Pearl Harbour The New Evidence: whether Churchill and Roosevelt conspired to allow it to happen.

Chlodio

Ad Honorem
Aug 2016
3,485
Dispargum
#11
The responsibility for base defense was primarily the job of General Short.
The top brass had reasons for withholding intelligence.
The bottom line, given the imminent "war warning", they should have had the radar up and working, and the island's defence HQ properly staffed, even on the weekend.
Which war warning? There were at least two. One was sent the previous weekend, Nov 30. Hawaii went on alert, but no attack came. A second war warning was sent on Dec 7, but it only arrived after the attack.
 
Jan 2015
3,182
Rupert's Land ;)
#12
Which war warning? There were at least two. One was sent the previous weekend, Nov 30. Hawaii went on alert, but no attack came. A second war warning was sent on Dec 7, but it only arrived after the attack.
The war warning wasn't "attack will come today", but more like "hostilities may come soon".
They should have been on alert 24/7 indefinitely, with rotating shifts on a heightened level of alert
 

Chlodio

Ad Honorem
Aug 2016
3,485
Dispargum
#13
The war warning wasn't "attack will come today", but more like "hostilities may come soon".
They should have been on alert 24/7 indefinitely, with rotating shifts on a heightened level of alert
That's pretty much impossible. Going on high alert metaphorically injects adrenaline into the command. For a short period, maybe a few days, high levels of performance are possible, but then fatigue sets in and performance falls off. Soldiers get tired, machines like aircraft need maintenance. It would have probably been worse for the US if the Japanese had attacked after the US forces were on alert for a few days. That's why Kimmel and Stark took their forces off high alert sometime around December 2 or 3. You can't stay on high alert forever.

As an example of what can happen when you go on alert too soon, consider the Philipines. When word of Pearl Harbor came in, US forces in the Philipines launched their fighters. The fighters flew defensive patrols for a few hours, but then the decision was made to bring the planes down to refuel them and let the pilots eat lunch. It was just that moment that the Japanese attacked. They were lucky. There had been fog over Formosa that prevented an earlier attack. The point is, there are limits to how long an organization can stay at high alert.

But I take your point that more could have been done. The HQ should have been fully manned. Some of the anti-aircraft guns could have been manned, probably not all of them. A few defensive patrols could have been airborne. Maybe some, but not all, scout planes sent out. The bases could have been on alert from 0600 - 0900 daily and then partially stood down for the rest of the day.
 
Oct 2015
332
Belfast
#14
A couple of questions here.

Did Admiral Chester Nimitz receive a warning of an imminent attack and do absolutely nothing about. In spite of promises to the contrary?

Why did J. Edgar Hoover ignore the evidence of an attack when it was presented to him by the British spy Dusko Popov?
 

Chlodio

Ad Honorem
Aug 2016
3,485
Dispargum
#15
It wasn't Nimitz, it was Kimmel in command of the fleet on December 7. Nimitz only took command when Kimmel was fired after the attack. Kimmel received a warning and put Pearl Harbor on high alert on the weekend of Nov 30. No attack came so Kimmel stood his forces down. As I mentioned in a previous post, you can't keep forces on high alert forever. Going on alert provides a short term advantage in battle, but quickly exhausts men and machines. There were few, if any, preparations in place on December 7. Vague messages continued to arrive from Washington, but Kimmel was reluctant to keep switching back and forth between high and low levels of alert. It would have been bad for morale. The troops don't like it when the chain of command appears indecisive.

I can't speak about Hoover.
 
Jun 2011
291
The Old Dominion
#16
Not to mention that Nimitz at the time of Pearl Harbor was nowhere in the operational chain of command, he was Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, what they used to call the Bureau of Personnel.

The claim of Popov was his. To wit I would respond, show us specifically the evidence, besides his post war writing, that this "warning" actually occurred.

After all, I could easily claim to have warned the FBI of the 9-11 events and, just because I said so, it must be true.
 

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