density grew by a factor of 10 times in the Southern Argolid from ca. 700 BC to ca. 340 BC, an annual rate of increase of 0.64%, higher than in any civilization in the world during the Early Modern period (Chinese population growth rate was estimated at 0.42% during the Early modern period). Also, during this period there was a massive migration to the new Greek colonies in the Mediterranean, which means that the actual population of the Greek civilization increased by an even larger factor, in 340 BC, according to the estimates of Mogens Herman Hansen, 58% of the population of Hellas lived in the Aegean and 42% in the colonies, so if the population in the Aegean increased by 10 times from 700 BC to 340 BC, them the total Hellenic population increased by 17.3 times over these 360 years, a demographic expansion of 0.8% a year over 360 years.

Hence, fast and sustained population growth existed well before the industrial revolution.

And living standards in Greece, despite the massive population growth, improved by an even more impressive margin (differently from Qing China, by the way):

Estimated median per capita space, square meters:

7th century BC - 12.3
6th century BC - 18.7
5th century BC - 43.9
4th century BC - 62.7
(increase of 410%)
(source: http://www.historum.com/ancient-hist...ml#post1025012)

In terms of housing standards, for instance, median living space increased by 410%, while the quality of the buildings also increased which indicates that per capita consumption of housing in terms of value increased by a factor around 10 fold.

There was also a massive increase in the number of mediterranean shipwrecks recorded from the 8th to the 4th century BC, increasing in number from 2 shipwrecks to 46 shipwrecks, an increase of 23 fold over a 400 year period. And 4th century shipwrecks were on average bigger.

By the time of Aristotle, in the mid 4th century BC, Hellenic civilization was drastically different from it's state 400 years earlier: population increased by massive proportion, living standards improved by an exponential factor and trade among the Greek cities exploded in quantity.

Therefore, claiming that before the industrial revolution there wasn't real economic growth and that living standards didn't change much across time is nonsense: in several cases it did, such as in Classical Greece, the case which I happen to have the most information.

Bart Dale · May 8th, 2012, 04:44 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Guaporense

The problem with wage data is that before the 19th century the vast majority of the populations in both Europe and Asia didn't work for wages. In China, actually, only in the last 10 years that the majority of the population is earning wages: In the year 2000, 60% of the Chinese labor force was still composed of mostly self sufficient agricultural workers.

Therefore, wages are not a very good indicator of economic developed by themselves. The argument, for instance, that Europe was stagnated before "the industrial revolution" is based on stagnated real wages. However, that point is not strong in the sense that the vast majority of Europeans didn't work for wages in the 16th century.

A better indicator of actual economic growth in the sense of a greater degree of commercial activity and even a better indicator of relative levels of economic development would be the merchant shipping tonnage indicator. Since it shows exactly the phenomena that I am trying to measure: economic activity beyond self sufficiency, which before the invention of the rail road in the 19th century was based on maritime methods of transportation.

I agree with you here. Although the quality of data may be better from Europe, I think that for all eras before the later half of the 19th century we just don't have complete enough records to make really reliable estimates. Many of indirect measurements such registered tonnage, would be more complete, and hence more reliable.

Bart Dale · May 8th, 2012, 04:59 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Guaporense

You haven't understood my point:

My point is that there isn't such clearly defined type of social process as an industrial revolution as outside of the historical framework of Western Europe in the late 18th and early 19th century.

I.e. one cannot say that China was near the brink of an "industrial revolution" in the 11th century. That's because there is not such thing as an industrial revolution in technical terms. We have the historical event, the British Industrial revolution from ~1770 to ~1860 where there occurred an much greater volume of entrepreneurial innovations than ever before and this much greater flow of entrepreneurial innovation continues to this day.

Song China also had a certain economic explosion from 960 AD to 1080 AD. Levels of copper and iron consumption increased at exponential rates during the period.

Another, even more ancient case, of an economic explosion is in Classical Greece from 800 BC to 330 BC, where living standards show consistent improvement over the course of several centuries, though at a rather slow pace, still the average house sizes increased by a comparable degree to American house sizes from the 18th though the end of the 20th century as I have shown in another tread.

I think I understand your point. My understanding, in my words, of what you are trying to say is that while there was a dramatic rise in economic production and living standard during the 19th century, you can't say it was a "revolution", and caused by revolutionary factors. Instead, the dramatic rise was from the accumulated results of evolutionary trends and advances that had been going on for centuries before.

But a dramatic rise, in your opinion, is does not quality as a "revolution", even though the end results led to radical and uprecendent changes. To call it a "revolution" mask the evolutionary nature of the change. Have I understood you correctly?

mansamusa · May 8th, 2012, 07:50 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Guaporense

I see, so you don't really have any scientific definition of central planning (you don't agree or disagree with him, only says that "he is narrow and abstract").

Therefore, this discussion is futile.

Well Guaporense you provided a video, not an actual extract i could quote or something. You also said planning not central Planning per se, if that makes any meaningful difference. And his definition is narrow. Hayek and the other economists of the Austrian School of Economists were hell bent on equating any kind of government intervention or planning (with a few humane exceptions) as the Road to Serfdom or the road to Fascism and other totalitarian forms of government. Which to me is just paranoid. Here he is predicting The transformation of England into Fascist Germany:

Quote:

The increasing veneration for the state, the admiration of power, and of bigness for bigness' sake, the enthusiasm for "organization" of everything (we now call it "planning") and that "inability to leave anything to the simple power of organic growth"...are all scarcely less marked in England now than they were in Germany.

The Road to Serfdom, Hayek

or

Quote:

They do not realize that democratic socialism, the
great utopia of the last few generations, is not only unachievable,but that to strive for it produces something utterly different the very destruction of freedom itself.

The road to Serfdom

or better yet

Quote:

Although competition can bear some mixture of regulation,
it cannot be combined with planning to any extent we like
without ceasing to operate as an effective guide to production.
Both competition and central direction become poor and ineffi -
cient tools if they are incomplete, and a mixture of the two means that neither will work.
The road to Serfdom

Can you give me a single example of any modern successful economy which was defined by something else besides a combination of planning and free market competition. And how many of them have transformed into the tyrannies that Hayek prophesied? To me a signifigant portion of the Western countries with the highest productivity levels live up to the definition or at least my idea of Democratic socialism.
Overall Productivity ppp statistics - countries compared - Nation Master

mansamusa · May 8th, 2012, 10:15 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Guaporense

Therefore, claiming that before the industrial revolution there wasn't real economic growth and that living standards didn't change much across time is nonsense: in several cases it did, such as in Classical Greece, the case which I happen to have the most information.

I would tend to agree.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Guaporense

Perhaps the first processes of sustained economic growth occurred in Egypt and especially in the Mesopotamian city states: in fact the first attested mention of the word "liberty" is dated from 5th millennia BC Mesopotamia and the first mention of "democracy" is also dated from 5th millennia BC Mesopotamia. Liberty and democracy are closely associated with economic growth for several reasons, both are causative factors of growth and also are caused by growth..

If it is true that Ancient Egypt was one of the first processes of sustained economic growth, we should be certain it had close to almost nothing to do with democracy. It was a perfect example of an economy based on central planning as is shown by a description of the economics associated with the Old Kingdom or Pyramid Age:

Quote:

The enormous volume of construction work carried out during the two centuries when the kings of Manetho’s 3rd and 4th Dynasties held sway had a profound effect on the country’s economy and society. It would be wrong to underestimate the considerable effort and expertise required in the construction of large brick-built mastaba-tombs of the Early Dynastic Period, but pyramid construction in stone elevated such enterprises onto a completely different plane. The number of professional builders required must have been large, especially if one takes into account all those involved in the quarrying and transport of stone blocks, the construction of approach ramps needed by the builders, and all the logistics, such as provision of food, water, and other necessities, the maintenance of tools and many other related tasks.

The Egyptian economy was not based on slave labour. Even if one allows for much of the work to have been carried out at the time when the annual inundation made it impossible to work in the fields, a large section of the labour force required for pyramid building had to be diverted from agricultural tasks and food production. This must have exerted considerable pressure on the existing resources and provided powerful stimuli for efforts to increase agricultural production, to improve the administration of the country, to develop an efficient way of collecting taxes, and to look for additional sources of revenue and manpower abroad.

Demands on Egyptian agricultural production changed dramatically with the inauguration of pyramid building because of the need to support those who had been removed from food production. The consumption and expectations of those who joined the managerial elite increased in line with their new status. However, agricultural techniques remained the same. The state’s main contribution was organizational, including such acts as the prevention of local famines by bringing in surplus resources from elsewhere, the lessening of the effects of major calamities (such as low inundations), the elimination of damaging local conflicts by providing arbitration, and the improvement of security. Irrigation works were the responsibility of local administrators, and the attempts to increase agricultural production focused on expanding cultivated land for which the state was able to provide labour forces and other resources.

This went hand in hand with the need for a better administrative organization of the country and a more efficient way of collecting taxes. The existing major centres of population, often royal estates, now became capitals of administrative districts (nomes), with the strategically placed capital of the country, at the vertex of the Delta, providing the equilibrium between Upper Egypt (ta shemau) in the south, and Lower Egypt (ta mehu) in the north.

Old Kingdom cities are, however, overlaid by later settlements and, especially in the Delta, they often lie below the present water-table. These early settlements are therefore archaeologically practically unknown; even the capital of Egypt has not yet been excavated, and towns such as Elephantine, or Ayn Asil in the Dakhla Oasis, are exceptional. The earlier semi-autonomous village communities now lost their independence and privately owned land practically disappeared, all replaced by royal estates. The earlier rudimentary census was transformed into an all-embracing fiscal system. Egypt during much of the Old Kingdom was a centrally planned and administered state, headed by a king who was the theoretical owner of all its resources and whose powers were practically absolute. He was able to commandeer people, to impose compulsory labour, to extract taxes, and to lay claim to any resources of the land at will, although in practical terms this was tempered by a number of restrictions.

Shaw, Ian (2004-02-19). The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt (Kindle Locations 1965-1972). Oxford University Press, USA. Kindle Edition.

Ancient Egypt is just too old for its own good. I say this because Invariably people point out to China as the first fully developed bureucratic state, which fits our modern ideas of Government. But that aside--the above extract shows clearly that growing economic growth and sophistication in the Old Kingdom was associated with strong centralized planning revolving around the very undemocratic idea of the God-King. I do not know much about China, but from the little I know is it not safe to assume that china's growth was based similarly on centralized planning also revolving around the idea of a God-king/emperor? I would appreciate a response from those more knowledgeable.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Guaporense

But the case of pre-modern economic growth that I know best is Ancient Greece. In ancient Greece the archaeological evidence has shown indeed that there was a vast increase in population and a dramatic improvement in living standards.

Population density, some Greek sites, according to field surveys:

Koressos on Kea

900 BC to 700 BC - 100
480 BC to 323 BC - 1,020-1,455

Southern Argolid

750 - 650 BC - 1,100
480 - 200 BC - 10,855

So field survey evidence shows that there was a massive population explosion in Greece from 700 BC to about 340 BC. Population density grew by a factor of 10 times in the Southern Argolid from ca. 700 BC to ca. 340 BC, an annual rate of increase of 0.64%, higher than in any civilization in the world during the Early Modern period (Chinese population growth rate was estimated at 0.42% during the Early modern period). Also, during this period there was a massive migration to the new Greek colonies in the Mediterranean, which means that the actual population of the Greek civilization increased by an even larger factor, in 340 BC, according to the estimates of Mogens Herman Hansen, 58% of the population of Hellas lived in the Aegean and 42% in the colonies, so if the population in the Aegean increased by 10 times from 700 BC to 340 BC, them the total Hellenic population increased by 17.3 times over these 360 years, a demographic expansion of 0.8% a year over 360 years.

Hence, fast and sustained population growth existed well before the industrial revolution.

And living standards in Greece, despite the massive population growth, improved by an even more impressive margin (differently from Qing China, by the way):

Estimated median per capita space, square meters:

7th century BC - 12.3
6th century BC - 18.7
5th century BC - 43.9
4th century BC - 62.7
(increase of 410%)
(source: http://www.historum.com/ancient-hist...ml#post1025012)

In terms of housing standards, for instance, median living space increased by 410%, while the quality of the buildings also increased which indicates that per capita consumption of housing in terms of value increased by a factor around 10 fold.

There was also a massive increase in the number of mediterranean shipwrecks recorded from the 8th to the 4th century BC, increasing in number from 2 shipwrecks to 46 shipwrecks, an increase of 23 fold over a 400 year period. And 4th century shipwrecks were on average bigger.

By the time of Aristotle, in the mid 4th century BC, Hellenic civilization was drastically different from it's state 400 years earlier: population increased by massive proportion, living standards improved by an exponential factor and trade among the Greek cities exploded in quantity..

Ancient Athens reached the heights of Economic greatness under Proto-Socialist Tyranny and Democracy. Peisistratus and Pericles. But before Peisistratus there was Solon of the 7th century who instituted the Shaking Off of Burdens---Seisachtheia-- where the debts of small holders owed to the Aristocrats were cleared away--which to me is proto-socialist intervention in private commercial affairs. But the example of Peisistratus is more clear. He takes land away from Aristocrats and redistributes it to poor farmers. He also gives what sems to be the equivalent of state grants or cheap loans to poor farmers:

Quote:

Peisistratus reduced the hereditary power of the squires and made life easier for the ordinary farmer. To them he sometimes advanced money, perhaps for settling on new ground that previously had been used only for grazing and was now to be used for growing olive trees and vines. He also gave some new land from a few confiscated estates of exiled nobles. He completed Solon's work for the peasants, and he succeeded to such an extent that he could afford to impose a tax on produce....

From Solon to Socrates--Victor Ehrenberg

His infrastructure projects were seemingly a miniature repitition of the ambitions of the rulers of the Kemetic Pyramid age:

Quote:

Equally Important for his popularity were Peisistratus' practical plans for Athens, for instance, a better water supply from the famous well of the Enneakrounos. He and his soms also added to Solon's New market place, the agora, which soon grew into the very centre of city life. It has rightly been said that under Peisistratus, Athens changed from what was little more than a village into a city, and a flourishing and beautiful city at that. Naturally, for all these activities he needed a good deal of money. It seems that his considerable personal resources went into a common state treasury, probably as the largest contribution; obviously he had to supervise state finances himself. There were also custom duties, which increased with the growing trade, and some other public income, in particular from the Laurium Mines. The man whose reign witnessed a vigorous naval and trading policy was at the same time a man of wide intellectual interests and deep religious feelings. He truly laid the foundations of Athenian greatness.

From Solon to Socrates--Victor Ehrenberg

And indeed the age Peisistratus was the age of accelerated cultural exchange between Ancient Egypt and Greece. The sculptural style of Greece at the time and just before was an imitation of Kemet's or I should say heavily imfluenced by Kemet. The same may well be true of the growing power and importance of state; however we can never know for sure. But lets not stray.

In the case of the later Pericles we have the same kind of state interventionist policies:

Quote:

Pericles - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

It was from the alliance's treasury that Pericles drew the funds necessary to enable his ambitious building plan, centered on the "Periclean Acropolis", which included the Propylaea, the Parthenon and the golden statue of Athena, sculpted by Pericles' friend, Phidias.[58] In 449 BC Pericles proposed a decree allowing the use of 9,000 talents to finance the major rebuilding program of Athenian temples.[45] Angelos Vlachos, a Greek Academician, points out that the utilization of the alliance's treasury, initiated and executed by Pericles, is one of the largest embezzlements in human history; this misappropriation financed, however, some of the most marvellous artistic creations of the ancient world.

So to paraphrase Clinton's slogan--"Its the bureacracy, stupid!" Not democracy. And my example of Venice which is the model of later European Mercantilism revolving around the discovery, exploration and colonization ofthe New World also proves the same.

fascinating · May 8th, 2012, 11:45 PM

Guapo, this thread is entitled "the Industrial Revolution Myth". Then you say

Quote:

This "industrial revolution" was not caused by the coal deposits in England, nor by the invention of the steam engine: these innovations were caused by the "industrial revolution" and not causes of the industrial revolution

Was there an industrial revolution or not?

PragmaticStatistic · May 9th, 2012, 11:16 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Wenge

According to many websites I have viewed China's urbanization rate is higher than that of The United States. Have you visited China recently. Just in the small city I live in the areas that are being urbanized is growing at an accelerated pace and I am sure the same is true for the majority of China.

Urbanization Rates of Countries

If you want to see how fast China has grown, take this interactive tour of western China to see how much industry has grown in the rural areas separated by vast wood lands.

**spellbanisher** · May 9th, 2012, 11:19 AM

The Broadberry and Gupta papers were written six years before the Allen paper, which pretty much refuted their findings, as have the findings of Van Zanden and a few other scholars.

**spellbanisher** · May 9th, 2012, 11:29 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Guaporense

I would also like to present some examples of pre-19th century cases of fast economic growth. Indeed, there were several cases of fast economic growth before modern times.

Perhaps the first processes of sustained economic growth occurred in Egypt and especially in the Mesopotamian city states: in fact the first attested mention of the word "liberty" is dated from 5th millennia BC Mesopotamia and the first mention of "democracy" is also dated from 5th millennia BC Mesopotamia. Liberty and democracy are closely associated with economic growth for several reasons, both are causative factors of growth and also are caused by growth.

But the case of pre-modern economic growth that I know best is Ancient Greece. In ancient Greece the archaeological evidence has shown indeed that there was a vast increase in population and a dramatic improvement in living standards.

Population density, some Greek sites, according to field surveys:

Koressos on Kea

900 BC to 700 BC - 100
480 BC to 323 BC - 1,020-1,455

Southern Argolid

750 - 650 BC - 1,100
480 - 200 BC - 10,855

So field survey evidence shows that there was a massive population explosion in Greece from 700 BC to about 340 BC. Population density grew by a factor of 10 times in the Southern Argolid from ca. 700 BC to ca. 340 BC, an annual rate of increase of 0.64%, higher than in any civilization in the world during the Early Modern period (Chinese population growth rate was estimated at 0.42% during the Early modern period). Also, during this period there was a massive migration to the new Greek colonies in the Mediterranean, which means that the actual population of the Greek civilization increased by an even larger factor, in 340 BC, according to the estimates of Mogens Herman Hansen, 58% of the population of Hellas lived in the Aegean and 42% in the colonies, so if the population in the Aegean increased by 10 times from 700 BC to 340 BC, them the total Hellenic population increased by 17.3 times over these 360 years, a demographic expansion of 0.8% a year over 360 years.

Hence, fast and sustained population growth existed well before the industrial revolution.

And living standards in Greece, despite the massive population growth, improved by an even more impressive margin (differently from Qing China, by the way):

Estimated median per capita space, square meters:

7th century BC - 12.3
6th century BC - 18.7
5th century BC - 43.9
4th century BC - 62.7
(increase of 410%)
(source: http://www.historum.com/ancient-hist...ml#post1025012)

In terms of housing standards, for instance, median living space increased by 410%, while the quality of the buildings also increased which indicates that per capita consumption of housing in terms of value increased by a factor around 10 fold.

There was also a massive increase in the number of mediterranean shipwrecks recorded from the 8th to the 4th century BC, increasing in number from 2 shipwrecks to 46 shipwrecks, an increase of 23 fold over a 400 year period. And 4th century shipwrecks were on average bigger.

By the time of Aristotle, in the mid 4th century BC, Hellenic civilization was drastically different from it's state 400 years earlier: population increased by massive proportion, living standards improved by an exponential factor and trade among the Greek cities exploded in quantity.

Therefore, claiming that before the industrial revolution there wasn't real economic growth and that living standards didn't change much across time is nonsense: in several cases it did, such as in Classical Greece, the case which I happen to have the most information.

Yeah through that thread, and all of that is based pretty much on such paltry evidence as to be statistically invalid.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Lord_of_Gauda

There is no evidence that a few hundred houses surviving from the 1st millenia BCE mediterranean are actually representative of the average. We simply do not have the sample size to make such a claim.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Naomasa298

The sample size needs to be correlated with the socia-economic demographic of the places being surveyed. A sampling of houses in Beverley Hills will not give you a representative view of the wider population.

Not to mention, the larger houses with superior construction are also the ones that are most likely to have survived to be excavated, so the sampling could well be self-selecting, and there is no reason to think that 50 houses equates to a figure that is trustworthy.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Lord_of_Gauda

There really isn't a consensus, just educated guesses. I've pointedly asked authorities in Greco-Roman studies on how they are assigning greater materials wealth simply based on size of the houses, and where is the data which indicates what the size of the average family unit in classical Athens was, or how many family units and semi-units (such as extended family) dwelt there. The answers are always nebulous, such as 'in my opinion/i think' etc. There is no data on this, just speculation.
The fallacy of drawing living standards from housing sizes without knowing the number of inhabitants in the house is demonstrated no better than the case of the Haida Gwaii: these native Americans of British Columbia have, by far, the largest dwelling spaces ever documented, the infamous 'log-houses' that were comparable to the a single level floorspace of a skyscraper.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Lord_of_Gauda

You are misrepresenting data. What we have, is a variation of housing sizes through 1st millenium BCE Greece- with a noted expansion of houses in the latter centuries.

What the dataset doesn't indicate, is whether this was a general social phenomenon, or simply a case of the 95th percentile of the population getting super-rich and affording far greater housing sizes. For example, the average housing size in India today is smaller than that of 50 years ago, yet the top 1% of the Indian society lives in far bigger accomodation today than 50 years ago. This is because the top percentile of Indian population have become far richer than the rest of their society compared to 50 years ago.

There is no evidence in your data to preclude this. Not to mention, your data-set is laughably small and as such, no hard conclusions can be driven.
We have less than 0.0001% of the dwellings from classical Greco-Roman world surviving. This is a percentage of dataset that statistical analysis dictates to have extremely dubious conclusions.

You do not prove a negative- basic exercise in logic, buddy. To claim that Greek houses were large, you need to follow some very simple guidelines:

1. demonstrate that the housing excavated so far is representational of social structure: that 70% of the houses belong to 'poor to semi-poor people', 20% to the 'middle class' and 10% to the 'rich', as is the historic spread of wealth in most societies. If 80% of your houses discovered are from the top 10th percentile, it is basic skewing of data.

2. Establish a statistically valid data-set. You cannot draw a hard conclusion from 0.0001% of the evidence.
For any statistical measurement to be considered valid, it must represent, atleast 5-10% of the data-set.And even this margin is extremely low, as in engineering parlayance, considering 5-10% of the dataset is establishing a premise, using less than 5% of the dataset is considered pure guesswork.

While this may be hard to do with ancient archaeology, where naturally 90% or more of the dataset perishes, you can still drive a 'soft conclusion' by correlating data with major segments of city excavations: for example, please provide us the average house size of Olynthos and explain what parameters are used to determine the bounds of a house. Show us how much of the data is skewed by the 90th percentile, living in huge villas.

I am sure you can appreciate the simple fact that a king occupying 50% of a small city, owing to a huge palace, fundamentally skews data.

Your conclusions are unsound and fundamentally putting the cart before the horse: your dataset is insignificant, your conclusion fails to differentiate between average living standards and those of the 90th percentile, it simply fails to point out what sort of houses have mostly survived- the rich people's or the poor ones.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Lord_of_Gauda

These are not estimates. These are complete, unadulturated guess-works, with zero substantiation- either from the poster or from the author of works he is quoting. Please be warned! There is no basis to pick the number 5-7 over those of 4-12, except for what *we* guess to've been a room's capacity based on what *we* assume might've existed there. Ie, pure nonsense.

Welcome to classical studies, folks, where nonsensical numbers rule- the 'classic' trick of lending a veneer of credibility in completely ridiculous conclusions by tossing arbitary numbers around, boring people with the validity of such numbers.

I might also add that in the recent housing bubble, McMansions were being built all over the United States even as the average person's standard of living was stagnating.