Yes there were a couple of inflection to it. Pan-Scandinavianism was one of those, but looking at the timing and emphasis of that movement, the sharper critics of it already in the day observed that largely it was a vehicle for Denmark to try to push for support – not least military support – for itself in its conflict with Prussia and the Germans more generally. Which was why it pretty comprehensively deflated with the Scheleswig-Holstein war, when the Swedish government clearly came down on the side that people clamoring for war with Prussia on Denmark's side were a bunch of dangerous fantasists (beginning with HM Charles XV), and there would be no Swedish participation. (Never mind that the king protested to them that he had publicly given his Royal Word to personally lead an army of 100 000 Swedes, at a huge, rather wet party thrown by the students of Copenhagen University he had attended.)My interpretation is that a lot of the "Great Swedeners" became pan-Scandinavists (until they stopped being so during the last third of the 1800s) and after that had a bit of influence over public life and discourse. But broadly speaking I'd say you are right.
Following that, with the unification of Germany into the German Empire, what we got was a brand of thinkers who managed to vicariously adopt Germany's cause as somehow also Sweden's, and so could also again dream of future military glory, if only by hoping to hitch the little Swedish cart to the German juggernaut. That's where the pro-war as a CP ally in Swedish politics and culture around WWI appeared – like Sven Hedin, or Fredrik Böök. It was largely the same formula for those that in WWII argued that Sweden should take part in the German-led war against the USSR. The weakness of it is that it still has this vicarious quality, requiring an adoption of Germany, which wasn't some kind of universal preference with the Swedes.