Economy of Third Reich was a socialist economy

Larrey

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Sep 2011
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The III Reich's economy was fascistic, meaning the Party was the intervener with capital and labor in determining what the economy needed or where it should go.

In America today, we see government plus business private-public projects, such as Utah's UTA transportation operation. It's American fascism not socialism.
Mostly it engaged in stealing from one part of society the regime disapproved of, to buy off other parts of society it approved of through preferential subsidies.
 

Code Blue

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Feb 2015
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My opinion is more accurate than a ridiculous myth that is designed to make Germany look "awesome."
That's just arguing against a straw man. I believe I am addressing an opinion that no one stood up to Hitler. By the time the Munich Pact rolls around, it's too late for France and Britain to stand up effectively, and Chamberlain is wrongly scapegoated. If nothing else, in 1919, it was 3 against 1. At Munich, it was 2 against 2.
This misrepresents how Germany won the Battle of France in 1940, for France was FAR from helpless.
Quickly is not a misrepresentation, and no one said "helpless."

You talk about "myth," but Germany did defeat France quicky and easily. It is a mistake to emphasize Germany didn't have so many "guns" ca 1936 or 1938. The US didn't have that many guns in 1941, but by 1944 they did. What Germany had and the US had is capacity to make more and better weapons and these advantages accrue with the passage of time. I would say that by 1936 - just by the triumph of the will - Germany was too much for any of its neighbors. By 1940, they were too much for all of them added together. But again, that's just 20-20 hindsight.

The issue that hurt the French was that Gamelin expected the main German thrust to be in northern Belgium as it was in 1914
And in 1944, Hitler supposedly thought they were coming via Dunkirk, not Normandy. So? Manstein feinted and hit his opponent's weak spot. How often is that going to work against a nervous and one-dimensional opponent? I don't know how your game theory works, but if I was handed the job of invading France in 1940, the first - the absolute first - thing that would occur to me is that the French generals are going to assume we are coming the same way as 1914.
What, is there some politically correct thing? One has to deny the military power of the Wehrmacht or risk his anti-Nazi status?

Not saying that there weren't concerns or that Roosevelt was "stupid." But there is ultimately a difference between a private citizen, free to voice his opinion, and a President who must take other things into account. And with other factors in mind... I'd think that while Roosevelt came to distrust German aggression with its neighbors ultimately fell into the same camp of people that couldn't believe that Germany would become as barbarous as it did under Hitler.
First you opine that FDR can't say, and then that he doesn't know. Those are mutually exclusive.

IMO, he knows a lot and he's not saying. He knows what Hitler is going to do. And plain old territorial aggression by itself is not barbarity. The Holocaust is.
 
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Sam-Nary

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Jun 2012
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No, but to the Nazi intimidation tactics began already in the 1920's. And for intimidation to work, killings are better than arrests, and the Nazis began that early. And once in power they could then do both. And no, of course they couldn't kill everyone, anymore than they could arrest everyone. Then again they didn't have to, as they did make it plain they could kill anyone, and arrest anyone. And in the end the Nazi regime in power did end up putting 1,5 million German political opponents in prison or KZ-lager. So it's not as if prison wasn't a potent prospect for German dissenters in the Nazi period.
In the 20s though and before the Nazis were in power... that sort of intimidation may not be one hundred percent effective, as the Nazi Party only gained about 33% of the vote when they took power. It was the largest single party... but the second largest was the Social Democratic Party, one of the parties that the Nazis had feuded with through the 20s. Not as much as the Communists but one of the parties that they did feud with and was outlawed after the Nazis began securing power for the future after the Enabling Act was passed.
 

Code Blue

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No he does not. All he has to do is NOT send the bulk of the mobile French army to be cut off somewhere up by the Dutch border by the German "sickle cut". Don't do that and there are simply enough French bodies between the Germans and where they want to go to slow them right down.
You said someone playing the French side would have "a decent knowledge of what is coming."
And now you adjust the French pieces with knowledge of what happened in 1940 to prove you can stop the 1940 attack - WITH advance knowledge, by not going for the head fake.

That's why the German victory in France was a triumph of strategy, and to some extent tactics, but really NOT of industrial or technological capabilities.
Germany had those advantages, even though the war didn't last long enough to need them.
 
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pugsville

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Oct 2010
9,477
The quotes are very useful. You just don't like what they say.

This exchange started with me asking you a question you haven't answered yet. I have pateintly allowed you to cross examine me and provided some of my evidnece, at considerable personal effort. The one-way street has reached its end.
[/QUOTE]

You are unwilling to support what you say.
 

Sam-Nary

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Jun 2012
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At present SD, USA
That's just arguing against a straw man. I believe I am addressing an opinion that no one stood up to Hitler. By the time the Munich Pact rolls around, it's too late for France and Britain to stand up effectively, and Chamberlain is wrongly scapegoated. If nothing else, in 1919, it was 3 against 1. At Munich, it was 2 against 2.
It's FACT that no one stood up to Hitler in a reasonable way, among any of the powers outside of Germany. Germany was not ready for war when it marched into the Rhineland, and orders were in place that had France reacted by invading, the Germans were to pull back across the Rhine. However, remembering the diplomatic troubles that they had from the occupation of the Ruhr in the 20s and the fact that the British saw the Rhineland as "Hitler's backyard," France didn't act, despite the fact that they were bound by the Versailles Treaty TO act.

And while it may have been "2 on 2" at Munich, the fact that Beck was nervous on the operation and the fact that Hitler's policies were threatening war to the point where he was considering some major form of protest on the part of the army would give some implication that while Germany was in a stronger "position" by 1938, it was not such that they felt confident in a conflict with France and Britain. That sort of confidence really didn't shift until the summer of 1940 following the Battle of France and as Germany began preparing for the strategic mistakes that would ultimately cost it WW2.

Quickly is not a misrepresentation, and no one said "helpless."

You talk about "myth," but Germany did defeat France quicky and easily.
Not necessarily easily... and you're again confusing strategic/tactical mistakes on the part of the Allies with German ability. Had France's best units been sent into the Ardennes, you would have seen massed tank on tank battles, like the fighting at Hannut and Gembloux in history. The Germans might have advanced... but with heavy losses that would compound many of their logistical problems and risks that they were taking in 1940. But because Gamelin assumed the Germans would be using a variant of the Schlieffen Plan, he didn't place his best units near the Ardennes. He placed them much further north so they could engage on the Belgian plain. When the German tanks emerged at Sedan and Namur, the French were then out of position.

It is a mistake to emphasize Germany didn't have so many "guns" ca 1936 or 1938.
Why? Because it refutes the idea that the Germans were superior?

Germany had the capacity to produce more, yes. But if you look into the economic side of things through WW2, that capacity was never at full efficiency and managed its resources poorly. Thus why the Germans ended up using so many captured vehicles for various projects and engagements through much of WW2. This includes using Renault FT17s to combat the Resistance in 1944. Which raises the issue that if the Germans suffered a loss where material would have to be replaced, that production capacity would fall behind.

I would say that by 1936 - just by the triumph of the will - Germany was too much for any of its neighbors.
You do realize that "Triumph of the Will" was pure propaganda and that much of what was used to show "might" was largely staged and thus not fully indicative of how strong Germany actually was in 1936? It made for impressive cinematography, and many would actually copy the techniques used... but it did not show the full truth. And in fact many early Nazi efforts to try and show strength followed this sort of pattern. They'd have a lone squadron fly over one point in a repeating pattern or a lone tank unit drive past one point in a large circle several times. The viewer wouldn't see the unit circle around and would thus assume that Germany had a great many air squadrons or tank units.

Manstein feinted and hit his opponent's weak spot. How often is that going to work against a nervous and one-dimensional opponent?
Given Gamelin's weaknesses, probably plenty. And that is a testament to Manstein's ability as a strategist. However, it should be noted that the reason Manstein gets so much attention with regard to the Battle of France was the fact that Manstein's plan went AGAINST the OKW plan...

If I was handed the job of invading France in 1940, the first - the absolute first - thing that would occur to me is that the French generals are going to assume we are coming the same way as 1914.
But that's you with the hindsight knowledge that Manstein's plan worked in history. When the Germans began planning for the invasion of France in 1939, much of the original plan WAS a repeat of the Schlieffen Plan, with some minor alterations to account for the logistical and flank issues that hurt the Germans after the Battle of the Marne in 1914. Hitler didn't like it because it wasn't daring and only promised to get as far as where the Germans were in 1918 before stopping with no guarantee that France would surrender after that. Some front commanders, like Rundstedt didn't like it because the OKW plan came off as repetitive, and thus why Manstein was asked to come up with an alternative to the OKW plan.

Manstein's plan promised outright victory over France, which the OKW plan didn't, and when the Allies got copies of the original OKW plan as the result of a German pilot getting lost over Belgium WITH the plans... Manstein got the added bonus that if Gamelin didn't initially suspect a repeat of the Schlieffen Plan, the fact that Allied intelligence would then point to a repetition of the Schlieffen Plan would then lead to changes in the operation. And if Gamelin did expect the Schlieffen Plan being repeated... the intelligence would then only confirm what was already suspected. Which is good for Manstein and good for the context of 1940... but not the war as a whole.

What, is there some politically correct thing? One has to deny the military power of the Wehrmacht or risk his anti-Nazi status?
No, this is more recognizing actual facts and evidence that the Wehrmacht was not this super organization that only lost because Hitler was an idiot. They had their strengths, but they were not invincible, and they didn't inspire either the Western Allies or the Soviets to copy their tactics. They may have adapted to German tactics, but they didn't adopt German tactics. And the longer the war went on... the more and more the casualty ratios began to more heavily favor the Allies/Soviets. This was masked by Wehrmacht officers' memoirs that often exaggerated Soviet numbers and highlighted Hitler's mistakes while downplaying the army's own mistakes...

First you opine that FDR can't say, and then that he doesn't know. Those are mutually exclusive.
Not necessarily. The US was not, and still is not, a totalitarian dictatorship where Roosevelt was privy to all the information on what American companies were doing. And in trying to defend a Capitalist economic model, if a more heavily regulated one, he really couldn't push for that kind of control over what Ford, IBM, or any other American company would do. A fair number of companies and Republicans spent the 30s calling Roosevelt a Socialist for the things he did do. Trying to take control over American companies over where and who they did business with would only confirm that to them.

And without that kind of control... he can't know what their employees may have found in Germany before 1941 or what the Germans reported to those companies prior to 1941. Now, he might get some information from his State Department, and Dodd as an ambassador was openly critical of the Nazis during Dodd's tenure as ambassador to Germany. But given conflicts within the State Department and the fact that Dodd was often countered by other members of the staff in Germany... many of those reports that Roosevelt got would be conflicting. Thus making it hard to know when the ambassador says "Hitler is a threat to human life and dignity" and then the chief aide at the embassy says, "Dodd is exaggerating." FDR couldn't have known for sure who was right. He may have personal suspicions, but not enough to know for sure.

And plain old territorial aggression by itself is not barbarity. The Holocaust is.
On this, I agree... the problem, though, is that given the Nazi Party's agenda, ultimately the two are going to be hard to separate. For the plans for German expansion were all in the East and would result in Germany gaining increased populations that their ideology deemed sub-human and operated in a way that would make dealing with them in a humane way difficult. Because many countries weren't going to just take in millions of refugees in the 1930s... often with some form of anti-Semitism in the background or with some assumption that the Nazi Party's rants were more bark than bite...
 

pugsville

Ad Honorem
Oct 2010
9,477
So, the player who takes the French side has to know what is coming? Did the Prussians know what was coming in 1870?

And you are missing the point. What you call German industrial production is actually German-American industrial production. Germany didn't go from prostrate and bankrupt to Blitzkrieg-capable in 15 years by itself.
Ford and GM Scrutinized for Alleged Nazi Collaboration

It get back to the OP. All these governments use elements of capitalism, socialism,communism and fascism.. It's not a clash between those isms.
The provided link does NOTHING to support the case you are making,

Basicly says that In 1939 when the war deban US eexcurtives of FORD and GM did not oppose conversion of their subsidaries planets to arms production. Like it would not have happened anyway. That NAzi Gemany would have taken No for an answer.
 

Code Blue

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Feb 2015
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The provided link does NOTHING to support the case you are making,
That is untrue, since I am repeating and paraphrasing - in effect plagiarizing - its contents. It's not even a case I am making, but a case that has already been made.