Patton’s generalship?

sparky

Ad Honorem
Jan 2017
5,357
Sydney
yes , in airborne assault the initial impact is paramount ,
being basically light infantry they have to take , dig and hold withing the reaction time of the enemy
the air force wasn't up to their duty , as usual the fly boys deserve some kick in the pants for their strategic arrogance and tactical neglect

of the three reasons given the three together are valid ,
certainly the original plan made light of the German reaction ,
the 82nd performance was underwhelming
but above all the plan rested on a series of optimistic circumstances ,
somehow it seems like the planning was botched , the inter-arm coordination and the chain of command muddled
an operation ticking on a scale of hours should have been controlled more tightly
the men on both side were very brave and are beyond reproaches
 
Nov 2019
199
United States
If the width of your front is at most maybe a few miles wide as the Garden plan was, having a huge force does you little good. The fact that two SS Panzer divisions, the 9th and 10th were available was a significant and strong foce for such a narrow front. This doesn't even account for the LXVIII corps and the 5 SS Kampfgruppes also available.

I think this article prettyclearly covers this issue;

"Although often overlooked, the most salient reason for the breakdown of Market Garden was the failure of 30 Corps’ two formations, the Guards Armoured Division and the 43rd Division, to reach the Lower Rhine at Arnhem. This is routinely ascribed to unexpectedly heavy German resistance, but it was not the case. The only opposition encountered in the ground advance up the airborne corridor was at Nijmegen, where the 82nd Airborne Division did the bulk of the fighting.


The real problem was an overall lack of urgency from the outset. Major-Generals Allan Adair’s Guards Armoured Division was scheduled to link up with the U.S. 101st Airborne at Eindhoven, approximately 16 miles from the start line, by 19:30h on Sept. 17. It did not move until 14:35 and halted at dusk after covering just seven miles. It took another full day to cover the remaining distance against minimal German resistance. The Guards started late and stopped early throughout Garden and followed the standard British dictum that tanks fought by day and halted by night, while 30 Corps also forbade vehicular movement after dark.


All this failed to address the urgency of the situation despite this being explicitly and repeatedly stressed and acknowledged in a variety of orders. Similarly, Major-General Ivor Thomas’ 43rd Division took 30 hours to travel 60 miles unmolested up the airborne corridor to Nijmegen and then effectively wasted three days after crossing the River Waal on Sept. 22. Neither formation acted with the application required, and gave the distinct impression that the plight of the 1st Airborne Division was not really their concern.


The root of the problem was that the two division commanders simply ignored direct orders and Corps commander Horrocks tolerated their behaviour, in part apparently due to illness; Horrocks had been allowed to return to duty before fully recovering from serious wounds received in 1943. He was ordered to take sick leave in December 1944. By that time the damage to Market Garden was done."



Beyond this however is the actual front the Airborne divisions weretasked to cover. If you added the total front these divisions were asked to cover it would be in excess of 40 miles, 10 more miles than standard strategy would expect as rational.
 
Nov 2019
199
United States
As Lidell Hart so would have pointed out this defines the routes available to the "point of the spear" to take advantage of weaknesses or strength of the defense to attack. This inherently including the lethargy of the attacking units to take advantage of. The fact that the defending airborne units lacked both effective transport and armor to attack or defend against the attacks that the German's easily reacted with defines the ultimate failure of the mission.
 

sparky

Ad Honorem
Jan 2017
5,357
Sydney
could be wrong but I would have thought , for such an important operation , the original breach should have been pushed broader and deeper
while keeping the British armor for the rapid exploitation , was there nothing else to broadens the breach ?
at least it would have given General Student some other concern beside biting the flanks of the column
by the way that was standard soviet doctrine by 1944 , Marshall Koniev "X" tactic ,
a broad push to create uncertainty , a narrow breach immediately enlarged by specified assault units ,
while the exploitation armor is rushed toward their operational goals

by the way 30th corps had to re-build a bridge at Nimegen , this was foreseen as a probable occurrence but took nearly a day
 

sparky

Ad Honorem
Jan 2017
5,357
Sydney
could be wrong but I would have thought , for such an important operation , the original breach should have been pushed broader and deeper
while keeping the British armor for the rapid exploitation , was there nothing else to broadens the breach ?
at least it would have given General Student some other concern beside biting the flanks of the column
by the way that was standard soviet doctrine by 1944 , Marshall Koniev "X" tactic ,
a broad push to create uncertainty , a narrow breach immediately enlarged by specified assault units ,
while the exploitation armor is rushed toward their operational goals

by the way 30th corps had to re-build a bridge at Eindoven , this was foreseen as a probable occurrence but took nearly a day
 

redcoat

Ad Honorem
Nov 2010
7,900
Stockport Cheshire UK
If the width of your front is at most maybe a few miles wide as the Garden plan was, having a huge force does you little good. The fact that two SS Panzer divisions, the 9th and 10th were available was a significant and strong foce for such a narrow front. This doesn't even account for the LXVIII corps and the 5 SS Kampfgruppes also available.

I think this article prettyclearly covers this issue;

"Although often overlooked, the most salient reason for the breakdown of Market Garden was the failure of 30 Corps’ two formations, the Guards Armoured Division and the 43rd Division, to reach the Lower Rhine at Arnhem. This is routinely ascribed to unexpectedly heavy German resistance, but it was not the case. The only opposition encountered in the ground advance up the airborne corridor was at Nijmegen, where the 82nd Airborne Division did the bulk of the fighting.


The real problem was an overall lack of urgency from the outset. Major-Generals Allan Adair’s Guards Armoured Division was scheduled to link up with the U.S. 101st Airborne at Eindhoven, approximately 16 miles from the start line, by 19:30h on Sept. 17. It did not move until 14:35 and halted at dusk after covering just seven miles. It took another full day to cover the remaining distance against minimal German resistance. The Guards started late and stopped early throughout Garden and followed the standard British dictum that tanks fought by day and halted by night, while 30 Corps also forbade vehicular movement after dark.


All this failed to address the urgency of the situation despite this being explicitly and repeatedly stressed and acknowledged in a variety of orders. Similarly, Major-General Ivor Thomas’ 43rd Division took 30 hours to travel 60 miles unmolested up the airborne corridor to Nijmegen and then effectively wasted three days after crossing the River Waal on Sept. 22. Neither formation acted with the application required, and gave the distinct impression that the plight of the 1st Airborne Division was not really their concern.


The root of the problem was that the two division commanders simply ignored direct orders and Corps commander Horrocks tolerated their behaviour, in part apparently due to illness; Horrocks had been allowed to return to duty before fully recovering from serious wounds received in 1943. He was ordered to take sick leave in December 1944. By that time the damage to Market Garden was done."



Beyond this however is the actual front the Airborne divisions weretasked to cover. If you added the total front these divisions were asked to cover it would be in excess of 40 miles, 10 more miles than standard strategy would expect as rational.
Amazing, despite the fact that the Guards got to Nijmegen ahead of schedule and were then held up because the 82nd hadn't captured the bridge, it's all their fault because they moved slowly, and not a word of criticism about the 82nd leadership's lack of urgency in capturing the bridge.
 
Apr 2014
200
New York, U.S.
Amazing, despite the fact that the Guards got to Nijmegen ahead of schedule and were then held up because the 82nd hadn't captured the bridge, it's all their fault because they moved slowly, and not a word of criticism about the 82nd leadership's lack of urgency in capturing the bridge.
“Lack of urgency” or dealing with an almost impossible situation given the forces available to Gavin?
In the planning for Market, Gavin correctly pointed out that the Groesbeek ridge had to be captured along with the assault on Nijmegen. General Browning approved the plan.
But Gavin’s “light” division was not capable of accomplishing both objectives in the time allotted.
 
Nov 2019
199
United States
FYI, the reason in large part that there weren't as many transport aircraft available is that because Antwerp (the Scheldt specifically), not open for shipping, the transport aircraft were tasked with supplying fuel to keep British and American armor capable of movement. In other words Monty's insubordination shot himself in the foot twice.
 

redcoat

Ad Honorem
Nov 2010
7,900
Stockport Cheshire UK
“Lack of urgency” or dealing with an almost impossible situation given the forces available to Gavin?
In the planning for Market, Gavin correctly pointed out that the Groesbeek ridge had to be captured along with the assault on Nijmegen. General Browning approved the plan.
But Gavin’s “light” division was not capable of accomplishing both objectives in the time allotted.
There may be valid reasons why the bridge wasn't captured on the first day, be the sad truth is the XXX Corps was smeared as too slow because of the falsehood of Gavin who claimed the XXX Corps was 36 hours late on reaching the bridge, which is clear nonsense as the operation had only started 42 hours before XXX Corps reached the Nimegen, a distance of 50 miles.
The fatal delay for this operation was at Nijmegan, not in the advance before then.