When and why did professional infantry replace noble knights as the dominant force on medieval battlefields? How dominant were cavalry in this period?

Apr 2017
138
Bayreuth
#51
Ok, it is your opinion. Let us agree to disagree here.
Logic, is no opinion, that is why it is called logic.

No it doesn’t. At least I didn’t saw that written in the first post or in the thread title.
I am confused, who made those claims? And this question is rhetorical, since I didn’t noticed that anyone said that. But in the sequence of posts I eventually missed it.
I don’t know why you are addressing this to me, you should address this to the person that claimed that the professionals disappeared. If you find that person…
OP's question is a common modern historical thesis.
He did not invented it.

It is a counter thesis that developed in the last decades, because before the common perception was that gun-powder replaced knights.
Now the perception is that the infantry became more professional showed by the Swiss mercenaries as the turning point.
That thesis has a backrgound of the 19th century, because of the Napoleonic warfare militaries of that time considered the development level of their infantry as superior and downgraded medieval infantry.
That spreads at the moment because most know only second hand sources and do not know (because of Sir Oman and the like) that a medieval miltiary army was exactly like every force before and after (only the equipment changed/developed).

And I am adressing the thesis directly and show its flaws, as mercenaries already replaced amateure infantry in the 12th- 13th century and by that automatically question the dominance of knights by a military perception how warfare developed.

Again you should ask that to the person that claimed that. Professional infantry probably existed since pre-historical times, the issue here is “dominant force on medieval battlefields”.
What is based on that thesis. If they are dominant - then somebody else is not. Right? So:
The knights were not like machine-guns vs. arrows. A machine-gun is a dominant force if you got none.
The cavalry is in constant progress, something you argeed on.
Knights/cav only seems to be more dominant – because of events like Hastings that are by authors mispresented:

The British forces were not even able to throw vikings out of their country.
And they suddenly face Normanns who come from the culture (the Franks; leading military power in development) that made vikings run.
All odds are in such a battle against them (the British).
No big achievement of the Normanns. That they claimed the cav was the birth of Christ I do believe.

Kroissenburg 1260 – 7000 panzerrider vs.an Hungarian army.
That German guys are from the top of the military development against people who fought 300 years before, like in the stone-age with horse-archers and no infantry.
That is like an US-America Marine Corps vs. lately founded Afghanistan Army.
Same thing repeated in the Battle of Kressenbrunn of the same year between Austrian/Boehmians vs. Hungarians while they had equal numbers (ca. 30.000).

While in the Battle on the Ice (1246) the Novogrod city guard (and with all respect to the history of Novogrod, but they are really not Sparta) held off Danish+German veteran knights.

The 7:1 ratio (that Ichon quoted) did not apply here or anywhere EXCEPT in propaganda.

1115 German Emperor Henry V. vs. (New-)Saxon uprising in Welfesholz (here were dukes involved, but that is an uprising of the people). The Imperial army lost.

Battle of Montaperti 1260 – again the side with more cav (and more infantry) lost. Here German mercs were involved – ca. 2000 professional infantrists, that went to Siena (Italy) to fight there.
More or less 5000 on horse back (let it be 800 knights) and +20.000 infantry.

Battle of Doffingen 1388 – pyrrhic victory of an army of knights and prof. soldiers of cities vs. farmers+landlords (ca. 2000 on each side) resulted into the loss of power for the cities.
Here farmers took out mercenaries/professional soldiers.
Sealed with another loss of cities that resulted into more propaganda of the superiority of noble knights, while the other side had knights, too - but mercenaries.

Battle on the Marchfeld 1278 – most influencal battle in the perception of medieval warfare, as it laid the foundation for the Habsburgs and was political used (now you have to know that the Habsburgs even employed professional forgers to get onto the throne; they used every trick of the book – that is why that battle is so known)– the dominant force with more knights lost.

Again I said before – I do not want to write a book, but I could name here dozens of such events that questions the idea that anyhow noble knights were more dominant or important than the rest of the forces.
And these knights here are the top of the development level. So better equipped and trained nobody could be.

But it is very common by historians to use battles like Hastings or Gransee (superior knight force, what is unfortunately based on the propaganda of the winning side – and what is left out then in historical works that the same sources mention that the battle was won by infantry who took that knights out) to find support for a thesis.

I tried to avoid this but Oman is a British conservative and so does his research look like.
And Patterson... If an historian tells me that horses can not charge people, where we do have in every museum here armor for exactly that purpose and multiple modern military manuals of the last 200 years (I do not even want him to read the stuff from 1000 years ago – as horse owner you should be familar with the Spanish Riding School in Vienna, they do preform figueres that are based on if your horse is stuck in infantry after a charge from the medieval time) – I can not have any high respect of any further research work.
If he does not even know how cavalry works - why does he write a book about cavalry units?
That does not compute with me.
And then I really do not care anymore what his ideas are about military retreats or he thinks a battle looks like , because it takes me 30 minutes and I find dozens of contradictory examples.
Here you got a some already, where they btw charged into infantry all the time.

But I serioulsy explained this now over and over... that was the last time...
 
Last edited:
Mar 2014
1,877
Lithuania
#52
I would like to point out that in some regions heavy cavalry remained dominant power much longer. Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth is perfect example. They mostly fielded cavalry armies with infantry having only supporting role and they were quite successful against large variety of infantry based armies.
 

sparky

Ad Honorem
Jan 2017
4,085
Sydney
#53
Battle of the golden spurs ,
1302 the flower of Frankish knighthood got taken down by the Flemish burgers militia
the knights charged on pikes , the fallen knights golden spurs were offered to the local church

Battle of Arsuf ,
Saladin chronicler gasping in astonishment at Richard the Lionhearted heavy cavalry charge
it cut through Saladin army like butter and gave the victory to the crusaders

Battle of Bannockburn , the English knights got utterly destroyed by Scottish peasants

in each cases , the ground and disposition did matter a lot
also the leadership , armored knights were not very disciplined and would , for glory ,do as they wished
unless under a strong competent commander
that was a recurring problem with feudal levies ,
Japanese armies had the same issue
Sekigahara started by some guy wanting to strut his stuff

professionals were on the whole more reliable
 
Feb 2018
202
US
#54
There seems to be a linear progression assumption here in the topic question, as if when time goes on cavalry becomes replaced as the arm of decision [I am replacing 'knights' with cavalry in general]. It really depends on the region and specifics, but it definitely isn't remotely linear or even in the same direction at times. Geography, resources, the strength of a kingdom's administration and logistics (which generally rises throughout this era), and opponents all play major roles. So many things depend on the circumstances. Firepower was becoming increasingly important in the late medieval and early modern era, but it depended. Sir John Smythe, writing of late 16th century warfare, stated that 1,000 just light cavalry could rout 3-4,000 arquebusiers or musketmen without the support of other weapons or advantageous terrain. But supplemented with protection with pikes or advantageous terrain, a well-trained unit could deliver devastating results, like the Spanish arquebusiers at Cerignola in 1503. Even earlier, Jan Zizka won ludicrously outnumbered battles with poorly trained troops using strong defensive positions and his wagon cannons (i,e at Kutna Hora). The extraordinary maneuverability of Swiss pike units allowed infantry to aggressively threaten cavalry forces, protect gun infantry, and seize the initiative even on battles conducted on flat terrain normally good for cavalry.

But the Swiss solution did not work in the east. The best Ming general, Qi Jiguang, found that his favored pike formations against the Japanese wouku did not work against steppe cavalry armies because they had so many spare horses that they could use some to disrupt the pike formation, as once a pike impales a horse it is not immediately reusable. But no country in Western Europe has this abundance of horses due to geography, so Swiss pike formations worked phenomenally to protect ranged infantry forces against the small numbers of horsemen available.

This wasn't just a Europe vs China difference either. In the 16th and 17th centuries, Polish/Lithuanian cavalry emerged as a most extraordinary arm of decision and strategic flexibility despite the general shift in Western Europe to infantry and artillery. While Zizka had won two centuries earlier by seizing strong terrain points and fortifying them with artillery, the Polish cavalry was devastating enough that it could break even fortified positions, such as at the far more numerous Russians at Klushino (1610). Even when brought to central Europe, the Polish style of warfare proved superior on many occasions, as at the battle of Vienna. But then if you look 8 years earlier, Turenne fought an entirely different battle at Turckheim than the one at Vienna (1683) or say another Sobieski battle at Podhajce (1667). Turenne maneuvered in a constricted zone full of fortresses, and fought much more heavily based upon fire tactics than cavalry shock. I don't see this as any different than the enormous difference between the western and eastern fronts in World War I. Part of this is simply a strategic problem: the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth has to defend a ridiculously large amount of territory, often against elusive Crimean Tartar cavalry forces. And stronger cavalry forces often have the initiative by default: they don't have to attack into a bad situation. So the PLC, like other nations such as the Mughals or Chinese, had to innovate further.

One thesis I've seen in several places and is pretty convincing (one spot is in Andrew de la Garza's 'Mughals at War'), is that the nations bordering the steppe were forced to innovate a great deal because of the ultra deadly threat of the nomadic cavalry. So its no surprise that the PLC has to create its own elite winged hussars and logistical methods to supply long-ranging campaigns in response, and that honed against such strong opponents with a good military tradition, they continually won great victories. Normally one thinks of strong cavalry armies aggressively outmaneuvering around the flanks, cutting off supplies, or delivering critical charges against weak points. But the PLC had other great military innovations, like they showed at Khotyn (1621), using field fortifications to produce a defense-in-depth that also allowed for deadly hussar counterattacks against a far superior Ottoman foe.

In the east there also was no shift of linear progression. The Ming under the Yongle Emperor won a decisive campaign in Mongolia against the Northern Yuan in 1402 where their firepower from gunpowder infantry and artillery proved decisive against a cavalry-centric nomadic army. But on the other hand, the Ming were crushed at Sarhu in 1644 by the heavily outnumbered Manchu cavalry (ostensibly 9,000 vs 40,000), who were able to defeat Ming gunpowder infantry under Ma Lin in infantry squares with reserve forces behind them in a set of trenches three deep. Manchu armor and disciple seems to have proved decisive.

In later eras cavalry could prove the arm of decision, but only in very specific situations. Nader Shah, even with a highly advanced gunpowder army in the mid 18th century, relied heavily on cavalry as his arm of decision in certain battles (though not all), such as at Kirkuk and Kars. Even though the mainstay of his army was built upon well-trained firepower and top of the line artillery upgraded every three years, he still created openings he could only exploit with the speed and shock of his nomadic cavalry. Even in Napoleon's time, cavalry was more restricted and limited to conjunction with other arms but had moments of key impact. Murat's cavalry charge at Eylau was critical to tip the scales of the battle. Napoleon's lack of cavalry after 1812 severely crippled him in scouting, denial of information, and in pursuit after won battles. Ultimately until tanks, cavalry were the only reliable means of exploiting won battle through pursuit. In World War I, Edmund Allenby used cavalry very effectively in the Palestine/Syrian front, in pursuit, in coordinated attacks with infantry, and in an enveloping maneuver. (i,e at Megiddo)
 

Tulius

Ad Honorem
May 2016
5,110
Portugal
#55
I dont truly believe that there was a "fall in importance" of cavalry rather that the mounted Heavy Armored Cavalryman was simply replaced on the battlefield, by lighter versions which incorporated elements from its predecessors history. We see breast plates helms etc of cuirassiers of numerous European kingdoms following the 16th c and many other elements which echo the era of the armored knight. i do not believe that it was the (profesionalisation ) of the infantry which caused this. Rather the material economic and social evolution of the 1500 c - 1700 c changed the nature of combat. We still find the traditions of the knight being kept internally in monarchies but the economic de-centralisation which saw power sharing by landed magnates rapidly becomes centralisation around single monarchies which allows the financing of full time forces.

I agree my quip about artillery lacks qualification, but as soon as ranged mobile projectiles were used on the battlefield it hastened a process which was already underway:

I think also if we look at the terrain of Europe it is far more suited to large infantry forces than it ever was for large cavalry forces.
The question raised here by Marshall Ney is for the Medieval period, and he gives us the timeline: 500-1500 AD; I was mentioning two periods, the second one being the 14th and 15th centuries, where the artillery gained a constant importance but still didn’t achieve the technological development that would make it much more practical and decisive, already at the end of the 15th century, but mostly on the 16th already out of the period of analysis. As are the material, economic and social changes of the Age of Discoveries.

Let me diverge a bit, and this isn’t necessarily an answer to your post, it is a bit more a reflex of the (re)readings that I am doing, and I hope that in some way it also can help Marshall Ney in his work:

A Spanish author already pointed here by johnincornwall, Francisco García Fitz in his small book “Ejércitos y actividades guerreras en la Edad Media europea”/“Armies and Warlike activities in the European Middle Ages” points (the translation, as well as any mistake, from Spanish to English is mine):

“The conventional image of the Medieval warfare present us the battles, at least the ones before the 14th century, as a succession of charges made by the heavy cavalry. Such combats were made with only one tactical model: the one formed by three lines of knights – hacies – that organized in small formations of 10 or more men – denominated conrois –, clashed against other formations. This tactic would take advantage of the impetus of the horse run and of the solidity of the set formed by the horse and the protected horsemen – supported by the stirrup and the high saddle – and the large lance hold by the knight under his arm – lance couched – to defeat the enemy ranks. It was even considered that this immense power of shock would be enough to break the resistance of any other armed corps and that the visual effect of the charge would be so terrifying that the enemy would hardly wait for the impact, unless it would had a similar formation. As so expressly said a contemporary, the byzantine princess Anna Comneno, a western knight fully armed could break the walls of Babylon if they were on their way. Seen it this way, we cannot find hard that it was defended so frequently that the feudal cavalry for several centuries had no rival in the battlefield.”

In the following paragraph:

“And yet, this tactical model wasn’t the only one, and probably never reached a predominant status.[…]”

In the page 68:

“So, the men fought on foot during all the Middle Ages, and the idea of the eclipse of the infantry – seen as a combat branch, not as a social class – since the 4th century, must be qualified. An yet, there are no doubts that after the 14th century, and even with some victories of the feudal cavalry, the infantry – seen now as a combat branch but also as a social class – gained a growing role in the field of battle, being particularly efficient when acted in mass, in big compact groups, and when it was combined with heavy cavalry.”

And in the following page:

“[…] the introduction of the field artillery, after the middle of the 15th century, also created a tactical enrichment.[…] Its full development would be posterior to the period analysed here.”
(pp. 66-69)

I think that his excerpts are quite elucidative, unfortunately since it was out of his scope, Garcia Fritz here analyses only the Feudal Western Cavalry (the mounted knight) versus infantry and doesn’t his analysis to other cavalries, present in the same scenarios, the light cavalry, the Muslim (both Arabs and Berbers) and the Byzantine, or even the Eastern European ones.

Good post, Yuyue. A good overall vision. Liked the reference to Sir John Smythe (I presime that is this one: John Smith (High Sheriff of Kent) - Wikipedia). Since he is from the 16th century is an author that can interest me and an author that I am not familiar. What is the title of the work that you are referring? Anyway when we open too much our chronology and geographical area of analysis it is much more difficult to find common features. It is also curious to note that the cases that we mention always tend to be the ones in the geographical areas that we are more familiar. My first pointed case was the one of Aljubarrota (Portugal), Willempie mentioned the case of the Netherlands, Ryanx in his last post mentioned a series of clashes in Germany/Central Europe, and johnincornwall mentioned cases in Spain. This is also one of the advantages of an international forum.
 
Oct 2014
15
Britain
#56
Did the Spanish and Portugese experiences with the armies of the Umayyad caliphate and its successors force a different type of evolution in the use of Heavy Cavalry. I ask considering if the constant exposure to the caliphates way of war altered there (Spain and Portugals) approach compared to there Northern Frankish neighbours who only came into contact sporadically with heavily mixed non European opposition prior to the 11th century. The 11th century saw them in constant conflict with Islamic Turkic forces whose composition and cultural groups would have been different from the period of the 8th century.
I know that in North western Europe we have the battle of Toulouse fought by count Odo (721 ) and the battle of Tours (731)fought by Charles Martel which were mostly fought dismounted although these have to be considered prior to the classic period of Armored knights.
Its also interesting to note that from 500 to 1100 "Iberian tactics involved knights approaching the enemy, throwing javelins then withdrawing to a safe distance before commencing another assault. Once the enemy formation was sufficiently weakened, the knights charged with thrusting spears (lances did not arrive in Hispania until the 11th century) "

Yuyue wrote - There seems to be a linear progression assumption here in the topic question, as if when time goes on cavalry becomes replaced as the arm of decision [I am replacing 'knights' with cavalry in general].
I dont think there is a belief that cavalry was "being replaced" as the arm of decision, i think everyone would agree that after 1500 there are many instances where Cavalry is the arm of decision. But there is far greater equality between infantry and cavalry on the battlefield when considering ascendancy through periods. But the type of cavalry becomes centrally important. As it necessarily changes due to battlefield and social conditions.

Tulius quoting Garcia: - “And yet, this tactical model wasn’t the only one, and probably never reached a predominant status.[…]”
i think this is very concise and wholly true
 

Ichon

Ad Honorem
Mar 2013
3,531
#57
The 7:1 ratio (that Ichon quoted) did not apply here or anywhere EXCEPT in propaganda.
There was another quote about the disappearance of professional infantry not being a 'real' event but I kept missing which page it was said on. Professional infantry do not rise from nothing. The famous Roman legions were levies that fought continuously for decades before becoming 'professionals' and even here I think we should use that word carefully. Mounted knights were capable and often did fight on foot but they also fought as cavalry in most instances they were able. Charles Martel dismounting on a rise in the trees to fight off the Arab cavalry charges is an early example in the medieval era. It is no surprise to see an absence of professional infantry when there are no large states for long periods of the medieval timeline and few states which fought continuously wars that lasted decades. Tke Byzantines, Charlemagne, and couple others are the RARE examples not the average representation of medieval warfare.


The 3-7 : 1 is for offensive campaigns because any cavalry can ALSO be an infantry and due to the fortifications and slow pace of actual conquest in the middle ages a bit part of war was raiding and devastating/terrorizing the enemy and achieving a peace settlement where castles/lands are exchanged without even requiring sieges. The largest conquests were most often achieved when large kingdoms/states fell into internal strife and simply could not offer coordinated resistance. When there was sustained resistance against an invader the warfare was usually a long series of raids and borders changing in fits and starts. Also nobility or really anyone with sense would prefer to be cavalry as they have a better chance of escape should things go wrong and while sieges were an important part of medieval warfare an army did not arrive to a fortification and lay siege with a simple march from their own territory. Without cavalry which itself was rarely very disciplined as others have noted- the even more poorly trained and motivated infantry would be easy prey for enemy cavalry attacking their supply lines (such as they were) so to even make a siege possible the army has to arrive and be able to sit in front of a fortification for some period of time. Cavalry facilitates that.

It is not a simple question of if cavalry are better than infantry but how can the cavalry or infantry be trained, supplied, led, motivated, and traditions passed on which is quite important for era when most warriors could not read so unless told or seen, experience was lost.

Most medieval states relative to Rome or the other common examples of professional infantry were very poor. Agricultural societies with little outside trade, specialization, or market economies could not afford to dedicate large portions of their best manpower to training for war full time. The most common solution adopted was to train a smaller group of men to fight and command with the best (relatively) resources available which was fighting as cavalry or on foot depending on the situation but since the general belief was battles would come down to contests between the mounted warriors on both sides with the infantry merely setting the stage because the infantry tended to be levies with relatively little experience, equipment, or training.

One of the common examples used is English longbowmen as being exceptional for their deadly ranged ability but in reality longbowmen were so useful because they represented a return to a semi-professional soldiery as they trained together and fought on campaigns together over periods of decades and even generations where the men were not the very few less than 1% of an agrarian population who were trained and equipped knights but represented the higher classes of the peasantry and even being relatively small in proportion to the entire population were capable of fielding many more warriors than knightly families could provide. Because longbowmen were lower classes the social mores allowed them to do soldierly tasks which is often entrenching, fortifying, and fighting however the situation calls for. Using bows then going into melee in support of the much smaller numbers of English knights and men at arms who had dismounted to fight due to the nature of the battlefield and the English battleplan.
 
Likes: sparky

sparky

Ad Honorem
Jan 2017
4,085
Sydney
#58
Good Post ,
on logistics of siege warfare ,
due to the very low productivity of farming , miserable road and the slow and expensive transport
the slow pace of the march was because it was dictated by the pace of the cattle moving with the columns as food on the hoof

the besieging army had as much chance of starving as the besieged , sending raiding parties further and further out
and an equal or even greater chance of suffering epidemics ,
long sieges were very rare , if only because the knights owned only a few weeks of service and would just pack up and go home
same for the levies , usually of low military quality
while the mercenary would stick around in the hope of getting paid or to get good pillage sacking the place
if an agreement was reached , the place ransom had hopefully to cover the cost and expectations
not paying fully the mercenary was a pretty net way of making them stick around , waiting for their reward

on the move an army had to forage around for most of its supplies ,
the counter move was to attack the foraging parties with cavalry , forcing them to stay close to the main force and thus getting less food
that's why medieval armies were always on the move , they were eating the place bare if they stayed put for too long
 
Likes: Ichon

Tulius

Ad Honorem
May 2016
5,110
Portugal
#59
Did the Spanish and Portugese experiences with the armies of the Umayyad caliphate and its successors force a different type of evolution in the use of Heavy Cavalry. I ask considering if the constant exposure to the caliphates way of war altered there (Spain and Portugals) approach compared to there Northern Frankish neighbours who only came into contact sporadically with heavily mixed non European opposition prior to the 11th century. The 11th century saw them in constant conflict with Islamic Turkic forces whose composition and cultural groups would have been different from the period of the 8th century.

I know that in North western Europe we have the battle of Toulouse fought by count Odo (721 ) and the battle of Tours (731)fought by Charles Martel which were mostly fought dismounted although these have to be considered prior to the classic period of Armored knights.

Its also interesting to note that from 500 to 1100 "Iberian tactics involved knights approaching the enemy, throwing javelins then withdrawing to a safe distance before commencing another assault. Once the enemy formation was sufficiently weakened, the knights charged with thrusting spears (lances did not arrive in Hispania until the 11th century) "
Interesting questions here that I probably don’t know to fully answer.

For analysis of the Christian Medieval “Spain” (meaning here the all peninsula, both today’s Portugal and Spain territories) we need to divide two periods: The Visigothic, and the one of the “Reconquista”.

At least for the Visigothic period I am pretty sure that johnincornwall knows to answer much better than me, He is a avid reader of Garcia Moreno a good expert in the period Curiously the Portuguese historiography never looked much to that period.

This is a short period (500-711), and from some notes that I have from Garcia Moreno, “Hispania Visigoda”, there was a small campaign army with a high degree of professionalization, mostly composed by horsemen. (pp. 45-46). From memory: There were Hispano-Romans in the army as well as free men and serfs/slaves. The army had a decimal organization that is discusses if it was Germanic or Roman. The “thiufae” was the biggest organization with some 1000 men. The “gardingos” were lower nobility that I think also fought on horse. The levy army was proto-feudal. The Visigoths were quite influenced by the Romans at this stage and the Arab/Berber influence was probably null. There was both heavy and light cavalry (with javelins). And as we see the hit and run tactics are not only Muslim/Arab/Berber, they already existed before their arrival, as we also can see from the Roman sources.

The other period is the “Reconquista” period. This period is the biggest one, ranging from 711-1492, so we will have many changes here, some similar to the rest of Europe and already mentioned here. Anyway here we will have an intense contact with the Muslims and necessarily a strong influence – the use of the “adarga” shields by the Spanish is a good example, in the final days of the 15th century. The influence of the French and other Central and North European regions raise in the 11th century, but I don’t know if that Wikipedia quote is correct stating “lances did not arrive in Hispania until the 11th century”.

Anyway, I already pointed in this thread that the iconography of the “Beatus” usually don’t show the horsemen with defensive equipment, which is… surprising.
 
Apr 2017
138
Bayreuth
#60
Sorry Ichon, I only reply to not be rude. Same thing,

I named sources, showed you battles, explained that all. I not go Authun-here and quote you the passages from prime-sources, because I run on that:
If you are interested into something, you have to invest time into it.
If you (random) think second and third hand works are good enough. Cool.
You chose on what level you want to run on, I am not feeding it to anybody, but then you have to be aware about the level you run on.
You got all info and directions up there.

And I will not repeat this, specifically if I see that stuff that was explained seems to be forgotten already two posts later or people do not even know the most popular prime-sources but start to debate with me, about events that are contradicting to them.
Like I can not follow your logic in eye-sight of events happening in Russia, Italy, Poland, Hungary and Germany cross 300 years to say: The Byzantines, Charlemagne and couple of other are RARE examples.
And I do not want to understand that logic.

That is why same answer: I am not going to repeat... It is all up there.
Consider this as a display of respect, because I do not reply to people I consider a waste of my time.
 

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