Krystian

I can't really understand why was it that in the early modern period - the 16th and 17th century, the Japanese clans could gather armies of tens of thousands and have battles such as the Siege of Osaka where 240,000 men fought on both sides or Sekigahara with 160,000, while the much larger and more developed European states had usually an army of less than 40,000. The biggest and most powerful European state at the time was Spain, the Empire over which the sun never sets, had an army of 40,000 - as much as two or three powerful Japanese clans. During the invasion of Korea the Japanese had a force, including all the reserves, of as much as 500,000 people - an unimaginable force in Europe at the time. How was that possible? Were the European states unable to muster such forces or did they simply not need to? Was Japan more populated at the time than France or Spain?



PS. I also have a small second question to those that have knowledge in the field - was European 16th century plate armor such as the Maximillian or Gothic armor better in terms of close-combat protection than the late 16th century japanese plate armors?

Frank81

I've questioned on this too before. After reading some works and studying several figures I'll make an hypothesis on this.

However, a correction first: the number of men that European powers could field is usually very underestimated. In 1491, a 65,000 men Castillian army was operating around Granada. In 1532, Charles V was able to amass a 150,000 men force in a single place during his Danubian counteroffensive against the Ottomans. During the second half of 16th centuy, Spain was able to field 100-150 thosand full professional soldiers permanently, althoug scattered around the planet. 80,000 of those soldiers fought during 40 years in the Netherlands. By 1625, the Spanish Habsburg were able to movilize 300,000 men, including militia.

However, the usual field army was in the order of 20-30 thousand men certainlly. In any case, in front of these numbers, the Japanese mobilization capacity is astounding.



*Several causes could be behind of this:

1. Organizative:

A. Was the Japanese organization better? I don't think so, the supply and tax system of Japanese state (or states) seem to be highly efficient, but European didn't lagged behind. In fact, due to intensive use of naval transport European movilization capacity could be superior.

B. Was the military organization different? Japanese seem to have relied heavilly on militia while Europeans were heavilly focused on professional armies. However, the Japanese experienced a process of professionalization that made their late 16th century and early 17th century armies not so different of those in Europe.

In conclusion, I can't tell if organization is the key factor.



2. Productive-Demographic-Logistic. Here's my two cents:

In a territory of around 300,000 km2, by 1600 there lived 17 million Japanese people. The european Spanish Habsburg territories comprised 800,000 km2 with around 15 million people, 8-9 million in 580,000 km2, Iberia.

It is stimated that Japan could produce 2,859,000,000 kgs of food in 1600. This means 168 kgs per capita, or 160 if we count 18 million people,
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http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~eniugh/congress2011/fileadmin/eniugh2011/dokumente/Comparative_Living_Standards_Bassino_Broadberry_Fu kao_Gupta_Takashima_2011_04_16.pdf

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The World Economy Volume 1: A Millennial Perspective Volume 2: Historical ... - Angus Maddison - Google Libros



There is no such data for all Spain. So I'll try to deduce it: a century before, 700,000 people in Andalusia produced 110,000,000 kgs, 157 kgs per capita. If productivity could be extrapolated to Iberia a century later, 8 million people could produce 1,256,000,000 kgs.

This means: surely in Japan, people needed far less territory in order to produce the same amount of food, in other words, agriculture was more productive. Furthermore, this large amount of food was available in a territory far shorter, which improve logistic performance. My coclusion is that the large agricultural output available in short distances can explain the large armies of Sengoku Jidai era Japan.

Maybe other European territories were more productive than Iberia, but the basic point remain.

Guaporense

There is also the problem with the reliability of fantastic numbers.

I don't think that Frank81's argument about higher agricultural productivity is valid. First, agricultural productivity is not measured on a per capita or per territory basis, agricultural productivity is better measured by the amount of food a single family could purchase and in this respect japan was actually one of the poorest countries in the world during the early modern period. Another measure is urbanization: the capability of producing large agricultural surpluses to feed a urban population.

In that respect, Northern Italy was the region in the world with the highest rates of urbanization during the 15 and 16th centuries. Though the political fragmentation of the region mean't that there wasn't a unified state that could mobilize it's military potential.

On the invasion of Korea: Most numbers I have seem say they mobilized an army of 140,000 - 150,000 men for the invasion of Korea. That was 3% of their adult male population. Nothing that I could consider absurd.

Japan had the same population as France which had an army of 160,000 men in the 16th century.

Frank81

My problem with agricultural productivity by hectare is that I can't make by now stimations for large countries in Europe.


They exists for Japan: in 1600 farmed area covered 2,047,903 hectares, which produced 2,859,000,000 kgs. This means a very high 1396 kgs/hectare, a mean productivity on par with the highest ones in Europe.



Regarding the fantastic numbers, certainlly our Eastern scholars tend to be uncritic with these numbers. I've looked carefully some accounts and have found interesting dates. For instead, the number of troops involved in Korea included a very large proportion of non combatants, according with Turbull's "Samurai Invasion":


*Goto Shumiharu, a daymio from Goto islands, leadered 705 men to Korea. They were:

1 general
5 commisioners (army, flags, supply, bows, spears)
3 messengers
2 inspectors
11 mounted samurais
40 foot samurais
38 samurai attendants
120 ashigaru

5 priests, doctors, secretaries
280 labourers
200 boatmen

Figting men: 220
Logistic support: 485
Horses: 27

*Shimazu Yoshihiro leadered a 10,000 men division as follow:

600 samurai
3,600 ashigaru (1,500 arquebusiers, 1,500 archers, 300 spearmen of which 200 with yaris)
300 flag bearers

Fighting force: 4,700 men
Logistical support: 5,300 men


----

If we take the Shimazu division example, the fighting force that invaded Korea was composed of 74,589 men (23,000 arquebusiers).

The total number ready for war that stayed in reserve in Japan were 97,000 men, 45,590 figting men if we count according to Shimazu proportions.



This sum 120,179 men, a number surprisingly similar to that of Habsburg Spain the same years. Is it close to the one time maximun movilization capacity of Japan?

spellbanisher

This presumes that urban areas aren't enriched at the expense of rural areas. When you consider that countries like France and Germany had rising levels of urbanization but stagnant levels of per capita GDP in the eighteenth century, that means that urban areas only grew by greater exploitation of rural areas. This is also evident by the higher life expectancies of Asian Adult males over European Adult males; in China and Japan in the eighteenth century adult male life expectancy was 39.6 and 41.1 years, compared to 34 years for a English male, 27.5 for a French male, and 25 for a Prussian male. Laborers in the Yangtze valley consumed 4,600 calories a day (and overall 2,600), compared to about 2,500 in England.

So the picture is a little more complex than just looking at one variable.

Frank81

Hell, sorry guys I can't edit and did a little mistake by adding 4,700 fighting men/5300 logistic men to Shimazu division. It's 4,500 and 5,500.