I'm repeating myself. And people wonder why I post the same thing like a broken record. I will only use Kangxi's campaign in 1696 to make it simple as the figures cited by Perdue here are very straight forward.Haevenly Kaghan, I don't remember the whole discussion very well, but I red some of my previous posts and they seem to already answer your newest post.
And previously I said:
As you can see, European armies did not need forced extractions. They did it only far away from their borders. As for Qing, they sometimes bought something from the Mongols, but they usually took food with them and then returned to their borders to resupply. Sometimes happened that an army abroad was waiting for supplies, but it seems that
1. Usually it was a small army.
2. The distance from the border was not particularly large, though I'm not sure about all the cases.
3. The Chinese handled it worse than the Russians.
To quote Perdue, "Military Mobilization in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century China, Russia, and Mongolia":
"The Central Army, 37,000 men led by Kangxi himself, would travel from Beijing 1100 kilometers across the Gobi desert; the East Route army would leave from Shengjing (Fengtian) with 35,000 men and head for the Kerulen, a distance of traveling 1300 kilometers; the West Route army of 35,000 men would set out from Guihua in Ningxia and travel a shorter route of 900-1100 km to the Tula River."
So to counter your points:
1) Kangxi's 1696 campaign was with 107,000 soldiers.
2) The distance for the campaign of 1696 is divided into three routes with the Central Army 37,000 in strength marching 1100 km across the Gobi; the East Route with 35,000 traveling 1300 KM, and the west Route army of 35,000 traveling 900-1100 km to the Tula River. This is over 1100 KM. The distance in the Zunghar campaign of 1755 was from Hami to Ili, which is 1,275 KM (you assume it stopped at Gansu when it went much further than that).
To quote Brian Davies' Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe, 1500-1700:
"To lead a column of 132,000 Muscovite troops and support personnel and
100,000 horses from the banks of the Samara across 300 km of empty steppe was
an enormous logistical challenge."
The Zunghar campaigns travelled over a thousand miles in foreign lands for over a year. Kangxi's 1696 campaign with 107,000 soldiers might have only lasted 3-4 months, but it was still divided into three routes with the Central Army 37,000 in strength marching 1100 km across the Gobi; the East Route with 35,000 traveling 1300 KM, and the west Route army of 35,000 traveling 900-1100 km to the Tula River; as opposed to the 132,000 Russians in the 1687 Crimean campaign divided into 5 routes that only traveled less than 300 KM on the steppe for barely three months.
How are the numbers above vague?Perdue doesn't give evidence to disprove that. Everything you quoted is so vague that it can't prove your point.
They are so precise I wonder whether you've even read the entirety of Perdue's article before responding.
Since I posted them several times, and it seems you still didn't catch them, let me put it in simpler words:
1) Army Size:
Qing: 107,000 Russia: 132,000
Qing: 1100 + KM Russia: less than 300 KM (only part of the army reached that distance too)
Qing: 99 days Russia: less than 3 months
I don't know whether its because you are not putting in enough effort at reading the sources presented, or just isn't capable of grasping their main points.And if by "supply depots in foreign lands" you mean that the Qing supllied the foreign depots by buying food from the local population on foreign territory, then you are talking about something which was not an achievement at all. Everybody did that. Only if Qing sent food from inside their borders to the foreign depots, it would be an achievement, but as I said, Poles and Russians did it too.
"Therefore many armies, including that of France when it moved beyond its depots continued to live off of the land well into the eighteenth century. In such cases the army increasingly used a system pioneered by the Spanish Army of Flanders in the 1570s and perfected during the Thirty Years War...it aimed to limit soldiers' pillage of a region...in this system armies extracted regular payments in money or kind from a region under threat of force. In return for the Kontributions, occupying commanders promised to safeguard the region from violence by their soldiers...Sometimes armies' demands exceeded a locale's ability to pay, and soldiers resorted to seizing forcibly what they wished or took hostages to assure final payment - as did the Swedes in 1631 when they evacuated Munich with a third of their Kontribution, unpaid. Sometimes, too, an army might be driven from an area after it had collected what it needed, only to be replaced by its opponents with fresh demands on civilians. The system could thus still be extremely costly for inhabitants and have long-term consequences, due to the period's recurring warfare. In the prosperous Basse-Meuse region the cost of Kontributions doubled - and sometimes tripled-the nomal levels of taxes in the 1690s, a burden from which the area nonetheless recovered eventually. In economically less strong areas, like Nordlingen in Germany, early modern military exactions contributed to long-term decline."
Violence in Early Modern Europe 1500-1800 p.64
Europeans required forced contributions in foreign territory which caused long term economic decline in places like Nordlingen Germany.
"The campaign of 1755-60 drew most of their grain supplies from Gansu, and the army purchased its supplies on the market. The local effect was to drive prices up by a factor of three, but so far as I know at this point, no major subsistence crisis ensued. Mobilization of ever-normal granary stocks, plus relief campaigns, combined with the more important impact of the private grain market to ensure regular flows of grain following established marketing links. In this way, the establishment of the commercial grain economy of the Northwest served as the foundation for the conquest of Inner Asia. "
"my current limited and rather chauvinist impression is that the Qing state was much more successful than Muscovy. Russian state provisioning remained almost exclusively military; there seems to have been no concern about sparing the civilian population the burdens of provisioning or with giving it regular relief. The Muscovite grain trade had such a low level of commercialization that market purchases only rarely proved possible. Agricultural yields improved in the southern region, but at the cost of the extension of serfdom. "
Gansu bore the burden of the Zunghar campaign (NOT Xinjiang, so the comparison with Xinjiang is invalid, even though Xinjiang is the foreign territory, Gansu was the province that was taxed).
Peter Perdue. "Military Mobilization in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century China, Russia, and Mongolia"