With all Russian technical and numerical superiority in 1941, the Red Army suffered a monstrous rout within several motnths since the beginning of the campaign.
And if you look into the history of 1942 - then exactly the same defeat it suffered in the first half of 1942, but on a smaller scale. This is in the Crimea and near Kharkov. There, the Russians honestly admitted after the war that the reason for the rout is that the Germans attacked the Russian troops, who had previously been concentrated for a large offensive. And they did not prepare for defense at all
But exactly the same defeat and for the same reason was in the summer of 1941 for the entire Red Army. And there is no need to read the study of Suvorov (Rezun) - just look at the map of the deployment of Russian troops in June 1941 - and everything becomes clear. Two strongest fists of the Russians near Białystok and in the Lviv-Drohobych area the Germans were easily turned into huge "cauldrons" if they struck first
But the Russians clearly expected that they would be the first to strike
And if you look into the history of 1942 - then exactly the same defeat it suffered in the first half of 1942, but on a smaller scale. This is in the Crimea and near Kharkov. There, the Russians honestly admitted after the war that the reason for the rout is that the Germans attacked the Russian troops, who had previously been concentrated for a large offensive. And they did not prepare for defense at all
But exactly the same defeat and for the same reason was in the summer of 1941 for the entire Red Army. And there is no need to read the study of Suvorov (Rezun) - just look at the map of the deployment of Russian troops in June 1941 - and everything becomes clear. Two strongest fists of the Russians near Białystok and in the Lviv-Drohobych area the Germans were easily turned into huge "cauldrons" if they struck first
But the Russians clearly expected that they would be the first to strike
Because deception works.