Advanced Allied Military Technology (Secret Weapons) in World War 2

Sep 2012
108
The Germans weren't planning on needing extreme cold weather equipment when they planned Barbarossa because the campaign was supposed to be over, the war won, months before winter. It was envisioned that it would last 3-4 months.

During the campaign German soldiers brought with them standard combat uniforms and shelter quarters used as ponchos, while additional standard issue clothing like great coats were stored in unit supply trains, or dropped off at depots along the invasion routes. The bulky and heavy extreme cold weather clothing, the gloves, the overboots, the specially made fur lined clothing, those generally weren't available because they were not anticipated to be necessary. And as other poster explained, they weren't not priority even after the first frost from October onward. At that point the various German army groups, especially Army Group Center, were massively overextended, their supply lines were already too long to get basic supplies to survive in combat, meaning ammunition (especially bulky artillery), fuel, food, etc. They were closing in on Moscow, every mile they advanced was just that much harder to supply. So while they recognized they needed cold weather clothing they recognized more than without the essentials their advance would stall and the war would continue on to the next year. By December when the massive Soviet counterattack occurred, the Germans were at their culminating point, they had advanced as far as it was possible and at their most vulnerable to counterattack. At this point, it was even more urgent to get them ammo and fuel, without those supplies they'd

Its not like the troops were fighting in nothing but barren fields. Every city, town, village they entered where homes with clothing and bedding and curtains and other forms of cloth, every enemy soldier dead or captured had a uniform, every civilian found dead or alive, all were sources for more clothing to acquisition for cold weather, which the Germans had already demonstrated they had no problems with. A lot of the time the stuff they could find was better than the issue stuff, because not much of the issue stuff was fur lined, while a lot of the Russian stuff was.

The biggest concern the Germans had wasn't a lack of proper issued extreme cold weather clothing, it was regular equipment, weapons, vehicles, etc. that weren't rated for those temperatures, added with a gross lack of knowledge regarding techniques and procedures necessary to operate equipment in those temperatures. Things like weapons lubrication, starting engines in extreme cold, vehicles covered in mud after it freezes, radio batteries in extreme cold, etc., these were all things that caught the Germans completely off guard because they'd never trained in similar temperatures during prior invading the Soviet Union, or during the pre-war period, so they had to learn the hard way how to operate and survive in such climates. For the Germans, much of the Soviet Union in winter was hell on Earth. For the Soviets, it wasn't fun time (they had it really bad too), but for them its not Hell, its just winter.
Add into this mess the fact that the DRB's locomotives were never winterized either, and this became a major issue when the temperatures started dropping. The entire operation (Barbarossa) was "planned" on a half-assed set of assumptions. Logisticians (like the above mentioned Dorpmuller) provided initial objections as to the feasibility of success and were summarily cashiered when their own predictions came true.
The Third Reich was not a system that accepted failure to do the impossible with inadequate resources.

They just found a "yes-man" (with the right national socialist fervor), replaced the practical, competent person with him, and carried on. The fact that all of the problems (initially identified by the now deposed manager) were resolved post-facto by the replacement figure was shown as a testament to the strength of some one who has the "right" kind of approach.
If you take a deeper look at the whole rotten system, this pattern is obvious on so many (civil and military) levels that it will make your head spin.
There were also a large number of well connected industrialists who were in "protected" situations and were milking the system for all it was worth during this period. The entire procurement system was fundamentally flawed.
Much of this is what Speer resolved to create his "armaments miracle".
 
Dec 2017
309
Poland
RAF also had Glouster Meteor jet propelled fighters starting by first half of 1944. They were never deployed over Europe to fight Luftwaffe in case one shot down and enemy examines its technical secrets in wreckage. They were kept in British airspace to fight against V-1 flying bombs.
On the one hand, it's logical, but on the other hand... Theoretically, the Germans had the same problem with the Ar 234. It was a reconnaissance aircraft. He could fall to the enemy's land. The Germans had to think about this danger, but this plane (even as an early prototype!) was flying over Great Britain.

There is also another issue that I do not understand. The Allies also worked on jet aircraft. When the Germans started using such aircraft and proved to be effective in combat, the Allies should probably consider it an "alarm" and also quickly send their versions of jets to combat ...? Of course, we can say that it was unnecessary, because a large number of good aircraft with piston engines was an acceptable solution. But when our pilots die in battle, because the enemy is faster... it is difficult to enjoy: "No problem, our scientists do not have to hurry, because we will win with the weapon we have."
 
Oct 2016
1,079
Merryland
On the one hand, it's logical, but on the other hand... Theoretically, the Germans had the same problem with the Ar 234. It was a reconnaissance aircraft. He could fall to the enemy's land. The Germans had to think about this danger, but this plane (even as an early prototype!) was flying over Great Britain.

There is also another issue that I do not understand. The Allies also worked on jet aircraft. When the Germans started using such aircraft and proved to be effective in combat, the Allies should probably consider it an "alarm" and also quickly send their versions of jets to combat ...? Of course, we can say that it was unnecessary, because a large number of good aircraft with piston engines was an acceptable solution. But when our pilots die in battle, because the enemy is faster... it is difficult to enjoy: "No problem, our scientists do not have to hurry, because we will win with the weapon we have."
new weapons systems like jet aircraft take time.
in fact I believe the Brits did deploy a few at the end of the war (Comets?).
correction--Gloster Meteor