antonina

Depends how you calculate it, Germans invaded 1 September, last Polish coastal defenses surrendered on October 2 and the Operational Group Narew continued to fight in the northeast against the German Motorized Infantry Division until October 6. But lets leave that.

My reasons for "abysmal preformance" are as follows:

The Poes were attacked without warning, they'd been prevended from mobilising (their British and French allies had entreated them to not to do this,as it might unnecesarily "provoke" the Germans ), they fought completely alone and from 17 September (Soviet invasion from the east) were dealing with war on two fronts.
Plus the German performance in Poland from day one (random terror bombing, mass executions of civilians etc.) was something France didn't experience.

The French had seven months to prepare (gained by failing to fulfill the obligations of the mutual assistance pact with Poland) They had masive British help in men and equipment, on land and air, not counting about 80,000 Polish soldiers who'd come to their assistance with the hope of fighting the Germans.

Yet they didn't hold out longer than Poland did. I'm sorry if "abysmal" sounds unfair, but considering all help Poland got in 1939 was a bunch of heartwarming leaflets, I'm not sure it's all that unfair.

I feel that to. It's kind of nasty to say things about people behind their backs.

bartieboy

They didn't have massive help from the British,
by the time of the invasion of Poland there were 2 understrength British divisions in France.

If France attacked she would be all alone against the numerical superior Germany army.
Still the French could have taken the Ruhr in two weeks if they mounted a proper offensive.

Edgewaters

The British efforts were no more succesful than the French. Their greatest moment was succesfully running away at Dunkirk. In that phase of the war, the Germans had superior doctrine. Mobile warfare was simply far beyond the attrition strategies employed by the British and French.

If the British did not have the Channel to hide behind, they would have suffered the same fate. It is not a difference of character but the fact that the Channel was a much more formidable wall than Maginot could ever hope to be, and there was no way to do an end-run around it, as there was with Maginot.

By the time the French surrendered, they were outmaneuvered and crushed. They did not surrender prematurely. They were still fighting months after defeat became inevitable; and they were refused desperately needed support from the RAF during this time. The British had concluded it was a lost cause and gave up, before the French

antonina

I wsn't referring to September 1939.
My assessment concerned the defense of France in 1940.

sylla1

If any calculations may involve extreme nationalism, the results would be always known in advance, irrespectevely on the variables involved.

You should give the Polish rulers a little more credit; they were perfectly well aware of the military menace of the III Reich long before September 1, 1939.
As I have already explained, the French did hold a bit longer than the Poles (and the Greeks even longer).
And of course, none of these contenders did achieve any single military victory against the Wehrmacht all along these campaigns; the latter had a lot of picnics for a couple of years.

That said, and amazing as it may sound, like it or not, each and any nation has always behaved according first and foremost to their own reslpolitik, Poland naturally included.
Just remember Teschen 1939.

And of course, the Western Allies had the best intention to defeat Germany; they did what they thought at the moment was the best option to achieve such goal.

The prevalent military doctrine was simply outdated, an obvious fact in hindsight but hardly so at the moment.

France and Britain (and far as I can tell most military men of this Planet at the time, including many German commanders) had the lessons of WW1 in mind for their main strategical decisions.

Namely a positional warfare strategy, where the contender who attacked first tended to have the greater casualties, let say like in the Somme, Verdun, the Spanish Civil War or even the Winter War.

Plainly, nobody was ready for the tactical revolution in progress that is nowadays regularly called Blitzkrieg... and certainly neither France nor Poland nor Britain.

Congo

Antonina and sylla1,

I'd side with one of you then the other would respond with a convincing post that I would suddenly switch.

I think you are both right to a degree.

Poland may have been aware that Germany may attack, but France was definitely aware of Germany's intentions and, you would think, should have committed more casualties and lasted much longer.

But I'm not sure if the phrase "abysmal" performance on the French part would be appropriate. The casualties were still quite high. The French could have still lost the war and inflicted light casualties, but they didn't. You'd think, however, that with the impending war, they would have lasted longer. With the Germans invading Poland, everything had changed. The intensity of the situation, the trust between the opponents corrupted... you would think France would have... not necessarily fought better or harder, but lasted longer (thus inflicted more casualties).

But that had nothing to do with them. Only how innovative the Germans had become in tactical warfare. Still, by 1940, no nation was prepared to combat Germany. Perhaps the Soviet Union, with its ability to give up undeveloped land for time, the United Kingdom, protected by the English Channel and the United States, nearly untouchable with an ocean between her and Germany...

...only these nations could stand a chance against Germany.

oh... and that is what happened. Interesting...

Diced

I agree with this sentiment. It seems only the Germans and Russians actually understood the value of tanks at this time. I remember reading about British generals who still felt Cavalry would have a bigger role than tanks in the coming wars.

Don't agree with this, these countries, by themselves would not have stood a chance against Germany. It was really the combination that made them victorious.

Paulinus

Quite good trolling Edgy - I can't resist the bait. Apart from the fact that the small BEF in Belgium fought quite well when it wasn't being obliged to withdraw because it was hopelessly outflanked through no fault of it's soldiers actions, it's patently obvious that if by some miracle the channel hadn't existed the British would have had a very much larger and more powerful land army (perhaps like the one it had at the end of WWI) rather than just a dominant navy, decent airforce and tiny army. The RAF of course did fight in France but when it became clear the war in France was lost the remnants were withdrawn to fight what became the Battle of Britain and as it turned out there were just enough planes to win so that France could be liberated by the western democracies and returned to self rule in 1944 rather than have the nazis replaced by the soviets in say 1949. Under the circumstances pulling those fighters out of theatre when they were was the best thing that could have happened for France. In fact I'm now wondering whether Dowding was ever made a chevalier de la legion d'honneur...

Sam-Nary

The Soviets never really grasped blitzkrieg tactics either. In Operation Barbarossa, while the Germans found the T-34s the Soviets had there to be nearly indestructable, more often then not, the Soviet tanks were alone and easily ambushed by the Luftwaffe or through superior numbers of German tanks, roughly the same way they defeated France and Britain in 1940.

The principle tactic that the Soviets used to win the war in the East was called "Deep Battle" by Mikhail Tukhachevsky. It was not "blitzkrieg" in the fact that tanks broke through enemy lines and cut off command and supply points, but gathered in mass groups where an attacker would face wave after wave of Soviet forces. In a sense, the Soviet tactic was to mass their forces and throw them at the enemy, and eventually their numbers would overwhelm their opponent.

However, the Soviets didn't truly implement these tactics until late December 1941 AFTER Tukhachevsky was executed for supposedly plotting against Stalin. Tukhachevsky's failure was similar to De Gaulle's in the sense that his government didn't trust him, but unlike France, which would allow De Gaulle to experiment on a small scale in the 30s and allowed men like LeClerc to begin learning about armored warfare on some level... the Soviet Union was a dictatorship run a paranoid man who believed everyone might be out to replace him. Tuchachevsky was a victim of Stalin's purges in 1937, and many of the officers he had trained were sent to Siberia.

As a result of these purges, Soviet tactics went backward as much of the Red Army was commanded by Stalinist officers who were not as strong militarily as Tuchachevsky. As a result, in 1939, the Soviet Union was in no way shape or form ready to fight the Wehrmacht. The Winter War FURTHER proved this as the Red Army had to through the bulk of its army to only just barely defeat Finland's much smaller army. The Soviets tried to reform their army, but this was incomplete when the Germans invaded in 1941, and the officers who served under Tuchachevsky weren't released. This allowed the Germans to win their spectacular victories on the Soviet borders and drive deep into Russia.

What got Tuchachevsky's subordinate officers released and his "deep battle" tactics accepted was the arrival of the Wehrmacht near Moscow. That FINALLY got Stalin to drop his paranoia. And the Germans noted that the tenacity of the Red Army rose as they neared Moscow... perhaps because instead of Comminterns the Red Army had real officers who knew what they were doing?

And even with these lessons learned, the Red Army wouldn't be able to take the offensive until late 1942 when Hitler's attack toward Stalingrad finally lost offensive momentum and the Axis was merely trying to hold on to what they'd gained.

But, had Stalin's paranoia held firm, the Wehrmacht would have taken Moscow and waited out the winter while facing a fairly disorganized Red Army with no good officer to lead them... possibly even lacking Zhukov in a position to take over.

In comparing the Soviets with France, what saved the Soviets was that their dictator ultimately swallowed his pride and let his "opponents" go. In France, while De Gaulle proposed armored tactics first, and men like Raynaud supported him, men like Petain and other French politicians obstructed these efforts, and even as the war started, the rivalries within the French government hurt them. They NEVER got their act together in time to save themselves.

I do agree though that it took a combination of all forces. If it weren't for Britain, Hitler probably would have invaded the Soviet Union with at least half a million more men, which would have been sorely needed by the Wehrmacht in Russia. The Soviets were the forces that took the major body blows that the Germans could deliever. More German soldiers fought in the East than anywhere else, even as early as 1941). This enabled the Western Allied Armies to nip at the edges of Hitler's empire. But, without America, the Allies would lose a major supplier. Lend lease aid truly aided the Soviets in their various offensives by giving them the trucks to give their infantry some mobility and improve their supply situation. All of the Allies did something to win the war.

Toomtabard

Oh Beorma come on now!-where is your sense of humour?-I just find it remarkable and a complimentary tribute to the international mindset of the modern denizens of Lower Saxony that they have elected McAlister -why should that ''annoy you''? or anybody else?
I keep posting about McAllister in the hope that you will give me a grass roots citizens view of how he is viewed in Lower Saxony?-give me an answer and I promise that I won't mention him again in any future posts to you.-okay?