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Old November 20th, 2012, 05:17 PM   #111
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The new order in Europe was defined by Paris Conference ended in Versailles Treaty as well as a individual treaties between neighbouring countries signed in early 20’s.
There was only very few countries in Europe which were not happy with Peace of Versailles and subsequent European Order signified by League of Nation. These countries intended to revise Versailles status quo in Europe.
This was Soviet Union and Germany. Italy could be also included in this group.
As the existing order and status quo could be changed only by war, it is obvious that the revisionist country had common interest from the very beginning thus close cooperation between Weimar Germany and Soviet Union in military matters well before Nazis comes to power.
This cooperation needs overridden the ideological differences. Needs for expansion was stronger than ideology constrains.
These revisionist countries are entirely responsible for WWII as they cooperate to start the hostilities.
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Old November 20th, 2012, 05:21 PM   #112
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Quote:
Originally Posted by sylla1 View Post
I almost forgot it; the Pact of 23 August 1939 naturally included the several times aforementioned secret and now famous protocol on the partition of Eastern Europe between both powers, largley analogous to the Tilsit treaty of 1807 betweem Monsieour Buonaparte & Alexander I.

Click the image to open in full size.

The left figure shows the accord what was signed.

The right one shows what was actually partitioned.

The difference was fundamentally due to the (naturally unrequested) Soviet invasion of Poland once the later's army had been definitely crushed by the Wehrmacht; i.e. more Polish territory now for the Germans in exchange of Lithuania for the Soviets.
Nonsense, it was a result of Treaty of Friendship Cooperation and Demarcation signed by Soviet and Germant 28 September 1939

See below the "naturally not requested " Soviet invasin. Sylla, do not ambarass yorself any more.
Qte“From the beginning, the German government repeatedly asked Vyacheslav Molotov whether the Soviet Union would keep to its side of the partition bargain. The Soviet forces were holding fast along their designated invasion points pending finalization of the five-month-long undeclared war with Japan in the Far East. On 15 September 1939 the Ambassadors Molotov and Shigenori Tōgō completed their agreement ending the conflict, and the Nomonhan cease-fire went into effect on 16 September 1939. Now cleared of any "second front" threat from the Japanese, Soviet premier Joseph Stalin ordered his forces into Poland on 17 September. It was agreed that the USSR would relinquish its interest in the territories between the new border and Warsaw in exchange for inclusion of Lithuania in the Soviet "zone of interest".


Qte “Two weeks after the German invasion, the Soviet Union invaded eastern Poland, coordinating with German forces. On September 21, the Soviets and Germans signed a formal agreement coordinating military movements in Poland, including the "purging" of saboteurs. A joint German-Soviet parade was held in L'vov and Brest. Stalin had decided in August that he was going to liquidate the Polish state, and a German-Soviet meeting in September addressed the future structure of the "Polish region." Despite a warming by the Comintern to Germany, German tensions increased when the Soviet Union stated in September that it must enter Poland to "protect" their ethnic Ukrainian and Belorussian brethren therein from Germany, though Molotov later admitted to German officials that this excuse was necessary because the Soviets could find no other pretext for the Soviet invasion”

Last edited by Edward; November 20th, 2012 at 06:27 PM.
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Old November 20th, 2012, 06:53 PM   #113
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Just to stop your nonsense regarding lack of military cooperation and not requested Soviet intervention, please read this correspondence of German Moscow Embassy



Telegram

No. 253 of September 3
BERLIN, September 3, 1939-6:50 p. m.
Received MOSCOW September 4, 1939-12:30 a. m.

Very Urgent! Exclusively for Ambassador. Strictly secret! For Chief of Mission or his representative personally. Top secret. To be decoded by himself. Strictest secrecy!
We definitely expect to have beaten the Polish Army decisively in a few weeks. We would then keep the area that was established as German sphere of interest at Moscow under military occupation. We would naturally, however, for military reasons, also have to proceed further against such Polish military forces as are at that time located in the Polish area belonging to the Russian sphere of interest.
Please discuss this at once with Molotov and see if the Soviet Union does not consider it desirable for Russian forces to move at the proper time against Polish forces in the Russian sphere of interest and, for their part, to occupy this territory. In our estimation this would be not only a relief for us, but also, in the sense of the Moscow agreements, in the Soviet interest as well.
In this connection please determine whether we may discuss this matter with the officers who have just arrived here and what the Soviet Government intends their position to be.



Telegram

VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 5, 1939-2:30 p. m.
STRICTLY SECRET

No. 264 of September 5
Reference my telegram No. 261 of September 4.
Molotov asked me to call on him today at 12:30 and transmitted to me the following reply of the Soviet Government:
"We agree with you that at a suitable time it will be absolutely necessary for us to start concrete action. We are of the view, however, that this time has not yet come. It is possible that we are mistaken, but it seems to us that through excessive haste we might injure our cause and promote unity among our opponents. We understand that as the operations proceed, one of the parties or both parties might be forced temporarily to cross the line of demarcation between the spheres of interest of the two parties; but such cases must not prevent the strict execution of the plan adopted."
SCHULENBURG


Telegram

URGENT
BERLIN, September 9, 1939-12:50 a. m.
Received Moscow, September 9, 1939-12:10 p. m.
STRICTLY SECRET

No. 300 of September 8
For the Ambassador personally.
Reference your telegram No. 261.
We are of course in accord with the Soviet Government that the validity of agreements arrived at in Moscow is not affected by local extension of our military operations. We must and will defeat the Polish Army wherever we meet it. Nothing in the Moscow arrangements is thereby altered. Military operations are progressing even beyond our expectations. The Polish Army, from all indications, is more or less in a state of dissolution. Under these circumstances, I consider it urgent that you resume the conversation with Molotov regarding the military intentions of the Soviet Government. It may be that the summoning of the Russian Military Attaché to Moscow indicates that decisions are in preparation there. I would therefore ask you to speak to Molotov on the subject again in an appropriate manner and to wire result.
RIBBENTROP







Telegram

VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 14, 1939-6 p. m.
SECRET

No. 350 of September 14
Reference your telegram No. 336 of September 13.
Molotov summoned me today at 4 p. rm. and stated that the Red Arm had reached a state of preparedness sooner than anticipated. Soviet action could therefore take place sooner than he had assumed at our last conversation (see my telegram No. 317 of September 10). For the political motivation of Soviet action (the collapse of Poland and protection of Russian "minorities") it was of the greatest importance not to take action until the governmental center of Poland, the city of Warsaw, had fallen. Molotov therefore asked that he be informed as nearly as possible as to when the capture of Warsaw could be counted on.
Please send instructions.
I would direct your attention to today's article in Pravda, carried by DNB, which will be followed by a similar article in Izvestia tomorrow. The articles serve [to prepare] the political motivation mentioned by Molotov for Soviet intervention.
SCHULENBURG




Telegram


VERY URGENT
BERLIN, September 15, 1939-8:20 p. m.
Received MOSCOW, September 16, 1939-7:15 a. m.
STRICTLY SECRET



No. 360 of September 15
For the Ambassador personally.
I request that you communicate the following to Herr Molotov at once:
1) The destruction of the Polish Army is rapidly approaching its conclusion, as appears from the review of the military situation of September 14 which has already been communicated to you. We count on the occupation of Warsaw in the next few days.
2) We have already stated to the Soviet Government that we consider ourselves bound by the definition of spheres of influence agreed upon in Moscow, entirely apart from purely military operations, and the same applies of course to the future as well.
3) From the communication made to you by Molotov on September 14, we assume that the Soviet Government will take a hand militarily, and that it intends to begin its operation now. We welcome this. The Soviet Government thus relieves us of the necessity of annihilating the remainder of the Polish Army by pursuing it as far as the Russian boundary. Also the question is disposed of in case a Russian intervention did not take place, of whether in the area lying to the east of the German zone of influence a political vacuum might not occur. Since we on our part have no intention of undertaking any political or administrative activities in these areas, apart from what is made necessary by military operations, without such an intervention on the part of the Soviet Government there might be the possibility of the construction of new states there.
4) For the political support of the advance of the Soviet Army we propose the publication of a joint communiqué of the following content:
"In view of the complete collapse of the previous form of government in Poland, the Reich Government and the Government of the U.S.S.R. consider it necessary to bring to an end the intolerable political and economic conditions existing in these territories. They regard it as their joint duty to restore peace and order in these areas which are naturally of interest to them and to bring about a new order by the creation of natural frontiers and viable economic organizations."
5) We assume in proposing such a communiqué that the Soviet Government has already given up the idea, expressed by Molotov in an earlier conversation with you, of taking the threat to the Ukrainian and White Russian populations by Germany as a ground for Soviet action. The assignment of a motive of that sort would be out of the question in practice. It would be directly contrary to the true German intentions, which are confined exclusively to the realization of well-known German spheres of interest. It would also be in contradiction to the arrangements made in Moscow and, finally, would-in opposition to the desire for friendly relations expressed on both sides expose the two States before the whole world as enemies.
6) Since the military operations must be concluded as soon as possible because of the advanced season of the year, we would be gratified if the Soviet Government would set a day and hour on which their army would begin their advance, so that we on our part might govern ourselves accordingly. For the purpose of the necessary coordination of military operations on either side, it is also necessary that a representative of each Government, as well as German and Russian officers on the spot in the area of operations, should have a meeting in order to take the necessary steps, for which meeting we propose to assemble at Bialystok by air.
I request an immediate reply by telegraph. The change in text agreed upon by Gaus with Hilger has already been taken care of.
RIBBENTROP


Telegram

VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 16, 1939.
STRICTLY SECRET

No. 371 of September 16
Reference your telegram No. 360 of September 15.
I saw Molotov at 6 o'clock today and carried out instructions. Molotov declared that military intervention by the Soviet Union was imminent-perhaps even tomorrow or the day after. Stalin was at present in consultation with the military leaders and he would this very night, in the presence of Molotov, give me the day and hour of the Soviet advance.
Molotov added that he would present my communication to his Government but he believed that a joint communiqué was no longer needed; the Soviet Government intended to motivate its procedure as follows: the Polish State had collapsed and no longer existed; therefore all agreements concluded with Poland were void; third powers might try to profit by the chaos which had arisen; the Soviet Union considered itself obligated to intervene to protect its Ukrainian and White Russian brothers and make it possible for these unfortunate people to work in peace.
The Soviet Government intended to publicize the above train of thought by the radio, press, etc., immediately after the Red Army had crossed the border, and at the same time communicate it in an official note to the Polish Ambassador here and to all the missions here.
Molotov conceded that the projected argument of the Soviet Government contained a note that was jarring to German sensibilities but asked that in view of the difficult situation of the Soviet Government we not let a trifle like this stand in our way. The Soviet Government unfortunately saw no possibility of any other motivation, since the Soviet Union had thus far not concerned itself about the plight of its minorities in Poland and had to justify abroad, in some way or other, its present intervention.
In conclusion, Molotov urgently asked for an explanation of what was to become of Vilna. The Soviet Government absolutely wanted to avoid a clash with Lithuania and would, therefore, like to know whether some agreement had been reached with Lithuania regarding the Vilna region, particularly as to who was to occupy the city.
SCHULENBURG



Telegram

VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 17, 1939.
SECRET

No. 372 of September 17
Reference my telegram No. 371 of September 16.
Stalin received me at 2 o'clock at night in the presence of Molotov and Voroshilov and declared that the Red Army would cross the Soviet border this morning at 6 o'clock along the whole line from Polozk to Kamenetz-Podolsk.
In order to avoid incidents, Stalin urgently requested that we see to it that German planes as of today do not fly east of the Bialystok-Brest-Litovsk-Lemberg Line. Soviet planes would begin today to bomb the district east of Lemberg.
I promised to do my best with regard to informing the German Air Force but asked in view of the little time left that Soviet planes not approach the above-mentioned line too closely today.
The Soviet commission will arrive in Bialystok tomorrow or day after tomorrow at the latest.
Stalin read me a note that is to be handed to the Polish Ambassador tonight, to be sent in copy to all the missions in the course of the day and then published. The note contains a justification for the Soviet action. The draft read to me contained three points unacceptable to us. In answer to my objections, Stalin with the utmost readiness so altered the text that the note now seems satisfactory for us. Stalin stated that the issuance of a German-Soviet communiqué could not be considered before two or three days.
In future all military matters that come up are to be handled by Lieutenant General Köstring directly with Voroshilov.
SCHULENBURG






Telegram

VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 17, 1939.
SECRET

No. 372 of September 17
Reference my telegram No. 371 of September 16.
Stalin received me at 2 o'clock at night in the presence of Molotov and Voroshilov and declared that the Red Army would cross the Soviet border this morning at 6 o'clock along the whole line from Polozk to Kamenetz-Podolsk.
In order to avoid incidents, Stalin urgently requested that we see to it that German planes as of today do not fly east of the Bialystok-Brest-Litovsk-Lemberg Line. Soviet planes would begin today to bomb the district east of Lemberg.
I promised to do my best with regard to informing the German Air Force but asked in view of the little time left that Soviet planes not approach the above-mentioned line too closely today.
The Soviet commission will arrive in Bialystok tomorrow or day after tomorrow at the latest.
Stalin read me a note that is to be handed to the Polish Ambassador tonight, to be sent in copy to all the missions in the course of the day and then published. The note contains a justification for the Soviet action. The draft read to me contained three points unacceptable to us. In answer to my objections, Stalin with the utmost readiness so altered the text that the note now seems satisfactory for us. Stalin stated that the issuance of a German-Soviet communiqué could not be considered before two or three days.
In future all military matters that come up are to be handled by Lieutenant General Köstring directly with Voroshilov.
SCHULENBURG
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Old November 20th, 2012, 06:57 PM   #114
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Edward View Post
Nonsense, it was a result of Treaty of Friendship Cooperation and Demarcation signed by Soviet and Germant 28 September 1939

See below the "naturally not requested " Soviet invasin. Sylla, do not ambarass yorself any more.
QteFrom the beginning, the German government repeatedly asked Vyacheslav Molotov whether the Soviet Union would keep to its side of the partition bargain. The Soviet forces were holding fast along their designated invasion points pending finalization of the five-month-long undeclared war with Japan in the Far East. On 15 September 1939 the Ambassadors Molotov and Shigenori Tōgō completed their agreement ending the conflict, and the Nomonhan cease-fire went into effect on 16 September 1939. Now cleared of any "second front" threat from the Japanese, Soviet premier Joseph Stalin ordered his forces into Poland on 17 September. It was agreed that the USSR would relinquish its interest in the territories between the new border and Warsaw in exchange for inclusion of Lithuania in the Soviet "zone of interest".


Qte Two weeks after the German invasion, the Soviet Union invaded eastern Poland, coordinating with German forces. On September 21, the Soviets and Germans signed a formal agreement coordinating military movements in Poland, including the "purging" of saboteurs. A joint German-Soviet parade was held in L'vov and Brest. Stalin had decided in August that he was going to liquidate the Polish state, and a German-Soviet meeting in September addressed the future structure of the "Polish region." Despite a warming by the Comintern to Germany, German tensions increased when the Soviet Union stated in September that it must enter Poland to "protect" their ethnic Ukrainian and Belorussian brethren therein from Germany, though Molotov later admitted to German officials that this excuse was necessary because the Soviets could find no other pretext for the Soviet invasion
Talking about "embarassment"...
... please just check with the minimal care the dates of your exact information,
... how all these negotiations were naturally after the Polish army had been duly crushed by the Wehrmacht,
(more exactly, after the debacle of Bzura was irreversible)
... and then please tell us where exactly any "nonsense" of my previous post might be.

BTW how much time have you been waiting to write that in one of my posts?
It's easier to write that to substantiate, right?

Have you tried decaf?
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Old November 20th, 2012, 07:12 PM   #115
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Edward View Post
Just to stop your nonsense regarding lack of military cooperation and not requested Soviet intervention, please read this correspondence of German Moscow Embassy



Telegram

No. 253 of September 3
BERLIN, September 3, 1939-6:50 p. m.
Received MOSCOW September 4, 1939-12:30 a. m.

Very Urgent! Exclusively for Ambassador. Strictly secret! For Chief of Mission or his representative personally. Top secret. To be decoded by himself. Strictest secrecy!
We definitely expect to have beaten the Polish Army decisively in a few weeks. We would then keep the area that was established as German sphere of interest at Moscow under military occupation. We would naturally, however, for military reasons, also have to proceed further against such Polish military forces as are at that time located in the Polish area belonging to the Russian sphere of interest.
Please discuss this at once with Molotov and see if the Soviet Union does not consider it desirable for Russian forces to move at the proper time against Polish forces in the Russian sphere of interest and, for their part, to occupy this territory. In our estimation this would be not only a relief for us, but also, in the sense of the Moscow agreements, in the Soviet interest as well.
In this connection please determine whether we may discuss this matter with the officers who have just arrived here and what the Soviet Government intends their position to be.



Telegram

VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 5, 1939-2:30 p. m.
STRICTLY SECRET

No. 264 of September 5
Reference my telegram No. 261 of September 4.
Molotov asked me to call on him today at 12:30 and transmitted to me the following reply of the Soviet Government:
"We agree with you that at a suitable time it will be absolutely necessary for us to start concrete action. We are of the view, however, that this time has not yet come. It is possible that we are mistaken, but it seems to us that through excessive haste we might injure our cause and promote unity among our opponents. We understand that as the operations proceed, one of the parties or both parties might be forced temporarily to cross the line of demarcation between the spheres of interest of the two parties; but such cases must not prevent the strict execution of the plan adopted."
SCHULENBURG


Telegram

URGENT
BERLIN, September 9, 1939-12:50 a. m.
Received Moscow, September 9, 1939-12:10 p. m.
STRICTLY SECRET

No. 300 of September 8
For the Ambassador personally.
Reference your telegram No. 261.
We are of course in accord with the Soviet Government that the validity of agreements arrived at in Moscow is not affected by local extension of our military operations. We must and will defeat the Polish Army wherever we meet it. Nothing in the Moscow arrangements is thereby altered. Military operations are progressing even beyond our expectations. The Polish Army, from all indications, is more or less in a state of dissolution. Under these circumstances, I consider it urgent that you resume the conversation with Molotov regarding the military intentions of the Soviet Government. It may be that the summoning of the Russian Military Attaché to Moscow indicates that decisions are in preparation there. I would therefore ask you to speak to Molotov on the subject again in an appropriate manner and to wire result.
RIBBENTROP







Telegram

VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 14, 1939-6 p. m.
SECRET

No. 350 of September 14
Reference your telegram No. 336 of September 13.
Molotov summoned me today at 4 p. rm. and stated that the Red Arm had reached a state of preparedness sooner than anticipated. Soviet action could therefore take place sooner than he had assumed at our last conversation (see my telegram No. 317 of September 10). For the political motivation of Soviet action (the collapse of Poland and protection of Russian "minorities") it was of the greatest importance not to take action until the governmental center of Poland, the city of Warsaw, had fallen. Molotov therefore asked that he be informed as nearly as possible as to when the capture of Warsaw could be counted on.
Please send instructions.
I would direct your attention to today's article in Pravda, carried by DNB, which will be followed by a similar article in Izvestia tomorrow. The articles serve [to prepare] the political motivation mentioned by Molotov for Soviet intervention.
SCHULENBURG




Telegram


VERY URGENT
BERLIN, September 15, 1939-8:20 p. m.
Received MOSCOW, September 16, 1939-7:15 a. m.
STRICTLY SECRET



No. 360 of September 15
For the Ambassador personally.
I request that you communicate the following to Herr Molotov at once:
1) The destruction of the Polish Army is rapidly approaching its conclusion, as appears from the review of the military situation of September 14 which has already been communicated to you. We count on the occupation of Warsaw in the next few days.
2) We have already stated to the Soviet Government that we consider ourselves bound by the definition of spheres of influence agreed upon in Moscow, entirely apart from purely military operations, and the same applies of course to the future as well.
3) From the communication made to you by Molotov on September 14, we assume that the Soviet Government will take a hand militarily, and that it intends to begin its operation now. We welcome this. The Soviet Government thus relieves us of the necessity of annihilating the remainder of the Polish Army by pursuing it as far as the Russian boundary. Also the question is disposed of in case a Russian intervention did not take place, of whether in the area lying to the east of the German zone of influence a political vacuum might not occur. Since we on our part have no intention of undertaking any political or administrative activities in these areas, apart from what is made necessary by military operations, without such an intervention on the part of the Soviet Government there might be the possibility of the construction of new states there.
4) For the political support of the advance of the Soviet Army we propose the publication of a joint communiqué of the following content:
"In view of the complete collapse of the previous form of government in Poland, the Reich Government and the Government of the U.S.S.R. consider it necessary to bring to an end the intolerable political and economic conditions existing in these territories. They regard it as their joint duty to restore peace and order in these areas which are naturally of interest to them and to bring about a new order by the creation of natural frontiers and viable economic organizations."
5) We assume in proposing such a communiqué that the Soviet Government has already given up the idea, expressed by Molotov in an earlier conversation with you, of taking the threat to the Ukrainian and White Russian populations by Germany as a ground for Soviet action. The assignment of a motive of that sort would be out of the question in practice. It would be directly contrary to the true German intentions, which are confined exclusively to the realization of well-known German spheres of interest. It would also be in contradiction to the arrangements made in Moscow and, finally, would-in opposition to the desire for friendly relations expressed on both sides expose the two States before the whole world as enemies.
6) Since the military operations must be concluded as soon as possible because of the advanced season of the year, we would be gratified if the Soviet Government would set a day and hour on which their army would begin their advance, so that we on our part might govern ourselves accordingly. For the purpose of the necessary coordination of military operations on either side, it is also necessary that a representative of each Government, as well as German and Russian officers on the spot in the area of operations, should have a meeting in order to take the necessary steps, for which meeting we propose to assemble at Bialystok by air.
I request an immediate reply by telegraph. The change in text agreed upon by Gaus with Hilger has already been taken care of.
RIBBENTROP


Telegram

VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 16, 1939.
STRICTLY SECRET

No. 371 of September 16
Reference your telegram No. 360 of September 15.
I saw Molotov at 6 o'clock today and carried out instructions. Molotov declared that military intervention by the Soviet Union was imminent-perhaps even tomorrow or the day after. Stalin was at present in consultation with the military leaders and he would this very night, in the presence of Molotov, give me the day and hour of the Soviet advance.
Molotov added that he would present my communication to his Government but he believed that a joint communiqué was no longer needed; the Soviet Government intended to motivate its procedure as follows: the Polish State had collapsed and no longer existed; therefore all agreements concluded with Poland were void; third powers might try to profit by the chaos which had arisen; the Soviet Union considered itself obligated to intervene to protect its Ukrainian and White Russian brothers and make it possible for these unfortunate people to work in peace.
The Soviet Government intended to publicize the above train of thought by the radio, press, etc., immediately after the Red Army had crossed the border, and at the same time communicate it in an official note to the Polish Ambassador here and to all the missions here.
Molotov conceded that the projected argument of the Soviet Government contained a note that was jarring to German sensibilities but asked that in view of the difficult situation of the Soviet Government we not let a trifle like this stand in our way. The Soviet Government unfortunately saw no possibility of any other motivation, since the Soviet Union had thus far not concerned itself about the plight of its minorities in Poland and had to justify abroad, in some way or other, its present intervention.
In conclusion, Molotov urgently asked for an explanation of what was to become of Vilna. The Soviet Government absolutely wanted to avoid a clash with Lithuania and would, therefore, like to know whether some agreement had been reached with Lithuania regarding the Vilna region, particularly as to who was to occupy the city.
SCHULENBURG



Telegram

VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 17, 1939.
SECRET

No. 372 of September 17
Reference my telegram No. 371 of September 16.
Stalin received me at 2 o'clock at night in the presence of Molotov and Voroshilov and declared that the Red Army would cross the Soviet border this morning at 6 o'clock along the whole line from Polozk to Kamenetz-Podolsk.
In order to avoid incidents, Stalin urgently requested that we see to it that German planes as of today do not fly east of the Bialystok-Brest-Litovsk-Lemberg Line. Soviet planes would begin today to bomb the district east of Lemberg.
I promised to do my best with regard to informing the German Air Force but asked in view of the little time left that Soviet planes not approach the above-mentioned line too closely today.
The Soviet commission will arrive in Bialystok tomorrow or day after tomorrow at the latest.
Stalin read me a note that is to be handed to the Polish Ambassador tonight, to be sent in copy to all the missions in the course of the day and then published. The note contains a justification for the Soviet action. The draft read to me contained three points unacceptable to us. In answer to my objections, Stalin with the utmost readiness so altered the text that the note now seems satisfactory for us. Stalin stated that the issuance of a German-Soviet communiqué could not be considered before two or three days.
In future all military matters that come up are to be handled by Lieutenant General Köstring directly with Voroshilov.
SCHULENBURG






Telegram

VERY URGENT
Moscow, September 17, 1939.
SECRET

No. 372 of September 17
Reference my telegram No. 371 of September 16.
Stalin received me at 2 o'clock at night in the presence of Molotov and Voroshilov and declared that the Red Army would cross the Soviet border this morning at 6 o'clock along the whole line from Polozk to Kamenetz-Podolsk.
In order to avoid incidents, Stalin urgently requested that we see to it that German planes as of today do not fly east of the Bialystok-Brest-Litovsk-Lemberg Line. Soviet planes would begin today to bomb the district east of Lemberg.
I promised to do my best with regard to informing the German Air Force but asked in view of the little time left that Soviet planes not approach the above-mentioned line too closely today.
The Soviet commission will arrive in Bialystok tomorrow or day after tomorrow at the latest.
Stalin read me a note that is to be handed to the Polish Ambassador tonight, to be sent in copy to all the missions in the course of the day and then published. The note contains a justification for the Soviet action. The draft read to me contained three points unacceptable to us. In answer to my objections, Stalin with the utmost readiness so altered the text that the note now seems satisfactory for us. Stalin stated that the issuance of a German-Soviet communiqué could not be considered before two or three days.
In future all military matters that come up are to be handled by Lieutenant General Köstring directly with Voroshilov.
SCHULENBURG
I'm glad that my posted sources of the other thread were eventually read by you and that they were useful for your posts.
http://www.historum.com/war-military...allies-26.html

As you may understand, I have already read what I post; but thanks.

In any case, is good to verify that the relevant primary sources still exclude any military alliance, exactly the same as the day I posted them first.
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Old November 20th, 2012, 07:13 PM   #116

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You bet they did. They had an early alliance with Germany and assisted him in attacking Poland.

but then Hitler screwed them and invaded.

Hitler was a dick and make a lot of broken promises.
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Old November 20th, 2012, 07:21 PM   #117
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Currahee View Post
You bet they did. They had an early alliance with Germany and assisted him in attacking Poland.

but then Hitler screwed them and invaded.

Hitler was a dick and make a lot of broken promises.
Nope, not exactly.

I mean, of course Herr Hitler was "a dick" and of course he did break a lot of promises.

But they didn't have any "early alliance"; their non-aggression pact was signed just nine days before the war.

And "they" didn't "assist" the Germans in attacking Poland; for such goal, Germany didn't require any assistance.

The coward & opportunistic Soviet invasion was done when the brave Polish army had already been duly & entirely crushed by the Wehrmacht.

For better or for worse, had the Soviets not invaded as they did, all Poland would have been inevitably occupied by the Germans.

As it was eventually the case some 22 months later at Barbarossa, of course



Just check out some of the previous posts of this thread.
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Old November 20th, 2012, 07:28 PM   #118
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Quote:
Originally Posted by sylla1 View Post
I'm glad that my posted sources of the other thread were eventually read by you and that they were useful for your posts.
http://www.historum.com/war-military...allies-26.html

As you may understand, I have already read what I post; but thanks.

In any case, is good to verify that the relevant primary sources still exclude any military alliance, exactly the same as the day I posted them first.
Sure, Sylla. You are creating new History. By the way, i did not use the same source but it is irelevant anyway.
So you still can not read anything regarding military cooperations in these dispatches? I can believe this. A few extracts below;

In order to avoid incidents, Stalin urgently requested that we see to it that German planes as of today do not fly east of the Bialystok-Brest-Litovsk-Lemberg Line. Soviet planes would begin today to bomb the district east of Lemberg


Reference my telegram No. 371 of September 16.
Stalin received me at 2 o'clock at night in the presence of Molotov and Voroshilov and declared that the Red Army would cross the Soviet border this morning at 6 o'clock along the whole line from Polozk to Kamenetz-Podolsk.

Reference your telegram No. 360 of September 15.
I saw Molotov at 6 o'clock today and carried out instructions. Molotov declared that military intervention by the Soviet Union was imminent-perhaps even tomorrow or the day after. Stalin was at present in consultation with the military leaders and he would this very night, in the presence of Molotov, give me the day and hour of the Soviet advance.

No. 360 of September 15
For the Ambassador personally.
I request that you communicate the following to Herr Molotov at once:
1) The destruction of the Polish Army is rapidly approaching its conclusion, as appears from the review of the military situation of September 14 which has already been communicated to you. We count on the occupation of Warsaw in the next few days.
2) We have already stated to the Soviet Government that we consider ourselves bound by the definition of spheres of influence agreed upon in Moscow, entirely apart from purely military operations, and the same applies of course to the future as well.
3) From the communication made to you by Molotov on September 14, we assume that the Soviet Government will take a hand militarily, and that it intends to begin its operation now. We welcome this. The Soviet Government thus relieves us of the necessity of annihilating the remainder of the Polish Army by pursuing it as far as the Russian boundary. Also the question is disposed of in case a Russian intervention did not take place, of whether in the area lying to the east of the German zone of influence a political vacuum might not occur. Since we on our part have no intention of undertaking any political or administrative activities in these areas, apart from what is made necessary by military operations, without such an intervention on the part of the Soviet Government there might be the possibility of the construction of new states there.



No. 350 of September 14
Reference your telegram No. 336 of September 13.
Molotov summoned me today at 4 p. rm. and stated that the Red Arm had reached a state of preparedness sooner than anticipated. Soviet action could therefore take place sooner than he had assumed at our last conversation (see my telegram No. 317 of September 10). For the political motivation of Soviet action (the collapse of Poland and protection of Russian "minorities") it was of the greatest importance not to take action until the governmental center of Poland, the city of Warsaw, had fallen. Molotov therefore asked that he be informed as nearly as possible as to when the capture of Warsaw could be counted on.

Reference your telegram No. 261.
Under these circumstances, I consider it urgent that you resume the conversation with Molotov regarding the military intentions of the Soviet Government.

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Old November 20th, 2012, 07:43 PM   #119
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Edward View Post
Sure, Sylla. You are creating new History. By the way, i did not use the same source but it is irelevant anyway.
So you still can not read anything regarding military cooperations in these dispatches? I can believe this. A few extracts below;

In order to avoid incidents, Stalin urgently requested that we see to it that German planes as of today do not fly east of the Bialystok-Brest-Litovsk-Lemberg Line. Soviet planes would begin today to bomb the district east of Lemberg


Reference my telegram No. 371 of September 16.
Stalin received me at 2 o'clock at night in the presence of Molotov and Voroshilov and declared that the Red Army would cross the Soviet border this morning at 6 o'clock along the whole line from Polozk to Kamenetz-Podolsk.

Reference your telegram No. 360 of September 15.
I saw Molotov at 6 o'clock today and carried out instructions. Molotov declared that military intervention by the Soviet Union was imminent-perhaps even tomorrow or the day after. Stalin was at present in consultation with the military leaders and he would this very night, in the presence of Molotov, give me the day and hour of the Soviet advance.

No. 360 of September 15
For the Ambassador personally.
I request that you communicate the following to Herr Molotov at once:
1) The destruction of the Polish Army is rapidly approaching its conclusion, as appears from the review of the military situation of September 14 which has already been communicated to you. We count on the occupation of Warsaw in the next few days.
2) We have already stated to the Soviet Government that we consider ourselves bound by the definition of spheres of influence agreed upon in Moscow, entirely apart from purely military operations, and the same applies of course to the future as well.
3) From the communication made to you by Molotov on September 14, we assume that the Soviet Government will take a hand militarily, and that it intends to begin its operation now. We welcome this. The Soviet Government thus relieves us of the necessity of annihilating the remainder of the Polish Army by pursuing it as far as the Russian boundary. Also the question is disposed of in case a Russian intervention did not take place, of whether in the area lying to the east of the German zone of influence a political vacuum might not occur. Since we on our part have no intention of undertaking any political or administrative activities in these areas, apart from what is made necessary by military operations, without such an intervention on the part of the Soviet Government there might be the possibility of the construction of new states there.



No. 350 of September 14
Reference your telegram No. 336 of September 13.
Molotov summoned me today at 4 p. rm. and stated that the Red Arm had reached a state of preparedness sooner than anticipated. Soviet action could therefore take place sooner than he had assumed at our last conversation (see my telegram No. 317 of September 10). For the political motivation of Soviet action (the collapse of Poland and protection of Russian "minorities") it was of the greatest importance not to take action until the governmental center of Poland, the city of Warsaw, had fallen. Molotov therefore asked that he be informed as nearly as possible as to when the capture of Warsaw could be counted on.

Reference your telegram No. 261.
Under these circumstances, I consider it urgent that you resume the conversation with Molotov regarding the military intentions of the Soviet Government.

Let me guess; are you still proudly patriotically pretending that even after the portentous debacle of the brave Polish army at Buzra the German victory could have even remotely not been a fact yet?

Are you seriously pretending that in any of those endless telegrams posted here for no apparent reason there might be any single line where the Germans were asking for the "assistance" of the Soviets due to their inability to continue mercilessly beating to death at pleasure the brave Poles?

Being such the case, please don't be so shy any more and share the specific relevant line alone with us.
Thanks in advance.
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Old November 20th, 2012, 07:54 PM   #120

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I guess USSR wanted a temp. truce with germany to take poland and develop their war capacities
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