Edward

If continental Power looses their Battle Fleet, this is incontinence, sometime big sometime smaller.
But if maritime Power looses their Navy, this will constitute a major disaster.
The British Admiralty and admiral Sir John Jellicoe were perhaps too cautious but the consequences of loosing a major naval battle would be horrendous for Great Britain.
The German Imperial Navy could afford a greater risk as the battles lost will have much smaller consequences on land struggle across frontlines.

Every time I analyse the battle, it strike me that the German Navy displayed much better gunnery then the Royal Navy.
To achieve the same number of hits, Royal Navy used 25% more ammunition than German Navy.
The result will be even worse if there will be no suicidal charge of German Battle Cruisers Squadron against entire royal Navy during German escape from The “T” crossing manoeuvre. At this period 18 British Battleship fired at German squadron simultaneously from the distance of 4 miles. From 18:95 to18:30 German Battle Cruisers sustained 37 hits (over 30% of all hits) from heavy guns of British Battle fleet. This engagement was fought at a distance so close as 4 miles.

Could you comment on the Battle of Jutland Gunnery statistic listed below?

Battle of Jutland- gunnery statistic


British Battle Cruisers and Battleship
Shell fired = 4534
Hits=123
Percentage of hits/shell fired = 2.7128%

German Battle Cruisers and Battleship
Shell fired = 3597
Hits = 122
Percentage of hits/shell fired = 3.3912%

Source:

deadkenny

To repeat my post from the other thread on this same topic:

So the German battlecruisers far outperformed the British battlecruisers. However, the main British battlefleet (i.e. battleships) outperformed the German battleships.

deadkenny

Regarding this point, it sounds reasonable. However, the fact is that it was the British who were attempting to force an engagement of the main battlefleets at Jutland. The Germans attempted to ambush the British battlecruisers, but sought to avoid a clash between the main battlefleets. Since the British had a considerable advantage in number of ships as well as in 'weight of shot' (15" and 13.5" guns for the British vs. 12" and 11" guns for the Germans) it was the Germans who fell back on the 'fleet in being' strategy and ran away in order to perserve their fleet rather than risk losing it. Much later in the war, when a last desparate sortie was attempted the sailors mutinied rather than going on (what was seen as) a 'suicide mission'.

Cicero

The former First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill said of the battle that Jellicoe "was the only man on either side who could have lost the war in an afternoon.
I am glad to see a naval battle discussed here. I had begun to thin that I was the only one that cared about things happening on 3/5ths of the worlds surface!
Jutland was a lost opportunity on the part of the British Navy to score a decisive victory over the German Navy. It ended with a tactical victory for the Germans, in that more British tonnage was sunk 113,300 British to 62,300 German, but a was strategic victory for the British is that the Germans retreated back into port to never challenge the British for dominance again during the war.
More later on this subject... I've got to get to work!

diddyriddick

I would agree that it was a tactical victory for the Germans, but you would have to call it a strategic one for the British.

Cicero

Agreed!!!

In my autograph collection, I have a signed photo of Admiral Jellico.. I should post it!

deadkenny

It is certainly a 'standard' view of the battle to call it a 'tactical' German victory but a 'strategic' British victory. My view is simply that it was an 'inconclusive' clash. Nothing was changed in the situation as a result.

In terms of losses, the British lost 3 battlecruisers to 1. That was the extent of the German 'tactical' gain (other losses were 3 British cruisers and 8 destroyers vs. 4 German cruisers, 1 pre-dreadnought and 5 destroyers). However, the British had more ships to begin with, so that 'ratio' of losses did not really improve the German position. Neither side lost any battleships, and both sides quickly repair any damage their battleships had suffered.

If there was any 'conclusive' outcome, it was psychological and the 'victory' was entirely British. The Germans declined to 'risk' their fleet until it was too late and the sailors refused to go on a late war 'suicide' mission. If you convince your opponent that they cannot sail their fleet on the open ocean or you will destroy it, then you've won the battle.

Edratman

I agree that the German's did not even gain a tactical victory. After the conflict, the British were the side remaining on the field of battle, a point which is the final arbitor in battles where neither side is destroyed.

Also, it is only the adherents of the losing side who seek to find solace in any other facet other than the win/loss column entry.

Cicero

What follows is a summary of the conclusions of Flawed Victory , Jutland 1916 by Kieth Yates… not my own conclusions.

Potential Tactical German victory analysis :
The British, in spite of its losses, was battle ready the day after the first conflict, while Scheer’s fleet wasn’t ready for fleet action for 6 weeks. The majority of the British losses in life and capitol ships was the loss of the three Battle Cruisers (BCs) Indefatigable, Invincible and Queen Mary, due to magazine explosions that each ship received after only a few shots – a result of poor design with thin armor, inadequate flash protection and unsafe cordite. Kieth argues that if these anomalies are removed, then the tally of men lost is essentially the same ( 1,800 British and 2,000 German).

Kieth gives a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of gunnery, which he believes is inflated artificially in favor of the Germans ( hit rate 3.3% German compared to 2.17% British) due to the fact that a high percentage of their “hits’ on British ships were more due to local battle conditions, favoring Germany, than to superior overall gunnery. A comparison of the results of Capitol ships firing at Capitol ships on both sides shows both sides to have a similar hit rate of 3%. Prewar studies that at realistic long range distances (up to 20,000 years) that the expected rate would be 5%, but that in poor conditions this could be as what was actually experienced at 3%.

One factor that did stand out was the lack of uniformity amongst British squadrons with the poorest performance seen in the BC squadrons with a hit rate of only 1.4% (indeed the worst two BCs had a hit rate of 1%), this poor performance likely a consequence of lack of adequate practice facilities for gunnery available to the Battle cruisers at the Firth of Forth.

Technically the British had superior fire control systems while the Germans had superior range finding apparatus. The German firing practices allowed for faster target range acquisition than the British, though once the target was acquired, the British system and practices allowed for more prolonged accurate fire.

The German capitol ships were more heavily armored allowing them to sustain more damage than their British counterparts. The British armor piercing shells were also inferior, often exploding prematurely and superficially causing little damage. There was a high rate of duds ( non exploding projectiles) on the British side.

Other adverse aspects for the British were poor communications, inflexibility of command structure and lack of initiative on the part of subordinate commanders.

Strategic British Victory Analysis –

Beatty’s BCs lead Scheer to believe that he was facing a smaller force and led Scheer to attack what was actually a larger force of the entire Grand Fleet, forcing Scheer to retire after having his T crossed twice. Scheer retired by night leaving Jellico in possession of the field and never left his ports in force again to challenge the British fleet.

The blockade of the German coast continued with dire consequences for the German government and for the civilian population. The Germans stepped submarine attack on shipping and in Jan 1917 resumed unrestricted submarine warfare which eventually helped bring the US into he war ( along with the infamous Zimmerman Telegram Incident). Thus Jutland can be viewed as a British Victory in that it caused the Germans to alter completely their war at sea with eventual unanticipated consequences for them.

deadkenny

A thorough and thought provoking analysis. Thanks for posting it.