Ok, true; the very real and likely possibility that Hitler would break his word and treaty. Gosh, now I feel even stupider than Chamberlain lol. I guess I was just thinking that the terms themselves were reasonable, but only if Hitler kept his word on the terms, but that is the most colossal 'if' of all time.
To be honest though, I probably would have accepted the terms even knowing that Hitler ultimately wouldn't have stuck by them. What I see Hitler wanting by offering these terms is to gain as much time and concentration of forces as possible for his invasion of the Soviet Union as possible. The way I see it, he would have needed to withdraw his forces from their occupation of western Europe to effect this in the first place. Immediately after the German evacuation of conquered western territories, repatriation of POWs, and extracting of many Jews from Europe, I would have re-armed in western Europe and literally have struck Germany in the back while it's forces were embroiled in the Soviet Union. My fingers would have been crossed possibly even more than Hitler's were when accepting the terms. I can see why Churchill, without the benefit of hindsight, rejected the terms. As I would have probably seen it though, I had little to lose and much to gain by temporarily accepting the terms, all the while with my fingers crossed.
the Article says the when the Sovereign Union beats Germany, Britain and France should declare war and reverse the treaty anyway. (so it advocates totally cynical policy, it does not envisage any lasting peace settlment based on this treaty)
The premise that the Soviet Union still beats Germany is very questionable as the treaty impose a sort of lend/lease from France and Britian to Germany and the Soviets would not be getting lend lease.
And the premise that Germany would qucikly makes terms and depose the Nazis when Britian and France decale war is rather naive about the extent of Nazi control of Germany.
The idea that democratic nations can just switch the war on Nazi Germany on and off is I think naive. once peace is made turning around and syaing 3 years later the Nazis must be crushed is problematic. It's easier for totalitarian states to say they have always been at war with Eurasia (regardless of what your memory says) no so democracies
Aside from the historical fact that Hitler did not send Hess (and thus the title of the article is misleading or flat out wrong), there was no chance of dealing with Hitler rationally. The man was mentally ill - and did too many amphetamines as well, which certainly did not help.
It is true that Hitler did not want war with England for he saw racial ties with non-Jewish Brits and because England was a naval power and Hitler, who had an infantryman’s mentality, saw Germany as a land-based power. But as far back as Mein Kampf Hitler saw France as an enemy in the west.
In the same book he recognized that England always sought a balance of power but seemed oblivious to the fact that a German-dominated Europe was every bit a problem for England as an overbearing France had long been.
Hitler in Mein Kampf:
“What England has always desired, and will continue to desire, is to prevent any one Continental Power in Europe from attaining a position of world importance. Therefore England wishes to maintain a definite equilibrium of forces among the European States--for this equilibrium seems a necessary condition of England's world-hegemony.
What France has always desired, and will continue to desire, is to prevent Germany from becoming a homogeneous Power. Therefore France wants to maintain a system of small German States whose forces would balance one another and over which there should be no central government. Then, by acquiring possession of the left bank of the Rhine, she would have fulfilled the pre-requisite conditions for the establishment and security of her hegemony in Europe. The final aims of French diplomacy must be in perpetual opposition to the final tendencies of British statesmanship.
Taking these considerations as a starting-point, anyone who investigates the possibilities that exist for Germany to find allies must come to the conclusion that there remains no other way of forming an alliance except to approach England. The consequences of England's war policy were and are disastrous for Germany. However, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that, as things stand to-day, the necessary interests of England no longer demand the destruction of Germany. On the contrary, British diplomacy must tend more and more, from year to year, towards curbing France's unbridled lust after hegemony. What he seems to have missed was that once Germany became a threat to France then the “equilibrium of forces among the European States” meant that England would bond with France against Germany.”
So even by Hitler’s own logic (he did have some in the earlier years) England agreeing to peace in 1941 was a non-starter (ignoring that Hess was free-lancing when he flew to Eng;and) – especially in light of Churchill’s awareness of Franklin Roosevelt’s firm position.
Of course, to Hitler it was always open season in the East.
There was not going to be any peace while Hitler was around.