Of all the battles he was personally engaged in he lost only one battle in the 1813 campaign, he won all the others. I don't understand why that would classify as overall poor. I don't assume we blame Napoleon for the mistakes made by MacDonald at Katzbach. His forces were roughly equal to the Prussian army and it is not as if he sent his subordinates on impossible tasks in general. Taking his inferior and outnumbered cavalry into regard you cannot blame him for taking a defensive posture around the Elbe. It seems his strategy of preventing the coalition from combining, by giving Oudinot and MacDonald the tasks of checking the Prussians and Swedes, was a pretty logical one to take. All he had to do was to strike decisive blows at Schwarzenberg whom he didn't have in high regard. Dresden nearly proved this plan would work. Your criticism would probably be that he shouldn't have tried to defend Germany in general and retreat to more solid frontiers behind the Rhine, but that neglects the fact that by doing so Napoleon would have to abandon all his German satelites. How strong would his diplomatic position be after that? How would he convince his German troops to still be fighting for him?"In general he was very poor" I do not say or iomply he was univerally poor at all time in the campaign. I woudl say despite some good moments and Dresden was a Brilliant victory as I said, he overall performance was poor.
Not as many as often has been made out, Petrie (page 15) gives not more than 75,000 new conscripts, Petrie gives a detailed dicsuion of what Napoleo'n army of 1813 consisted of. The Russian were battlef harddned in teh first phase of the campaign, in the second half large amnounts of the resevre army and militia were intergreated into the army, about half the Russian troops in the second half of the campaign after the truce. At least half the Austrians army was recnet conscipts as was the Prussians. There was not a huge differential in quality
Faulire to carry out basic scouting a recurring failure of the French army. 180,000 don;t just slip away unless you are being very lax.
4:1 depends whose figures you take, I would sugguest the rigires are more like 3:1, but as I have said a Brilliant Victory.
Following up Battle sis an importnat skill one which Napoleon failed to do pretty repeatedly , even Austrelitz the pursiant went the wrong way.
You want to cherry pick history to only the incidents that show Napoleon favorable light?
With regards to quality. The French did not only have a lot of new conscripts, for even 75.000 I find quite a large number (though I have read higher estimates), but a lot of his forces were also garrison troops and allies who weren't always reliable. On top of that, and this is really important to point out, his cavalry was massively inferior. I believe Lieven argued this as well. A lot of the quality horses had been spent in Russia and on top of that training an efficient cavalry in the short run is no easy tasks.
You really think a military genius like Napoleon would let 180.000 men slip without a pretty solid reason? You know how hard it is, even for a victorious army, to mount a proper persuit in difficult weather and terrain. Or do you judge the Russians the same way for letting Napoleon slip across the Berezina? Cause if you do then fair enough. But to just argue, he was lax is way to easy. There were many others factors at play. And I know you don't give this much credit, but there are sources that argue that Napoleon caught an illness after the battle. Without his strong centralized command a proper persuit was a lot harder to organize. On top of that he was distracted by the new of the disasters at Katzbach and Grossbeeren which made his situation more precarious as well. In Lieven's Russia vs Napoleon it also states that Napoleon might not have known about the narrow passes behind Ertz mountains. This may also have had to do with the lack of proper reconnaisance the French could now perform.
At Austerlitz he crushed a lot of Russian forces with his mobile artillery in the aftermath of the battle. In any case the Austrians were spent and the Russians on the retreat. He had achieved his political goal after the battle.
You call it cherry picking, I call it taking a different approach then how I did before in debates surrounding this topic. I remember very vividly that I took quite a balanced approach in previous debates. I felt I was compromising, but I never really felt like that favour was returned by staunch Napoleon-revisionists. For example I remember quite well how I criticized Napoleon for leaving to many of his capable commanders and men in obsolete forts, how he should have appointed commanders in a better way, how he should have exploited his interior lines better etc etc. What did I get in return? Well: 'Yes all that and a lot more negative stuff that he did'. If we follow your logic then Napoleon stubmled into victory at Austerlitz by a combination of luck and capable subordinates. You cherry pick statistics how the allied numbers were a lot lower and simply dismiss opposite numbers as Bonapartist propaganda, how Napoleon was lucky that the allies even gave battle at all, how his commanders basically did all the work during the battle and how he apparantly made more mistakes after the battle. Does Napoleon get any credit at all for the battle that most historians still classify as his crowning achievement? Didn't you also argue that Ulm was just an accident or something like that? That might have been someone else, it has been some time since we had these old debates.