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Old December 11th, 2016, 09:13 AM   #21

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Originally Posted by Tercios Espanoles View Post
Was it ever used successfully?
But yes,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Khalkhin_Gol
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Old December 11th, 2016, 11:45 AM   #22
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Originally Posted by Tercios Espanoles View Post
Was it ever used successfully?
Sorry to quote myself
"Deep Operation Also known as Soviet Deep Battle was a tenet that emphazised destroying, supressing or disorganizing enemy forces not only at the l'une of contact,but through the depth of the battlefiel. ....The Soviet Union was the first country to officially distinguish the third level"
According me, the "third level" permitted to Soviet, counter offensive or offensive since 1941.
Battles of Smolensk (personal point of view)and in particular Moscow counter offensive(common historians point of view).
Let's not talk about 1942, the question of the OPs is only about1941.
Sorry, not enough time to elaborate.

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Old December 11th, 2016, 11:50 AM   #23
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Originally Posted by Tercios Espanoles View Post
Was it ever used successfully?
Yes, of course many time.
For instance Moscow counter offensive in 1941.
You can list Stalingrad (1942), Kursk(1943) and others.
The biggest success of Deep Battle is also the Bigger terrestrial offensive of all time.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration
It's surprising and even "suspect", that this doctrine wasn't more famous.(cold war?).
Sorry i must go.

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Old December 12th, 2016, 10:33 PM   #24
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Originally Posted by Spartacuss View Post
I agree. The Red Army of 1941 was built for offensive operations. Having been beaten to the punch by the Germans, the Soviets were plagued by the consequences the oft cited army purges, and the extremely poor performance of Stavka. Deep Battle was out the window then.
Actually my point of view is that despite first big defeats in June and early July, soviet headquarter worked out an effective strategy to reroute Germans of Moscow road and to attract and delay them in south USSR thanks sacrifices of troops, like a gambit in chess play ( a bloody one).
If you look at a map in Barbarossa source, you can note Germans armies moves "imposed" by necessity to fight against Smolensk counter offensive in July, and to eliminate the threat of a large Soviet armies concentration in the Kiev sector.
All these Germans victory cost them vital time, men and material.
Of course, all that can be contested, but there're some "clues".

- Source mention that Smolensk counter-offensive was already planned in Zuhkov pre-war plans.
- Guderian did an interesting comment after battle of Kiev, he called it a "diversion" and a lost of time and like other generals he considered it as a "bright tactical success" but also, as a strategical error.
-A very interesting clue, during the battle of Kiev. Soviet already began to "move" their factories to the East, Krutchov was in charge of this plan.
Such a plan couldn't be improvised in only several weeks, above all with all complications involved by defeats.
-Vyasma-Briansk battle was also, "mentionned" in Soviet defensive pre-war plan.
-Elite Siberian troops, began to reach Moscow since october and didn't move till December.

All that is debattable but i'm quite sure that to imagine Soviet battles along Summer 1941 as desperates and disordered counter-attack is a legend.
It seems that official Western military history had been a little bit "scornfull" about Soviet doctrine and strategy, Soviet being seen as victorious only thanks "general winter" or a "massive steamroller effect".
I suspect military leaders like Zuhkov, Timochenko, Koniev, Malinovski, Vassilievski and others were more subtile than Westerns thought.
I think that Stavka was able to work out elaborate plans since 1941, and this despite Stalin and that we must consider the Soviet military cultural mindset (heavy losses are "acceptable" in Deep Battle ).
"We won despite Stalin" general Bagramian.

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Old December 13th, 2016, 04:18 AM   #25

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Originally Posted by Spartacuss View Post
I agree. The Red Army of 1941 was built for offensive operations. Having been beaten to the punch by the Germans, the Soviets were plagued by the consequences the oft cited army purges, and the extremely poor performance of Stavka. Deep Battle was out the window then.
The Red Army of 1941 was not built for anything except to fulfil Stalin's desires. It had already been purged - I know some dispute this but veterans recall the purges took place - of a great deal of its professional officer ranks because Stalin did not feel the Army was politically compliant enough. The period of political control had been short and professionalism was beginning to return by the time of Barbarossa, but the red Army was in no fit state to compete with the Wehrmacht in anything other than climatic tolerance.

It is true that Russian tanks had previously been optimised for mobility, as evidenced by the Christie suspension models and the ability of tanks to adapt to running on road without tracks, but the Russians were not thinking in terms of armoured breakthroughs and had, like many others, assumed that tanks would be used as a cavalry complement to the infantry, though I suspect they hadn't held back tactical thinking as much as the French who used their tanks as mobile pillboxes dispersed among the infantry. In other words, their thinking was still generic at that stage rather than optimal for attack or defence.

As far as offensive operations were concerned it made a poor show against Finland and only succeeded in the Baltic States because there was so little to oppose it. In both east and west, the generic emphasis would move toward defence, since the Soviets were increasingly paranoid about hostilities breaking out either against Japan or Germany. Russia had every reason to fear Germany since it knew full well what sort of arsenal it had - the Russians had been co-operating and had allowed the Germans space to test and practise since the twenties. They were also under no illusions concerning the risk that Hitler would make good his desire and create lebensraum in Soviet territory. Russia and Germany were business partners in commerce, especially the supply of oil and raw materials to Germany. For their part, Germany was supporting Russian enterprise and industry.
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Old December 13th, 2016, 08:37 AM   #26

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Originally Posted by caldrail View Post
The Red Army of 1941 was not built for anything except to fulfil Stalin's desires. It had already been purged - I know some dispute this but veterans recall the purges took place - of a great deal of its professional officer ranks because Stalin did not feel the Army was politically compliant enough. The period of political control had been short and professionalism was beginning to return by the time of Barbarossa, but the red Army was in no fit state to compete with the Wehrmacht in anything other than climatic tolerance.

It is true that Russian tanks had previously been optimised for mobility, as evidenced by the Christie suspension models and the ability of tanks to adapt to running on road without tracks, but the Russians were not thinking in terms of armoured breakthroughs and had, like many others, assumed that tanks would be used as a cavalry complement to the infantry, though I suspect they hadn't held back tactical thinking as much as the French who used their tanks as mobile pillboxes dispersed among the infantry. In other words, their thinking was still generic at that stage rather than optimal for attack or defence.

As far as offensive operations were concerned it made a poor show against Finland and only succeeded in the Baltic States because there was so little to oppose it. In both east and west, the generic emphasis would move toward defence, since the Soviets were increasingly paranoid about hostilities breaking out either against Japan or Germany. Russia had every reason to fear Germany since it knew full well what sort of arsenal it had - the Russians had been co-operating and had allowed the Germans space to test and practise since the twenties. They were also under no illusions concerning the risk that Hitler would make good his desire and create lebensraum in Soviet territory. Russia and Germany were business partners in commerce, especially the supply of oil and raw materials to Germany. For their part, Germany was supporting Russian enterprise and industry.
it is a bit more complicated

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Old December 13th, 2016, 10:45 AM   #27
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caldrail;2662837]
Quote:
The Red Army of 1941 was not built for anything except to fulfil Stalin's desires. It had already been purged - I know some dispute this but veterans recall the purges took place - of a great deal of its professional officer ranks because Stalin did not feel the Army was politically compliant enough. The period of political control had been short and professionalism was beginning to return by the time of Barbarossa, but the red Army was in no fit state to compete with the Wehrmacht in anything other than climatic tolerance.
Purge are mentionned in sources, i don' contest that the Red Army was still badly weakened in 1941 .
But if you're right, why Barbarossa failed since end of July and was replaced by Typhoon in September that also failed in December?
Do you still believe to obsolete point of view of "general winter"?
Do you seriousely support theory of a lucky Soviet Victory?

Quote:
It is true that Russian tanks had previously been optimised for mobility, as evidenced by the Christie suspension models and the ability of tanks to adapt to running on road without tracks, but the Russians were not thinking in terms of armoured breakthroughs and had, like many others, assumed that tanks would be used as a cavalry complement to the infantry, though I suspect they hadn't held back tactical thinking as much as the French who used their tanks as mobile pillboxes dispersed among the infantry. In other words, their thinking was still generic at that stage rather than optimal for attack or defence.
Battle of Kalinh kol, is a demonstration of Soviet capacity in 1939 with crews quickly trained.
I recall you that it was a post-purge battle using Deep Battle doctrine.
If you have a look to the map of Moscow counter offensive in 1941, it's clear that plan is elaborate.
About tanks:
What about T26 since the early 1930s or T34 and KV1 manufactured since 1939.
As you Said it, Soviet adapted Christie's suspension system to their tanks to gain mobility and speed.
Therefore why did they do it?



Quote:
As far as offensive operations were concerned it made a poor show against Finland and only succeeded in the Baltic States because there was so little to oppose it. In both east and west, the generic emphasis would move toward defence, since the Soviets were increasingly paranoid about hostilities breaking out either against Japan or Germany. Russia had every reason to fear Germany since it knew full well what sort of arsenal it had - the Russians had been co-operating and had allowed the Germans space to test and practise since the twenties. They were also under no illusions concerning the risk that Hitler would make good his desire and create lebensraum in Soviet territory. Russia and Germany were business partners in commerce, especially the supply of oil and raw materials to Germany. For their part, Germany was supporting Russian enterprise and industry.
Agreed, but War in Finland or Poland wasn't led by Zuhkov, plus Soviet poor show was emphazised by western history.
Let's not forget second "round" of Finland Campaign in which Finnish Army was crushed by power of Red Army.
Moreover low BEF performance in France in 1940, didn't prevent British having a great success in North Africa since 1941.
Therefore the Red Army failures of 1940 can't be seen as systematically crippling for its 1941 abilities.
Maybe your opinion is a little bit "old fashion" or why not, mine is too bold.

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Old December 14th, 2016, 04:00 AM   #28

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why Barbarossa failed since end of July and was replaced by Typhoon in September that also failed in December?
Both were offensive operations. Barbarossa didn't actually fail - it was not properly adhered to. The Germans were in visual sight of their main political objective - Russia's capital, Moscow. In Moscow, people were evacuating and for a short while, Stalin believed he was doomed. The problems were -

1 - The continuous and seemingly endless Russian terrain was playing havoc with German morale. For all their advance, men on the front line never felt they were capturing anything, never achieving anything.

2 - The Wehrmacht were only equipped for that one short offensive. Requests for winter clothing were dismissed with angry reactions from HQ. Their vehicles were not built for the Russian winter, nor were their crews trained for it.

3 - Hitler had assumed that the Russians would collapse. They did at first, withdrawing to defensive lines, and please note that veterans compare the defence of Moscow in 1941 with the defence of Moscow in 1812 - the effect of the Russian winter was in both era's significant. As Hitler always did, when the surrender never happened, he looked for some other objective, and of course by that stage the loss of commercial supplies from Russia would have made itself felt, hence the desire to aim for regions of raw materials/oil. Hitler was of course keen to retain the fertile Ukraine as a breadbasket of the German people, and also please note that many Ukranians, released from soviet oversight, were only too happy to comply.

Quote:
Do you still believe to obsolete point of view of "general winter"?
Of course. Veterans are quite clear on the harsh reality of it.

Quote:
Do you seriousely support theory of a lucky Soviet Victory?
Luck is fundamental to warfare. Of course, it is also said you make your own luck. Study of army commanders in WW" (or any other era for that matter) shows many agonised over their decisions and were often in the dark about what they actually faced. You gather what you know, try to out-guess the opponent, make a decision, then cross your fingers as you support the plan.

Quote:
What about T26 since the early 1930s or T34 and KV1 manufactured since 1939.
As you Said it, Soviet adapted Christie's suspension system to their tanks to gain mobility and speed.
Therefore why did they do it?
To compete with German forces. They knew full well what was coming. The lighter tanks would be used - in the same way as German vehicles - as reconnaissance units, whereas the arms race applicable in industrial warfare meant that heavier and more powerful tanks became desirable. The Russians came up with a great design in the T34 and being a simple vehicle, it was mass produced easily. At Stalingrad, unpainted T34's were rolling out of the production line manned by factory workers. It wasn't just the equipment - you have to consider the manpower equation.
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Old December 14th, 2016, 12:26 PM   #29
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caldrail;2663388]Both were offensive operations. Barbarossa didn't actually fail - it was not properly adhered to. The Germans were in visual sight of their main political objective - Russia's capital, Moscow. In Moscow, people were evacuating and for a short while, Stalin believed he was doomed.
Sorry but here, i can't put up with a such complaining vision of the German failure in 1941.
You must joke😨because it seems you' ve got a solid , complete, traditional knolwedge about WWII in the East, but maybe, in the "style Western Cold War version"😵.
Perhaps, should you read this:H-Net Reviews
That's post- Cold War and, it seems that Glantz has a point of view a little bit different than yours.

If not,it is necessary, i think, to recall Germans military objectives without going too much.
According to a 1978 essay by German historian Andreas Hillgruber, the invasion plans drawn up by the German military elite were coloured by hubris steeming from the rapid defeat of France at the hands of the invincible Wehrmacht and by ignorance tempered by traditional German stereotypes of Russia as primitive backward Asiatic country.
Hitler believed Moscow to be of not great importance in the defeat of the Soviet Union and instead believed victory would come with the destruction of the Red Army West of the capital.
Hitler and his generals disagreed on where Germany should focus its energy, he repeated his order of "Leningrad first, Dombass second, Moscow third".
We all know it was a complete failure, no Leningrad, no Dombass (Rostov counterattack ,Timoshenko), nor Moscow in German basket at the end of the Campaign.....
You refer also, to Stalin will to leave Moscow and to Soviet panic.
Of course this existed but, i refer to strategy chosen by best Soviet generals since 1941, Zuhkov won his case about Moscow
Stalin was a "handicap" for them till mid-1942, because he always minggled in their plans, and sometimes, with catastrophic consequences, in particular about battle of Kiev.
I'll deal with another points of your post later because i must go.
Anyway, respectfully.
See you soon,

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Old December 14th, 2016, 10:03 PM   #30
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caldrail;2663388] The problems were -

1 - The continuous and seemingly endless Russian terrain was playing havoc with German morale. For all their advance, men on the front line never felt they were capturing anything, never achieving anything.

2 - The Wehrmacht were only equipped for that one short offensive. Requests for winter clothing were dismissed with angry reactions from HQ. Their vehicles were not built for the Russian winter, nor were their crews trained for it.
All that is Well known, but that's only two points of a more complex question.
You only take in consideration the endless Russian terrain and the lack of winter clothing and we could also, add lack of adapted material to winter conditions, like if Germans would be alone and that the Red Army was dropped out.
About this, Glantz tackled this point on Russian sides, winter existed also for them and they suffered too."Snow and mud, for instance, also existed on the Russian side of the front. Most German studies explain the problems the weather caused the Wehrmacht, but do not explain how the Red Army continued to function in spite of the weather". The ability to launch a so massive and elaborate offensive during a snowstorm, is a military exploit. We can note trough example of Moscow counter- offensive, that the Red Army progressed a little bit , since the Finnish War, didn't it?
Actually, it seems that Russian army wasn't as weak than often claimed in conventional (and obsolete?) history of WWII in the East in 1941, plus i 'll later deal with Summer Soviet counter offensive, if you're interested, of course.
Let's not forget that in the beginning of Barbarossa, Germans had not only advantage of the surprise but also, numerical superiority on Russians.
You can grant that the Red Army had the great challenge to recover its forces in very unfavourable conditions and that eventually, despite Wehrmacht and all difficulties it succeeded.
Plus this vision can appears weird, how to resist to the Wehrmacht enduring such heavy losses, to massively counterattack and moving thousands factories to the East with a weack army?
A yes, i've forgotten the classic and convenient explanation of the famous "inexhaustible flood of Soviet troops and equipment".
Glantz and House reveal, that the Red Army, like the Wehrmacht, suffered from personal shortage and that: "Actually Soviets had (a better) ability to strip troops and equipment from others sector of the front in order to achieve crushing superiority at breakthrough sectors. Time after time the Russians deceived the Germans regarding the site of upcoming Soviet offensives".
Actually Russian won in December because they performed better than Germans.

Quote:
3 - Hitler had assumed that the Russians would collapse. They did at first, withdrawing to defensive lines, and please note that veterans compare the defence of Moscow in 1941 with the defence of Moscow in 1812 - the effect of the Russian winter was in both era's significant. As Hitler always did, when the surrender never happened, he looked for some other objective, and of course by that stage the loss of commercial supplies from Russia would have made itself felt, hence the desire to aim for regions of raw materials/oil. Hitler was of course keen to retain the fertile Ukraine as a breadbasket of the German people, and also please note that many Ukranians, released from soviet oversight, were only too happy to comply.
Barbarossa objectives are already mentionned in my previous post, all those you mention were already intended since June, 22.
Actually what changed with Typhoon compared to Barbarossa, was that Hitler gave up to anihilate the Red Army and decided to focus his offensive to Moscow, planning to collapse USSR thanks a quick and decisive capture of the capital city.

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