The Men and Women behind Roman Emperors

Tiberius Claudius Aurelius Aristobulus

In November 284 in Asia Minor the imperial army in the east was returning from its war with Persia when it discovered their young emperor Numerian dead and decaying in his litter. Among those aware of whatever had happened, there had been negotiations and politicking, with those involved including Numerian's praetorian prefect/father-in-law Flavius Aper, and the commander of Numerian's domestici (household troops), Diocles (the future Diocletian), among others, with pro-Diocletianic sources claiming that Aper sought to secure the emperorship for himself. Ultimately, after the emperor's death was discovered, Diocles was presented before a military assembly and declared emperor by the army. The new emperor changed his name to the Romanized Diocletianus, and standing on the podium before the assembled troops, he then accused Aper of having killed the emperor and immediately slew him with his own sword, in the process perhaps removing a co-conspirator. This was all in spite of the fact that Numerian's brother Carinus was still emperor and was currently ruling in the west and overseeing affairs in war-torn Gaul. News of Numerian's death and Diocletian's usurpation travelled, and Carinus' praetorian prefect Sabinus Julianus took matters into his own hands, launching his own usurpation from Italy. Julianus' usurpation was a fleeting affair. He fought Carinus near Verona in Italy and was soundly defeated and killed. However, the usurpation of Julianus meant that Carinus needed a new praetorian prefect, and he appointed the equestrian-ranked Tiberius Claudius Aurelius Aristobulus to assume this role.

Knowing he would also need to face Diocletian in battle, whose battle-hardened army had (under Carus) sacked Ctesiphon only two years prior, Carinus sought to secure Aristobulus' loyalty. For the year 285 Carinus assumed the ordinary consulship and made Aristobulus his consular colleague. In receiving the office of consul, Aristobulus was also admitted into the senatorial order. Diocletian, meanwhile, had secured the loyalty of Roman Syria, Anatolia and Egypt.

In spring 285 Carinus marched against Diocletian, who had entered the Balkans with his army. Carinus himself was intimidating. He had already defeated two usurpers during his reign (Sabinus Julianus and, in 283, Marcus Aurelius Julianus), and had campaigned with success in Britain and on the Rhine. But Diocletian was not to be underestimated. As already noted, his army was also experienced, and he had secured sources of food and trained manpower in the east. He was a career officer whom Zonaras claims had been dux of Moesia (12.31). Zonaras also relates the following about Diocletian's seizure of power (12.30): 'For the army chose Diocletian sovereign, since he was there at the time and had exhibited many acts of courage against the Persians.' This refers to Carus' campaign of 283. But Diocletian's greatest strength was not his military leadership, but rather the fact that he was a shrewd politician. That he, the commander of the domestici, should have been chosen emperor by his fellow officers in the eastern imperial army, some of whom ought to have been more senior than him, suggests that his colleagues had hoped to control him. As the future would show, Diocletian was an exceptionally proactive ruler who very much played his own game when it came to power-sharing, imperial succession, administration, the economy, religion, self-representation and ceremonial.

When the armies of Carinus and Diocletian faced one another near the river Margus near Viminacium, Carinus' army gained the upper hand. Sources vary, but either Carinus won the battle or was in the process of winning the battle when he was struck down by his own soldiers, or, per the Epitome de Caesaribus, a tribune (38.8). The hostile sources, influenced by Diocletianic propaganda, claim that Carinus was killed because he had defiled the wives of his officers. Perhaps this is true, but it is a literary trope often applied by Romans to rulers whom posterity has decided were tyrants, i.e. those who had lost the power struggle. In any case, the tribune that slew Carinus was not necessarily the only person involved in the conspiracy. The future emperor Constantius I was the governor of Dalmatia during the period of Carus and his sons (Origo 1.1; HA, Carus 17.6). He soon received a prestigious military career under Diocletian and his future co-emperor Maximian, in c. 288 he married Maximian's stepdaughter Theodora, and in 293 he was co-opted into their imperial college as Caesar, before being promoted to Augustus in 305. Could it be that Constantius made a friend of Diocletian (and Maximian) by switching sides during the civil war with Carinus? If Constantius had switched sides as the governor of Dalmatia, this would have been strategically important, since Dalmatia was very near to Moesia, where the battle between Diocletian and Carinus was fought, and would have threatened Carinus' line of retreat. Indeed, Constantius eventually named a son of his Dalmatius, seemingly in honour of the appointment he had held around the time of this conflict.

Likewise, Aristobulus appears to have betrayed his emperor. After Diocletian won the civil war, he allowed Aristobulus to retain the offices of praetorian prefect and consul, with Diocletian replacing Carinus as his consular colleague. To allow Aristobulus to retain an office as powerful as the praetorian prefecture is telling. Aurelius Victor reports that this was because of the services (officia) that he had rendered (Caes. 39.14). It would appear that, despite Carinus' attempts at securing the loyalty of his new praetorian prefect, Aristobulus turned against his master in favour of Diocletian.

At some point before 290 Aristobulus ceased to hold the praetorian prefecture, but Diocletian did not cease to present him with honours. He held the prestigious proconsulship of Africa for an exceptionally long tenure of four years (290-294), and he was then rewarded with the urban prefecture (295-296). These two posts represent the pinnacle of honours that could be awarded to a senator short of giving him a second ordinary consulship (a rarity for anyone who wasn't an emperor or Caesar).

What happened next is not known, and as should be clear, we do not actually know very much about Aristobulus. But when we relate the offices he held between 284 and 296 to Diocletian's usurpation and the subsequent civil war, we get a hint of how important he must have been to the course of history.

Flavius Merobaudes (1 of 2)

Merobaudes first appears in history as one of the military officers who, in 363, at the end of a major war with Persia, escorted the body of Julian to its resting place in Tarsus (Philostorgius, HE 8.1. The other commander was Julian's cousin and future usurper Procopius: Ammianus 25.9.12). His name is Germanic, and he may have been a Romanized Frank. He doesn't reappear in history until 375, when he is Valentinian I's Magister Peditum (Master of Infantry), but he could have received the post as early as 372, when the last known Magister Peditum, Severus, is last attested. By 375 he was already a powerful figure, as events were to show.

In 375 Valentinian sent Merobaudes across the middle Danube at the head of an advance force, with the Comes Rei Militaris Sebastianus as a subordinate commander, to plunder and burn the lands of the Quadi as part of a punitive response to their raids (Ammianus 30.5.13; Zosimus 4.17.1). Zosimus notes that Merobaudes was a man of 'the greatest military experience'. Valentinian himself made Aquincum his base, and then proceeded into Quadi territory from another direction. Valentinian then went into winter quarters at Brigetio, and in November received an embassy from the Quadi seeking peace. Angered by what he perceived to be the excuses of the envoys, Valentinian flew into a rage and subsequently died of an apoplectic fit.

At the time of Valentinian's death there were two other emperors, but both were far from Pannonia: his brother Valens was in Syria and ruled the east, and his 16-year old son Gratian was based in Trier in Gaul. The absence of a present emperor could have invited military rebellion and usurpation (Ammianus 30.10.1) and could be exploited by Rome's enemies to the north of the Danube (Zosimus 4.19.1). The officers present acted with alacrity, and it was Merobaudes who took the leading role in what followed. Ammianus relates what happened (30.10.2-6):

'When affairs were in this critical state, and all were equally in dread, and likely to share in whatever dangers that might arise, as if in the same boat, it was agreed in accordance with the advice of the highest officers, after having torn down the bridge, which they had previously built under necessity when invading the enemy's territory, that Merobaudes at once should be summoned by order of Valentinian when he was still alive. He, being a sharp-witted man, either guessing what had happened, or perhaps having learned it from the messenger who summoned him, and suspecting that the Gallic troops [the army in Pannonia] would violate the terms of peace, pretended that an order-ticket had been sent to him to return with the messenger, in order to guard the banks of the Rhine because the barbarians were getting wilder. And Sebastianus, who was still unaware of the emperor's death, he sent to a more distant post, which had been secretly ordered; for although Sebastianus was a quiet and peace-loving man, he stood in high favour with the troops, and hence he was particularly to be feared at that time. Accordingly, after Merobaudes turned back, the matter of succession was carefully considered and the plan was unfolded that the boy Valentinian [Valentinian II], son of the deceased emperor and then four years old, should be summoned and given a share in the rule. He was at the time a hundred miles distant, living with his mother Justina at the country house called Murocincta. When this had been approved by unanimous consent, the boys' uncle Cerealis was immediately sent to the place, put him in a litter, and brought him to the camp; and on the sixth day after the passing of his father he was in due form declared emperor, and after the customary manner hailed as Augustus. And although, while this was being done, there was some thought that Gratian would take it amiss that another emperor was chosen without his permission, this fear later vanished and men lived free from care, since Gratian, besides being a kindly and righteous man, loved his kinsman with great affection and saw to his education.'

The Epitome de Caesaribus (45.9) and Zosimus (4.19.1) similarly note that Merobaudes (and also the Magister Militum per Illyricum Equitius) took the leading role in Valentinian II's elevation. Philostorgius assigns a prominent role to both the army in Pannonia and Valentinian II's mother Justina (HE 9.16). Merobaudes' own political influence must have expanded in his role as emperor-maker, but, as we will see, he did not limit his subsequent activities to the court of Valentinian II. As for Sebastianus, Zosimus claims that he ultimately left for the court of Valens, since Gratian and Valentinian II, 'by reason of their youth, were unacquainted with affairs, and attended to little beside the calumnies of the eunuchs who waited on them' (4.22.4). If we see this mention of eunuchs as a generic reference to powerful court officials, Zosimus' claim is not at odds with Ammianus, who, as we have seen, claims that Sebastianus was kept in the dark and sent to a distant post by Merobaudes on account of his popularity with the troops. Sebastianus would eventually play a prominent role as Magister Peditum of the east (Merobaudes' eastern equivalent) in the Gothic campaign of 378, and would be killed on the battlefield of Adrianople (Ammianus 31.12.5-7 claims he urged Valens to battle against the objections of Valens' Magister Equitum Victor, who wanted Valens to wait for the army of Gratian to arrive, whereas Zosimus 4.23.6-24.1 claims Sebastianus actually favoured caution. It seems that there was some effort by ancient historians, including Zosimus' source Eunapius, to defend their patrons and favourites from accusations of responsibility for Adrianople. Sebastianus had conducted successful harassment warfare against the Goths in the lead-up to Adrianople, and it is plausible that he wished Valens to lead them to victory before his old enemies in the west could claim the credit.).

Despite how Ammianus presents it, it is apparent that Gratian was not immediately happy with his half-brother's elevation, nor was Valens. As David Potter notes (2014: The Roman Empire at Bay, p. 530): 'Both refused to recognize the legitimacy of Valentinian’s proclamation until well into 376, after negotiations in which Themistius traveled west to discuss matters on Valens’ behalf with Gratian, and Gratian appears subsequently to have restricted public appearances by his younger brother.' And yet, despite the controversial nature and initially reluctant reception of his actions, Merobaudes does not appear to have suffered any consequences. It was actually quite the opposite. In 377 he held the ordinary consulship with Gratian himself as his colleague. From 376-378 Gratian also promoted members of the Theodosian family to important posts, namely Claudius Antonius, Eucherius and the future Theodosius I. Perhaps Merobaudes enjoyed an alliance with this family. In the same year, Merobaudes was in Milan, where he gave a favourable reception to the corrupt Romanus, formerly the Comes of Africa. Romanus complained of the bias of the judges concerning a corruption trial against his officials, and Merobaudes called for more witnesses to be brought forth, but as far as we can tell he did little more to help Romanus (Ammianus 28.6.29-30).

More interestingly, in 377 the Tervingian Gothic revolt began in Thrace, and with Greuthungian Goths crossing the Danube as well, the conflict threatened the security of the Balkans as a whole. Gratian, presently based in Gaul, was made aware of the danger, and sent the Pannonian army under Frigeridus to assist the eastern forces. He then prepared to send another force from Gaul under the Comes Domesticorum Richomeres. It is apparent that Merobaudes objected to this use of Gallic manpower. More than half of Richomeres' army refused to travel east, and Ammianus notes in his typically carefully worded, non-committal way that they had been 'induced (as some maintained) by Merobaudes, who feared that if Gaul should be deprived of its defences, it would be laid waste at will by raids from across the Rhine.' Again, Merobaudes appears to have avoided punishment for actions that at best amounted to insubordination. Indeed, while one could therefore list his name among those whose actions ultimately contributed to the comedy of misfortunes that ultimately led to Adrianople, he was actually proven right about the Rhine frontier. When in 378 Gratian himself began to march an army to the Gothic war, the Lentiensian Alemanni 'seized upon this information' and campaigned across the border (Ammianus 31.10.4). As Ammianus says, 'Gratian learned of this with great alarm, recalled the cohorts which he had sent on into Pannonia, brought together the others, which wise policy had kept in Gaul, and gave the command to Nannienus' (31.10.6). Gratian ultimately campaigned in Alemannia himself, perhaps accompanied by his Magister Peditum Merobaudes, and then marched back towards to the east, too late to take part in the Battle of Adrianople. Zosimus notes that, by the time of Adrianople, the incursions across the Rhine had resumed (4.24.4).

Barbara Saylor Rodgers gives a notable assessment of Merobaudes' actions in 375 and 377 (1981: 'Merobaudes and Maximus in Gaul', Historia 30.1, p. 102): 'Twice Merobaudes seems to have assumed personal responsibility (once with Equitius) for the welfare of the empire in general or the Gallic provinces in particular. We do not know that he received as much as a reprimand on either occasion; his escape from censure is due as much to his having been right as to his having been powerful. Power was his means of attaining an end, not the end in itself. Ammianus, who rarely has a kind word for anyone and is quick to point out the aggressive and ambitious actions of almost every leading figure, does not say that Merobaudes promoted Valentinian in order to expand the basis of his own influence, or that he caused the soldiers to desert in order to undermine Richomeres' position. Ammianus endows Merobaudes with patriotic (or practical) motives on both occasions: in 375 he sent away Sebastianus, a possible pretender to the throne, and in 377 he worried more about Gaul than about Valens' problems.'

Flavius Merobaudes (2 of 2)

As a powerful and influential figure in Gratian's retinue, Merobaudes may well have had a hand in the elevation of Theodosius as emperor in the east in 379. However, Merobaudes does not reappear in our sources until 383, when he enjoyed a second ordinary consulship, a very rare honour for anyone not in the imperial family. He was the choice of Gratian, whereas Theodosius made Saturninus, who led the negotiations with the Goths in 382, his consular colleague. Gratian therefore continued to reward Merobaudes with honours, but how did Merobaudes feel about Gratian? Because of the Gothic war, Gratian had relocated his court to Milan, but in 383 he was faced with the usurpation of the Comes of Britain, Magnus Maximus. Maximus crossed his army to Boulogne, and the two armies met in the vicinity of Paris. There then followed five days of skirmishing, during which Gratian lost control of his army. First his Moorish cavalry deserted to Maximus, and the rest of his army soon followed suit. He was forced to flee back towards Italy, but was overtaken and executed by Maximus' Magister Equitum Andragathius in the vicinity of Lyons. Maximus then secured control of Gaul, allowed Valentinian II to rule in Italy, and made an agreement of co-existence with Theodosius. The chronicler Prosper includes an important detail: in the skirmishing around Paris, Gratian was overthrown because he was betrayed by his Magister Militum Merobaudes (s.a. 384).

On the reasons for Gratian's overthrow, Neil McLynn says the following (1994: Ambrose of Milan, pp. 151-154: 'Gratian's court seemed unusually susceptible to the twin evils of inadequate central direction and interference from special interests. The government's handling of the Priscillianist affair provoked a bitter indictment from Sulpicius Severus a generation later: 'Everything was for sale there, through the greed and might of a few men' (Chron. 2.49.3).
A similar context of court intrigue might be suggested for yet another exercise of imperial authority during the same period, the removal of the altar of Victory from the senate house in Rome. ...
Many contemporaries believed that Gratian had brought the coup upon himself. Some pagans saw it as retribution from the gods whom the emperor had spurned; even those sympathetic to the general tenor of the regime deplored the rampant greed of the emperor's friends, and the excessive licence which his modest good nature allowed them. A specific piece of advice from these overmighty friends was widely believed to have had a direct bearing upon the emperor's fall. He had been persuaded to show conspicuous favours to a body of Alans who had been recruited at great expense, showering them with gifts and even dressing in their costume; the 'hatred' that this engendered among the rest of the army, it was alleged, had sealed Gratian's fate.
This personalized explanation is typical of ancient historiography. The modern historian might point instead to certain structural features of Gratian's reign, above all the massive effect that the redeployment of the army to northern Italy must have had. Under Valentinian, the stabilization of the Rhine frontier had created a nexus of powerful interests, centred around the many recruits from the Rhineland whose families and other local connexions anchored the main field army there. The gravitational pull of the region was shown in the use made by Merobaudes of a pretended threat to the Rhine frontier after Valentinian I’s death; it was confirmed in 377 when the same Merobaudes, the consistent advocate of the 'Rhine interest', quietly frustrated Gratian's plans for a Balkan campaign. The departure of the court for Italy, however sensible strategically, can only have disrupted this pattern of relations. Although too much should perhaps not be read into a moralizing tale about stereotyped 'barbarians', the controversy over the regiment of Alans might be related to this situation as a government attempt to consolidate its new Danubian orientation by creating a new elite without any ties to Gaul. The advisors who urged Gratian to consort with these exotic warriors would therefore appear in a more creditable light. On the other hand, the army's hostility would prove, after all, well founded: the new recruits represented a direct threat to their own position.
... In Italy, as we have seen, the court was faced with influences far more complex and powerful than those which could be brought to bear on Trier. The aristocrats of Rome had a pernicious ability to annex the machinery of government to serve their own ends; their generally accepted claim to embody Roman traditions and values allowed an easy confusion between their own political and economic interests and those of the empire as a whole. We cannot determine exactly how far the government was in thrall to these interests after 381, but the increased volume of Symmachus' contacts with the court (his correspondence burgeons throughout the 380s) suggests a trend. This 'colonization' of the government helps explain why the emperor was perceived to be at the mercy of his advisors. The church, too, profited from the move to Italy to claim—through Ambrose—a higher profile in the court's religious life and a place for its business on the imperial agenda. But imperial authority, once made broadly available, could be usurped by factions: by Priscillian and his enemies, or by militant Christians in the Roman senate. Amid the clamour of these competing interests, it is not surprising that Gratian was pulled in various directions, nor that he attracted resentment from the victims of the policies to which he lent his name.
No emperor was ever fully in control of his empire; but Gratian, fatally, was seen to have lost his grip. The weaknesses described above would not have sufficed to persuade Maximus to risk rebellion had they not been thrown into sharp relief by the insouciant disloyalty of his colleague. Theodosius' declaration of ecclesiastical independence was only part of a general consolidation of his own autonomy in the east, which culminated in the proclamation of his five-year-old son Arcadius as Augustus on 19 January 383. Gratian, who was not consulted and never recognized the promotion on his coinage, was powerless to interfere with his partner's dynastic projects. Maximus, a fellow-Spaniard who claimed a family connexion, may well have hoped for approval from the ambitious emperor of the east.'

On Merobaudes' personal motivations, Rodgers again views Merobaudes as a pragmatist with the empire's interests at heart (pp. 102-103): 'The general would have seen that Gratian was alienating the army. ...as he saw the men going over he surely would have consulted his own interests as well as the state's, and he could accomplish three things by betraying Gratian: he could save himself by joining the probable victor, he could ensure both the victory and the attendant circumstances of its costing as few lives as possible by taking his men with him, and he could give the Gauls a better ruler.’

In 387 Maximus invaded Italy and sought to overthrow Valentinian II, who fled east with his court to Theodosius before he could be caught. The next time we read of Merobaudes is on an inscription from Italy from the 9th of January 388, dated to the consulships of Theodosius for the second time and Merobaudes for the third (ICVR 1.370). A third ordinary consulship for someone who was not a member of the imperial family is otherwise unheard of in the fourth century, and the fact that his consular iteration was higher than that of Theodosius himself emphasizes the unusual nature of the honour that had been granted by Maximus. However, by the 10th of January Maximus is alone attested as consul in Italy (ICVR 1.371-72, 374-75). He had withdrawn the consular honour from both Theodosius and Merobaudes, after making unsuccessful attempts to secure peace with Theodosius. By 388 Theodosius had sided with Valentinian and was at war with Maximus. That year Theodosius overthrew Maximus and restored Valentinian II to the west. However, in 389 a Gallic orator, Pacatus, delivered a panegyric before Theodosius in which he made final mention of Merobaudes in a politically convenient passage accusing Maximus of murder (Panegyrici Latini 2(12).28.4):

'But if anyone should seem to anyone to have been less cruel in that respect in comparison with the rest of his crimes, let that man recall your death, Vallio, celebrator of a triumph, and yours, Merobaudes, wearer of the consular robe. The one [Merobaudes], after holding the highest magistracies and wearing consular purples, and uniting within the household a kind of senate of honours, was obliged to take his own life...'

Rodgers speculates on what had happened (pp. 104-105): 'Perhaps Merobaudes stayed in Gaul as Maximus' magister peditum, or even, as Vetter suggests, acted as an intermediary in the various negotiations between the eastern and western courts. He was in Gaul or in Italy by sometime in 387. Maximus nominated him as consul - to put him off his guard? - and later, when it became clear that Theodosius was finally ready for war, he had Merobaudes destroyed as too dangerous. He may have considered that his general was more loyal to Theodosius than to himself, or he may have suspected that, loyalty aside, Merobaudes would serve him as he had served Gratian in 383. Theodosius meanwhile, whether or not he knew that Merobaudes was dead, appointed his own consul, Cynegius, once he learned that Maximus had nullified their agreement by invading Italy.'

C. E. V. Nixon also speculates (Nixon & Rodgers 1994: In Praise of Later Roman Emperors, p. 486 n. 94): 'Merobaudes may have fallen from favor, for example, for opposing the invasion, or he may have been forced to commit suicide because Maximus could not afford to leave him in his rear.'

However we assess Merobaudes' motivations, whether he was self-interested or rather believed what he did was for the good of the empire, or at least the west, Merobaudes' political boldness was probably what killed him in the end. And so ended a career that, while frustratingly we only know of it from sparse fragments of information, was clearly extraordinary in nature.

The Messalina affair is an interesting episode, and it's unfortunate that the surviving testimony on Messalina is laden with caricature - Roman senators, those who wrote the histories, did not have a good opinion of women exercising real power, and Claudius' reign was characterized by the power wielded by Messalina and Agrippina (as well as his freedmen). I do not doubt that Messalina was associated with and even instigated the executions of certain senators, but the frivolous and petty personality that is described by the sources is not necessarily a true reflection of her character. Was she really having senators executed for reasons of their not wanting to sleep with her or a desire for even more wealth, or was there more at stake? I'm reminded of the trivial reasons given by Suetonius and others for Domitian's prosecutions. For example, it was claimed that he executed the governor of Britain, Sallustius Lucullus, because he named a spear after himself. More likely, Lucullus became seditious because of the transfers of troops from Britain to the Danube, and the resulting loss of opportunity to win renown campaigning in Caledonia, and the spear issue became one of several pieces of evidence as part of a larger accusation of treason. Returning to Messalina, the executions of Julia Livilla and Julia Livia and her efforts against Agrippina the Younger indicate that dynastic threats posed by women of more distinguished birth (from a dynastic perspective) and their sons was one of her considerations. Like Domitian, Messalina fatally made enemies within the palace itself, namely the freedmen, after she had instigated the execution of the imperial secretary Polybius.

Looking at the event itself, I agree that if it was a coup it was poorly executed. Perhaps they believed that Geta and his men would rush to their support, but they had evidently not secured their support prior to the feast. Messalina may have felt driven to act against Claudius because of the growing influence of Agrippina the Younger, who around this time became an ally of Pallas. Although she was Claudius' niece, Agrippina was a very desirable wife by virtue of her pedigree. Like the condemned Julia Livilla, she was the daughter of Germanicus and Agrippina the Elder, the granddaughter of Agrippa, and the great-granddaughter of Augustus. Messalina was the great-granddaughter of Marc Antony and Octavia. She couldn't provide the dynastic legitimacy that Agrippina could (Claudius was a Claudian, but he wasn't a Julian). It is likely for this reason that Claudius honoured his new wife Agrippina as Augusta, the third woman to receive this honour (after Livia and Antonia the Younger). Agrippina thus endangered Messalina's standing as wife of the emperor, and she also endangered the succession of her son Britannicus, since Agrippina had a son in Nero. Indeed, as time would have it, Nero was propped up as heir apparent alongside Britannicus and then succeeded Claudius in place of Britannicus, killing him soon afterwards. So perhaps Messalina, like many other queens and empresses, was driven to protect the future of her progeny.

Nevertheless, whether Messalina intended a coup or not, the marriage/engagement effectively amounted to one in the eyes of the Romans. To marry the wife of the emperor was a challenge against Claudius, since it lent dynastic legitimacy to the husband. If Messalina had really given Silius Julio-Claudian heirlooms as wedding gifts, this would have strengthened this impression.

Gaius Ceionius Rufius Volusianus

Volusianus was an Italian senator whose career spanned the reigns of Probus through Constantine. He was the first member of his father's family, the Rufii of the Etruscan Volsinii, to achieve consular rank. This appears to have happened during the reign of Probus in c. 280, when he received a suffect consulship. In c. 282, either under Probus or Carus, he was then made a corrector of Italy, holding jurisdiction in southern Italy. On his mother's side of the family, the Ceionii, another family member received an even greater honour soon afterwards. The sons of Carus, emperors Carinus and Numerian, made Volusianus' uncle Ceionius Varus urban prefect from autumn 283 to spring 285, a lengthy tenure for the position.

Volusianus held his office for an exceptional eight years, something Volusianus was sure to mention on an inscription dated more than twenty years later (ILS 1213, AD 314). Whereas the corrector in northern Italy kept changing (M. Aurelius Julianus 283, Acilius Clarus 286, T. Aelius Marcianus 287, Paetus Honoratus 289-290), Volusianus retained his position in the south from c. 282 to c. 290. This was despite Diocletian's take-over of Italy in 285. Whereas Diocletian replaced Ceionius Varus as urban prefect with Rufinianus Bassus, a senatorial ally and consular colleague from early in his reign (he was consul with Diocletian in either 284 or early 285), Volusianus remained in his position. Like Aristobulus in post 1, it is possible that he had rendered a useful service to Diocletian during his civil war with Carinus.

In 289 a brother or maternal cousin, Ceionius Proculus, was likewise awarded a suffect consulship, but in c. 290 Volusianus was finally replaced. In fact, by 293 another senatorial ally of the regime, L. Aelius Helvius Dionysius, held a position over both north and south as corrector utriusque Italiae (ILS 1211). Volusianus is not attested in another office until 305/6, and so it is possible that he had been eclipsed by rival senators. However, by 303 Volusianus had married into the prestigious consular family of the Nummii, and this allowed for a comeback in the years immediately following the abdication of Diocletian and Maximian in 305. It may also be relevant that in c. 302 Helvius Dionysius had been disgraced and executed under the authority of Maximian on an allegation of conspiracy. In either 305/6 or 306/7, that is, under the Augusti Constantius I and Galerius, or Galerius and Severus, Volusianus served in the prestigious post of proconsul of Africa.

Perhaps while he was still proconsul, in October 306 Maxentius seized power in Rome. Maxentius enjoyed the support of important senators, including the Anullini, since they despised Galerius' plans to extend the poll tax to Italy, from which it had been exempt since the Late Republic. If he was proconsul at the time, Volusianus would have made a timely show of support, or even was among the senatorial conspirators. Whether he was responsible or not, the mint at Carthage was quick to honour Maxentius and his father Maximian (who had returned from retirement in support of his son), and the African grain supply continued without issue.

Regardless of our uncertainty concerning his activities in 306, by 309 he was undoubtedly a prominent supporter of Maxentius, serving as his praetorian prefect. In April 308 Maximian had sought to depose his own son before a military assembly in Rome, but the soldiers protested Maximian off the podium, and he soon fled for Gaul in disgrace. However, the soldiers in Africa had an affection for Maximian, who had resided and campaigned in Mauretania, Numidia and Africa in the late 290s. Later that year, either with military support or at swordpoint, Domitius Alexander, the elderly uicarius of Africa, usurped power. He courted an alliance with Constantine, who at that time ruled Gaul and was providing refuge for Maximian, but in 309 Maxentius sent Volusianus with an army to crush the usurper. Volusianus was of course already familiar with Africa, but moreover, Alexander had been uicarius of Africa since 303, and so he was a former associate of Volusianus, and perhaps even a rival.

Zosimus, influenced by Constantinian invective against Maxentius, narrates how Alexander fared (2.14): 'But thinking it better first to arrange affairs in Africa, Maxentius raised an army, bestowing the command of it on Rufius Volusianus, the praetorian prefect, and sent them into Africa. He sent Zeno also along with Rufius, who was a person not only expert in military affairs, but esteemed for his courtesy and affability. On the first charge, Alexander's troops retired on a body of men in the rear, nor was the other party left unconquered by the enemy. Alexander himself was taken and strangled. The war being thus at an end, a good opportunity was afforded to sycophants and informers of impeaching all the persons in Africa, who had good estates, as friends to Alexander. Nor were any of the accused spared, but some of them put to death, and others deprived of all their possessions. After this Maxentius triumphed at Rome for the mischief done at Carthage.'

From 28 October 310 to 28 October 311 Volusianus was rewarded with the urban prefecture, the magistracy that his uncle had held nearly thirty years before. In September 311 he was named alongside one Rufinus as the ordinary consuls for the year. However, on 28 October 306 Maxentius lost the Battle of the Milvian Bridge to Constantine and was overthrown. Upon entering the city, Constantine refused to allow any vengeance for whatever crimes were committed under the 'tyranny' of Maxentius (Panegyrici Latini 12(9).20.4). Clemency and reconciliation was the order of the day, with Constantine not wanting to appear a foreign invader, but rather a liberator, to the inhabitants of the Eternal City. Fittingly, the next three urban prefects of Rome had all formerly been urban prefects under Maxentius. Annius Anullinus was retained as urban prefect until 29 November, Aradius Rufinus was then prefect until 8 December 313, and then Volusianus embarked on a long, second tenure as urban prefect until 20 August 315.

In 314 Constantine notably wrote to him urging him, in his capacity as urban prefect, to set free those who had been enslaved under Maxentius (CTh 5.8.1). He was also awarded with other honours during this time. In 314 he enjoyed his second ordinary consulship, his third in total - an extraordinary honour for someone who was not a member of the imperial family. To honour himself, he thus commissioned the collation of a list of consulships from the beginning of the Republic, a list that became the basis for the Descriptio Consulum (also known as the Consularia Constantinopolitana). He was named a comes (companion) of Constantine, and by now he and Rufius Festus (a relative) were members of the quindecimuiri sacris faciundis (CIL 6.2153), the group of fifteen priests responsible for guarding the Sybilline Books. He was also a iudex sacrarum cognitionum, a judge in the imperial court of appeal.

Volusianus had reached extraordinary heights, but in August 315 it came crashing down. The political climate was changing, and he faced repeated accusations of an unclear nature from his enemies in the senate. From July to September Constantine then visited Rome to celebrate his decennalia. The occasion was honoured with the senate's erection of the Arch of Constantine, which depicted Constantine's victory over Maxentius. Its inscription praised Constantine for rescuing the state from both 'the tyrant and at the same time his faction'. In August, while Constantine was still in the city, this key former member of the Maxentian faction, Volusianus, was exiled by senatorial decree. He died at some point later without having been rehabilitated (Firmicus Maternus, Mathesis, 2.10-13).

But despite his eventual exile, Volusianus left behind a grand political legacy. Despite being exiled himself by Constantine in the 320s (possibly because of an association with Crispus), Volusianus' son Ceionius Rufius Albinus, born to Nummia Albina in 303, was returned from exile (possibly following Fausta's execution) and became ordinary consul in 335 at the strikingly young age of only 31. He then held the urban prefecture from 335 to 337, another incredible honour considering his age, before disappearing from history upon the death of Constantine. A son from a previous marriage, also named Volusianus, was praetorian prefect in 321, and was the father of the urban prefect in 365. Ultimately, Volusianus' lineage held high office in every generation until the late fifth century.

Works consulted: Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire 1; Timothy Barnes 1975: 'Two Senators under Constantine', JRS 65, 40-49; Barnes 1982: The New Empire of Diocletian and Constantine; David Potter 2013: Constantine the Emperor.

Since I never actually supplied an OP, the point of this thread is to discuss the men and women who wielded considerable influence behind Rome's emperors. You can supply biographies (my posts on Aristobulus, Merobaudes and Volusianus) or mini-essays on notable incidents (Tammuz's post on the marriage-scandal of Messalina), and you can discuss existing biographies and mini-essays, or just give your thoughts on people you think worth discussing. But I am not interested in re-hashing an old debate about to what degree we can still talk about a Republic and what we mean when we talk of 'emperors'. It can be continued here for those so inclined: The most biggest lie about roman emperors. I use the term 'emperor', and I have thought carefully about Roman 'emperorship' (see e.g. Greatest Leaders in History, ''Caligula'' by Douglas Jackson, Favourite Emperor of the Julio-Claudian and Flavian Periods). But if anyone disagrees with my use of 'emperor', this is not the thread to discuss it.

DiocletianIsBetterThanYou said:

Tiberius Claudius Aurelius Aristobulus

In November 284 in Asia Minor the imperial army in the east was returning from its war with Persia when it discovered their young emperor Numerian dead and decaying in his litter. Among those aware of whatever had happened, there had been negotiations and politicking, with those involved including Numerian's praetorian prefect/father-in-law Flavius Aper, and the commander of Numerian's domestici (household troops), Diocles (the future Diocletian), among others, with pro-Diocletianic sources claiming that Aper sought to secure the emperorship for himself. Ultimately, after the emperor's death was discovered, Diocles was presented before a military assembly and declared emperor by the army. The new emperor changed his name to the Romanized Diocletianus, and standing on the podium before the assembled troops, he then accused Aper of having killed the emperor and immediately slew him with his own sword, in the process perhaps removing a co-conspirator. This was all in spite of the fact that Numerian's brother Carinus was still emperor and was currently ruling in the west and overseeing affairs in war-torn Gaul. News of Numerian's death and Diocletian's usurpation travelled, and Carinus' praetorian prefect Sabinus Julianus took matters into his own hands, launching his own usurpation from Italy. Julianus' usurpation was a fleeting affair. He fought Carinus near Verona in Italy and was soundly defeated and killed. However, the usurpation of Julianus meant that Carinus needed a new praetorian prefect, and he appointed the equestrian-ranked Tiberius Claudius Aurelius Aristobulus to assume this role.

Knowing he would also need to face Diocletian in battle, whose battle-hardened army had (under Carus) sacked Ctesiphon only two years prior, Carinus sought to secure Aristobulus' loyalty. For the year 285 Carinus assumed the ordinary consulship and made Aristobulus his consular colleague. In receiving the office of consul, Aristobulus was also admitted into the senatorial order. Diocletian, meanwhile, had secured the loyalty of Roman Syria, Anatolia and Egypt.

In spring 285 Carinus marched against Diocletian, who had entered the Balkans with his army. Carinus himself was intimidating. He had already defeated two usurpers during his reign (Sabinus Julianus and, in 283, Marcus Aurelius Julianus), and had campaigned with success in Britain and on the Rhine. But Diocletian was not to be underestimated. As already noted, his army was also experienced, and he had secured sources of food and trained manpower in the east. He was a career officer whom Zonaras claims had been dux of Moesia (12.31). Zonaras also relates the following about Diocletian's seizure of power (12.30): 'For the army chose Diocletian sovereign, since he was there at the time and had exhibited many acts of courage against the Persians.' This refers to Carus' campaign of 283. But Diocletian's greatest strength was not his military leadership, but rather the fact that he was a shrewd politician. That he, the commander of the domestici, should have been chosen emperor by his fellow officers in the eastern imperial army, some of whom ought to have been more senior than him, suggests that his colleagues had hoped to control him. As the future would show, Diocletian was an exceptionally proactive ruler who very much played his own game when it came to power-sharing, imperial succession, administration, the economy, religion, self-representation and ceremonial.

When the armies of Carinus and Diocletian faced one another near the river Margus near Viminacium, Carinus' army gained the upper hand. Sources vary, but either Carinus won the battle or was in the process of winning the battle when he was struck down by his own soldiers, or, per the Epitome de Caesaribus, a tribune (38.8). The hostile sources, influenced by Diocletianic propaganda, claim that Carinus was killed because he had defiled the wives of his officers. Perhaps this is true, but it is a literary trope often applied by Romans to rulers whom posterity has decided were tyrants, i.e. those who had lost the power struggle. In any case, the tribune that slew Carinus was not necessarily the only person involved in the conspiracy. The future emperor Constantius I was the governor of Dalmatia during the period of Carus and his sons (Origo 1.1; HA, Carus 17.6). He soon received a prestigious military career under Diocletian and his future co-emperor Maximian, in c. 288 he married Maximian's stepdaughter Theodora, and in 293 he was co-opted into their imperial college as Caesar, before being promoted to Augustus in 305. Could it be that Constantius made a friend of Diocletian (and Maximian) by switching sides during the civil war with Carinus? If Constantius had switched sides as the governor of Dalmatia, this would have been strategically important, since Dalmatia was very near to Moesia, where the battle between Diocletian and Carinus was fought, and would have threatened Carinus' line of retreat. Indeed, Constantius eventually named a son of his Dalmatius, seemingly in honour of the appointment he had held around the time of this conflict.

Likewise, Aristobulus appears to have betrayed his emperor. After Diocletian won the civil war, he allowed Aristobulus to retain the offices of praetorian prefect and consul, with Diocletian replacing Carinus as his consular colleague. To allow Aristobulus to retain an office as powerful as the praetorian prefecture is telling. Aurelius Victor reports that this was because of the services (officia) that he had rendered (Caes. 39.14). It would appear that, despite Carinus' attempts at securing the loyalty of his new praetorian prefect, Aristobulus turned against his master in favour of Diocletian.

At some point before 290 Aristobulus ceased to hold the praetorian prefecture, but Diocletian did not cease to present him with honours. He held the prestigious proconsulship of Africa for an exceptionally long tenure of four years (290-294), and he was then rewarded with the urban prefecture (295-296). These two posts represent the pinnacle of honours that could be awarded to a senator short of giving him a second ordinary consulship (a rarity for anyone who wasn't an emperor or Caesar).

What happened next is not known, and as should be clear, we do not actually know very much about Aristobulus. But when we relate the offices he held between 284 and 296 to Diocletian's usurpation and the subsequent civil war, we get a hint of how important he must have been to the course of history.

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On the subject of Flavius Merobaudes, Eastern Roman History has just released a video on the general for which I did the research: