None of Hitler's interference r strategic Ideas had any sort of nuance. Flat absolute statements. Rank amateurism.
he also replace the heads of staff with pliable yes men rather than those suited to the role. More focused on pliable military than one that was good at it;s job.
German generals staff in both world wars for operations over strategy. I would agree they were often strategically weak. But the sort of simplistic views expressed by Hitler hardly helped.
Strategy is the province of politicians, they have every right to be involved because strategy aims to align military operations with political decisions. It is not just the responsibility of military officers, they need to be involved and their opinions heard. But whom in the OKW or OKH or the General Staff was doing it?
Strategically, the thrust through Sedan during the invasion of France wasn't nuanced? Thank Hitler for that. The creation of the panzertruppen as its own branch and army level maneuver force, not directed to support infantry, thank Hitler for that. Neither were his original ideas, having been pushed by subordinates, but neither were popular among the general staff and yet Hitler authorized them.
Operationally, the Kiev encirclement wasn't nuanced? The largest encirclement in the history of warfare, with over half a million Red Army soldiers captured. Halder and numerous other generals wanted to push to Moscow for a cheap and meaningless victory (which would have led to a worse Stalingrad like encirclement in the winter as that big counteroffensive was always going to happen), instead Hitler was thinking about logistics, supplies, and that Army Group South needed help in Ukraine.
The stand fast order in winter 1941-42, when the German generals all wanted to retreat in the dead of winter, with few supplies, with most of their vehicles inoperable, against an overwhelming Red Army offensive. Hitler said no, dig in, hold or die, and had the Luftwaffe resupply them by air. And they suffered, but they held. Numerous generals later claimed it saved the Ostheer, which would likely have routed in a panicked retreat and mass slaughter from enemy fire or the weather had they been allowed to retreat (which would happen later in '44-45).
Hitler replaced generals that failed, couldn't cut it, didn't work out, which is what leaders are supposed to do. Read Thomas Rick's The Generals about the US military's recent trend in refusal to relieve underperforming generals and the negative affects it has on the force as a whole. Relieving leaders is
supposed to happen. What isn't supposed to happen is killing poor performers, which is what Stalin did (especially early war).
Beck and Brauchitsch were relieved simply because they could not work with Hitler, and that's a problem. High command don't need to be best buddies with the boss, but a healthy professional relationship needs to exist. I think Brauchitsch admitted later on (though much of the surviving generals all lied) that he had planned to lead a coup or assassination attempt against Hitler, so that kind of explains some things.
Halder was relieved because Barbarossa was his baby, the manner in which it was carried out was his plan and against the advice of Hitler (who only wanted two prongs, not three); when he failed again in '42 after Blau collapsed, he had provided the rope to hang himself. His post war writings were what caused the "It was Hitler's fault" myth in the first place. And while a lot was Hitler's fault, a lot of it was Halder's too. Not that he nor BH Liddell Hart would ever admit that post war...
Numerous other generals disobeyed their commander in chief in ordering retreats when they were forbidden to do so. Now they might have personally believed their plan was better, smarter, making more military sense, but proper military discipline means they have to obey those orders, their personal opinion is not supposed to affect which orders they choose to follow. These included Rundstedt, Guderian, and many others, who while being relieved were largely recycled to perform other important roles in the war, including other major troop commands.
Manstein was relieved because in '43 he wouldn't shut up about trying to take over the entire Ostheer, because he constantly demanded more troops and equipment, because he refused to fight the war as Hitler saw it and refused to see it from a viewpoint higher than operational, and most of all, because he was a failure, having botched not only Kursk but all follow on operations.
Sure. Zeitler was a yes man. But he was competent. Model was a yes man, but he was competent. Schoerner was a yes man, but he was competent (well, more ruthless than competent, which is what Hitler really wanted in his generals). The list goes on. By late war Hitler finally had officers willing to follow his orders, but by that point his orders were hopeless because Germany was in a no-win situation (and had been since 1943).
Hitler made a ton of bad decisions in the war. But the narrative that a completely amateur civilian refused to take the advice of his super professional generals causing the defeat is simply myth.