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June 11th, 2011, 08:04 PM
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#21 | | Historian
Joined: Jan 2009 From: Tennessee Posts: 8,298 |
I can see both sides of this question. As far as how the vessels were used, to what function, there is similarity.
But in the OP, as to the expense of building and maintaining a battleship fleet. Well, that can be a big subject.
Were it not for Englands wooden walls, French and or Spanish would be the toungue spoken in Picadilly these days, and long since.
Were it not for the steel ships that used steam and turret guns, I think German would be the lingo of the day.
So, was it worth it?
It definitely was for England.
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June 11th, 2011, 08:06 PM
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#22 | | Drinker of Tea
Joined: Dec 2010 From: California Posts: 2,278 |
The Allies could not have won WWII without fleets. They were just as important as the Army imo.
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June 11th, 2011, 09:25 PM
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#23 | | Historian
Joined: Jan 2009 From: Tennessee Posts: 8,298 |
The reason we didnt see more battleships in WWII than we did, was the complicated treaty talks of the Washington, and later the London treaty which was a naive way that the leaders of the free nations sought to avoid an arms race that nobody could afford.
And so, we just saw more cruisers and destroyers and aircraft carriers used for killing in WWII.
And they were not as survivable as the battleships were. And so, more sailors died as a result. At least, that is one way to look at it.
Some excerpts from the London Treaty. Relax, you dont have to read a bunch of text. Its audio.
Complicated, isnt it? And, one of the treaties results was that heavy capitol ships, such as heavy cruisers, went into battle almost devoid of sufficient armor (Treaty tonnage limitations). They had very powerful guns, but no armor. Result...more ships sunk (of course) and more lives lost.
So, was the Arms Limitation treaties worth it?
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June 12th, 2011, 01:19 AM
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#24 | | Acting Corporal
Joined: May 2011 From: Navan, Ireland Posts: 5,177 |
Souldn't the 'battleship' be viewd the same as any bit of military technology, it developed adapted and declined.
HMS Victory etc dominated the seas as did the very different Dreadnougts and ships like HMS Warrior before her.
By 1945 technology had moved on and a 'battleship' was expensive and not cost effective.
In modern and future warfare we are looking at cruise missiles and Drones and an aircraft with pilot may be viewed as a great expense and not cost effective.
Doesn't mean the Spitfire or the P51 were 'not worth it'
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June 12th, 2011, 07:50 AM
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#25 | | Historian
Joined: Jul 2009 Posts: 4,994 |
Richard Stanbery,
Most people tend not to have much knowledge of the interwar treaties. Thanks for bringing this up.
One thing not well understood is that the limlitations of the 1922 treaty prevented the US from fortifying Guam or the Aleutians. (Japan could not fortify the Marshalls and Carolines or improve Formosa; Britain could not improve Hong Kong).
Early US naval plans called for a fortified naval base at Guam which would have given Japan a great advantage in "near seas" closer to their bases and support. A US force caught by surprise at Guam might have been eliminated in such a strategic scenario. So, Pearl became the hub of the eastern Pacific bastion. (Actually, Guam would have been so difficult and expensive to improve it is not likely it would have been.)
Also, had the US been able to improve the Aleutians militarily, and had Japan taken them so improved early in the war, they could (and would) have been used as submarine bases for attacks on merchant shipping along the northeastern Pacific coasts. The Aleutians are about half way on the shortest geographical route to Japan from North America.
Those restrictions actually drove the navy to rewrite potential war plans, and to develop ship types and engineering that enabled the fleet to conduct the island-hopping offensive of the 1940s. The fleet had to carry its infrastructure and support with it, and not depend on distant stations that could not be held.
I know logistics is not glamorous, but it is what wins the wars.
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Last edited by pikeshot1600; June 12th, 2011 at 09:17 AM.
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June 12th, 2011, 10:37 AM
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#26 | | With the Ball People
Joined: Feb 2011 From: Amelia, Virginia, USA Posts: 2,604 |
There was opposition to dreadnought battleships (I suggest we use "BB" as shorthand) after WW1. The RN was stuck with a large fleet of mostly obsolete BBs, with another naval race with the Americans and Japanese looming. The Americans had 8 ships planned, 4 BBs and 4 battlecruisers, a program that was recognized to yield somewhat obsolete ships (lead times meant ships were designed years before launch). The Japanese wanted a strong navy, but knew she couldn't outbuild the British and Americans. It was with a sigh of relief that the next race was paused by treaty.
Richard is absolutely correct, the treaties had a decisive effect on the nature of naval combat in WW2. Tonnage and caliber limits caused all navies to build unbalanced designs, and it meant that cruisers, being available in relatively large numbers, would perform many tasks that might have gone to BBs instead.
BBs cost a lot of money, and aircraft promised a possible cheaper alternative. In Britain, it was argued that 1000 bombers could be built for the cost of one BB, but when the numbers were crunched it turned out that maybe 20 could be built. General Mitchell is given a lot of credit as a prophet, with his insistence that airpower made BBs obsolete. He wanted to scrap the navy, believing that Army bombers could protect the shores. What is often overlooked is that through the thirties aircraft lacked the power to carry weapons that could sink a BB. High altitude heavy bombers, like Mitchell advocated, were useless for attacking ships at sea through the war. Mitchell certainly did not want aircraft carriers, which were the weapon system of the future, though in 1939 that had yet to be shown. Remember every class of BB built during WW2 was designed prewar, when aircraft had yet to reach their potential.
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June 12th, 2011, 10:50 AM
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#27 | | Scholar
Joined: Apr 2011 From: The Bluegrass Posts: 557 | Quote:
Originally Posted by botully There was opposition to dreadnought battleships (I suggest we use "BB" as shorthand) after WW1. The RN was stuck with a large fleet of mostly obsolete BBs, with another naval race with the Americans and Japanese looming. The Americans had 8 ships planned, 4 BBs and 4 battlecruisers, a program that was recognized to yield somewhat obsolete ships (lead times meant ships were designed years before launch). The Japanese wanted a strong navy, but knew she couldn't outbuild the British and Americans. It was with a sigh of relief that the next race was paused by treaty.
Richard is absolutely correct, the treaties had a decisive effect on the nature of naval combat in WW2. Tonnage and caliber limits caused all navies to build unbalanced designs, and it meant that cruisers, being available in relatively large numbers, would perform many tasks that might have gone to BBs instead.
BBs cost a lot of money, and aircraft promised a possible cheaper alternative. In Britain, it was argued that 1000 bombers could be built for the cost of one BB, but when the numbers were crunched it turned out that maybe 20 could be built. General Mitchell is given a lot of credit as a prophet, with his insistence that airpower made BBs obsolete. He wanted to scrap the navy, believing that Army bombers could protect the shores. What is often overlooked is that through the thirties aircraft lacked the power to carry weapons that could sink a BB. High altitude heavy bombers, like Mitchell advocated, were useless for attacking ships at sea through the war. Mitchell certainly did not want aircraft carriers, which were the weapon system of the future, though in 1939 that had yet to be shown. Remember every class of BB built during WW2 was designed prewar, when aircraft had yet to reach their potential. | Mitchell's claim that bombers made the BB obsolete was something of a lie. While he was able to sink Ostfriesland, she was anchored with all interior hatches and compartments open, no pumps running, and obviously with no damage control parties. It was simply a matter of time, she would have sunk on her own given enough time. There was a period in the late '30s when armor piercing bombs, and aerial torpedoes placed the BB in grave danger due to lack of effective AA armament. The remodeled old BB and the new fast BB of the US, with their excellent DP 5" armament, radar fire control, and VT fuses for AA shells, rendered them a much tougher nut to crack.
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June 12th, 2011, 07:39 PM
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#28 | | Historian
Joined: Jan 2009 From: Tennessee Posts: 8,298 |
Yes, and the London treaty agreements did place a number cap on heavy cruisers (ranked by gun size of 6.1 inch, or 155mm) to specific numbers. Light cruisers were not given a specific number in the agreement, but an overall tonnage was assigned for the several nations. Japan was allowed about 100,000 tons of light cruisers, for example.
And so, if one wanted to have more light cruisers, then one simply built more ships with lighter armor.
And so, the BB was not phased out of preeminance in the 1930s because smaller ships were better. The BBs started to loose sway because of politicians naive attempts to make the world a better place by limiting militarism.
A BB is a much more capable and survivable surface ship than a cruiser with thin armor. But...that is how the treaty stacked up. And so we saw less BBs and a lot more crappy cruisers used in WWII. Read death traps.
The aircraft carrier, now that did have some advantage obviously. But the naval aircraft had a far easier time putting down thin skinned cruisers than BBs.
All I can say is that it was a good thing for Britain that they didnt enter into some kind of silly naval treaty with the Germans before WWI. If they had, the Germans would have likely won WWI.
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June 13th, 2011, 05:18 AM
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#29 | | Historian
Joined: Jul 2009 Posts: 4,994 |
Richard,
Interesting comments on the treaty limitations on cruiser tonnage. The Japanese navy began to build new light cruisers before the Washington Treaty, most of them in the 5,000 Ton category. They looked rather primitive in retrospect, but they mostly carried 5.5" guns, six of which could fire on the broadside.
EDIT: I just checked Wiki and this stuff is all over the place there.
A Japanese naval architect, Admiral Yuzuru Hiraga was chief of the Naval Technical Research Laboratory. He designed a cruiser, Yubari, that displaced less than 3,000 T, but that carried six 5.5" guns - all on the line of the keel, and with no loss of speed, and no loss of operational range. That ship entered service I think in around 1924.
That design enabled the IJN to design later heavy cruisers that mounted a powerful armament on displacements within the Treary limits, and still have some protection and more powerful engines. Clever engineering indeed.
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Last edited by pikeshot1600; June 13th, 2011 at 05:30 AM.
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June 13th, 2011, 05:28 AM
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#30 | | Historian
Joined: Jul 2009 Posts: 4,994 |
The comment about Great Britain entering into a naval treaty with Germany should be considered in view of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902 - by which the RN essentially relinquished its position in Asia. The squadrons on Asiatic stations went home to strengthen what became the Grand Fleet.
Of course the security and strategic position of the Home Waters was far more important than Asia.
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