America played the key role in German defeat in World War I

#51
Shucking and jiving is what Euros have to do when confronted with the truth about the Great War. They were a hairbreadth from losing it. Twice. And America saved them twice.

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pugsville

Ad Honorem
Oct 2010
7,801
#52
Sims' book, like all publications by serving Naval officers of the era, was approved for publication by Secretary Daniels. It therefore can be considered an official document.
And offical documents are ALWAYS 100% accurate. No they are not. So what's the point of this? It's been repeatedly pionted out and your cliams rest of Sims being unfailable. Well no one is going to accept that. You can just endless repeat teh sam eargumenst or you could actually enter into some actual debate,.

Shuck and jive, Euros. Shuck and jive.
Again nothing of substance. Mount an argument.,
 
Nov 2014
1,426
Birmingham, UK
#54
Sims' book, like all publications by serving Naval officers of the era, was approved for publication by Secretary Daniels. It therefore can be considered an official document.

Shuck and jive, Euros. Shuck and jive.

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So, about the German 'mass surrenders' that were 'almost exclusively due to the AEF' whilst the AEF only took 1/7th of the prisoners taken. How did that happen again?
 

Sam-Nary

Ad Honorem
Jun 2012
6,712
At present SD, USA
#55
Admiral Sims was the USN's theater commander in Europe during WW1, and had a reasonably diverse career before the War, including two tours as President of the Naval War College. Located in Newport, Rhode Island, the NWC is the Navy's professional development academy; officers commission through a college's ROTC or the US Naval Academy at Annapolis and go to professional development training at Newport. Saying all this to say that ADM Sims was one of the more intellectual and well-informed officers in the United States Navy in 1917, and was a natural choice to be the Naval equivalent of Black Jack Pershing.
He may have been a well trained skilled naval officer, but that does NOT mean his word was to be taken over everyone else's word, particularly as Sims' position was only with relation to the US Navy's involvement in the war. This meant that he was not in command over the entire naval theater of operations, and that unless he either got extensive sourcing from the Royal Navy and the German Imperial Navy with regards to naval operations, his claims can and must be taken with a grain of salt... especially as it is unlikely that either would have just let a lone US officer have unrestricted access to their records...

And as for the comparison to Pershing, while, Sims may have served in a similar role with the US Navy, unless he was given direct command over the entire coalition's naval forces, his role is probably lesser than what you seem to think it was. Because Pershing had to follow FOCH'S orders after Foch was named Supreme Allied Commander, or convince Foch to allow a separate operation. By the terms of the Allied command structure, Pershing was in no place to demand anything.

The main point thus far is within weeks of his arrival in London in April 1917 he was sure of the following facts:
1) U-Boats were sinking British shipping at a rate the British shipbuilding industry couldn't make good on
And how many U-boats did Germany have in 1917? What was the quality of their officer training? How many torpedoes did they have and for how long could the Germans sustain these attacks?

And did Sims INVENT the convoy system, which is what beat the submarines?

How many destroyers did the British have? Where were they stationed? What was their officer training?

Because keep in mind, when Sims arrived, the British shipping was coming in alone and one at a time. This meant that any and all escorts had to be spread out over the entire ocean and simply set up an easy shooting gallery for German U-boats, because those ships were alone and thus easy targets.

The main point thus far is within weeks of his arrival in London in April 1917 he was sure of the following facts:

2) The Allies had completely failed to find any reliable means of locating submarines; the Brits had only destroyed 50-60 in the entire war
Sims really didn't have an answer for that either. The reliable means of detecting a submerged submarine, sonar, wouldn't be developed until between the two wars. The only time during WW1 in which a submarine would visible was when it was surfaced to recharge its batteries and move at full speed, and at times this meant that these submarines could be found and sunk at that time, as RMS Olympic did U-103 in early 1918.

The main point thus far is within weeks of his arrival in London in April 1917 he was sure of the following facts:

3) Virtually the entire British political-military establishment, David Lloyd George excepted and called out in the text, was of the opinion that, barring solving the submarine problem, the UK would have to get out of the war in 6-8 weeks at most.
But that submarine problem was solved when the convoy system was implemented. It enabled there to be fewer anti-submarine ships needed as all the ships being escorted would be together, rather than sailing alone. This thus enabled the use of either destroyers, armed merchant cruisers, or Q ships to then use the convoys as bait to lure a submarine into attacking and then depth-charging the suspected area from which the attack came from.

He is definitely of the opinion that, rather than the desperate gamble that Conventional Wisdom so often portrays "unrestricted submarine warfare" as, the German Admiralty saw the Allied catastrophes of 1916 (specifically the meat grinders of Verdun and the Somme) as a strategic opportunity to being the war to a close by forcing the UK out in weeks before the Americans could make any sort of contribution.
And the German admiralty is always right? The Germans began unrestricted submarine warfare in 1915 because they had no ability to beat the Royal Navy in open battle. And they'd try in 1916, but failed at Jutland... and men like Falkenhayn were demanding for it in 1916 even before the great battles of that year started...

And what would the German navy know about the land combat of 1916? Verdun was a disaster of Germany's own making. It was Falkenhayn who put forth the idea to capture the French fortress city in the hope that the French would either be so disheartened by the loss of the city that they'd surrender or so enraged that they would launch suicidal offensives against the German line somewhere along the front. The idea that Falkenhayn intended to fight a battle of attrition is something he made up AFTER the war to cover up the fact that Verdun was a disaster of Germany's own making. "Bleeding the French white" was a possibility, but it was not Falkenhayn's end goal. And even if it was, his plan committed the Germans to attack on the east bank of the Meuse rather than both banks at the same time. The result was that as the Germans advanced toward Verdun, they would come under fire from hills held by the French on the west bank of the Meuse, even though the Crown Prince TOLD Falkenhayn that attacking on both banks would be more cost effective from day one... but the perceived fop was ignored and Falkenhayn committed the German army to a battle in which they had a pretty much 1:1 casualty exchange ratio, not something you want when you're outnumbered by the coalition against you.

And the Somme was hardly a disaster... The imagined breakout may not have happened, but it did relieve German pressure on Verdun and it convinced Hindenburg and Ludendorff that staying on the Somme battlefield in 1917 would be dangerous. For it has been said that the Somme was, "the death of the German field armies."

And meanwhile in the east, the Russians under Brusilov practically annihilated an Austrian army in Galacia and pushed the southern wing of a German army back, forcing troops from Verdun to be rushed east to rescue their Austrian allies and only to arrive as the Romanians came in after the line stabilized...

Had the Allies had better coordination in mounting the Somme and Brusilov at the same time... and had Romania come in when the Brusilov Offensive began... you likely would have seen Austria collapse in 1916... and they'd even secretly tried to surrender on their own in 1916 anyway, though no one accepted the Austrian terms and when Germany found out about it, they blew their proverbial top.

The Allies had gone through tremendous amounts of men and materiel that they couldn't make good on without the British merchant marine. American factories, Canada, India and Australia were oceans away, the Tsar had abdicated in March and Russia was in chaos, and the Italians were in stalemate. Removing the UK from the war was a simple mathematical calculation, leaving France to face the Germans, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottomans virtually alone.
And you've yet to provide credible evidence of this beyond Sims' memoirs, which I doubt have much on Germany's industrial output and the quality of said output in the later years of the war... or even the middle years of the war.

You've also failed to explain how Britain and France were so "defeated" militarily and yet had more men in the field in 1918 than the Americans and took more casualties than the Americans.

As previously mentioned, the shipping crisis was critical in the Spring of 1917; the Home Fleet was restricted to 5/8 speed except in dire emergencies. And only the ineptitude of German intel prevented their control of the surface of the seas; some feinting sorties would quickly have depleted the supply of imported fuel oil. The American capital ships that were eventually deployed being coal-fired vice oil burners was not due to any anti-British sentiment on the part of the USN's senior leadership. Instead, it was an austerity measure based entirely on the critical shortage of fuel oil in the UK. And their assignment to convoy duty speaks volumes of the RN''s incapability to adequately support both the Grand Fleet AND adequately support convoys.
I don't think the British used the term "Home Fleet" until the years between the two wars. So... are you getting confused between WW1 and WW2 now?

And how exactly would Admiral Sims be able to control Germany's intelligence services?
 

pugsville

Ad Honorem
Oct 2010
7,801
#56
"Well no one is going to accept that."

This isn't AHF, and pretentious psuedo intellectualism isn't the rule of the day here, thankfully.

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well has any other poster here accepted it? I don;t see anyone here acepting Sims as the gospel.

Yeah other people are the problem, if they don;t agree with you they must be have some problem and you must insult them all.
 
#57
Article 1534, Navy Regs. As it happened, there's almost no mention of Sims' ongoing feud with Chief of Naval Operations Benson in the book. The approval process was designed to ensure accurate, professional publications to improve the strategic and tactical uses of seapower. The Office of Naval Intelligence and the current President of the Naval War College also reviewed the book before publication. This is a professional military document by any reasonable definition of the term.



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pugsville

Ad Honorem
Oct 2010
7,801
#58
Another example of the conspiracy. Marginalize and denigrate anything that contradicts the Conventional Wisdom. At least here it looks like biased pretentious psuedo intellectualism isn't the rule of the day like in some other forums.

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I adviance an argument given information and sources. You reply with rhetoric and no substance.
 

Sam-Nary

Ad Honorem
Jun 2012
6,712
At present SD, USA
#60
Article 1534, Navy Regs. As it happened, there's almost no mention of Sims' ongoing feud with Chief of Naval Operations Benson in the book. The approval process was designed to ensure accurate, professional publications to improve the strategic and tactical uses of seapower. The Office of Naval Intelligence and the current President of the Naval War College also reviewed the book before publication. This is a professional military document by any reasonable definition of the term.
Why would the US Naval Regulations make any reference to arguments between officers as part of the naval regulations? Arguments between officers is something that happens because officers don't always agree, and regulations usually only make sure that the two aren't killing each other over the argument. There is no regulation that says they have like or agree with each other.

And being "professional" does not mean "accurate." There have been plenty of professional historians that have written things based on bias or on what information that they'd had available at the time that would result in inaccurate histories. With the former, it's outright lying and is bad... with the later, it can be tolerated to a degree as the full information from other sources aren't always made public immediately... as the British kept the secrets of Bletchley Park and breaking of Enigma secret for years after WW2. And in some cases some historians do plenty of research, but happen to end up with sources that are either poor or biased without the historian knowing.

It's why in many cases we need to look into multiple sources than just one specific one. As the more you draw in, the more one learns and improves their understanding with regard to the sources presented.