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Rhine Campaign, 1702
The year was 1702. Villars had lost six months with the French host sitting between Metz and Strasbourg while the indecisive Marechal Catinat vacillated in Alsace, unwilling to stir in the face of the Habsburg-Imperials under the Markgraf von Baden. Having mobilized his forces earlier in the year, the latter had debouched across the Rhine River in the neighbourhood of Speyer and Germersheim, cut Landau off from its communications, and besieged the fortress. Catinat stood idly by as the invaders seized Lauterbourg, Wissembourg, and Haguenau, barring his path of relief while making further headway into the region.
Unable to cope with his lackluster superior, Villars wrote to the court, barraging them with letters bitterly complaining about Catinat and criticizing his command. Yet, his tirades came to naught, for King Louis XIV sided with his marechal over this matter rather than the inexperienced and unproven Villars. However, with nothing being achieved, the minister of war, Chamillart, would later write to Villars in late August, informing him that the king had openly admitted that Catinat was wrong in not pursuing a more vigorous campaign and that Villars had been right.
He therefore received new orders from Louis XIV commanding him to lead an invasion army into the Empire together with Max Emanuel, the Elector of Bavaria, who he was to join forces with. This offensive plan was well-suited to the nature of Villars, but there was one major problem. Both the French lieutenant general and the Elector were not predisposed towards one another. Villars knew Max Emanuel to be a jealous man, while the latter viewed him as vainglorious. Nevertheless, Louis XIV ignored this possible clash of personalities because he believed that Villars was the only one ably suited to working with such a strong character as the Elector.
While plans were being drawn up for the offensive, Landau was weakening and due to fall. Yet, seeing an opportunity with Baden and the Imperials focusing on the Rhine, where Catinat could hold head to them, Villars wrote to Chamillart his strategic vision for the upcoming campaign. First, the French were to force a passage by way of Huningue on the southern bend of the Rhine, where they were to make a junction with the Bavarians. From there, they were to march rapidly along the right bank of the Danube River, assuring their line of retreat and opening secondary communications with the Army of Italy under Marechal Vendome.
They were then to capture Ulm, Donauworth, and Ingolstadt, clearing the Danube while simultaneously establishing supply depots to support their offensive. From there, the Franco-Bavarian cavalry were to undertake independent missions deep into the heart of Austria and scourge the countryside, bringing war to the Imperial heartland, their economic centers along the great river, as well as threatening their capital and strategic center of communications. Should Baden be forced to vacate the Rhine theater and fall back to defend the Imperial holdings, then the French Army of the Rhine under Catinat should be free to launch an all out offensive, retaking the places which had been lost and pressing across the river to seize upon the enemy posts left behind in their wake.
It was definitely an audacious plan, but one far too ahead of its time. Though, if one would recall my work on Moreau, it was the exact axis of operation which he had undertaken in 1800, and also one Napoleon himself would utilize in 1805 and 1809. Such an operation would require the greatest cooperation and diligence from various armies beyond that of Villars and the Elector, but also Catinat's Army of the Rhine and Vendome's Army of Italy, as aforementioned. Stuck fighting a multi-front war with the Flanders and Spanish theaters still open, France did not have the resources to pool into such a grand undertaking. Yet, Villars' strategic vision was clear. If he had possessed a vast army and the logistical means to victual it, a push down the Danube in this fashion would not only threaten the Imperial heartland, but also completely unravel the communications of their own armies on the Rhine under Baden and in Italy under Prinz Eugen by seizing the strategic central position.
However, before it could even take off, bad news had arrived from Landau, as the fortress finally capitulated on September 9. Now, the Markgraf von Baden was free to manoeuvre and he would not sit idly by while allowing his opponents to carry out their plans. Hearing news of Baden moving south, Max Emanuel immediately withdrew the corps under the Comte d'Arco who he had dispatched west to make a junction with Villars, fearing an attack on his own territories in Bavaria. He this did without informing the French lieutenant general and, to compound upon this issue, a messenger carrying the news to Catinat had been apprehended by Imperial riders, who passed this crucial piece of intelligence on to their commander.
Baden now knew that Villars would not be receiving any aid from the Bavarians. Having left 3,500 infantry to garrison Landau and a corps of observation behind the Lauter River to screen his movements against Catinat on September 20, he recrossed the Rhine and descended down the east bank to Kehl, opposite Strasbourg. Though Villars had sent numerous requests to Catinat to demonstrate against the Imperial lines along the Lauter in order to distract them for him to affect his junction with the Bavarians (as he was still uninformed as to their countermarch back home), the marechal had vacated the environs of Strasbourg and went into quarters. This allowed Baden to leverage his central position unmolested and march for Friedlingen on the east bank of the Rhine, opposite Huningue.
By September 29, Villars was already at Friedlingen and constructing a bridge across the Rhine. The Imperials had floated several barges packed with stones downriver, seeking to destroy the French pontoons, while Baden had dispatched 4,800 horsemen under Furstenberg ahead to hold head to Villars at Friedlingen, who overestimated the enemy numbers as 7,000 strong and felt that he did not have enough men to force a crossing, as his corps was still strung out on the march and would not fully concentrate at Huningue until October 1. Still believing that the Bavarians would come to succour him, his hopes were dashed when a message finally arrived to his quarters, informing Villars that the Elector would not come to his aid.
The furious lieutenant general was only assuaged by word from the king, delivered from Chamillart, that he had been granted 5,000 infantry and 2,400 cavalry which were moving up to reinforce him. Having arrived at Friedlingen on October 4, Baden set to work further entrenching his position and making it all but impossible for Villars to risk a crossing in the face of the enemy. Yet, the lieutenant general was nothing if not adaptable. Sending his new corps of reinforcements ahead to Neuenberg, he continued preparations for a crossing at Huningue on October 11 while also having his men busy themselves to distract the Imperials. The very next night, his reinforcements had arrived and captured Neuenberg in a coup de main.
Meanwhile, assured as to the inactivity of Catinat, Baden had called down Styrum, his subordinate holding the Lauter, to make a junction with his main army at Friedlingen. It was at noon on October 13 that Furstenberg informed his chief that the French had captured Neuenberg and, seeing that this was true, the Imperial feldmarschall made haste to stop Villars. Furstenberg was ordered to command the rearguard at Binzen, just a short trip from Friedlingen, while the rest of the army moved to block the French at Neuenberg. Having fooled Baden into believing that he was going to outflank the Imperials via Neuenberg to bypass Friedlingen, Villars watched as they abandoned their entrenchments and marched away. Under the cover of the night, he moved his forces into position and crossed the Rhine, shunting aside the few detachments left to guard the enemy earthworks in front of Friedlingen.
By early light of October 14, the French were on the other bank with their main army, which numbered 12,500 infantry and 4,080 cavalry (some 2,500 men were left behind to guard the bridgehead at Huningue). Villars had outmanoeuvred Baden and was now moving to fall upon his rear with the weight of superior numbers. Forced to swing his army around, Baden was only able to bring to bear 9,500 infantry and 4,560 cavalry to confront the French, the rest left to hold head to the French reinforcements at Neuenberg or strung out on the march. The exhausted Imperials, who had been marching all night were now faced with the prospect of facing a more numerous foe who were also in possession of their field fortifications.
Aligning his horsemen in the open plain such that their left faced Fort Friedlingen and their right was anchored against the nearby hills, Villars led the columns of his infantry up the slopes to try and outflank the Imperials along the forested ridges, lined with grapevines. Moving to attend to his left, Baden sent his infantry up the heights to check the French in turn, hoping to blast them with concentrated volleys as they left the cover of the woods. Then, personally leading his 36 squadrons, he charged at the head of the horsemen, but the Imperials were thrown back by de Magnac's vigorous countercharge. Yet, they did not venture far in pursuit, suffering heavy enfilade fire from the guns of Fort Friedlingen.
Back in the wooded hills, Villars was feeding his infantry into the fray, who gave a few scattered volleys before closing in with the bayonet. However, as they debouched from the broken terrain, they found their ranks disordered and thrown into confusion by Furstenberg, who was detached with the Bayreuth Dragoons to charge down the French as they ran out from the trees. In an instant, the whole lot was routed and Villars had to personally rally his men as they fled back into hiding behind the dense foliage. Throwing himself into the thick of battle, he cried, "Where is your courage? The battle is already won! Cry with me, 'Vive le Roi!'" but even this could not stem the tide of fleeing men. Then, hopping down from his horse, Villars picked up a standard, drew his pistol, and charged out against the advancing line of Imperial infantry.
This had an immediate effect on the men who rallied by the company and, following the example of their brave commander, returned to the fray. Under the sheer weight of numbers, the Imperial infantry snapped and were turned to flight. However, covered by their horsemen and with the French too exhausted to pursue, the battle was an indecisive affair. It was only later in the day that Fort Friedlingen fell to an assault by scaling ladders. The French had taken 2,550 killed & wounded, while the Imperials had suffered similarly at 2,874 killed & wounded. Though, aside from the price in lives, Villars had acquired all of the enemy's ammunition carts and a considerable number of provisions from their baggage train, together with 11 guns and 30 standards. Without any hesitation, Louis XIV awarded Villars his marechal's baton for this fine victory.
The year was 1702. Villars had lost six months with the French host sitting between Metz and Strasbourg while the indecisive Marechal Catinat vacillated in Alsace, unwilling to stir in the face of the Habsburg-Imperials under the Markgraf von Baden. Having mobilized his forces earlier in the year, the latter had debouched across the Rhine River in the neighbourhood of Speyer and Germersheim, cut Landau off from its communications, and besieged the fortress. Catinat stood idly by as the invaders seized Lauterbourg, Wissembourg, and Haguenau, barring his path of relief while making further headway into the region.
Unable to cope with his lackluster superior, Villars wrote to the court, barraging them with letters bitterly complaining about Catinat and criticizing his command. Yet, his tirades came to naught, for King Louis XIV sided with his marechal over this matter rather than the inexperienced and unproven Villars. However, with nothing being achieved, the minister of war, Chamillart, would later write to Villars in late August, informing him that the king had openly admitted that Catinat was wrong in not pursuing a more vigorous campaign and that Villars had been right.
He therefore received new orders from Louis XIV commanding him to lead an invasion army into the Empire together with Max Emanuel, the Elector of Bavaria, who he was to join forces with. This offensive plan was well-suited to the nature of Villars, but there was one major problem. Both the French lieutenant general and the Elector were not predisposed towards one another. Villars knew Max Emanuel to be a jealous man, while the latter viewed him as vainglorious. Nevertheless, Louis XIV ignored this possible clash of personalities because he believed that Villars was the only one ably suited to working with such a strong character as the Elector.
While plans were being drawn up for the offensive, Landau was weakening and due to fall. Yet, seeing an opportunity with Baden and the Imperials focusing on the Rhine, where Catinat could hold head to them, Villars wrote to Chamillart his strategic vision for the upcoming campaign. First, the French were to force a passage by way of Huningue on the southern bend of the Rhine, where they were to make a junction with the Bavarians. From there, they were to march rapidly along the right bank of the Danube River, assuring their line of retreat and opening secondary communications with the Army of Italy under Marechal Vendome.
They were then to capture Ulm, Donauworth, and Ingolstadt, clearing the Danube while simultaneously establishing supply depots to support their offensive. From there, the Franco-Bavarian cavalry were to undertake independent missions deep into the heart of Austria and scourge the countryside, bringing war to the Imperial heartland, their economic centers along the great river, as well as threatening their capital and strategic center of communications. Should Baden be forced to vacate the Rhine theater and fall back to defend the Imperial holdings, then the French Army of the Rhine under Catinat should be free to launch an all out offensive, retaking the places which had been lost and pressing across the river to seize upon the enemy posts left behind in their wake.
It was definitely an audacious plan, but one far too ahead of its time. Though, if one would recall my work on Moreau, it was the exact axis of operation which he had undertaken in 1800, and also one Napoleon himself would utilize in 1805 and 1809. Such an operation would require the greatest cooperation and diligence from various armies beyond that of Villars and the Elector, but also Catinat's Army of the Rhine and Vendome's Army of Italy, as aforementioned. Stuck fighting a multi-front war with the Flanders and Spanish theaters still open, France did not have the resources to pool into such a grand undertaking. Yet, Villars' strategic vision was clear. If he had possessed a vast army and the logistical means to victual it, a push down the Danube in this fashion would not only threaten the Imperial heartland, but also completely unravel the communications of their own armies on the Rhine under Baden and in Italy under Prinz Eugen by seizing the strategic central position.
However, before it could even take off, bad news had arrived from Landau, as the fortress finally capitulated on September 9. Now, the Markgraf von Baden was free to manoeuvre and he would not sit idly by while allowing his opponents to carry out their plans. Hearing news of Baden moving south, Max Emanuel immediately withdrew the corps under the Comte d'Arco who he had dispatched west to make a junction with Villars, fearing an attack on his own territories in Bavaria. He this did without informing the French lieutenant general and, to compound upon this issue, a messenger carrying the news to Catinat had been apprehended by Imperial riders, who passed this crucial piece of intelligence on to their commander.
Baden now knew that Villars would not be receiving any aid from the Bavarians. Having left 3,500 infantry to garrison Landau and a corps of observation behind the Lauter River to screen his movements against Catinat on September 20, he recrossed the Rhine and descended down the east bank to Kehl, opposite Strasbourg. Though Villars had sent numerous requests to Catinat to demonstrate against the Imperial lines along the Lauter in order to distract them for him to affect his junction with the Bavarians (as he was still uninformed as to their countermarch back home), the marechal had vacated the environs of Strasbourg and went into quarters. This allowed Baden to leverage his central position unmolested and march for Friedlingen on the east bank of the Rhine, opposite Huningue.
By September 29, Villars was already at Friedlingen and constructing a bridge across the Rhine. The Imperials had floated several barges packed with stones downriver, seeking to destroy the French pontoons, while Baden had dispatched 4,800 horsemen under Furstenberg ahead to hold head to Villars at Friedlingen, who overestimated the enemy numbers as 7,000 strong and felt that he did not have enough men to force a crossing, as his corps was still strung out on the march and would not fully concentrate at Huningue until October 1. Still believing that the Bavarians would come to succour him, his hopes were dashed when a message finally arrived to his quarters, informing Villars that the Elector would not come to his aid.
The furious lieutenant general was only assuaged by word from the king, delivered from Chamillart, that he had been granted 5,000 infantry and 2,400 cavalry which were moving up to reinforce him. Having arrived at Friedlingen on October 4, Baden set to work further entrenching his position and making it all but impossible for Villars to risk a crossing in the face of the enemy. Yet, the lieutenant general was nothing if not adaptable. Sending his new corps of reinforcements ahead to Neuenberg, he continued preparations for a crossing at Huningue on October 11 while also having his men busy themselves to distract the Imperials. The very next night, his reinforcements had arrived and captured Neuenberg in a coup de main.
Meanwhile, assured as to the inactivity of Catinat, Baden had called down Styrum, his subordinate holding the Lauter, to make a junction with his main army at Friedlingen. It was at noon on October 13 that Furstenberg informed his chief that the French had captured Neuenberg and, seeing that this was true, the Imperial feldmarschall made haste to stop Villars. Furstenberg was ordered to command the rearguard at Binzen, just a short trip from Friedlingen, while the rest of the army moved to block the French at Neuenberg. Having fooled Baden into believing that he was going to outflank the Imperials via Neuenberg to bypass Friedlingen, Villars watched as they abandoned their entrenchments and marched away. Under the cover of the night, he moved his forces into position and crossed the Rhine, shunting aside the few detachments left to guard the enemy earthworks in front of Friedlingen.
By early light of October 14, the French were on the other bank with their main army, which numbered 12,500 infantry and 4,080 cavalry (some 2,500 men were left behind to guard the bridgehead at Huningue). Villars had outmanoeuvred Baden and was now moving to fall upon his rear with the weight of superior numbers. Forced to swing his army around, Baden was only able to bring to bear 9,500 infantry and 4,560 cavalry to confront the French, the rest left to hold head to the French reinforcements at Neuenberg or strung out on the march. The exhausted Imperials, who had been marching all night were now faced with the prospect of facing a more numerous foe who were also in possession of their field fortifications.
Aligning his horsemen in the open plain such that their left faced Fort Friedlingen and their right was anchored against the nearby hills, Villars led the columns of his infantry up the slopes to try and outflank the Imperials along the forested ridges, lined with grapevines. Moving to attend to his left, Baden sent his infantry up the heights to check the French in turn, hoping to blast them with concentrated volleys as they left the cover of the woods. Then, personally leading his 36 squadrons, he charged at the head of the horsemen, but the Imperials were thrown back by de Magnac's vigorous countercharge. Yet, they did not venture far in pursuit, suffering heavy enfilade fire from the guns of Fort Friedlingen.
Back in the wooded hills, Villars was feeding his infantry into the fray, who gave a few scattered volleys before closing in with the bayonet. However, as they debouched from the broken terrain, they found their ranks disordered and thrown into confusion by Furstenberg, who was detached with the Bayreuth Dragoons to charge down the French as they ran out from the trees. In an instant, the whole lot was routed and Villars had to personally rally his men as they fled back into hiding behind the dense foliage. Throwing himself into the thick of battle, he cried, "Where is your courage? The battle is already won! Cry with me, 'Vive le Roi!'" but even this could not stem the tide of fleeing men. Then, hopping down from his horse, Villars picked up a standard, drew his pistol, and charged out against the advancing line of Imperial infantry.
This had an immediate effect on the men who rallied by the company and, following the example of their brave commander, returned to the fray. Under the sheer weight of numbers, the Imperial infantry snapped and were turned to flight. However, covered by their horsemen and with the French too exhausted to pursue, the battle was an indecisive affair. It was only later in the day that Fort Friedlingen fell to an assault by scaling ladders. The French had taken 2,550 killed & wounded, while the Imperials had suffered similarly at 2,874 killed & wounded. Though, aside from the price in lives, Villars had acquired all of the enemy's ammunition carts and a considerable number of provisions from their baggage train, together with 11 guns and 30 standards. Without any hesitation, Louis XIV awarded Villars his marechal's baton for this fine victory.
