What was the possibility of the Eastern Front being stalemated at the Dneiper even without Lend Lease?

Nov 2014
457
ph
Say the US stays neutral, so no lend lease, what is the possibility of the Soviets being able to hold the Dneiper and prevent further German advances due to the German logistics running out of steam at the Dneiper?
 
Nov 2014
457
ph
the Dnieper ? which year ??
the German advanced to the Volga ! they were defending on the Dnieper line in late 1943
Historically didn't the German offensive run of out gas short of Moscow, because of the mud, winter and Kiev? Maybe the Soviets would still have done the same in the autumn and winter of 1941 even without Lend Lease, so the Germans still could not get to Moscow because of the Russian Winter and Rasputitisa even without American help? But with out Lend Lease the Soviets do not have the mobility and the material provided to them, so their counter offensive post 1941 runs out of steam somewhere in the middle of Ukraine and near Vitebsk?
 

tomar

Ad Honoris
Jan 2011
14,258
Your posts are confusing.... Are you talking about the soviets holding the Dniepr line in 1941 ? If so, yes possible, but would have required a different defense strategy, with only light forces covering the border areas, whilst the main defense line would have run along to Dniepr and thence to lake Peipus in the North... That still leaves the "central area" (through Smolensk) , the most direct route to Moscow, without strong defensive terrain......

Or are you talking about the germans holding the Dniper in 1943 to 1944 ? No, not possible....
 
Nov 2019
15
The Arctic
The U.S. lend lease program didn't really start to take effect until late 1942 in my opinion. What was important was the amount of trucks and aviation fuel from the U.S. The supply of aircraft engines and radio sets from the British was just as important. I know lend lease supplied so much more that proved useful but that came much later. As the to OP I'll bypass the Dnieper debate as Operation Barbarossa had stalled and failed before any Lend Lease arrived. The Soviets would've still taken Berlin just maybe a couple of years later.
 
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Nov 2014
457
ph
The U.S. lend lease program didn't really start to take effect until late 1942 in my opinion. What was important was the amount of trucks and aviation fuel from the U.S. The supply of aircraft engines and radio sets from the British was just as important. I know lend lease supplied so much more that proved useful but that came much later. As the to OP I'll bypass the Dnieper debate as Operation Barbarossa had stalled and failed before any Lend Lease arrived. The Soviets would've still taken Berlin just maybe a couple of years later.
What makes you think so? That the Soviets will not be bled white somewhere around Kiev? I think no lend lease implies almost complete US neutrality. And couple of posters here were saying that the US staying neutral would mean everybody from Sligo to Perm speaking in German.
 

Maki

Ad Honorem
Jan 2017
3,957
Republika Srpska
The whole "Kiev saved Moscow" hypothesis is connected to the idea that the Russian winter saved Moscow and thus, had the Germans not diverted their forces to Kiev, they would have arrived at Moscow before winter and win. While the winter certainly hampered the Germans, it was not THE factor. German losses were mounting, their effectiveness had decreased significantly (Military History Visualized claims that the effectiveness of the infantry was 65% and that of the tanks 35%). The attack on Kiev made perfect sense. Had the Germans pushed towards Moscow before taking care of the Kiev situation, they would have 600,000 Soviet troops threatening their right flank. Also, had the Germans launched their thrust towards Moscow in September, the Soviet counterattacks near Smolensk which took place in August and September might not have happened and thus the Soviets would have been arguably stronger given that they wouldn't have launched such costly yet unsuccessful attacks.
 

sparky

Ad Honorem
Jan 2017
5,634
Sydney
1- there was very little lend lease between June and December 1941
2- Army group Center had to halt at Smolensk for its supplies , infantry , air fields , to re-group and refill , this was foreseen by the logistic department
3- Sending armor to help the struggling Northern and Southern armies groups was perfectly correct ,
4-the German Generals ( Von Kluge) stuffed up in overreaching for Moscow , Hitler wasn't too interested in taking it

After the Viazma and Briansk success , the smart thing would have been to go on the defensive for the winter
instead the generals committed a basic mistake of exceeding their maximum offensive point
they could still advance , but their forces impacts were becoming much more feeble and their whole armies were in a grossly overstretched posture
the early December blizzards didn't help but they were not the main reason for the Germans defeat
the total exhaustion of the men and gear , breakdown of the supplies lines and accumulated losses had more to do with it .
 

deaf tuner

Ad Honoris
Oct 2013
14,816
Europix
Say the US stays neutral, so no lend lease,
You know, it's actually fascinating how not one, but two non-factualities can be put into only nine words:

1. Japan attacked US, Germany declared war to US, not the other way around. US was dragged into war, didn't choose to renounce to it's neutrality.

2. The Lend-Lease was approved in March '41. US was neutral at the time.
 
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Futurist

Ad Honoris
May 2014
23,447
SoCal
The whole "Kiev saved Moscow" hypothesis is connected to the idea that the Russian winter saved Moscow and thus, had the Germans not diverted their forces to Kiev, they would have arrived at Moscow before winter and win. While the winter certainly hampered the Germans, it was not THE factor. German losses were mounting, their effectiveness had decreased significantly (Military History Visualized claims that the effectiveness of the infantry was 65% and that of the tanks 35%). The attack on Kiev made perfect sense. Had the Germans pushed towards Moscow before taking care of the Kiev situation, they would have 600,000 Soviet troops threatening their right flank. Also, had the Germans launched their thrust towards Moscow in September, the Soviet counterattacks near Smolensk which took place in August and September might not have happened and thus the Soviets would have been arguably stronger given that they wouldn't have launched such costly yet unsuccessful attacks.
In a scenario where the Germans go for Moscow earlier, it's possible that the Soviets would be willing to divert some (but probably not too many) troops from Kiev in order to better defend Moscow. After all, holding onto Kiev would be worthless if Moscow is going to fall--though whether Stalin would actually be able to realize this in time is an open question.

Also, Yes, the encirclement of the Soviet forces in the Kiev area resulted in something like 600,000-700,000 Soviet troops being taken prisoner by the Nazis--which is a pretty good deal. Taking out a huge number of your enemy's forces so that they will never be able to fight against you and threaten you again really does sound great from a Nazi perspective (and really from any perspective).