Pointless attacks in trench warfare in WWI: did the Germans do them as much? - Page 2 - Historum

Larrey · May 4th, 2012, 06:02 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by bartieboy

They sure did, after all, near the end of the war the German army had its cases of mutiny as well.
But probably the masters of these horrors were the Russians and the French... The Russians even send in their men in quite close formations.

It's also a matter of learning curves. The massive German attacks in 1914 against the French fortifications in the eastern part of the frontline were as suicidal as anything the French did in 1914.

The near suicidal French offensives in 1915 (i.e. how France ended up taking about 2/3 of their casualties for the entire war inside the first 18 months of it) were based on the premise of using a significant manpower advantage along the entire frontline, where the crucial but as yet unknown factor was actually how large a firpower superiority an attacker would need to get the better of a good defensive position. Just like everyone else the French had nowhere near a working answer in 1915. By 1916 they got better at it.

McGrunt · May 4th, 2012, 09:53 AM

The " pointless attacks " were used by all sides . They were called trench raids and what they really did was combat patrols . And patrolling is used to aggressively monitor the opposition . Very hairy business without a doubt .

dahermit · May 4th, 2012, 04:45 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Belisarius

It can be argued that no attack was truely pointless, nor were they necessarily any more "suicidal" than infantry attacks in WW2. For some bizarre reason people fixate on the first day of the Somme offensive as being typical of infantry attacks in WW1, this is far from being the case. As for the germans, they adhered to a doctrine of immediate counter-attack to regain any ground lost. This, more often than not, caused the Germans as many casualties as the allies.

It is my understanding the German policy was of immediate counter attack in WWII also. It makes logical military sense to counter attack immediately (and can be prepared to do it ahead of time with reserve troops), when pushed out of a position. The attacking force is at its most vulnerable when taking up newly won defensive positions. Troops may be scattered from the attack, defensive positions are only hastily fortified and reinforced, machine guns, and mortars may not yet be coordinated. Troops will only have the ammunition they attacked with. Machine guns and mortars will only have the little ammunition their crews could carry across the battlefield. If the force that has given ground does not counter attack, it becomes much more difficult to do so at a later date.

Frog33inUK · May 5th, 2012, 09:13 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Larrey

It's also a matter of learning curves.

Absolutely.
It has all to do with the evolution of the French doctrine throughout the war.
The paradigm of their "offensive" doctrine at the outbreak of war was proven wrong by the first clashes and the army went through an intense real-time adaptation process, with different "schools" fighting to get their views adopted by the High Command.
One important point is that the traditional French conservatism was shaken by the necessity to react quickly in real-time to German tactics.
The Germans seem to have started the war with a more solid structure in their doctrine.