HammockHank

What happened to the 82nd is very similar to that of the Red Devils: they were dropped too far from the bridge. Even so the 508th Regiment could have captured the Nijmegen bridge if it had advanced hours sooner from Groesbeek Ridge as Gavin claimed to have instructed it's commander to do. Due to an apparent delay or mis-interpretation of orders the 508th commander began his advance toward the bridge with only one company after receiving information that the bridge was lightly defended by Germans. Two other companies of the 508th were sent soon afterwards toward the bridge but one got lost in Nijmegen and the other was led to an ambush by a Dutch civilian. By the time the three companies joined up the Germans had been able to reinforce the defensive position and was too strong for the lightly armed AB battalion to shove aside.

That this was a failure in execution on the part of the 82nd is true but it was not due to anything like "they were not up for it" because the division fought like devils throughout the battle. Perhaps the fault lies more with "Boy" Browning who had used part of the airlift on the first day to land his HQ in the Nijmegen area. The air assets would have been put to better use if they had been committed to airlifting combat troops closer or, better yet, on top off, the bridge over the Waal in order to secure the bridge in a coup de main as the 6th AB did at Pegasus Bridge on D-Day.


Every one had a bad day. It was a bold plan that had to have everything go right in order for it to work. That didn't happen, but it was a nice try. Looking back the best course of action would have been to clear the approaches to Antwerp of Germans and to have cut the 15th Army off at the neck of Walcheren Island. That Ike didn't order Monty to do so instead off approving Market Garden justifies his detractors observations that he was not a very good land commander. This was probably one of the worst decisions Ike made during the entire campaign in Europe and he made the wrong choice knowing that the port of Antwerp was crucial to supplying a broad front strategy.

Guaporense

World War II was a war dominated by artillery. 60% to 70% of all casualties in WW2 were caused by artillery strikes. In some cases up to 80%.

As result strategic offensives planned without the use of artillery fail, always.

The effectiveness of air operations is overrated, both in terms of bombing or in terms of paratroopers. Air power is "too light" in the sense that heavy big guns are too heavy for airplanes and heavy big guns are what win wars.

Bish

I'm sorry, but its Infantry men that win wars. While you may well be right about the casualties caused by Artillery, you can blast the enemy as much as you like, but you still need boots on the ground.

I think Airbourse troops have their users and i wouldn't say they are over rated. If you can get troops behind enemy lines, whether by parachute/glider or helicopter, you can cause lots of problems.

As for air power being over rated, well it essentially does the same job as Artillery, only it does it out to a greater distance inside the enemy ground than any big gun.

Naomasa298

Sauces?

HammockHank

Yeah, I would agree that in WWII paratroopers were not decisive in any strategic engagement except for the capture of Crete (can this be labeled a strategic engagement?) and Hitler refused to use any more air drops after the horrendous losses suffered by the 7th Flieger Division. This is not to say though that AB troops did not have a role to play in major offensives.

In Normandy the 101st and 82nd drops were scattered all over the Cotentin Peninsula and were presumed to have been a failed drop but the scattering of the drops had unexpected positive consequences for the Americans in that it caused confusion in the German rear. This kept the Germans from concentrating on the landings at Utah and a few of the unflooded corridors were kept open for the push inland from Utah beach.

In the British sector 6th AB had the crucial role of keeping the bridges over the Caen Canal from being destroyed thus allowing for the expansion of the landing area eastward across the Canal and the Orne River.

In Market-Garden the initial drops went very successful in the sense that over 80% of the drops landed in the drop zone. The problem with Market (the airborne part) was, as much as market-Garden was a bold plan, the drop zones were not boldly planned at all except for a couple of drops that landed on their immediate objectives. If the plans had called for drops over the Son bridge, over the Nijmegen bridge and on the bridge at Arnhem then it's arguably possible to conclude that XXX Corps could have reached Arnhem and captured a bridgehead across the Rhine.

In this sense I don't think the use of AB troops in MG was a mistake but that the mistake was in how they were used.

As far as strategic bombing is concerned it played a significant role in the defeat of both Germany and Japan. By itself yeah, sure. It could not win the war alone as some startegic air enthusiast proposed but it did force Germany to dedicate an enormous amount of it's military resources in defense of the Fatherland instead of using them against the Russians and the western Allies.

Against Japan once the Mariannas were captured the strategic air offensive destroyed all major industrial targets within Japan and ended the war with the ultimate strategic weapon.

Nemowork

I think the 70% figure includes grenades, mortars and all offensive explosive devices but not defencive ones like land mines.

It was certainly th eGerman mortars that casueed most of the casualties in Normandy rather than the heavy artillery but i guess it depended on the theatre and everaged out over the war?

For example in an offensive most casualties are likely to be by gunfire amongst the front line troops but in a more static theatre where the shooting is being done by artillery into a city its going to be the other way around.

I'd still like to see a source though, it sounds too much like an internet meme than statistical fact?

beorna

perhaps I give the informations I already have. perhaps one can correct them, if they are wrong. If I understand it correct, then the 50th landed in drop zone T, north of Groesbeek and the 505th in drop zone N south of the town. Where was the 376 artillery batallion dropped? How many from the 1st british airborne corps were dropped at groesbeek? my information is, that at 01.30 pm ca. 20,000 soldiers, 511 vehicles and 330 artillery guns were landed, is that correct?
One bataillion of the 505th occupied Hill 81,8 west of groesbeek, sending patrols towards Heumen as well to get contact with the 504th. One bataillion occupied positions south of groesbeek including Hill 77,2 from which you can guard Riethorst and the street from the Reichswald to Mook and Nijmegen. Which batallion was it? Where was the third of its batallions? was this the 2nd batallion under Vandervoort, supporting the crossing of 3rd/504 at the waal river. Had col. Ekmans his HQ in groesbeek?

On september 18th the 406. Division zbV of the corpf "feldt" attacked the groesbeek hights east of the town with 2 understaffed batallions. They attacked as well the 505th in Riethorst, Horst and grafwegen. Which units of the 505th were there. Has anybody have informations about the German units in these area. I know that my grandfather was there, with his grenadier btl Münster, but not where exactly. If my information is correct, then around 2.00pm the landing zone N was cleared by the allies again. The attack seem to have been started around 12.40. Did the 319th und 320.
th Glider Field Artillery Bataillon, and the 456th parachute-Field-Artillery-Bataillon land here?

I read, that the 505th as well cleared the landing zone of the 101st airborne division. Which troops of the 505th were there. Wasn't their drop zone at Veghel and Helmond?
On september 20th the 505th and the 4th/Coldstream guards pushed back an attack between Groesbeek and Mook. At this day if my information is correct the corps feldt was supported by a parachute batallion and 5 mixed batallions, together with some armoured elements of the 7th Tank division. Is it correct that the 1st/505 under long stood on that day between Mook and groesbeek? At 03.00 pm Mook was taken by the germans, but cleared in the evening again by the US and Coldstream guards. I read about a regiment "Suffolk" at Mook as well, exactly the Ist/Suffolk. Is this true?
On september 21st the corps feldt stayed in positions, because it was too exhausted. On september 22nd the 505 .Parachute Infantry (less 2d Battalion) reestablished the road block at Mook. With Royals, reconnoitered to Riethorst and found road clear of enemy. What Royals?
on september 23rd the 82nd airborne was supported by a new infantry rgt. which one? It seems they cleared then the positions beneath hill 77,2.

Azita

If that is the case what did 30 corps have to help the 82nd with, when they arrived at the bridge on time?

Nemowork

30 corps had tanks, the yanks didnt. 30 corps also had assault boats so the infantry could cross the river and take the bridge from both sides. Its hard to equip paratroops with tanks and assault boats, their pockets arent large enough!

Its a fairly well known story that when 30 corps got to the Nijmegen bridge and helped clear it the 82nd was very keen to team up with the British armour and press on to Arnhem. Its part of US folklore that the Brits promptly stopped, brewed up tea and refused to go on any further without orders. Its usually presented by US paras as an example of their own derring do and can do spirit against the old world conformity if cavalry/the Brits/anybody who isnt a para.

It gets missed out that the armour arrived at Nijmegen bridge but their supporting infantry hadnt. Armoured units had come to depend and work closely with their own dedicated and trained infantry, the tanks needed the infantry to screen them from anti-tank weapons, the infantry needed the tanks for fire support and taking out srong points.

The idea of pressing on into unscouted territory with a bunch of lightly armed enthusiasts who hadnt a clue about armoured/infantry support tactics would have horrified most commanders. Doing it with exhausted troops after days of hard fighting after the hell they'd been through getting to the bridge was even more unlikely, they wanted to refit, rearm and let their own infantry catch up then advance in good order.

The delay turned out to be a mistake but theres no saying pressing on wouldnt have been a mistake as well.

Azita

As you say, the 82nd had failed to take their Single objective, and 30 corps had to do this for them, i have read accounts that the 82nd didn't even try to take the bridge, rather secured the higher ground over looking the area.

This huge delay to 30 corps prevented them relieving the British at Arnheim.