If Russia had to fight German alone in WW2, would it win?

Jan 2015
3,288
Front Lines of the Pig War
#51
Aha, compare Africa "battles" to Stalingrad. Relatively small point on Volga were fought and died millions isn't compatible even to entire war efforts of "allies".
Stalin evidently thought it was important, because he understood that victory at Stalingrad was greatly assisted by the Axis forces that had previously been diverted to Africa or France.

Millions of Germans didn't die at Stalingrad, 300,000 Axis soldiers were surrounded, less than the number of Axis soldiers surrounded in Tunisia.
 
May 2017
924
France
#52
Thank you very much.I enjoy very much statistics because the adjectives "often","numerous", big quantities" have allways subjectives conceptions.A lot of historians prefer polls (it is more rapid but less scientific) than censuses (very scientific but very long).And they make extrapolations and conclusions with multiplications X 10 of the results they have obtained with their investigations about their samples.The german army had 500 000 desertors in 1918.For a defeated army,it was important but not enormous.I think that the numbers you have the amability to communicate to us correspond to the period of the defeat (1941) until the period of the victory (1945).Please,have you the statistics for each year ? It would be very interesting.Thank you.
 
Jul 2016
9,327
USA
#53
The Barbarossa plan was good in itself. Among its shortcomings:

- it was created impromptu, in the absence at the Germans of strategic intelligence data for Russia (it obviously was not conducted), a serious analysis of its economic and military potential, etc. I can repeat - until the summer of 1940 (until the annexation by Russia the Baltic states, Bessarabia and Bukovina), the Germans had no intentions and plans to ever fight against Russia. I have not found any sign of that intentions and plans in their documents of 1939- mid 1940. Hence their lack of strategic intelligence of Russia and reliable data on its real potential.
The HQ of the German army (OKH) possessed an entire department whose job was to do nothing else besides gather intelligence about the Soviet Union, called the Fremde Heere Ost (FHO).

The Germans were not prepared to go to war until 1946, that was the original plan. Hitler didn't believe the Western Allies would actually go to war over Poland, he thought they were bluffing. When they declared war on Germany after Poland was invaded, it forced Hitler to kick off WW2 years before the German army was ready, as their mobilization and industry were drastically off their previously established plans (including Goering's horrific 5 year plan). The Soviet Union only allied itself with the Germans after its request to ally with France and the UK to invade Germany was brushed off.

Barbarossa plan was crap because it was based on false political/strategic assumptions, because the plan didn't even fit into what Hitler wanted, and countered the German Heer's top logisticians summary of how far the Germans could drive into the Soviet Union with proper supplies (this was utterly ignored, especially as the operation started, Barbarossa didn't work, and they went to improvising and driving deeper).

- The Germans did not consider that Russia was a military country. As much military as possible. All of its economy developed in the 1930s with a focus on a big war. And Russian military and economic plans in the second half of the 1930s provided for the preparation of war not with two or three capitalist countries, as they planned before, but with the entire capitalist world at the same time


The Germans knew this, they had been secretly teaming up with the Soviet Union in the 20s-30s and sharing military doctrine and technology. By the late 30s the Germans just largely discounted what the Soviets possessed as quality, especially after the drubbing they got fighting Poland, Japan, and Finland. They certainly had the biggest army in the world, with the most tanks, artillery pieces, etc. But the way the Germans saw it, they were a a Potemkin village, all show. To the racially motivated Nazis (and Germans as a whole), Slavs made poor soldiers, and the Bolshevik leadership was too incompetent and corrupt to ever be effective. *Note: This is how the Germans thought, not how I think.

Hence the monstrous number of Russian tanks produced before the WWII (about 32,000) and combat aircraft (more than 20,000). Tukhachevsky once said that they needed 100,000 tanks, and I think that this figure has firmly settled in the Kremlin's heads.
Most of those tanks were crummy light tanks. That was one of the reasons the Red Army took such a beating in 41-42 in terms of tank losses, most of those lost were the old, obsolete 20-30s era tanks that were grossly out of their element in the 40s.
 
Sep 2016
1,127
Georgia
#54
Right now you are telling that Czechoslovaki and Austria are Germany. Not to forget that Holland, France, Poland weren't Germany either.
I don't really understand what you are implying. Yes, Holland, France, Poland and Czechoslovakia aren't Germany. I never said that. Germany annexed or occupied those countries during their imperialistic policy leading up to war or during first years of war. In 1941 Germany and her allies ( Hungary, Romania, Italy, Finland ) attacked Soviet Union, that is truth. Plus, Spanish also sent a division there. Likewise, Belorussian SSR, Ukranian SSR and Baltic ones were occupied during first years of Great Patriotic War.
 
Nov 2015
1,757
Kyiv
#55
Barbarossa plan was crap because it was based on false political/strategic assumptions, because the plan didn't even fit into what Hitler wanted, and countered the German Heer's top logisticians summary of how far the Germans could drive into the Soviet Union with proper supplies (this was utterly ignored, especially as the operation started, Barbarossa didn't work, and they went to improvising and driving deeper)..
The Germans knew this, they had been secretly teaming up with the Soviet Union in the 20s-30s and sharing military doctrine and technology. By the late 30s the Germans just largely discounted what the Soviets possessed as quality, especially after the drubbing they got fighting Poland, Japan, and Finland. They certainly had the biggest army in the world, with the most tanks, artillery pieces, etc. But the way the Germans saw it, they were a a Potemkin village, all show. To the racially motivated Nazis (and Germans as a whole), Slavs made poor soldiers, and the Bolshevik leadership was too incompetent and corrupt to ever be effective. *Note: This is how the Germans thought, not how I think.
Most of those tanks were crummy light tanks. That was one of the reasons the Red Army took such a beating in 41-42 in terms of tank losses, most of those lost were the old, obsolete 20-30s era tanks that were grossly out of their element in the 40s
I think Barbarossa was not a bad plan. It was just a plan that the Germans considered in 1940 as a preventive one. As a plan "just in case." You can see it from some remarks in the text of the plan. And so th Germans did not make due effoers to get a sufficient amount of background information on Russia in 1939-1940 and before. That's why I called it the impromptu plan. The entire eastern campaign of the Germans in 1941 was impromptu. And you can reread Halder's diary to make sure of this.

Nevertheless, the Germans fulfilled the Barbarossa plan by 90 percent in 1940. I know very few large military plans created before the beginning of the military campaign which would be carried out in practice so thoroughly.

The Germans completely defeated the Red Army, which they opposed in June 1941. And scrapped tens of thousands of Russian tanks and aircraft. All this they did in a few months of summer-autumn 1941. And then, behind the trenches Russian dug, they found a reinforced concrete pillbox. And it became obvious to us all that Russia is not a victim, but a predator caught off-guard in the summer of 1941. And that she prepared herself for a big war much better and more thoroughly than Germany.

Russia is a country fully optimized for a big war. Remember this. In solving even simple peaceful tasks that country very often showed blatant inefficiency. And while it produced excellent tanks and aircraft. And for the sake of their aggressive army, the Russians are ready to go hungry and in ragged pants.

I judge the ineffectiveness of German strategic intelligence of Russia not by the existence of the Fremde Heere Ost (FHO), but by the real facts of 1941. For Germans, the existence of Russian tanks T-34 and KV-1 was a complete surprise, although they were in the series since 1940, and that year the Russians managed to release about 300 such tanks, not to mention 1941. A 300 pieces in 1940 are not much less than theT-IV tanks the Germans had in June 1941 on the Eastern Front (439).

And the Germans missed all these tanks - although KV-1 had managed a year before to fight in the Finnish campaign/ They also did not know of the new models of Russian planes when they met them in the sky in 1941

FHO, as I understand it, was subordinate to Halder, the chief of the German General Staff. And this group had to regularly make reports to him on the Russian army, armaments, etc. Moreover, the Russian army was actively rearming at that time, the defense industry was already working in the mode of wartime, etc.

And now open his diary for 1939-1940 and look there for at least some mention of this information at that time. I did not find anything. What does it say? The fact that this department probably focused in 1939 in Poland, and then worked through the sleeves. And that Barbarossa was a preventive plan, and that the Germans began to prepare for that war literally in the last months before June 1941, and that they had no strategic intelligence in Russia, and that their army and their equipment do not suit for Russian conditions, etc.

As for the Russian tanks - I do not see any signs of the "backwardness" of tens of thousands of Russian tanks by the summer of 1941. Many of them were not the new models - but most of them had normal cannons, powerful engines and armor qiote suitable for the standards of the 1941. Look at all tanks the Germans used in Eatern campaign in 1941. You'll see even worse situation. Moreover, I absolutely do not see in Russia the dominance of models of the 1920s. I can lay out their qty for you on each model in Red Army in June 1941, and you'll see for yourself that the tanks were all right at the Russians. The only significant drawback was clearly insufficient radio communication.

The thesis of the backwardness of Russian tanks and aircraft in the in June 1941 is no good. Although Russian propaganda simply adores the thesis. The Russians had a huge number of tanks with decent cannons, powerful engines and normal armor - if you compare them to the German tanks of 1941.

The new planes of the Russians were in the same quantities as the Germans. In addition, there were about 20,000 airplanes that could perfectly cope with most tasks of defending their troops from German raids, covering them from the air, and most of the other tasks that were headed for Russian aviation. At the "old" I-16 Soviet pilot Safonov at the beginning of the war managed to knock down a dozen German planes. And many Finnish aces on captured Russian I-16 destroyed dozens of Russian aircraft, including new types.

Similarly, French aviation in the campaign of 1940 with a mass of "backward" aircraft dealt a serious blow to the Luftwaffe. And the Polish aircraft with a very old planes in minor qty fought in 1939 much better than Russian aviation - in 1941.

So the Russians had a huge surplus of forces in the summer of 1941 to organize the impenetrable defense of their borders from the German invasion. And they have got in time enough advance data to wait for the Germans to invade in the summer of 1941. But it became obvious that the Red Army was preparing at that time for anything, but not to this task
 
Jul 2016
9,327
USA
#56
I think Barbarossa was not a bad plan. It was just a plan that the Germans considered in 1940 as a preventive one. As a plan "just in case." You can see it from some remarks in the text of the plan. And so th Germans did noI judge the ineffectiveness of German strategic intelligence of Russia not by the existence of the Fremde Heere Ost (FHO), but by the real facts of 1941. For Germans, the existence of Russian tanks T-34 and KV-1 was a complete surprise, although they were in the series since 1940, and that year the Russians managed to release about 300 such tanks, not to mention 1941. A 300 pieces in 1940 are not much less than theT-IV tanks the Germans had in June 1941 on the Eastern Front (439).

As for the Russian tanks - I do not see any signs of the "backwardness" of tens of thousands of Russian tanks by the summer of 1941. Many of them were not the new models - but most of them had normal cannons, powerful engines and armor qiote suitable for the standards of the 1941. Look at all tanks the Germans used in Eatern campaign in 1941. You'll see even worse situation. Moreover, I absolutely do not see in Russia the dominance of models of the 1920s. I can lay out their qty for you on each model in Red Army in June 1941, and you'll see for yourself that the tanks were all right at the Russians. The only significant drawback was clearly insufficient radio communication.

The thesis of the backwardness of Russian tanks and aircraft in the in June 1941 is no good. Although Russian propaganda simply adores the thesis. The Russians had a huge number of tanks with decent cannons, powerful engines and normal armor - if you compare them to the German tanks of 1941.
From Robert Forczyk's Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942

"In June 1941, the Red Army has the enormous total of 18,700 serviceable tanks available...A total of eighteen of the Red Army's twenty-eight mechanized corps were stationed in the five border districts in the west [positioned on the barely existing Molotov Line], with a total of 10,688 tanks, of which roughly 83% were serviceable...

...Soviet armour units were in the early stages of re-equipping with the KV-series heavy tanks and the T-34 medium tank, but out of 385 KV-1 and 185 KV-II built by mid-June, only 433 had been issued to troop units. Similarly, only 1,000 T-34 tanks were built before the German invasion and 903 arrived at units...


...During 1941, in spite of the fact that the KV and T-34 tanks were superior in firepower and armoured protection to any German tanks, the Red Army managed to lose 940 of the available 1,540 KV tanks (61 percent) adn 2,331 of the 3,131 available T-34 medium tanks (74 percent)"

As you can read, the Soviets started the war with few actual KV or T-34 tanks, their armor force structure was based largely around T-26, T-28, or BT-series tanks, all of which were grossly outdated and obsolete by 1941.

Furthermore, tank armor, guns, and powerful engines mean little when the real advantage comes from which side has better command and control, meaning commander cupolas, 3-man turrets, and radios, which the Red Army was seriously deficient with. Russian doctrine was to fight buttoned up with no communication between individual tanks once they were in the thick of it, while the Germans had at least a receiver radio in every tank, transceiver radios in every command tank, dedicated tank commanders whose job was to command the tank and nothing else, who had a very nice coppola to operate out of, often fighting hatch open and exposed to better see what was happening, to better coordinate their own tank, the platoons, companies, battalions, as well as better coordinate with infantry, better finding targets, better route selection, etc. Soviet didn't do this, they didn't even fight in combined arms, and they paid for it with outrageously high losses the first couple years until they finally fixed their problems.
 
Nov 2015
1,757
Kyiv
#57
From Robert Forczyk's Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942

"In June 1941, the Red Army has the enormous total of 18,700 serviceable tanks available...A total of eighteen of the Red Army's twenty-eight mechanized corps were stationed in the five border districts in the west [positioned on the barely existing Molotov Line], with a total of 10,688 tanks, of which roughly 83% were serviceable...

...Soviet armour units were in the early stages of re-equipping with the KV-series heavy tanks and the T-34 medium tank, but out of 385 KV-1 and 185 KV-II built by mid-June, only 433 had been issued to troop units. Similarly, only 1,000 T-34 tanks were built before the German invasion and 903 arrived at units...

...During 1941, in spite of the fact that the KV and T-34 tanks were superior in firepower and armoured protection to any German tanks, the Red Army managed to lose 940 of the available 1,540 KV tanks (61 percent) adn 2,331 of the 3,131 available T-34 medium tanks (74 percent)"

As you can read, the Soviets started the war with few actual KV or T-34 tanks, their armor force structure was based largely around T-26, T-28, or BT-series tanks, all of which were grossly outdated and obsolete by 1941.

Furthermore, tank armor, guns, and powerful engines mean little when the real advantage comes from which side has better command and control, meaning commander cupolas, 3-man turrets, and radios, which the Red Army was seriously deficient with. Russian doctrine was to fight buttoned up with no communication between individual tanks once they were in the thick of it, while the Germans had at least a receiver radio in every tank, transceiver radios in every command tank, dedicated tank commanders whose job was to command the tank and nothing else, who had a very nice coppola to operate out of, often fighting hatch open and exposed to better see what was happening, to better coordinate their own tank, the platoons, companies, battalions, as well as better coordinate with infantry, better finding targets, better route selection, etc. Soviet didn't do this, they didn't even fight in combined arms, and they paid for it with outrageously high losses the first couple years until they finally fixed their problems.
We in fact compare German and Russian tanks to the beginning of the Eastern campaign 1941? The Germans had there about 3000 light tanks T-1 (Pz.Kpfw. I), T-2 and Czech 38 (t). They did not exceed the Russian T-28 and BT-7, radically giving way to them in terms of armament and engine power. The Russian tanks had guns of 45 mm, the Germans had machine guns of 7.92 and 20 and 37 mm guns. The same 37-mm guns also stood on a part of the T-3 tanks.

All these Russian "obsolete" tanks, thus, could successfully maintain their infantry on the defensive, destroy all German tanks from their guns and inflict heavy damage on the advancing German infantry.

Perhaps you recall that the vast majority of the German infantry, advancing in the East in 1941 was not at all supported by German tanks? The average density of German tanks in the summer of 1941 is 1-2 tanks per kilometer of the front. Therefore, the Germans needed to concentrate tanks in several "fists", and on the main length of the front the Germans infantry advanced, supported by mortars, barrel artillery, aviation and armored cars. And without any tanks.

At the same time, the Russians not only had complete tank superiority at the front, but also a large number of tanks in the rear, which were transferred to the front in the second half of 1941.

The better than these Russian "obsolete" types were only the version of the German T-3 with a 50mm gun and the T-4 - 732 + 439= 1,171 in total.

Although in 1941 T-4 had a short-barreled 75mm howitzer with low armor penetration. Thus, the Russians, as I said, had a colossal superiority in the number of tanks in the summer of 1941, and almost 2,000 new powerful T-34 and KV-1 and KV-2 did not even have close analogues at the Germans.

I can also add that the Robert Forczyk provides you with incorrect data -

...Soviet armour units were in the early stages of re-equipping with the KV-series heavy tanks and the T-34 medium tank, but out of 385 KV-1 and 185 KV-II built by mid-June, only 433 had been issued to troop units. Similarly, only 1,000 T-34 tanks were built before the German invasion and 903 arrived at units...

I have a summary of the Russian Directorate of tank GBTU of the Red Army's about the presence of tanks in the Red Army for the period from 1.01.41 to 1.01.44.

It states that on July 1, 1941, the Red Army had 423 tanks KV-1, 213 tanks KV-2 and 1,225 tanks T-34. And also 5,383 BT-7 and BT-7M, huge T-35 (61 pcs) and 502 quite powerful T-28

In total, according to that document, in the Red Army by July 1, 1941 there were 27,813 tanks.

It remains to add that the Russians cite a lot of German propaganda about the fact that in 1941 Germany considered Russia a "colossus on clay feet", and Russian are bad warriors. Did not count! And Hitler wrote to his friend Mussolini the day before the Russian campaign began -

Duce!

I am writing this letter to you at a moment when months of anxious deliberation and continuous nerve-racking waiting are ending in the hardest decision of my life.
...
As far as the war in the East is concerned, Duce, it will surely be difficult, but I do not entertain a second's doubt as to its great success.


The Germans had a great experience of war with the Russians in the WWI, and they knew that the Russians were good fighters. As you know, Hitler was a veteran of the WWI though he has not fought against Russia
 
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Nov 2015
1,757
Kyiv
#58
With all Russian technical and numerical superiority in 1941, the Red Army suffered a monstrous rout within several motnths since the beginning of the campaign.

And if you look into the history of 1942 - then exactly the same defeat it suffered in the first half of 1942, but on a smaller scale. This is in the Crimea and near Kharkov. There, the Russians honestly admitted after the war that the reason for the rout is that the Germans attacked the Russian troops, who had previously been concentrated for a large offensive. And they did not prepare for defense at all

But exactly the same defeat and for the same reason was in the summer of 1941 for the entire Red Army. And there is no need to read the study of Suvorov (Rezun) - just look at the map of the deployment of Russian troops in June 1941 - and everything becomes clear. Two strongest fists of the Russians near Białystok and in the Lviv-Drohobych area the Germans were easily turned into huge "cauldrons" if they struck first

But the Russians clearly expected that they would be the first to strike
 
Nov 2015
1,757
Kyiv
#59
Furthermore, tank armor, guns, and powerful engines mean little when the real advantage comes from which side has better command and control, meaning commander cupolas, 3-man turrets, and radios, which the Red Army was seriously deficient with.
- here I agree with you. But the Russians did not understood it in 1941 - they hoped on their great tank superiority that will conquer whole Europe. They will start to win since the end of 1942 having American radio stations, American army phones and American wire for them. And moving their infantry, guns and all supplies in American army trucks.

Without all the most powerful American and British Lend-Lease assistance, neither the heroism of the Russians, nor the huge number of their tanks and airplanes would ensure them victory. And without American aluminum, they could not have produced half of the engines with an aluminum casing for the T-34, not to mention airplanes.
 
Jul 2016
9,327
USA
#60
We in fact compare German and Russian tanks to the beginning of the Eastern campaign 1941? The Germans had there about 3000 light tanks T-1 (Pz.Kpfw. I), T-2 and Czech 38 (t). They did not exceed the Russian T-28 and BT-7, radically giving way to them in terms of armament and engine power. The Russian tanks had guns of 45 mm, the Germans had machine guns of 7.92 and 20 and 37 mm guns. The same 37-mm guns also stood on a part of the T-3 tanks.

All these Russian "obsolete" tanks, thus, could successfully maintain their infantry on the defensive, destroy all German tanks from their guns and inflict heavy damage on the advancing German infantry.

Perhaps you recall that the vast majority of the German infantry, advancing in the East in 1941 was not at all supported by German tanks? The average density of German tanks in the summer of 1941 is 1-2 tanks per kilometer of the front. Therefore, the Germans needed to concentrate tanks in several "fists", and on the main length of the front the Germans infantry advanced, supported by mortars, barrel artillery, aviation and armored cars. And without any tanks.

At the same time, the Russians not only had complete tank superiority at the front, but also a large number of tanks in the rear, which were transferred to the front in the second half of 1941.

The better than these Russian "obsolete" types were only the version of the German T-3 with a 50mm gun and the T-4 - 732 + 439= 1,171 in total.

Although in 1941 T-4 had a short-barreled 75mm howitzer with low armor penetration. Thus, the Russians, as I said, had a colossal superiority in the number of tanks in the summer of 1941, and almost 2,000 new powerful T-34 and KV-1 and KV-2 did not even have close analogues at the Germans.

I can also add that the Robert Forczyk provides you with incorrect data -

...Soviet armour units were in the early stages of re-equipping with the KV-series heavy tanks and the T-34 medium tank, but out of 385 KV-1 and 185 KV-II built by mid-June, only 433 had been issued to troop units. Similarly, only 1,000 T-34 tanks were built before the German invasion and 903 arrived at units...

I have a summary of the Russian Directorate of tank GBTU of the Red Army's about the presence of tanks in the Red Army for the period from 1.01.41 to 1.01.44.

It states that on July 1, 1941, the Red Army had 423 tanks KV-1, 213 tanks KV-2 and 1,225 tanks T-34. And also 5,383 BT-7 and BT-7M, huge T-35 (61 pcs) and 502 quite powerful T-28

In total, according to that document, in the Red Army by July 1, 1941 there were 27,813 tanks.

It remains to add that the Russians cite a lot of German propaganda about the fact that in 1941 Germany considered Russia a "colossus on clay feet", and Russian are bad warriors. Did not count! And Hitler wrote to his friend Mussolini the day before the Russian campaign began -

Duce!

I am writing this letter to you at a moment when months of anxious deliberation and continuous nerve-racking waiting are ending in the hardest decision of my life.
...
As far as the war in the East is concerned, Duce, it will surely be difficult, but I do not entertain a second's doubt as to its great success.


The Germans had a great experience of war with the Russians in the WWI, and they knew that the Russians were good fighters. As you know, Hitler was a veteran of the WWI though he has not fought against Russia
You covered something like 15-20 different points in that post so I'll just deal with a couple:

German tank order of battle for Barbarossa:

Panzer I = 410 (almost entirely as the PzBef command tank variant)
Panzer II = 743 (used in light tank role for reconnaissance/scouting duties)
Panzer III = 967 (The primary medium tank for the panzer divisions in the schwerpunkt panzergruppe)
Various Czech tanks = 780 (Used as primary medium tank for those Panzer divisions who weren't given Panzer III)
Panzer IV = 439 (Used as infantry support vehicles, with its short barreled 75mm gun, limited AT abilities)

Note, these were not remotely equally spread out (similar to how the Soviet tank strength and type wasn't equally spread out among its forces). Some units had better quality armor then others, largely based on its role.

I included the summary of Soviet tanks not to discount the Soviets didn't have a lot of tanks (they did) but to show that your previous statement, that the Germans didn't plan on the T-34/KV series, weren't that big of a deal because their low numbers in the early portion of the campaign at least (however, they showed up more as the Germans drove deeper and the Soviet lines to their factories were shortened).

Absolutely, German tanks and AT guns both had problems penetrating the modern Soviet tanks, as the German tanks were all vulnerable to the 76mm gun. But they also had tactics that worked very well in defeating the piecemeal method at which the Soviets often attacked in 41-42, without proper infantry or artillery support, often with little to no planning, no communication, and based on outdated/completely incorrect intelligence, such as advancing until meeting heavy enemy tank resistance and then retreating into a baited ambush at which point the panzer division's AT weapons and AA guns (those precious 8.8cm guns) would maul the attacking Soviet tanks, followed by a fast counterattack often from the flanks or rear by German armor.

It was only when the Germans were very deep into Russia when Soviet armor began fighting smarter, using tactics that the Germans couldn't counter with their baited ambush approach. Such as the use of fire sack ambushes using armor, infantry, artillery followed by heavy armor counter attacks, these such new methods of fighting worked even though Soviet armor still had major issues with command and control and communication. And the Germans were stung hard (and that after six months of grueling combat that had already seen the German panzer divisions severely mauled without being properly reequiped with new vehicles and replacement soldiers, as the Germans had a horrific/nearly non-existent replacement system throughout the war). Add in weather, horrible logistics, and beyond stubborn Red Army defenses and constant threat of counterattack, that was why the Germans stalled.

Also, for your massive tank estimate for Soviet Union, are you including tankettes, the T-17, T-23, and T-27? I think you are, and those numbered in the many thousands and besides for reconnaissance (which the Red Army wasn't doing much of in 1941) they were next to useless. I was counting only actual typed light-heavy tanks that were positioned on the western border, discounting those that were in Siberia for instance, or being used for training purposes, being stockpiled, being repaired at depots, etc.