irishcrusader95

`well maybe not control but there tactics were well thought out in the horns of the buffalo attack

Kevinmeath

They had more rifles than usually given credit I think Snook in his book states that it was at least 1/4 and perhaps up to 1/3 of Zulu had guns of some sort , quality was variable as was ammunition. They tended to use less powder than required to 'save' some this of course effected performance.

Adrian Greaves 'Rorke's Drift' is a good book but in it has a good section on the treatment of the wounded. Also he outlines that CSM Bourne was certain that Martini Henrys were used against B coy 2/24th but most historians agree that the regiments in reserve at Isandlwana did not get the opportunity to get any from the dead, they then usually dismiss Bourne as being mistaken (a very 'brave' thing to do since he had served over 40 years and was a musketry expert).

The medical reports would seem to confirm this as many (most were killed by gun fire) of the GSW's could not break major bones, this would rule out Martini Henrys powerful ammunition.
However Greaves does point out that several of the killed are described in witness accounts bykilled 'clean shots' through the body and head which could point to more powerful rifles.

Anyway many of the Zulu had guns.

Agree with the 'Horns of the Buffalo' but the Zulu were very skilled light infantrymen and they did not simply attack in a 'human wave' into the volleys of the 24th, they couldn't. They did very skillfully use all the advantages of cover and concealment until a final rush when they had got as close as possible.

Their huge numerical superority was has you point out a dominant feature.

Kevinmeath

From what I have read their discipline was very strong, so would agree.

irishcrusader95

have you heard about the zulu king ordering one of his divisions to walk off a cliff just to prove their discipline to a visitor, they joyfully complied

Kevinmeath

I haven't heard of it and do not know whether its true or just illustration to frighten visiting missionaires, seems a little wasteful in men.

However the point is correct in that their discipline very strong indeed

Naomasa298

Bourne may have been certain about the Martini-Henrys but don't forget that at the time of Rorke's Drift, he was only 20 or 22, and memory and certainty dims with age.

The disaster at Isandlhwana wasn't entirely down to Chelmsford or Pulleine. Durnford outranked Pulleine (seeing as he was a substantive lieutenant-colonel, whereas Pulleine was merely a brevet), and Pulleine may have thought that he should have been in command.

Had the wagons been laagered and the troops close in as per standing orders, the outcome might have been very different, as demonstrated by tje subsequent battles at Kambula and Gingindlovu, where you'd have had to have been very unlucky indeed to have been killed on the British side.

Kevinmeath

Oh agreed, he was on old man when interviewed and age changes memories, he could easily have had 'False memory syndrome-- been told often enough it was so, he thinks it was so.
However lets not be 'ageist' and he was an excellent soldier who would know the sound of different rifles. Greaves' medical analysis is interesting but can be read to support either .

Major Dunbar 2/24th complained about the dispostion of the camp and was basically accused of cowardice by the staff officers, to which he in fury resigned his commission (his resignation was not accepted and luckily for him his company went with Chelmsford). He thought a poor position defended by 1200 redcoats not 600!

Chookie

I can't attach any blame to Pulleine or to Durnford. Chelmsford, in my view is entirely responsible for the result at Isandlwhana. The orders issued to Durnford were not exactly clear - in fact they were a model of how not to word an order - IIRC this order was issued by Major Cleary, but I don'r recall his being authorised to give orders (on the other hand, he was Chelmsford's military secretary...)

Kevinmeath

Agree to an extent but I think Durnford has to take some blame, if only because he was senior officer presant. Also riding off to engage a reported large force with his comparatively small cavalry force and then asking for redcoat companies to support him further weakened (it may have ben doomed anyway) the camps defences.

Even worse he withdraws leaving the redcoat companies totally exposed and isolated. To compound the mistake he ensures that he and several of his officers are last the leave their position. Now this sounds great and shows his bravery and looks good to the press (a fighting colonel in frontline etc) but who is supposed to rally his troopers? they are left to retreat in disorder with no rally point. One effective African NCO manges to keep his troop together the rest scatter in confusion. Whether this made any difference to the outcome of the battle is debatable.

SPERRO

Durnsford's original orders from Chelmsford, was to stay on the border with his mounted troops. However he did not take this very well and ended up at Isandlwhana on the night before the battle.
Although he outranked Pulliene, the fact that he was an officer of Engineers led to this being ignored (class snobbery).

JC