- Jan 2011
Point 5: I was talking about the overall strategy. We cannot invade (too few, and our allies do not want to commit lot of troops on the continent), and we do not want a blood bath as was WWI. So we fight on a small front (Belgium) and rely on heavy fortifications on the east. On the other hand, German should have difficiulties to supply its loss, thanks to USSR neutrality (which was not the case, but which was hardly an evidence in the 20-30's). If you want a back-up force to counter attack, you have to take it from somewhere. With more troops near Sedan, german ofensive could have failed, it's true, but those panzer divisions were really fast and the allies were always too slow.
7... you have to understand the geo political view of France after the battle of France. Our few allies (UK + Canada + ANZAC if you want) commited how many troops on the front? For what effectiveness? To France HQ and overall perception, it was 0. The geo political situation of Europe was as following: USSR was more or less allied with Germany, France was surrounded with pro facists regimes, US president said that the US would not go to war this time, the tiny UK army had fled away. Those are the pure facts you have, in 1940, to make a decision. For lot of french generals, the deal was to let the storm pass, making an acceptable armistice, and for some of them (as Giraud did) keeping in reserve the possibility to strike back when an other army could have been raised.
Oh I am not saying the situation was easy for France, but here we are taking the German view..... From the German perspective it was really a piece of luck that France gave up so "easily"... In war you cannot count on your adversary doing you such big favors....