Logistics and structures of ancient armies??

Mar 2012
4,226
I don't have time to post much lately but just wanted to say that I enjoyed the early posts a lot. It's unfortunate to see the thread devolve into nationalistic squabbling.
If these people actually sat down and read Perdue or Theobald humbly, instead of devolving into a nationalistic squabble because they don't like what these scholars said, they will learn plenty of facts and details of comparative logistics. You will probably learn a good deal from them too. So don't hide behind the smokescreen of relativism or nationalistic accusations. The fatal weakness with their method of argument isn’t its reliance on relativism, but the result of making inconsistent use of the historical evidence. All we require to sidestep the unavoidable tropes of all subjectivity and reach a definitive conclusion is a set of objective criteria. And we’ve already obtained those from the empirical data and scholarly sources, on which all my arguments are founded upon, whereas theirs are entirely predicated on their explicit denial, and apparently only because they emphatically disprove their preferred conclusion. I accept any primary or scholarly source more exhaustive than what Perdue gave, but I won't accept simple tropes lacking comparative analytical value such as; "Russian logistics are developed, so Perdue is wrong, read up" or making assumptions on things these scholars wrote to denounce their argument even when such assumptions cannot even be verified.
 
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Mar 2012
4,226
What you write about the damage during the Thirty Years' War is completely wrong. We wrote you that many times.
raziel, its clear to me now that you don't even read the sources you cited yourself. You apparently just throw in name of books, assume they back up what you said without even reading it, and then make claims that are outright false based on your own sources.

Everything that the books you cited agrees with what Perdue actually argued, if you are not so defensive from a mere first glance of what Perdue wrote, you'll have caught that:

"Ultimately, the kontributions system, designed to feed these huge forces, proved a failure. The demands of the armies were crippling. The discipline in them, a prerequisite if the system was to work effectively, was too poor to prevent the unlicensed pillaging which quickly reduced the supply potential of an area to zero. This was true even in the Swedish army, generally reckoned to be one of the better controlled. As early as May 1631 an official wrote, 'The cavalry do as they list...they plunder the land to the very bones, provoking complaints and curses fit to make you shudder.' By the 1640s this, plus the deliberate ravaging of territory to deny its resources to the enemy, had laid waste to whole areas of Germany. Field armies were reduced in size to 10-15,000 men, not because more could not be recruited but because more could not be fed; and the cavalry constituted a higher proportion than previously, simply because they were the most adept at foraging. French, Swedish and Imperial forces struggled control of territory from which supplies could be extracted by force, as the war degenerated into a series of battles, raids and manoeuvres which had little to do with any overall strategy designed to secure the political objectives of their masters, everything to do with the survival of the armies themselves. Strategy had become an appendage of logistics."


Frank Tallett War and society in Early Modern Europe: 1495-1715 pp.62




Contributions were collected in hostile territory, not in one's own country.
That was precisely one of Perdue's points if you bothered to digest his articles. The Mongolia and Xinjiang campaigns of the Qing did not force contributions on the locals of hostile territory and were largely supplied by the province of Gansu. This is why I compared Gansu to begin with, because the inhabitants there took the primary burden to supply these armies.




" Field armies were reduced in size to 10-15,000 men, not because more could not be recruited but because more could not be fed; and the cavalry constituted a higher proportion than previously, simply because they were the most adept at foraging."

"And there were glimmerings of a realization that by splitting an army on the march into several columns, and not concentrating it on to a single route, the troops could move more rapidly, subsist more easily and the countryside would suffer less damage. In 1675, for example, the 70 year old Derfflinger moved the Prussian army to confront the Swedes by dividing it into several units spread over a distance of nearly 80 miles, subsequently achieving a victory at the battle of Fehrbellin."

"French armies operating inside their own country or close to its borders could be provisioned, but they, like all other armies, were obliged to live off the land when on campaign outside their frontiers, with all the restraints which this entailed. 'it was the abailability or otherwise of local supplies, much more than magazines or convoys, that determined the movements of Louvois' forces just as it had those of Gustavus Adolphus. "

War and society in Early Modern Europe: 1495-1715 pp.62-65



In contrast, Perdue:
"The ability to supply up to fifty thousand soldiers for several years with grain, meat, weapons, and horses transported over thousands of miles of steppe, desert, and steep mountains represented an amazing feat of organization. By contrast, European armies at this time wriggled instead of marching on their stomachs. As Martin van Creveld remarks of European armies before the nineteenth century: 'In no instance that I have come across is there any question of a force on the move being supplied solely by convoys regularly shuttling between it and its base, and it was even been claimed that the mathematics involved in this kind of operation were too sophisticated for the military commander of the age to tackle', Although Louis XIV's forces could exceed 100,000 men, he could move them only slowly, and he could not feed them from his own supply lines. Armies had to prey on the local population in order to survive. The Qing armies, by contrast, moved quickly across the vast reaches of the steppes supported by relay posts which shipped rations to the men and fodder to the horses. Qing commanders made careful efforts to spare the local population the burdens of military supply, either by having soldiers carry their rations with them, or by giving them money to buy grain at market prices. The real victory of early Qing rulers was their ability to draw off the resources of a rapidly commercializing economy to serve national defense needs without inflicting excessive damage on the rural economy."





To sum it up, Frank Tallett and Peter Perdue's respective studies show that European armies of the time could muster around 15,000 soldiers per route; (armies of 100,000 would have to be divided into some 7 routes or they will starve, and Michael Roberts considered the 'simultaneous and effectively coordinated operations of five or seven armies moving under the king's (Gustavus) direction on an enourmous curving front extendingfrom the middle Oder to the Alpine passes', as a 'strategic concept more complex, vaster, than any one commander had previously attempted'), at a distance of usually less than 100 miles; anything more generally required pillaging local resources, whereas the Qing army was able to mobilize 50,000 per route in three separate routes marching over 1,000 miles away for three months in the late 17th century, and later for three years during Qianlong's time.
 
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Bart Dale

Ad Honorem
Dec 2009
7,059
As I suspected, the he Qing logistics system proved inadequate in the Dungan Rebellion, some 20 million died, and 70% of Gansu.

The Qing method of relying on a mixture.of interprovincial assistance and local resources did in work in resource poor Gansu, and the armies resorted to looting and extortion. Zuo Zongtang who ended the rebellion had to rely empire wide surge in interprovincial commitments. "Chinese and Indian Warfare - From.the Classical Age to the 1870" editors Kaushik Roy, Peter Longer;. E.Kaske pg 281.

The Dungan Rebellion is a better analogy with examples from 30 Years War Europe, with foreign armies from.differnt different provinces acting analogous to the foreign armies of different countries, the different provincial armies initially not all under a unified command. And the fighting took place in Gansu. Losing70% of the population does not show he Chinese logistics of the Qing army as superior to Euoropean armies. In fact, the Qing armies at the time were smaller than European ones, yet still the Qing had great difficult in supplying their armies in the Dungan rebellion.
 

Bart Dale

Ad Honorem
Dec 2009
7,059
Bart, before you accuse someone of ignorance, let me just remind you that when Hannibal invaded Italy, and converted various cities into supply depots for his army. So this isn't something new. This has always been the case.

It just means you put your food in a fixed location and have a route to your army and you can defend said position. Unless you think everyone carries everything on their back.
Hannibal.lost. He lost all his elephants, and a number cities joined Hannibal. .You can't put supply depots ahead of you. The cities he used as supply depots were not hostile territories, and Hannibal's campaign was much longer than any.of the European campaigns that were used as comparison.. And ancient armies

Poor Chinese army logistics.greatly contributed to killing 20 million in the Dungan Rebellion, including 70% of Gansu. Contemporary Western armies did not suffer from such logistics problems, the American Civil War was being fought at the same time as the Dungan Rebellion, and 70% of the population of any of the Confederate did not did die as happened in Gansu, nor anywhere close to 40% of the Shaanxi that died. The logistics of Qing armies were far inferior to European armies at the time.
 

Bart Dale

Ad Honorem
Dec 2009
7,059
I ask again, how are these factors relevant at all to Perdue's argument? If you actually understood his argument, all he said was the Qing could buy goods from the local people and didn't need to take things by force, who exactly did the buying is completely irrelevant to his point.
From the first, I stated this thread should be how the logistics worked, and those questions are about the mechanics of logistics, not about proving someone's pet theory.

Perdue's premise is fundamentally flaw, since he is making invalid comparisons, comparing apples to oranges. The frontier fighting he gives examples of is very different from the European ones he is making comparisons to.

When you compare fighting that is more similar, the Chinese methods were a disaster. During the Dungan Rebellion, where the fighting occurred within Gansu instead of outside it, 70% of Gansu' population died, and Chinese armies engaged in pillaging and extortion for supplies. Gansu was just a supply base essentially in Perdue's examples as far as I can tell, and so a more accurate comparison would be the effect of Louis campaign on the Home Front in France.

One of the concerns I see with the Qing method is a great reliance on just local resources. That is fine as long as there are local resources available, could be a problem if not available. When just using Gansu as a supply base, the Qing method worked ok. But when the fighting was in Gansu, ad in the Dungan Rebellion, it failed miserably, as I suspected it might.


What happened in reality was that there was no long term subsistence crisis in Gansu and the area became integrated into the rest of the Qing Empire. In European places like Nordlingen in Germany, early modern military exactions contributed to long-term economic decline. Perdue already cited these actual case samples, you just failed to actually notice them so don't blame me for repeating the same things like a broken record when I am merely playing it to a wall.
Gansu experience a long term decline too after the Dungan Rebellion, and it's living standard is lower than Norlingen. Perdue's comparisons are flawed, his comparisons should have been with Gansu at the time of the Dungan Rebellion.

Battles don't take place directly in population centers unless its a siege or intentional raids, so your caveats are meaningless. The Zungars raided Qing military outposts right next to Gansu in places like Hami and Kobdo throughout the 18th century. The Qing army does not take forcibly from locals to maintain these garrisons, and if you say otherwise cite a case of that or stop spewing just opinions.
Sieges and other battles do take place in population centers. If you have place an army in a city against potential assault, that can strain the local resources. If you are just using the area as a base, you can place your army away from the urban areas, reducing stress.

Tell me, why did Chinese armies resort to looting and extortion during the Dungan Rebellion, as bad as anything in Europe? The source I cited in a couple post back said 70% of the population of Gansu died, Wikipedia says the same thing. And a few raids is not the same as full scale fighting. I think the results of the Dungan Rebellion rather proves my point.

Zunghar raids to garrisons on the doorstep of Gansu can be seen several times during Yongzheng's reign.
For the third time, Perdue's argument was that there was no long term economic decline in Gansu as a result of the campaign. The price of goods returned to pre-war levels the moment war ended; in fact it went beyond that, the price of goods became cheaper and market integration increased.
As I said, a few raids is not nearly the same thing as having full scale battles fought in the same area.

How does Perdue explain the diasterous results of Dungan Rebellion? I can't help but think losing 70% of your population as Gansu did, isn't going to have long term effects. Why didn't the Qing logistics he praised so highly work then?

I don't see Perdue providing evidence there was long term price increases in Europe after the war. Can you provide examples where he said that there were long term increases in prices as a result of the wars in Europe?

My question is why there was any price increase in Gansu, and not all if China? It seems to me that the Qing relied too heavily on localized support, instead of spreading the burden of fighting the wat over all the empire. Which is why they had such a disaster in Gansu in the Dungan Rebellion. The Civil War, which was being fought at the same time, didn't result in 20 million deaths, even though the armies that fought, were far larger.

Far from convincing me of the superiority of the Chinese, Perdue has convinced me of the opposite. The Qing methods, while effective for the frontier fighting against the Zunghar, laid the seeds for future diasters that showed up in the Dungan Revolt.



To quote Perdue:



Perdue was comparing the economic situations of similar areas providing logistics to the army, not on anything else, you assumed he did, because you apparently holds the delusion that you know more basics than he does when it comes to military history and primary sources even when you haven't cited a single source nor demonstrated the competence to read the primary source materials and analyze them critically. [/We uote]

That is the flaw, Perdue wasn't making similar comparisons. A similar comparison would be the fighting in Gansu in the Dungan Revolt. A valid comparison would be the way Russia conquered it's eastern lands, and the effect on grain prices, but by his own words Perdue wasn't that knowledgeable. For example, I don't see him providing examples of long term rises in grain prices as a result of it's eastern conquest,, if its conquest of the many "Stan" countries.

The style.of.fighting makes a difference. The fighting seen in the Franco-Prussian war was very different than the fighting WW2 in the same areas, and had different consquences. Th scale of fighting was also different. That will affect logistics and the economy. All of which makes Perdue's comparison.of.doubtful.validity.

That these European areas were war zones is just your baseless opinion. If you think you are more qualified than professional historians you are going to need to cite an actual source.
This professional historian ignored the very same province when it involved the fighting during the Dungan Revolt. I think the results of the Dungan Revolt, with it's 70% reduction when Gansu was war zone, proves my point. Whether the area is a war zone or not does make a huge difference.



Envy slays itself with arrows.
Bart, the only person who is being outright dishonest right now is you fabricating the fact that these cases being raised were European armies devastating populations directly through war even when the authors explicitly and clearly talked about forced extractions and contributions forced upon the locals "in return for the Kontributions, occupying commanders promised to safeguard the region from violence by their soldiers."

Also, if you continue to make personal accusations on superiority boasting, you will be reported as I'm already utterly bored at these repetitive diversion tactics and the moderator has already warned you. Stay on the topic itself or stop posting altogether.
None of what you posted above is on topic, and when I ask you about the details about logistics, you shrug it off as unimportant in proving your pet hisorians claims for the Qing dynasty. The results of the Dungan Revolt, in the same area as Perdue was studying, but with fighting more similar to that in Europe, which Perdue ignored, rather completely undermines his positive assessment.

As I said, far from proving Wing superiority, Perdue's work does the opposite in my view. A few raids not withstanding, the bulk of the fighting was not in Gansu, so it is hard to understand why there would a large increase in grain prices at all. It seems the burden of supplying grain fell heavily on just Gansu, rather than the empire as a whole. That strongly indicates that the Chinese markets were not as well integrated as Perdue says, otherwise we should have not seen that localized tripling of grain prices. A truly integrated grain market would have seen a uniform rise in prices across the entire empire. That prices fell after the campaign ended proves not the amount of integration, but only that there was no longer a war driving up prices.

More accurately indicating Qing logistic capacity is the Dungan Revolt, and Qing seem to come off rather poorly with 18th century Europe. In 18th Western Europe,. I don't know of any conflict that killed off 40% to 70% of the population as happened in China. You find similar accounts in 17th century Europe as you saw in 19th century China, but things weren't as bad in Europe in the 18th century. And when. It comes to.comparable 19th century Western conflicts, the Qing come off far worse. Zuo Zongtang successfully resolved the Dungan conflict by not trying to rely on local resources.

A more accurate comparison would be 17th century Ming and Qing China, perhaps a comparison of the logistics of the Manchu armies conflict with the Ming with contrmporary European ones.

Please stop posting the same post over and over. If it didn't convince people the first time, it won't convince people just repeating the exact same thing. If you have some new points to make, or some new information to post, that is great. If your original post was dozenzs.of pages back, then reposting can be useful. Otherwise, it doesn't serve s useful purpose. It there is some information or aspect that was overllooked in the first post, then it would be more helpful if you only posted the pertain information, and point out what they overlooked the first time. If they didn't see your point, or rejected it the first time, it serves no real.purpose to.repeat the.exact same thing.
 
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Aug 2015
1,843
Los Angeles
Hannibal.lost. He lost all his elephants, and a number cities joined Hannibal. .You can't put supply depots ahead of you. The cities he used as supply depots were not hostile territories, and Hannibal's campaign was much longer than any.of the European campaigns that were used as comparison.. And ancient armies
Sorry, let me remind you AGAIN what you wrote.

It must be pointed out that with the numerous countries and borders, any countries force would probably a border before it ran into another supply depot. Contrary to the ignorance of you and your sources, one country could hardly set up.suplly depots in another country.


So let me break down how armies actual use a supply depot in enemy territories.
You have an army, that has a supply route that supplies your army over a range. As you push into enemy territorities, you clean out pocket resistances, and you set up a new supply depot, so that you don't have to carry all 365 days worth of food on you. You carry the necessary supplies for your next phase duration as you roam, and you get resupply from the base you NOW set up in your enemy territory.

So, if you think someone is talking about setting up a supply depot in ENEMY CONTROLLED territory, I honestly don't know what to tell you. I honestly don't.
Poor Chinese army logistics.greatly contributed to killing 20 million in the Dungan Rebellion, including 70% of Gansu. Contemporary Western armies did not suffer from such logistics problems, the American Civil War was being fought at the same time as the Dungan Rebellion, and 70% of the population of any of the Confederate did not did die as happened in Gansu, nor anywhere close to 40% of the Shaanxi that died. The logistics of Qing armies were far inferior to European armies at the time.
Yah, and no one is talking about the Dungan Rebellion. I am pretty sure everyone is on the same page except for you. You went to an entirely different period ALL TOGETHER.

The Dungan Rebellion is a 19th century event, and a mid-late 19th century. What you are replying to is an 18th century event. That's like saying well since the US is a global power in the 20th century surely in the 19th century we were a global power as well; that surely in the 19th century Chinese military was crap, surely 18th century Chinese military was crap as well.

I fail to see logic except for the consistency of ignorance and logical fallacy in your statements.
 
Aug 2015
1,843
Los Angeles
This professional historian ignored the very same province when it involved the fighting during the Dungan Revolt. I think the results of the Dungan Revolt, with it's 70% reduction when Gansu was war zone, proves my point. Whether the area is a war zone or not does make a huge difference.
No it doesn't. You are comparing an empire at perhaps it's absolute bottom to the absolute peak.

And also ignoring actual changes in governmental policies. Don't take this personally Bart, but you know nothing about internal Qing policies, that is why you would compare the Qing during Kangxi-Qianlong era where the Xiexiang system was still functioning, and then the mid Xianfeng era where the Xiexiang system collapsed in the 1850s.

Qing's collapse isn't just a military failure, but also an economic failure. To put the Dungan Rebellion as sort of a military issue ignores entirely the complex issues involved, and to think that the Dungan Rebellion exposed some sort of logistic issue Chinese always had is to put it frankly, stubbornly ignorant. To put it in ways you might comprehend, that is like saying the Social War is about war of independence while ignoring the underlying issues involved in the Social War.
 

Bart Dale

Ad Honorem
Dec 2009
7,059
Sorry, let me remind you AGAIN what you wrote.

It must be pointed out that with the numerous countries and borders, any countries force would probably a border before it ran into another supply depot. Contrary to the ignorance of you and your sources, one country could hardly set up.suplly depots in another country.


So let me break down how armies actual use a supply depot in enemy territories.
You have an army, that has a supply route that supplies your army over a range. As you push into enemy territorities, you clean out pocket resistances, and you set up a new supply depot, so that you don't have to carry all 365 days worth of food on you. You carry the necessary supplies for your next phase duration as you roam, and you get resupply from the base you NOW set up in your enemy territory.
The examples of fighting nomads like the Zunghars is not the same thing as fighting more settled peopled. With the lower population density, and fewer fortifications, you don't have to worry about the pockets of resistance in the areas you conquer in the same way you have to do with more settled areas.

That is why the comparison of the campaign against the Zunghars is a much different affair. It is much easier to set up these depots in more empty lands than more settled lands.

When the Qing had to fight in more settled lands, as in the Dungan Revolt they faced different set of logistic problems, and largely failed.

Yah, and no one is talking about the Dungan Rebellion. I am pretty sure everyone is on the same page except for you. You went to an entirely different period ALL TOGETHER. [/

The Dungan Rebellion is a 19th century event, and a mid-late 19th century. What you are replying to is an 18th century event. That's like saying well since the US is a global power in the 20th century surely in the 19th century we were a global power as well; that surely in the 19th century Chinese military was crap, surely 18th century Chinese military was crap as well.
The examples of Europe from the 30 Years War is from the 17th century is from a different a different time period too, yet with the double standard so typical of Chinese posters, you have used them, and then whine when I used examples from a time period no more distance than the European examples that were given to justify Chinese superiority. At least my examples were from the exact same region, just a different type of warfare.

I used the Dungan Revolt examples because:

1. It was from the exact same area as the examples of Perdue. Unlike Perdue, that uses examples from a different region, with different geography which could logistics, the Dungan Revolt example was the exact same region, so the Chinese can't complain that a different geography somehow made a difference.

2. It was to demonstrate the effects of different styles of war had on logistics. It is one thing to fight mostly nomads in a separate country, it is another thing to fight settled people in you own country.

So stop whining and being a hypocrite. The European examples from the 17th century and early 18th century were not from the same time as the Qing 18th century wars either, and the war being conducted was a much different type of war than those being fought in Europe. The kind of fighting done in the Dungan Revolt was much closer to the type of fighting done in Europe.

a. Fighting was against settled peoples.

b. More cities and fortifications that had to be dealt with

c. More different armies and factions fighting - Chinese militias, Chinese armies from different provinces that acted as different armies at first (Zuo Zongtang united all the forces), Muslim militias, Muslim rebels from Shaangxi province. This much more mimics the kind of fighting in the 30 Years War where examples were being used.

If you want to provide examples of 17th century Ming-Qing conflict logistics, that would be very nice. But you want to dismiss the the 19th century Dungan Revolt, fine, but then you only allowable examples need to come from mid 18th century Europe, not early 18th century Europe, and those haven't been provided.
 
Aug 2015
1,843
Los Angeles
The examples of fighting nomads like the Zunghars is not the same thing as fighting more settled peopled. With the lower population density, and fewer fortifications, you don't have to worry about the pockets of resistance in the areas you conquer in the same way you have to do with more settled areas.
Actually, establishing a supply depot against Zunghars is WAY HARDER than fighting a settled people. In fact, fighting any kind of nomadic presence is way harder than settled people. Because nomads run away. They are on horses, and they are mobile, and they make your resupply very hard.



That is why the comparison of the campaign against the Zunghars is a much different affair. It is much easier to set up these depots in more empty lands than more settled lands.
Until you realize you needed to defend that supply line against a nomadic people.

When the Qing had to fight in more settled lands, as in the Dungan Revolt they faced different set of logistic problems, and largely failed.
You still think the late Qing period problems is a MILITARY PROBLEM alone?

I honestly don't know what else to say.


The examples of Europe from the 30 Years War is from the 17th century is from a different a different time period too, yet with the double standard so typical of Chinese posters, you have used them, and then whine when I used examples from a time period no more distance than the European examples that were given to justify Chinese superiority. At least my examples were from the exact same region, just a different type of warfare.
I used them? Do you think all posters who post about China are the same?

Pfffffff.

And yah, your example is dogshit. Again after explained that the difference between a literately collapsed government and a competent government under Kangxi-Qianlong era, you still think it's close enough.

1. It was from the exact same area as the examples of Perdue. Unlike Perdue, that uses examples from a different region, with different geography which could logistics, the Dungan Revolt example was the exact same region, so the Chinese can't complain that a different geography somehow made a difference.
Actually, Gangsu was only PART of the region. Perdue is talking about not JUST Gansu, but Gansu and then outwards, thousand of miles beyond.

2. It was to demonstrate the effects of different styles of war had on logistics. It is one thing to fight mostly nomads in a separate country, it is another thing to fight settled people in you own country.
Eh, you also forget that this happened during the Nian Rebellion & tail end Taiping Rebellion, which make things a bit more difficult on existential threats.


So stop whining and being a hypocrite. The European examples from the 17th century and early 18th century were not from the same time as the Qing 18th century wars either, and the war being conducted was a much different type of war than those being fought in Europe. The kind of fighting done in the Dungan Revolt was much closer to the type of fighting done in Europe.
Calling me a hypocrite when you have been routinely exposed to know nothing about what you are talking about. Good point.


c. More different armies and factions fighting - Chinese militias, Chinese armies from different provinces that acted as different armies at first (Zuo Zongtang united all the forces), Muslim militias, Muslim rebels from Shaangxi province. This much more mimics the kind of fighting in the 30 Years War where examples were being used.
Yet has NOTHING to do with the discussion on Perdue's topic.


If you want to provide examples of 17th century Ming-Qing conflict logistics, that would be very nice. But you want to dismiss the the 19th century Dungan Revolt, fine, but then you only allowable examples need to come from mid 18th century Europe, not early 18th century Europe, and those haven't been provided.
No, I just want to show how your example has been :deadhorse:
 
Oct 2017
147
Poland
Kaghan, I appreciate that you have looked at the studies again, but you still pay too little attention to them. You treat both Perdue and other sources in a very arbitrary way. I think that we could talk in a more civilized way. At the beginning I was interested in Chinese logistics and I wanted to learn something about it from you. However, when I went into the discussion on this subject, you felt attacked and started to defend your position at all costs. Now I have examined this topic and the whole discussion has ceased to be interesting. It would be good if we were just talking about logistics in various times and places, instead of fighting for who is right. There are certainly many things that I could learn from you about Chinese logistics. Especially if you speak Chinese (I do not know where you are from). But first you would have to stop taking it so personally. For some reason, you got really caught up in a particular thesis and you do not want to see anything that does not fit.


Show me the source where European states have large state granaries that stores as much as ten percent of their annual tax and had the bureaucratic flexibility to re-direct resources. Cite the source where Europeans could completely buy local products without forced extraction. Even the sources you provided yourself said they couldn't.
Read more. I read it and say that you are wrong. The quotes you provide are taken out of context. From the general context of all these books, it appears that Europe used the same methods. But if you care so much about the quotes, I will throw a few here, but they do not matter without the context:


The 1556 Decree on Service enhanced military planning on the southern
frontier by making it possible to project in advance how many cavalrymen and
their slave and peasant retainers would be available for mobilization into different
forms of service and to calculate the costs of their deployment (in this regard it
functioned somewhat like the Ottoman
timar
system, which established the
ratio between
cift
allotments and the number of
sipahi
cavalrymen and the
cebeli
retainers they were to support). The additional recordkeeping involved in
inspections, promotions, and setting new cash and land entitlement rates also
stimulated further bureaucratization of the central military secretariat. By 1566
the secretaries for military affairs had their own offi
ce, the
Razriadnaia izba
,
which was expanded and renamed the
Razriadnyi prikaz
(Military Chancellery)
over the next decades.
The forces on the southern frontier also increased in size and structural
complexity as a consequence of Muscovite mastery of gunpowder technology.




Very little is known about the logistics of southern array operations in this
period, primarily because provisioning and transport remained for the most part
privately arranged and so went undocumented. The state played little role in
corps logistics because the bulk of the corps still consisted of middle service class
cavalrymen required to provide their own stores suffi
cient for three to four
month’s campaign, carried on their own packhorses and carts and sent ahead to
the muster point soon after mobilization had been announced. Any additional
provisions cavalrymen might subsequently need they would have to purchase
or forage for themselves from the villages near where they were stationed.
Musketeers and gunners did get rations money from the state, but they were still
expected to purchase their own supplies with it. The government’s primary
contribution to logistics was therefore limited to providing transport and drivers
(out of the
iam
post system, or specially requisitioned from taxpayers) to the
musketeers, gunners, and artillery, which elements were usually smaller in the
southern arrays than on campaigns on enemy soil on the western front.
Each corps had its own baggage train, refl ecting the fact that corps traveled
along separate routes and joined together for general battle on one fi
eld only
under unusual circumstances. On major operations on foreign territory, at least,
Muscovite army baggage trains tended to be very large even by the standards of
the time and their management required the appointment of special train
commanders



But baggage trains for the corps of the Borderland
and Riazan’ arrays were probably of much smaller proportion, for these corps
were not intended to make long marches across enemy territory and could draw
from local supply sources along the Abatis Line.
18
Local supply sources came in three forms. The larger or more strategically
positioned garrison towns along the Bank and Abatis Line (Kolomna, Tula,
Pronsk, Voronezh, etc.) held state granaries, fi
lled by grain taxation or govern-
ment purchase and designed to provision their defenders in time of siege or
blockade; these could also serve as rudimentary magazines from which the corps
could also draw. Merchant sutlers sometimes delivered supplies for sale, although
we cannot tell whether they were operating on government contract and under
instruction to provision particular units. Probably most supplemental provision-
ing was not state-organized but undertaken by servicemen arranging their own
occasional purchases of local food and fodder from townsmen and villagers,
with the government attempting some regulation by insisting these purchases
be made at fair market price so as not to exploit the tsar’s taxpayers (when
operating on enemy territory, of course, the army was free to seize what it
needed and extort “contributions”).
19



The Smolensk campaign also required more elaborate logistics than previous
operations. The traditional formation cavalry
sotnia
(century) could not be
expected to cart in enough of their own food and fodder to last through the
entire siege, which would likely be a protracted affair given the imposing
fortifi
cations at Smolensk; but there would have to be controls upon their efforts
to supplement their stores by foraging lest they provoke resistance from the
rural population of Dorogobuzh and Smolensk districts and frustrate the aim of
“restoring” them to Muscovy. On arriving at Smolensk the army would in fact
fi nd most area foodstuffs already gathered up by the Poles for storage inside
Smolensk, the residue to be had only at astronomical prices; purchasing would
therefore be abandoned for exactions remunerated at below market price. These
forced deliveries were organized by assigning particular villages to provision
particular regiments.
Some supplemental stores – especially fodder for the cavalry – had been
cached at two marchroute magazines on Muscovite territory – at Mozhaisk and
Viaz’ma. A third magazine was founded at Dorogobuzh once it was liberated
from the Poles. The Mozhaisk and Viaz’ma magazines appear to have been
inadequate, for the army experienced serious provisioning problems while it
was still on the march to the Lithuanian border. The Dorogobuzh magazine fell
back into the hands of the Poles in October 1633.
The most signifi cant complication, though, was the much larger proportion
of this expeditionary army dependent upon rations money. This left the govern-
ment more responsible for collecting and delivering provisions than on previous
campaigns.
The provisions carted to Smolensk to be purchased with rations money had to come from two sources. One source was private contract. The Chancellery
of Foreign Provender contracted with hundreds of merchant sutlers to purchase
provisions for the Smolensk army, arranging with particular sutlers to deliver to
particular regiments, which bought these stores at prices fi
xed by the
government, usually at a little below Moscow market price. The other source
was the Germans’ ration (
nemetskii korm
), a tax in kind levied on Muscovite
taxpayers at the rate of 19–26,000 kg rusks, 9–13,000 kg barley fl our, and 1,600
kg salt pork per
sokha.
These stores were delivered to Smolensk by the same
sutlers and sold at the same prices; the money given for them was then used by
the Chancellery of Foreign Provender to buy up additional supplies.
In its fi rst months on enemy territory (August–December 1632) very little
reached the army, either through private sutlery or through the Germans’
ration. Deliveries of the Germans’ ration did improve from December 1632 to
October 1633; by the end of this period about 2.45 to 3 million kg of rye fl
our,
1.4 to 1.9 million kg of rusks, and 9,100 kg of salt pork were delivered. But this
was still inadequate, for it had become necessary to allow traditional formation
servicemen as well as troops in the foreign contingent to purchase Germans’
rations in order to survive.



On 15–18 May 1654 three Muscovite army groups invaded Lithuania. V. P.
Sheremetev’s Army Group North, about 15,000 men out of Novgorod, Pskov,
and Velikie Luki, marched against Nevel’, Polotsk, and Vitebsk; A. N.
Trubetskoi’s Army Group South, another 15,000 troops out of Briansk,
advanced towards Mstislavl’, Orsha, and Smolensk. The largest force, the
41,000-man Army Group Center, marching from Moscow against Dorogobuzh
and Smolensk, consisted of Great, Vanguard, and Rear Guard corps under Ia.
K. Cherkasskii, N. I. Odoevskii, and M. M. Temkin-Rostovskii and the elite
Tsar’s Corps under the personal command of Tsar Aleksei. Foreign formation
cavalry and infantry comprised a large proportion of these forces, particularly in
the Tsar’s Corps, and Tsar Aleksei even had a regiment of Polish-model hussar
lancers. The artillery taken into Lithuania reportedly exceeded 4,000 guns.
Jakob Kettler, Duke of Courland, observed, “No one has such an army.”
1
Hetman Khmel’nyts’kyi had also pledged Ukrainian troops for the campaign in
Lithuania: Colonel I. N. Zolotarenko was to take 20,000 mounted and foot
cossacks north through Starodub into Lithuania to occupy territory along the
line Gomel’–Propoisk–Staryi Bykhov, support Army Group South, and protect
the Hetmanate from Lithuanian counterattack.



One reason for Muscovy’s initial success on the Lithuanian front was over-
whelming numerical superiority. Counting Zolotarenko’s cossacks the invaders
numbered about 100,000 men,



On the
whole their logistic preparations had been sound. They used the Dnepr and
Western Dvina to move their heavy guns and stores into the Lithuanian interior.
Velikie Luki had already been prepared as a forward base and magazine for most
of the invading corps; the middle service class troops had shipped their personal
stores here in advance of the invasion, and about 3.9 million kg of state grain
had been stored here in new barns for the foreign formation infantry and cavalry
contingents.



To lead a column of 132,000 Muscovite troops and support personnel and
100,000 horses from the banks of the Samara across 300 km of empty steppe was
an enormous logistical challenge. On a campaign projected to last four months
these 132,000 men could be expected to consume 23,000 tons of grain. Their
horses would need 9,000 tons of dry fodder to supplement their green forage.
The traditional cavalry
sotni
could be expected to provide their own rations for
the duration of the campaign, but they comprised only 7.7 percent of Golitsyn’s
army; the remainder would have to be provisioned by the Military Chancellery.
It is a mark of the improved effectiveness of Muscovite logistics that the Military
Chancellery did succeed in mobilizing 22,283 tons of grain for the fi
rst Crimean
expedition. This was accomplished through a combination of extraordinary
levies (“on-demand grain”), regular levies (musketeers’ grain and “eighth-
grain”), special purchases, and requisitions from the granaries along the Belgorod
Line. Over the course of 1686 and spring 1687 grain was collected from across
European Russia and shipped to the muster points in Sloboda Ukraine by
wagon and on 125 barges launched from Briansk; some of it was delivered to
Kiev as well, for resupplying the expedition by boat down the Dnepr.



Golitsyn made a fatal error in wagering the expedition’s success upon fi
nding
suffi
cient green forage in the steppe.



On 13
June the army halted on the Konskie Vody to replenish its hay and water and
beheld a great reddish glow along the southern horizon: the Crimean Tatars had
set fi re to the steppe ahead to deprive the invaders of forage. By the time the
army approached the Karachakra River on the sixteenth it had become clear no
unburnt grass was to be had for many kilometers around and that the water taken
on at Konskie Vody had been tainted.



Much military activity
was therefore aimed at the capture or destruction of an
opponent’s economic resources.



A scorched-earth policy such as this might also be used to
hamper an advancing army. The Count of Nassau, Charles V’s
general, in retreat from Mézières in 1521, left a trail of
destruction behind him in hope of halting the pursuit by Francis
I. The French king adopted a similar policy in Hainault in the
autumn of the same year, engaging in ‘the most piteous
destruction of towns and spoiling of so fair a country as never
have been seen among Christian men’, as one contemporary
WAR & SOCIETY IN EARLY-MODERN EUROPE
60
noted.114 In 1536 the Duke of Montmorency evacuated Aix and
turned lower Provence into a wasteland: only the fruit trees were
deliberately left standing in the hope of giving dysentery to the
advancing army of Charles V. This pattern of ravaging the
countryside in order to deny its resources to an opponent was
repeated in the seventeenth century. Large tracts of Germany
were laid waste in this way during the Thirty Years War; and the
French commander Ville, who strongly advocated this method of
waging war, put it into operation in Roussillon in 1639. After his
victory at Sinsheim, Turenne devastated much of the Palatinate in
order to deny its use to Montecuccoli; and in 1704 Marlborough
ravaged much of Bavaria, his troops removing whatever crops,
livestock and property they could carry before destroying what
remained.



If such collapses were to be averted
in the future greater state intervention in army provisioning
seemed unavoidable, and most governments moved in this
direction during the later seventeenth century.
In many ways France led the way, notably under the guidance
of two successive Secretaries of State for War: Michel Le Tellier
(1643–66) and his son Louvois (1666–91).123 Le Tellier
designated a series of routes within France to which armies had
to adhere when on the move, and supply dumps were set up on
them by the local intendants, one marching day’s distance
apart, the intention being to avoid the indiscriminate
plundering which resulted when unfed troops were moved
across the country. Louvois oversaw the establishment of a
series of magazines at strongpoints along the frontier: at
Breisach in Alsace, Metz, Nancy and Thionville in Lorraine,
Sedan and Rocroi in Champagne, and Pinerolo in north Italy,
for example. Stocked with non-perishable foods (onions were a
great favourite) each had the theoretical capacity to withstand a
six-month siege. In addition, magasins généraux were set up
near the frontier to supply the field army as it embarked on campaign, and a permanent pool of vehicles and military
drivers was set up—the équipage des vivres—to supplement the
locally requisitioned transport which was still commandeered to
carry reserves of food with an army on the march. Some
military supplies were purchased directly by government
officials such as the surin-tendants généraux des vivres,
established by Richelieu in 1627, the commissaires des vivres,
or the intendants d’armée who, by the 1670s, were permanently
attached to the armies. However, a lack of ready money meant
that contracted victuallers remained the basis for gathering and
delivering supplies. They were employed on a much increased
scale by the Crown, but their activities were more closely
supervised than in the past, especially by the intendants
d’armée, who checked the quality, quantity and price of the
supplies they delivered. Where France led, others followed.
Much of the bread for the English forces in Flanders was
supplied by large-scale contractors: Solomon and Moses
Medina, Vanderkaa and the Dutchman Mynheer Hecop for
example; and Salvador Segundez and the Gomez brothers
supplied the Dutch and Portuguese forces in the Iberian
peninsula.124
None of this was exactly new: Sully had designated a number
of military corridors within France early in the seventeenth
century; magazines had been used in the sixteenth century, and so
too had bulk contractors. The later seventeenth century
witnessed an intensification of government involvement in
military provisioning, rather than any new initiatives. And
arguably just as important were measures undertaken by armies
themselves to improve their supply position. By 1700 most
armies on campaign included a specialist staff whose primary
function was to ensure the location and provision of foodstuffs.



Improved
discipline meant that the kontributionssystem could be made to
work more effectively.



Armies were undoubtedly better supplied in the later
seventeenth century than previously, as a result of initiatives
such as these and the greater involvement of the state in military
provisioning.



French armies operating inside their own country or
close to its borders could be provisioned, but they, like all other
armies, were obliged to live off the land when on campaign
outside their frontiers, with all the restraints which this
entailed.



https://imgur.com/a/0u3cNsh






The Ottomans possessed a distinct superiority in logistical organization over their European rivals, who were typically forced to resort to ad hoc solutions or even outright plunder in order to keep their armies in good supply.[69] State centralization allowed the Ottomans to maintain a sophisticated system of waystations (Ottoman Turkish: menzil) across the empire, stocked with provisions for the army along their route of march. Border fortresses contained depots which could supply the army once it arrived at the frontier.[70] This enabled the Ottoman army to largely, though not entirely, avoid having to live off the land through plunder.[71]



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transformation_of_the_Ottoman_Empire#Logistics


This chapter outlines the fiscal and administrative transformation of the Ottoman Empire during the course of the eighteenth century, a transformation that proved to be crucial in supplying the army with men and food. The new imperial administration proved to be a flexible system, in which contractual relations based on bargaining between centre and periphery gained an unprecedented significance. An extensive network of local ayan dynasties, who were located throughout the whole Ottoman world from the Balkans to North Africa, had gained a range of new powers relating to intermediation between the state and the citizens. The ayans became increasingly indispensable to the everyday functioning of the empire, and they also reduced, in wartime, the fiscal burden of the Sublime Porte, the centre of Ottoman bureaucracy in Istanbul. These local power-holders increasingly acted as military, fiscal and organizational entrepreneurs in a number of interrelated capacities.


http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/books/b9789004271302_016



As you can see, European armies did not need forced extractions. They did it only far away from their borders. As for Qing, they sometimes bought something from the Mongols, but they usually took food with them and then returned to their borders to resupply. Sometimes happened that an army abroad was waiting for supplies, but it seems that
1. Usually it was a small army.
2. The distance from the border was not particularly large, though I'm not sure about all the cases.
3. The Chinese handled it worse than the Russians.


Cite the source which challenges Perdue's argument that Qing soldiers only needed an average of 1.08 pounds of bread and noodles and 1.85 ounces of meat per man per day, compared to more than two pounds of bread per day for European soldiers.
There were different European soldiers and different Chinese soldiers. Probably not every Chinese soldier used a Mongolian diet, and some European soldiers used it. Often the soldiers withstood long without food, or they fed on anything, even human meat. Besides, the food taken by Russian and Polish soldiers sometimes lasted longer than in the case of the Chinese.
Cite the source where European grazing grounds are as large as those in the Qing Empire;
Not everywhere in Europe, but there were places like "300 km of empty steppe".


Where did Perdue write that Qing armies have to be withdrawn in winter? Cite it.
https://imgur.com/a/G3wm7vF







Like I said, please stop taking it so personally. Unlike you, I'm not going to write something like "ha, admit that you are wrong, I won and you lost." I just want to know what the truth is. There are some truths that you know better than me, and there are things about which I know better than you and I just try to explain to you what you do not understand.



I am not surprised that you have problems understanding Perdue because his works are poorly written.
It seems that according to Perdue, the incredible achievement of Chinese logistics was not the ability to maintain an army on foreign soil, only the ability to move and maintain the army on its own land. It is a bit ridiculous that he thinks that Europe has failed to do the same and that he thinks that European local populations suffered more than Chinese. The usual march of the army caused a crisis in China, small, but still.



Qing campaigned several years in a distant region
Distant ... from the capital! This is what Perdue talked about. Not about distance from borders.



Don't tell me to read up, show me the exact sources which disproves what Perdue said or quit wasting my time. There are no industrialization in either China or Russia in the 18th century, what are you even on about?
Nonsense. Again, read anything about it. I will give some quotes taken out of context (you need to know the context!). I have already given you quotes about the purchases made by the army. Now something about commercialization.



The reign of Peter the Great created favorable conditions for revival of Russian economy. Russia got actively engaged in mastering industrial production. The number of weaving and textile enterprises, especially those making broadcloth and wool, sky-rocketed in the country. The Ural became the center for smelting, with the metal products exported from the 1720s. Industrial production of porcelain was arranged for the first time.
Remarkable progress was observed in material culture, especially in the field of technology and engineering. The Ural heating engineer I.P. Polzunov developed the project of the universal steam engine and constructed a steam-power plant. The self-educated technician Ilya Kulibin invented a number of mechanisms, such as the watch, searchlight, semaphore telegraph, etc. He also developed the project of bridge over River Neva in St. Petersburg.

Agriculture was also going through changes, including replacement of the sickle with the scythe, founding horse-breeding centers, and successful development of cattle breeding.

Peter I attached great importance to trade, calling it “the Supreme owner of human destiny” and promoted its development in every possible way. Large-scale fairs were arranged, and big canals were built on his initiative.

The development of material culture and economy made it possible to upgrade the Russian army, making it one of the most modern and mighty ones. The Russian army got horse artillery, hand grenades and bayonets. However, the principal achievement in the military science of the epoch was foundation of the Russian fleet, the most cherished brainchild of Peter the Great.







Russia was blessed with a huge network of navigable rivers - the Volga, Don & Donets, Dnepr, Dnestr, Pruth, Bug, Livonian Dvina, Volkhov-Neva and Northern Dvina river systems, as many of their tributaries, notably the Oka and Kama in the Volga system, were navigable for much of the year; in the winter many rivers were frozen. This river system was complemented by a network of crude, unpaved roads, for instance the Vladimirka, the road connecting Moscow with Vladimir and Nizhny-Novgorod.
Peter the Great began work (1703-1722), on the connection of the Volga and Neva river systems (Mariinsk and Tikhvin Canal Systems, completed under Alexander I. in 1810-1811. In 1822 the Northern Ekaterininskiy Canal was completed, connecting the Kama (Volga system) and Northern Dvina; in 1829, under Nicholas I.,the Northern Dvina Canal, connecting the Neva and Northern Dvina river systems.



Large stretches of Russia are blessed by the fertile black soil. Traditionally, the main agricultural product was grain (wheat, barley, oats, rye); in the 18th century, potato cultivation expanded. Horticulture produced fruits (apples, berries, vegetables); cattle, horses, pigs, goats, sheep, poultry were kept, there was fishery, in the lesser densely populated areas hunting. Tobacco was cultivated; so was flax, providing the basis for a domestic linen industry, hemp, hop (essential for breweries). In the later 19th century, the cultivation of sugar beets expanded greatly, the basis for a sugar beet industry.
Catherine the Great called in settlers to cultivate vast stretches of land hitherto being used as pastorage, in the Ukraine region and along the middle Volga; many of those who came were Germans, Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs etc.; this policy, continued into the mid 19th century, greatly affected Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, Taurida, Saratov Gubernias and Bessarabia Oblast. Odessa became the leading port for the regional grain export.



Peter the Great realized the importance of the mining industry as a supplier of the arms industry. Soon Russia overtook Sweden as Europe's largest producer of pig iron, partially gained from iron ore, partially from swamp iron (for instance at Petrosavodsk, Olonets Gubernia). Discoveries of metal deposits in the Urals resulted in the emergence of a mining industry there, centered on Ekaterinburg (Perm Gubernia) and Slatoust (Ufa Gubernia).



The Russian Empire was a customs union since 1753 (Falkus p.28). In consequence of the Polish partitions, Russia had become a major exporter of grain; the grain exports only increased when the black soil of Ukraine was turned into farmland from the late 18th century onward, with Odessa emerging as the main port for exports.


http://www.efm.bris.ac.uk/het/mavor/EconomicHistoryRussiavol1.pdf
p.151

A large
part
of the commerce of the country was
con*
ducted by the gentry, through
their
stewards, and by the monas-teries.
The
sale
of
surplus produce
from
the
great
estates
was thus
either managed directly
or was
managed through middlemen,
who
were
generally despised
by
those who
employed
them. The trading
class
was thus of
little social account.
In
general their reputation
for
honesty
was not
high.
Yet
the
commerce
of
Russia
was
conducted
on an
extensive
scale.
Its
magnitude struck many foreign observers
from
the
sixteenth century onwards. Chancelour, Jenkinson, Fletcher,
1
and
other English ambassadors, travellers,
and traders in
Russia
in the
sixteenth century
all
speak
of the
great
trade in
hides, tallow, grain,
wax,
fish, flax,
and
furs carried
on at
Vologda,
Kazan,
and
Nijni
Novgorod
in
particular.
De
Rodes,
writing
in
1653,
remarks,
" It
is
well
known
to
everybody
that the
energies
of the
country (Russia)
are directed towards
commerce
and
sale.
. . .
All,
from
the
lowest
to
the
highest,
are
thriving upon
commerce.
In this
respect
the
Russian people
are
more active
than all
other people taken
to*
gether."
2
The
merchants bought
from
individual producers—craftsmen
who
brought their wares
to the
warehouses
of the
merchants,
or
who
took
them
to the
periodical markets, where
the
merchants made their
purchases.
The
greater merchants imported
goods
from
abroad,
and kept them for sale
in
their warehouses along with those
of
native
manufacture.


https://imgur.com/a/gQuQcWp





This wasn't talking about just enemy territory, its talking about already conquered territories


It was not conquered, it was not even subjugated. It was just occupied - it means that the army had a camp there. And it was not just one army, but several ones fighting against each other. A foreign, enemy territory. Unlike, for example, the Spanish Road, which was on a foreign territory, but it was an allied territory with no enemy forces.


It is worth noting that European wars in the 17th century were much more demanding than the 18th century wars of China. Despite this, Qing encountered great difficulties.

Where did the Qing mindlessly pester its enemy? Qing massacre of Zunghar was an after conquest strategic decision to eliminate resistance of a nomadic people.



Well, every extermination satisfies someone's desires.



The Mongolia and Xinjiang campaigns of the Qing did not force contributions on the locals of hostile territory and were largely supplied by the province of Gansu.
And this is also true for many European armies which operated either close to their borders or far from the border but for a few months only. Just like the Qing.


It also sometimes happened that an army stretched its line of stores with supplies deep into the hostile country. And as far as I know, Qing did not maintain supply stores outside of its borders. In any case, they probably did not keep them there all year, otherwise they would have to leave some army there for the winter.

50,000 per route in three separate routes
Are you sure? Was it not 50,000 in total? Besides, it is true for Western Europe, but armies in Eastern Europe were larger than in the West.
 
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