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Old January 31st, 2017, 11:21 PM   #81
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Quote:
Originally Posted by phil1904 View Post
[COLOR="Yellow"]The most important strategic interest of the Soviet victory of Smolensk, it's not a question of a temporary reconquest of a city named Yelnya.
it's in fact, that from this battle, it is the Soviets who control the events, strategically, and are able to choose their battlefields.



-Kiev (23 August-26 september 1941):Great German tactical victory but loss of times for the Germans and rerouting of Germans armies from the road of Moscow.
German losses: around 130,000.
Russians losses: around 700,00. (Glantz)
That statement is incorrect... As you correctly point out later in your post, the soviets are yet to suffer their most disastrous defeat in the battle of Kiev (September 1941).....and it is certainly not they who were able to "choose this battlefield"

Kiev is certainly not a mere "tactical" victory...... its much more than that...... leading to the collapse of the whole southern half of the front ..... allowing the germans to occupy all of Ukraine and reach Rostov on the Don (some 900 km from Kiev) by November
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Old February 1st, 2017, 01:36 PM   #82
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[QUOTE=tomar;2690678]
Quote:
That statement is incorrect... As you correctly point out later in your post, the soviets are yet to suffer their most disastrous defeat in the battle of Kiev (September 1941).....and it is certainly not they who were able to "choose this battlefield"
???If "i mentioned correctly later in my post" how can you claim that "this assestment is incorrect".
Indeed, the battle of Kiev was a big Soviet's tactical defeat but the strategic intent was clear.
Timoshenko intended to lead a new and bigger battle of Smolensk but Stalin refused his demand of a preventive repositionning of the Soviet armies and it allows the Germans to encircle the whole Russian armies and to prevent that these last could perform their Deep Defence as planned by Timoshenko.
An interesting point is that since the end of July, Krutchov was in charge to shift many factories to Ural .
Here is a clue that the Soviets didn't plan to keep this region.
I haven't got enough time to deepen on the battle of Kiev at the moment, but if you want to do it, i would be glad to compare sources and argues respectively with yours.

Soviets groupped many armies in the area of kiev, which obliged the Germans to lead a great battle which led them forward to the south.
Other sources already quoted in this topic (if you don't find them, i could provide you a list), mention the fact that the Germans' generals already wanted to focus their offensive on Moscow as early as August 1941 and that Hitler opposed it because of the threat posed by the Soviet armies located in Ukraine.
After the battle, Guderian said approximately: " the tactical success can't be denied but its strategic relevance remains to be proved".

Quote:
Kiev is certainly not a mere "tactical" victory...... its much more than that...... leading to the collapse of the whole southern half of the front ..... allowing the germans to occupy all of Ukraine and reach Rostov on the Don (some 900 km from Kiev) by November
The German progress up to Rostov (elastic defense?, refer post#41) was savagely countered by the brutal and brilliant Timoshenko's counteroffensive (still him) in November, leadind to a "rushed retreat" from the Southern Army Group under Von Runstedt.
A clear soviet strategic and tactic victory and a clear german's failure about on of their main strategic aim, the Dombass.
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Old February 1st, 2017, 02:01 PM   #83
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[QUOTE=tomar;2690676]
Quote:
Originally Posted by phil1904 View Post

Your "source" is a retired CIA officer ? Please excuse me if I am not impressed

here is what is said about him

Murphy's only actual visit to an archive was to the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA), where he obtained information on Ivan Proskurov, the chief of military intelligence. (Chapters 3, 5, 14, and 19 detail Proskurov's tragic demise.) The author submitted some questions to the Central Archive of the SVR, but they went unanswered, and he was not even allowed access to the actual documents that had been published in 1941 god

Murphy can be accused of excessive speculation throughout his work. Analysis is suspect if it is largely held together by qualifiers such as: "this report must have been rejected by the boss [Stalin]," "such minutia was probably typical of the reports ... sent to their case officers," an official "would surely have learned" and he was "probably also shown two reports," "it seems likely that ... [an] arrest was related to," and "so it must have been suppressed," etc. (pp. 102, 115, 192, 205, 201, 208).

I asked you several times, what is the evidence that Stalin ordered the forward defense approach ? Where are the relevant orders ? What is the evidence that Stalin oversaw deployment of troops...

If such documents dont exist, then it means the deployment was (as it should be) organized by the military.... I am not sure why you keep on denying such obvious things.... unless it is to maintain the thesis "its' all Stalin's fault"... that thesis is a political one, and explains nothing....

Conversely this supports what I have been saying


https://www.jstor.org/stable/153299?...n_tab_contents


"Zhukov was unwilling to blame Stalin entirely for the debacle ....... the Red army had failed to anticipate the striking power of the german army" .....

(a) dangerous disconnection that existed between the Soviet political strategy and military operational doctrine......"

Oh , and kindly stop the paternalistic (to be polite) tone
i'm very surprised by your post and the source you quote.
The source you quote is clear since the first lines and mention that Stalin was the main responsible of the first catastrophic soviets' defeats in spite of Soviet generals expected a German's attack and that he didn't take account of their warnings.
Since the first line, we can read: "When the german army struck the Soviet Union on 22 june 1941, stalin and the Soviet military were staggered by the blow. The Soviet dictator went into self imposed seclusion and the Red army belong its head long retreat"
"Marshall georgii.k, zhukhov who had pressed Stalin on several occasions to alert and reinforce the army, ..."
[B]"Zhukov was unwilling to blame Stalin entirely for the debacle of 22 June 1941 despite the dictator's refusal to alert the Red army" (please when you quote, don't cut the part of the sentence quoted that contradicts your studborn wrong point of view).
Therefore all is clear, Stalin refused to alert the Red army as i mentioned it, and then it's his fault if the the Red army was badly positioned in june 1941 despite demands of his generals.
I could gon on quoting your source and to show how it contradicts your wrong and studborn assestment.
Are you kidding? trolling?
Everybody know that stalin was the main responsible of the first defeats, that USSR was a totalitarian state and that Soviets generals couldn't contradict Stalin!
i don't wish to spend my life on the internet for endless and uninteresting disputs, we are not on facebook.

many sources confirm this, you don't like Murphy?
Why? i consider that's a good source because he 's a a former member of the CIA, therefore well placed to be well-informed about the archives and secret decisions of the Kremlin.

Do you like Geoffrey Roberts "Stalin's generals"? You can read it on google book, you find it easily, you type geoffrey Roberts Stalin's generals google book and you can read it,(the internet adress is very difficult to quote, a lot of figures) pre-war plans and the responsibility of Stalin are mentioned in the contents.

But maybe, you don't like Roberts, then you can try Kershaw.
-Ian Kershaw: "Decisive choices. 10 decisions that have changed the World. 1940-1941" (2009) French version
Chapter 6 page 355."Moscow spring-summer 1941. Stalin decides he's the best judge".
Here is an interesting quote of Stalin in mid-May adressed to his generals: "you can be sure that never Germany will attack Russia...If you provoke the Germans at the border, or if you move troops without our permission, you can be sure that heads will fall"
no doubt of the stalin's responsability for kershaw.

I could continue a long list of historian works on the Stalin's responsibility in the first Soviets' desasters in 1941, but i don't want to lose time.
Now if you want to defend alone, your weird point of view of a low Stalin's responsibility in the debacle of 1941, do it but do it alone and you'll not be credible anyway.
Besides, i don't care of your agressivity and animosity.
After all, it's not my fauld if you persit in defending an indefensible and well-known issue of the Soviet's history.

Last edited by phil1904; February 1st, 2017 at 03:59 PM.
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Old February 2nd, 2017, 05:53 AM   #84
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[QUOTE=phil1904;2691004]
Quote:
Originally Posted by tomar View Post

???If "i mentioned correctly later in my post" how can you claim that "this assestment is incorrect".
Indeed, the battle of Kiev was a big Soviet's tactical defeat but the strategic intent was clear.
Timoshenko intended to lead a new and bigger battle of Smolensk but Stalin refused his demand of a preventive repositionning of the Soviet armies and it allows the Germans to encircle the whole Russian armies and to prevent that these last could perform their Deep Defence as planned by Timoshenko.
An interesting point is that since the end of July, Krutchov was in charge to shift many factories to Ural .
Here is a clue that the Soviets didn't plan to keep this region.
I haven't got enough time to deepen on the battle of Kiev at the moment, but if you want to do it, i would be glad to compare sources and argues respectively with yours.

Soviets groupped many armies in the area of kiev, which obliged the Germans to lead a great battle which led them forward to the south.
Other sources already quoted in this topic (if you don't find them, i could provide you a list), mention the fact that the Germans' generals already wanted to focus their offensive on Moscow as early as August 1941 and that Hitler opposed it because of the threat posed by the Soviet armies located in Ukraine.
After the battle, Guderian said approximately: " the tactical success can't be denied but its strategic relevance remains to be proved".



The German progress up to Rostov (elastic defense?, refer post#41) was savagely countered by the brutal and brilliant Timoshenko's counteroffensive (still him) in November, leadind to a "rushed retreat" from the Southern Army Group under Von Runstedt.
A clear soviet strategic and tactic victory and a clear german's failure about on of their main strategic aim, the Dombass.
I referenced two of your statements.. One of them is incorrect , the other one is correct.. How hard is that to understand ?

Your thesis is that the soviets brilliantly conducted the Kiev battle, cleverly sacrificed 700 000 men, forced the germans to take another 400 000 square km or so of territory and then the genius Timoshenko (whom others generally rate as a passable field commander) counterattacked to gain back a few thousand of square kilometers of territory... This minor gain is a "clear strategic victory" while the german victory at Kiev is merely "tactical"

To continue the genius Timoshenko lauched an attack round Kharkov in May 1942 where he managed to lose about 300 000 men and some 3 500 pieces of heavy equipment (tanks and guns) while inflicting about 10 times less losses on the germans...

This is certainly creative..

The standard narrative is that Kiev is an unmitigated strategic disaster (as well as political, Stalin having stated to the British that the soviets would hold Leningrad, Moscow AND Kiev), and the follow up on the southern part of the front was equally disastrous up to Stalingrad
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Old February 2nd, 2017, 06:35 AM   #85
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[QUOTE=phil1904;2691011]
Quote:
Originally Posted by tomar View Post

i'm very surprised by your post and the source you quote.
The source you quote is clear since the first lines and mention that Stalin was the main responsible of the first catastrophic soviets' defeats in spite of Soviet generals expected a German's attack and that he didn't take account of their warnings.
Since the first line, we can read: "When the german army struck the Soviet Union on 22 june 1941, stalin and the Soviet military were staggered by the blow. The Soviet dictator went into self imposed seclusion and the Red army belong its head long retreat"
"Marshall georgii.k, zhukhov who had pressed Stalin on several occasions to alert and reinforce the army, ..."
[B]"Zhukov was unwilling to blame Stalin entirely for the debacle of 22 June 1941 despite the dictator's refusal to alert the Red army" (please when you quote, don't cut the part of the sentence quoted that contradicts your studborn wrong point of view).
Therefore all is clear, Stalin refused to alert the Red army as i mentioned it, and then it's his fault if the the Red army was badly positioned in june 1941 despite demands of his generals.
I could gon on quoting your source and to show how it contradicts your wrong and studborn assestment.
Are you kidding? trolling?
Everybody know that stalin was the main responsible of the first defeats, that USSR was a totalitarian state and that Soviets generals couldn't contradict Stalin!
i don't wish to spend my life on the internet for endless and uninteresting disputs, we are not on facebook.

many sources confirm this, you don't like Murphy?
Why? i consider that's a good source because he 's a a former member of the CIA, therefore well placed to be well-informed about the archives and secret decisions of the Kremlin.

Do you like Geoffrey Roberts "Stalin's generals"? You can read it on google book, you find it easily, you type geoffrey Roberts Stalin's generals google book and you can read it,(the internet adress is very difficult to quote, a lot of figures) pre-war plans and the responsibility of Stalin are mentioned in the contents.

But maybe, you don't like Roberts, then you can try Kershaw.
-Ian Kershaw: "Decisive choices. 10 decisions that have changed the World. 1940-1941" (2009) French version
Chapter 6 page 355."Moscow spring-summer 1941. Stalin decides he's the best judge".
Here is an interesting quote of Stalin in mid-May adressed to his generals: "you can be sure that never Germany will attack Russia...If you provoke the Germans at the border, or if you move troops without our permission, you can be sure that heads will fall"
no doubt of the stalin's responsability for kershaw.

I could continue a long list of historian works on the Stalin's responsibility in the first Soviets' desasters in 1941, but i don't want to lose time.
Now if you want to defend alone, your weird point of view of a low Stalin's responsibility in the debacle of 1941, do it but do it alone and you'll not be credible anyway.
Besides, i don't care of your agressivity and animosity.
After all, it's not my fauld if you persit in defending an indefensible and well-known issue of the Soviet's history.
Firstly this is a discussion forum, if you do wish to be challenged, this may not be the forum for you

Secondly I asked you several times for evidence that Stalin actually ordered the forward defense stance and oversaw the deployment of troops.. You have failed to provide that
Instead you provide quotes about Stalin not believing in a german attack... We do know that he did not think it would happen, I explained why, but this is irrelevant to the question of who actually selected the soviet forward defense stance.
I asked again, where is the evidence that :

1- Stalin selected the forward defense strategy
2- Stalin oversaw the deployment of troops in accordance with this strategy

3. On sources: it is useless to quote endless western authors who parrot each other or have their opinions... Sources in this case must be documents such as orders ("prikaz" in russian) or other documents signed by Stalin or key russian political/ military figures

Below is an example of such a document... Its addressed by Merkulov to Stalin in June 1941 and annotated by Stalin's own hand... THAT is a source document

In that document said Merkulov says that his source in the HQ of the german air force informs him that preparation for the german attack on the USSR are complete, and the attack may occur anytime... Stalin responds
"you should send your source to f***k his mother... this is not a source but disinformation"

This does give us some insight into Stalin's mindset at the time (as well as his use of colorful language).. It also tell us that at least Merkulov was not afraid to report things as they were

Click the image to open in full size.

Another interesting document is the directive below (you can use google translate) dated june 22 1941

It warns of potential german attack. Asks not to give in to "provocations" at the same time be ready to repel an attack as well as to take other measures (disperse planes on aerodromes etc..). Its signed Timoshenko and Zhukov... Which at least hints that THEY (and not Stalin) were responsible for troop deployment (as it should be )




№ 605. ДИРЕКТИВА ЗАНОВО КОМАНДУЮЩИМ ВОЙСКАМИ 3-й, 4-й и 10-й АРМИЙ 22 июня 1941 г.
Передаю приказ Наркомата обороны для немедленного исполнения:
1. В течение 22 — 23 июня 1941 г. возможно внезапное нападение немцев на фронтах ЛВО, ПрибОВО, ЗапОВО, КОВО, ОдВО. Нападение может начаться с провокационных действий.
2. Задача наших войск — не поддаваться ни на какие провокационные действия, могущие вызвать крупные осложнения.
Одновременно войскам Ленинградского, Прибалтийского, Западного, Киевского и Одесского военных округов быть в полной боевой готовности, встретить возможный внезапный удар немцев или их союзников.
ПРИКАЗЫВАЮ:


а) в течение ночи на 22 июня 1941 г. скрытно занять огневые точки укрепленных районов на государственной границе;
б) перед рассветом 22 июня 1941 г. рассредоточить по полевым аэродромам всю авиацию, в том числе и войсковую, тщательно ее замаскировать;
в) все части привести в боевую готовность. Войска держать рассредоточение и замаскированно;
г) противовоздушную оборону привести в боевую готовность без дополнительного подъема приписного состава. Подготовить все мероприятия по затемнению городов и объектов;
д) никаких других мероприятий без особого распоряжения не проводить.
Тимошенко Жуков
Павлов Фоминых
Климовских
ЦА МО РФ. Ф.208. Оп.2513. Д.71. Л.69. Машинопись. Имеются пометы: “Поступила 22 июня 1941 г. в 01-45″, “Отправлена 22 июня 1941 г. в 02-25 — 02-35″. Подлинник, автограф.


Click the image to open in full size.
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Old February 2nd, 2017, 01:55 PM   #86
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@Tomar
1/I didn't know you could read Russian, unfortunately, i don't read it, it's very dificult to check this source and to deepen on it.

2/ If this "interesting document" is dated from June 22, 1941, it only means that Timoshenko and Zhukov issued it only after the outbreak of Barbarossa i.e too late.
It prooves only that Timoshenko and Zukhov put the Red Army on high alert only after the Germans attacked when we know they asked it since the end of May and that Stalin refused to do it.
That's what i claim and that other fellow members know for a long time.

Therefore how this document can support the indefensible theory that Stalin wasn't responsible of the bad positionning of the Red army on June 22, 1941?


I recall you that in your previous post on this subject, you quoted only the half of a sentence and put aside the second part of this one that contradicted your view and that you quoted two more irrelevant sentences which didn't proove that Stalin was not responsible of the bad situation of the Red Army but mentioned only that the Red Army was ill prepared on 22 June 1941.
In this post you quote a Russian document which, only, mention, that Zhukov and Timoshenko put the Red Army on high alert after the German attack, that's irrelevant too to the subject in hand.

I recall you too, that you support the theory that Stalin would share the responsibility of the catastrophic first defeats in the border in June 1941 because his generals, and in particular Zhukov and Timoshenko, i've often quoted, had the same point of view when it's well known by many historumites that:
1/The Red Army was decimated by the purges initiated by Stalin since 1936.

2/Stalin refused all warnings about a German attack on USSR.

3/That Stalin refused all Timoshenko's and Zhukov's demands about repositionning in accordance with their plans and alerting their armed forces, "if not heads will fall" (Stalin).

4/Stalin refused the preventive attack against Nazi germany asked by Zhukov and Timoshenko since May, 1941.

5/ That USSR was a regime of terror and that nobody could contradict Stalin.


If you're interested in sources, i recommend you the excellent book of Geoffrey Roberts: "Stalin's generals", you can read it (in English) on the web, in particular:
- chapter 5 "In Kiev: War games and preparations, 1940". p.67
- Chapter 6:"Architect of disaster. Zhukov and June 22, 1941". P.87

You've got, also, very interesting maps, in particular:
- "A Soviet plan for an offensive war against Germany, May 1941". P. 94
- "The first War Game, January 2,6, 1941". P.83
- "The second War Game, January,8,11, 1941". P. 84

There's also an excellent another book of Geoffrey Roberts: "Stalin's wars" in which he deepens on the responsibility of Stalin on 22 June, 1941 in particular about the well known Krutchev's report.
If you type: "was Stalin responsible of the disaster of 1941" and you go on "Stalin's wars from World War to Cold War, 1939-1953." you can read many interesting pages which will learn you a lot.
Sorry but i don't succeed to quote them from Google book.

Besides, i repeat that it's not my fault if you pretend support an indefensible view on a well known issue of the Soviet's history that you don't know and that i don't care of your agressivity and animosity, our posts are not sent in the same mindset, my ego is low and i'm only interested in history.
It's out of question to let you post wrong and studborn statements even if it's about a small technicality, anyway, i don't think that you're credible about your "theory".
Can be could be exchanged our views in a future discussion? Anyway for me, this one is ended, because you don't post relevant sources supporting your statements and i'm a little bit bored by your attitude and above all, i wish that this topic go ahead and that it allows deepening on the German's strategy in 1941 and other relevant subjects connected to the OP's issue.

Last edited by phil1904; February 2nd, 2017 at 02:54 PM.
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Old February 7th, 2017, 03:20 PM   #87
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German Strategy in 1941: racism, economy and military plan

I/ Racism: A quick overview

Hitler, vaguely,mentioned in 1926 that he intended to invade the USSR so that Germany could conquer a "living space" ("Lebensraum") which could ensure the "survival of future generations".
On 10 February 1939, Hitler told his army commanders that the next war would be a "purely war of weltanschauungen (World vision)... totally a people's war, a racial war".
The racist doctrine of the Nazi considered that the USSR was populated by an inferior people ("untermenschen").
Nazi intended to kill, deport or enslave the majority of the Russian and to replace them with Germanic peoples, under the Generalplan Ost.
The generalplan Ost was a plan for the colonization of central and eastern Europe which planned to exterminate millions of Russians and reduce the survivors in slavery to the service of German settlers.
It was a question of administering the conquered areas by means of four major entities, the "ReichsKommissariat".
- Reichskommissariat Ostland (upper centre)
- Reichskommissariat Ukraine (lower centre)
- Reichskommissariat Moskowien (upper right)
- Reichskommissariat Kaukasus (lower right)

Click the image to open in full size.
The purple line on the map, shows the maximal advance of the Germans armies on the Eastfront.

The German's colonization project, the main area of settler settlement are hatched in red.
Click the image to open in full size.
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Old February 7th, 2017, 09:15 PM   #88
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German Strategy in 1941: racism, economy and military plan

II/ Economy: Compelling reasons

By the late 1930's, foreign trade became difficult because Nazi Germany lacked the gold or foreign exchange needed to finance any balance of payment deficit.
Realizing that an alliance with the Great Britain was impossible, Germany was in a deadlock and had to find quickly new markets for replenishment in raw materials.
Germany needed to arange close relations with Soviet Union it had again until 1934.
In 1936, Hermann Goring told several German industrialists : "Obtaining raw materials from Soviet Union is so important that he shall raise this issue with Hitler himself-however much the latter might be ill disposed to accept this"

German planners in April and May 1939, feared massive oil, food, rubber and metal ore shortage without Soviet help in the event of a war.
This was one the reasons why the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" was signed on August 19, 1939, expanded on February 11, 1940 and resulted in the delivery of raws materials to Germany including among over, 900,000 tons of oil, 1,600,000 tons of grains and 140,000 tons of manganese ore until 1941.

The impressive increase of Germans' imports from USSR between May 1940 and June 1941.
Click the image to open in full size.

Indeed, Nazi Germany lacked oil and could only supply 25% of its own needs, it has also, problems for metal ores, chrome,platinium, tungsten, Nickel, molybdenum and manganese.
Germans were very dependants on imports for these metals and sometimes, even at 100% as for Chromnium.
The USSR was the world's largest source of manganese, the second largest for chrome and platinium and the third largest supplier of crude oil, iron ore, and manganese.
Germany needed also, rubber from South Asia which transited by Russia.
Therefore Nazi Germany was interested in the conquest of Soviets industrials areas, in particular these of Kiev, Donbass (stellworks) and the oilfield of Baku.

Click the image to open in full size.
i can't guarantee that this map deals with 1940, but i think there shouldn't be any big geographical differences for the location of industrial sites in particular about those of Donbass, Kiev and Baku, but i confess, i've got troubles to check it.

Despite that Nazi Germany succeeded in reducing its dependence on food imports at "only" 13%, instead of 35 % in 1927, thanks to a quadriennal plan led by Goring, it had needed of food import yet.
This is why Germany was a lot interested too, in Ukrainian wheat.

But the trade agreements with USSR could only be a temporary expedient for the Germans and it was out of question to remain at the mercy of the "Soviet's good will" in case of the continuation of the war against the Western Powers.

Moreover, it seems that Hitler did, a little, the same reasoning as Napoleon in 1812, and imagined that the elimination of USSR would take away any hope of victory for the United Kingdom.

Here are all the ,strictly economic reasons, well known, for which the Germans decided to seize this regions at high economic potential for their future as a great power, to which can be added a geopolitical calculation designed to discourage the United Kingdom.

After a brief review of the strategic considerations from an ideological (racism), economic (predation) and geopolitical point of view, we have only to deal with the strictly military aspects of this strategy in part III.
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Old February 8th, 2017, 05:54 PM   #89
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German Strategy in 1941: racism, economy and military plan

III/ Military plan: A megalomaniacal and senseless Hitler's awackening

" Soldiers of the eastern front, overwhelmed by a heavy stain, condemned for months to remain silent, the time has come... About 160 Russian divisions are massed at our border...Here is the moment, soldiers of the eastern front, where we are going to conduct an enterprise which, because of its territorial dimensions and the forces it puts into play, is the most grandiose that the world has ever known...German soldiers, once again today, i decided to hand over to you the fate of Europe, the future of the German Reich and the existence of our people." A.Hitler June 22, 1941
It was by this declaration full of "wagnerian lyricism" that Hitler closed the diplomacy of hypocrisy with Stalin begun in August 1939.
It is to a powerful army indoctrinated with the principles of the "Special War" that Hitler adresses.
For the price of the efforts and sacrifices to come, most German soldiers received 30 cigarettes and a quarter of a liter of Schnaps.

At 3:15 am on June 22, 1941 the German guns opened fire, Barbarossa began, a formidable war machine engaged the test of force with the Red Army.
An army of more than 3 million men, 3,600 armored, 600,000 vehicles, 7,000 guns, 4,200 aircraft wrestled by several victorious campaigns, strikes by surprise, a Red Army weackens and which seems incapable of being able to hold the schock.
Never has the Wehrmacht been so powerful, it is well trained, its morale is high and it has tanks and aircraft of a superior power to those it had a year ago when it overthrew the French Army which was considered to be the most powerful adversary the Wehrmacht could face.

On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed the famous "Barbarossa" directive replacing General Marcks' "Operation Otto plan" considered as too optimistic, involving, roughly, half of the strengh that the Wehrmacht committed in Barbarossa.

Click the image to open in full size.

"it's necessary for the Wehrmacht to be able to crush Russia in a short campaign"
The main thing is there, deciding, which Hitler was also induced himself as commander-in-chief, fixed the plan of operation despite slight objections of Von Brauschitsch and Halder and Guderian's doubts about the real Red Army power (figures for tanks and aircraft).
No one could question Hitler's absolute authority, after his great victory in the West one year ago, over strategic choices and in any case, the vast majority of German generals were very optimistic: Russia will not hold more than three months, some even, give only three weeks of existence to the Red Army .

Barbarossa final plan.
Click the image to open in full size.

The main effort will be to the north, Leningrad, considered as the cradle of Bolchevism, is objective 1. Moscow is the second, Kiev and Ukraine coming only third.
The Red Army having been destroyed beforehand by daring "cauldron battles" conducted according circumstances.
Each of the three Army Groups, having to act separately, supported by a Lutwaffe that must quickly eliminate the Soviet Air Force ( Voyska, VPO) and thus has complete control of the sky.
In short, a simplistic, imprecise, strategy aimed at quickly annihilating the Red Army, to reach the three main geopolitical objectives.
Once the Red Army was eliminated, the remainder of the invasion was no more than a gradual occupation of the country, making it possible to move on to phase 2 of the "Generalplan Ost".

Of course, as we know, this "Hitlerian strategy", after 3 weeks of victories which seem to give reason to the Fuerher became "complicated" since "Smolensk" ans was given up in September, when "Typhoon" replaced "Barbarossa" before it finally, ended up failing at Moscow in December 1941.

Click the image to open in full size.

As incredible as it may seem, the German strategy was as vague as that and limited itself to attacking the USSR with an overwhelming army to crush everything in its path, using the service of a largely deficient and ill-informed intelligence on the real military potential of the USSR.

Last edited by phil1904; February 8th, 2017 at 06:17 PM.
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