irishcrusader95

i think some polish devisions had a part in this operation. they were not as powerful as say the british or americans so the germans were able to keep them back long enough for more troops to escape

i hardley look at this as a chance missed to end the war sooner or anything but lives saved due to the german soldiers who stood their ground to buy time for their comrades to escape

diddyriddick

Agreed. It is easy to play Monday morning quarterback. Moreover, I acknowlege that Monty took the brunt of the Axis counterattack at Caen. The problem is that Monty planned on being in Falaise on D+ 96 hours. He wasn't in there in D+ 72 days. Then rather than acknowlege that he had the slows, he attempted to revise the historical record in his memoirs by saying that was the master plan all along.

What is perhaps most troubling is that the Monty of Alamein and France in 1940 seems to have lost his moral courage by 1944. He was more interested in not losing a battle than in winning it.

I've said it before. Her Majesty was blessed with some tremendous battlefield commanders in WWII. Unfortunately, Monty wasn't one of them. He was overly cautious, blamed his subordinates when something went wrong, and took more credit for himself than was due when things went right. He stubbornly clung to his preferred strategy, even when he had been overruled, crossing the line of insiubordination. Moreover, he unapologetically insisted that Market-Garden was a sound operation, in spite of the Allies having been handed their collective behinds by the Germans.

Just my opinion, but he was way overrated.

irishcrusader95

maybe so but he stopped romel at el alimain which was a close brake as the germans then would have been within stricking distance of the oil fields of persia

Paulinus

I think he may have been overated once but now it tends to be the opposite so it depends on who's ratings you've been listerning to in the first instance. I'm well aware of his egomania, failure to get on with some of the US generals and propensity to revisionism, but he also did a large part of the detailed spade work and planning that made DD a success. His army took on the main German strength in France and eventually triumphed and I'm not sure it matters that his plan had been to take Falaise quickly because he would have been well aware that it entirely depended on the German response which was always going to be hard to devine. Market Garden was a failure (although not catastrophic) but Varsity was a success, plus he may have helped out quite a bit at the Bulge. Anyhow you've adopted the usual double standard of damning him for being timid in one breath (camped on Caen) and reckless in the next (rolling the dice for Market Garden). Despite its obvious deficiencies the latter would have succeeded had it not been for a randomly parked panzer division and crappy radios, c'est la guerre.

Edward

And the remains of German units, which escaped Falaise were used to defeat Arnhem landing.

redcoat

That was the speed of the Eighth army after the Second Battle of El Alamein, 21 st Army group only managed 250 miles in six days after the breakout at Normandy.

Monty may have been methodical in his planning, but his forces were capable of considerable speed in pursuit.

Edward

Elements of Polish 1st Armoured div. braked through towards Mt. Ormel at the neck of Falaise pocket and set positions on the slopes of hill 262. They never has been dislodged from their positions despite multiple attacks from east and west. But their limited forces were not sufficient to seal the gap. I think that Canadian Army was to slow to link with advancing elements of Polish division. The same apply to southern part of Allied pincer. French 1st div. was not fast enauhg to seal southern part of Mt. Ormel gap. Actually, the leading elements of Polish 1st division linked with American 90 infantry div in Chambois but the ground behind them was not secured.

German equipment destroyed in the Mont Ormel area, waiting to be scrapped near the Dives River-Valley

redcoat

Dempsey was the Allied commander in charge of the attack on Caen, Monty was the Allied Ground Commander, he was in charge of all the Allied forces in Normandy.
Indeed, he was his own worse enemy in that regard, but the only official phase line that Monty and Bradley would agree to before the invasion was to be on the Seine by D+90, they managed it with days to spare


Market Garden was anything but cautious, but even so Monty had been warned before the invasion that Britain was facing a grave manpower shortage and that heavy losses couldn't be replaced

Churchill would have been surprised by that remark,
Before Monty came along the British army had proved unable to decisively defeat any German lead forces, Monty showed the British Army how to...it wasn't pretty, but it worked.
Monty was not a nice person, but as his record shows he was a very good general.

Market Garden fell far short of expectations but it wasn't a total failure as it advanced the front in that sector by around 90 miles and inflicted almost twice the number of casualties on the German's than what the Allies suffered.

It was certainly a better operation than Bradleys Hurtgen Forest campaign

diddyriddick

Agreed. He deserves exceptionally high marks as a planner. My beef with him is as a field commander.

That absolutely makes sense. The problem is that Monty didn't see it that way. In his letters to Dempsey in April, he stressed the absolute necessity of driving inland on the first day so he didn't have to fight the reserve divisions with his back to the ocean. He was even prepared to sacrifice his armored brigades to achieve penetration into Caen. But when he landed, he wouldn't take the offensive. By D+ 24, it was too late. Because of his timidity, British and Canadian soldiers died in the meat-grinder that became Caen.

[/quote=Paulinus;375698]Market Garden was a failure (although not catastrophic) but Varsity was a success, plus he may have helped out quite a bit at the Bulge.

Apples and oranges. There is a difference between being bold and foolhardy. Armored doctrine called for rapid exploitation; Monty recognized that in the lead up to Overlord, and instructed Dempsey accordingly in April. This was the textbook method of maneuver that Monty had so effectively used at el Alamein. But he didn't follow up.

Airborne operations on the other hand, had had limited success to that time. You are correct that risks are involved when fighting wars-I can cut Monty some slack on that. But I have serious reservations about Market-Garden on two scores. Firstly, with a particularly risky operation like an airborne drop, detailed planning is more important than ever. But Market-Garden had less planning than any major Allied initiative. Had they taken a little time to plan, somebody might have asked "So.....What would happen if an SS Panzer division just happened to park on our axis of attack?" A complicated operation like an airborne drop is no time to be flying by the seat of one's pants.

And secondly, the entire idea of attacking with armor on a single axis to relieve progressively more isolated airborne units is extremely dangerous. They allowed no contingencies for the fog of war. The assumption was that Horrocks would advance basically unopposed. If XXX Corps was delayed in any meaningful way, the entire operation was in jeapordy.


P.S. This is NOT a critique of British leadership in general. It is specifically directed at Monty.

diddyriddick

An excellent point. How many net Allied lives might have been saved if they were attacking the fleeing 250k Germans, rather than those same Germans after entrenching on the east bank of the Rhein.