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January 24th, 2011, 09:39 PM
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#121 | | Historian
Joined: Dec 2009 From: rangiora Posts: 2,832 |
I used to have respect for Sylla and his opinions. | | |
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January 24th, 2011, 09:46 PM
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#122 | | Suspended indefinitely
Joined: Dec 2009 Posts: 19,934 | Quote:
Originally Posted by Bismarck I used to have respect for Sylla and his opinions.  | Sylla1 used to couldn't care any less about such respect  ; the reasons for such lack of care are still standing.
Sorry; I missed your question related to the OP.
P.S.; BTW please remember that a note of caution on Historumites' snipping has already been posted by a Mod here (post #112); I don't think that the fact that you were not explicitly named then should exclude you from its scope.
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Last edited by sylla1; January 24th, 2011 at 10:59 PM.
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January 25th, 2011, 12:05 AM
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#123 | | Suspended indefinitely
Joined: Nov 2009 From: Queensland, Australia Posts: 3,760 | Quote:
Originally Posted by sylla1 That is just a deliberate cheap fallacious hasty generalization.
The Long Range Desert Group and equivalent units (either Allied or Axis) were by definition special forces specifically designed for intelligence commando missions behind enemy lines, usually performed over terrain well beyond the capabilities of any regular vehicles Long Range Desert Group - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia .
The original statement naturally stands; as Herr Rommel stated and all the people of the time was well aware, the Qattara depression was entirely inaccessible for the regular motor units, either Axis or Allied; BTW an extremely relevant strategic issue for the battles of El Alamein.
For the record, Ed; your previous statement quoted above was patently wrong (BTW as timely explained by my posts) given your poor definition of " deep desert"; more specifically, overwhelming evidence has been shown here corroborating that even defensive positions like El Agheila were perfectly flankable from the desert side, a critical feature of the desert warfare (actually all along History) and one of the major explanations (from the very beginning) on why the original orders of Herr Rommel were definitively unfeasible; El Alamein was an extraordinary geographical exception, not the rule. | That is exactly what I have said. Qattara depression could be crossed only by light vehicle. But it could be bypassed entirely from the south if somebody will have enough transport and fuel. Once again you twisted my statement. | | |
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January 25th, 2011, 12:18 AM
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#124 | | Suspended indefinitely
Joined: Dec 2009 Posts: 19,934 | Quote:
Originally Posted by Edward That is exactly what I have said. Qattara depression could be crossed only by light vehicle. But it could be bypassed entirely from the south if somebody will have enough transport and fuel. Once again you twisted my statement. | Your argument here is twisted from its origin.
A tautology; no army from any side of WW2 ever " bypassed" the Qattara depression in such way.
There was a reason for that, and it was certainly not fuel.
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January 25th, 2011, 01:19 AM
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#125 | | Suspended indefinitely
Joined: Nov 2009 From: Queensland, Australia Posts: 3,760 |
[quote] Quote:
Originally Posted by sylla1 The Long Range Desert Group and equivalent units (either Allied or Axis) were by definition special forces specifically designed for intelligence commando missions behind enemy lines, usually performed over terrain well beyond the capabilities of any regular vehicles Long Range Desert Group - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia .
QUOTE] | Quote:
By Bismarck
I used to have respect for Sylla and his opinions. | So you have to resolve to Wiki to find out what the Long Range Desert Patrol is. I think that this is speaking for itself. I do not have to use linguistic parabolas of your style to express my total disappointment with your performance. I will terminate this discussion as everything you can say I could find in internet by myself without your help. I will join Bismarck in his opinion regarding your posts. | | |
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January 25th, 2011, 04:30 PM
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#126 | | Suspended indefinitely
Joined: Dec 2009 Posts: 19,934 |
[quote=Edward;446737] Quote: So you have to resolve to Wiki to find out what the Long Range Desert Patrol is. I think that this is speaking for itself. I do not have to use linguistic parabolas of your style to express my total disappointment with your performance. I will terminate this discussion as everything you can say I could find in internet by myself without your help. I will join Bismarck in his opinion regarding your posts. | Sorry; I missed your question on the OP too.
BTW, please remember post #112.
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Last edited by sylla1; January 25th, 2011 at 04:45 PM.
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November 6th, 2012, 01:39 PM
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#127 | | Academician
Joined: May 2012 From: Bristol UK Posts: 53 | | | |
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November 6th, 2012, 02:52 PM
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#129 | | Historian
Joined: Jun 2012 From: At present SD, USA Posts: 1,393 | Quote:
Originally Posted by Edward I would rather concentrate on Rommel mistakes. He was extremely capable general but he made mistakes. | From what I've seen from a biography on Rommel I have, the main mistakes in the first efforts to take Tobruk came from a lack of true familiarity with armored warfare. Rommel, like many other officers had been an infantry officer in WWI, and he recieved criticism, mostly from subordinates, that he used his tanks as if they were infantry, which left them vulnerable to fixed defenses.
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November 6th, 2012, 04:02 PM
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#130 | | What we have, we hold
Joined: Mar 2011 From: 6th Century Constantinople Posts: 3,334 |
The Australian defence of Tobruk was one of the most brilliant military achievements in human history. Rommel's Afrika Korps had never been defeated until he came to Tobruk. The Australians broke him like a stale biscuit.
Their success owed much to the bold use of harassment and guerilla tactics: Quote:
Commonly an attack would involve crawling several miles, surrounding the enemy position, followed by a concerted rush with bayonets. In most cases the action was over in a minute or two, more often than not without a shot fired.
Probably the most well-known single offensive action by the Rats was a fighting patrol led by Lieutenant William Horace Noyes, which stalked and destroyed three German light tanks, and killed or wounded the crews of 7 machine-gun and 11 anti-tank gun positions and their protective infantry. In addition, they damaged a German heavy tank, killed and wounded 130 in the process of taking a German garrison, most in the initial bayonet charge.
No Rats were lost that night.
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