Would Germany have been capable of winning the eastern theatre of wwII had it done the following?

May 2019
5
greece
#13
Germany attacked with a front that was to long to defend. If they had attacked with a more controlled front with better logistics. they may not have had so many forces, covering so wide a territory" fighting behind them.
You could argue, however, that the very insanity of the plan worked in it's favor. It helped(along with other not relevant factors) make Stalin believe that an invasion was not going to happen Crazy enough to (nearly) work
 
Sep 2012
108
#14
Their brutality exceeded the logistical needs.

If Germany would have treated the same way say France, or Belgium, the collaboration would have been almost inexistent and resistance would have been multiplied, for example.
I have to question your assertion in my bolded portion.
The logistical planning for the operation was fundamentally based around "living off the land", particularly with regards to fodder for the 600,000+ horses employed by (primarily) the "leg infantry" divisions assigned to it. There was no provision in Reichsbahn planning for any such tonnages.
This is not an inconsiderable matter.
In the western campaign such matters were dealt with in a similar manner, but there is a vast difference in scale between the resultant effect in these two cases.
Primary is the difference of the economic situations in the western (Benelux/France) countries and those of the peasants in Ukraine and Belorussia.

Also? When the Germans came to the west they were supported by one of the densest rail networks on the planet, running on a common rail gauge, and also fighting on a front that never was more than a quarter the size of Barbarossa's. They still "pillaged" their way across Belgium and France (just like they did in the USSR) but the difference here is all to do with the numbers of draft animals employed, and the much shorter distances between adequate logistical networks. The odd farmer suffered the misfortune of a Wehrmacht I.D. parking it's Artillery and Supply train on his land and eating everything in sight before moving on. In the Eastern campaign this was almost total, across a front that was 2,000 Km wide.

This is "Drang nach Osten". This is "Generallplan Ost". This is all documented.

Finally?

This is all based on logistics (or a desperate lack thereof).
See: "The Most Valuable Asset of the Reich; Vol.2" by A.C. Mierzejewski for a detailed insight into the Reichsbahn's acquiescence in the logistical planning of Barbarossa.

It all looks so simple until you really understand it.
 
Oct 2013
13,855
Europix
#15
I have to question your assertion in my bolded portion.
The logistical planning for the operation was fundamentally based around "living off the land", particularly with regards to fodder for the 600,000+ horses employed by (primarily) the "leg infantry" divisions assigned to it. There was no provision in Reichsbahn planning for any such tonnages.
This is not an inconsiderable matter.
In the western campaign such matters were dealt with in a similar manner, but there is a vast difference in scale between the resultant effect in these two cases.
Primary is the difference of the economic situations in the western (Benelux/France) countries and those of the peasants in Ukraine and Belorussia.

Also? When the Germans came to the west they were supported by one of the densest rail networks on the planet, running on a common rail gauge, and also fighting on a front that never was more than a quarter the size of Barbarossa's. They still "pillaged" their way across Belgium and France (just like they did in the USSR) but the difference here is all to do with the numbers of draft animals employed, and the much shorter distances between adequate logistical networks. The odd farmer suffered the misfortune of a Wehrmacht I.D. parking it's Artillery and Supply train on his land and eating everything in sight before moving on. In the Eastern campaign this was almost total, across a front that was 2,000 Km wide.

This is "Drang nach Osten". This is "Generallplan Ost". This is all documented.

Finally?

This is all based on logistics (or a desperate lack thereof).
See: "The Most Valuable Asset of the Reich; Vol.2" by A.C. Mierzejewski for a detailed insight into the Reichsbahn's acquiescence in the logistical planning of Barbarossa.

It all looks so simple until you really understand it.
In what way something like Operation Tannenberg or Intelligenzaktion was contributing in "living off the ground" or helped easing Germany's logistical problems?
 
Sep 2012
108
#16
Note: by capable i simply mean having a reasonable chance of victory. Also by victory i mean any treaty that would have given a lot of land to Germany. Not the wehrmacht's (let alone Hitler's) ridiculously ambitious plans.
1) don't declare war on the United states. Words alone can not describe the stupidity of this action.
2) Don't treat Slavs like vermin. It simply made them consider surrender worse than death.
3) Don't do the holocaust. The resources used for it could have been put to much better use (In case it needs to be said: i'm not saying that inefficiency was the only thing wrong with it. It's just that in this thread i am merely talking about war effectiveness) Not to mention that Germany needed labor badly. Killing workers(especially educated ones") is just insane
4) maybe Germany could have prepared it's economy for total war earlier? though i know very little about this subject
It's very unlikely that Stalin will accede to German terms.
The one fleeting possibility might lie (IMO) in the Spring of 1942; in the period just after Manstein kicked them off the Crimean peninsular and the Soviet offensives in the south (around Kharkov) were rebuffed and destroyed with much bloodletting.
Faint possibility, but perhaps realistic given the tenor?
Your other points (others have elaborated upthread):
(1) It's already a done deal. Delaying to wait for the USA to DOW the Reich obviates the reality of the existing situation. The status quo in the North Atlantic would not have held until May of 1942 when the Nazi's might have had the (above noted) opportunity to settle with Stalin. FDR was hell-bent on getting into the war and finishing Germany long before this point in the time line.
(2) This relates to Hitler's "weltanschaung" (read: "global perspective") and at this point in his megalomania there's little chance of changing his views.
(3) The resources devoted to the "Endlossung" were a pimple on the ass of an elephant. The "resources" (labor) you mention were ruthlessly exploited by the SS. Sure they "capped" a pile of people that could have been useful to them. They also starved +/-2 million Soviet POW's in the winter of 1941 because they had no logistical means to keep them alive. This was probably the bigger loss; they held hundreds of thousands of young men in the 18-25 demographic who would have been ideal for service in the coal mines and other industrial installations. Because they had no logistical apparatus in place to transfer/support these human resources, they let them starve/freeze to death.
(4) There's been a buttload of work published which refutes Herr Speer's (mistaken?) analysis of the German War Economy. One should be rather wary of his POV as he was a "sanitized" product of the Cold War, manufactured for the purpose of strengthening the FRG's position in NATO.
With all that has been revealed since his passing, I believe he should have hung at Nuremberg, along with the rest of those guilty bastards.
Vile, repugnant, self-serving.
His relationship with slave labor goes all the way back to the quarries that were providing the stone used in his "architectural masterpieces" built in the mid-1930's. UGH!
 
Sep 2012
108
#17
In what way something like Operation Tannenberg or Intelligenzaktion was contributing in "living off the ground" or helped easing Germany's logistical problems?
Don't be coy with me.
If you want to differentiate between "relatively" minor episodes, versus the big picture of the operational plan?... then state it as such. The operational plan had nothing to do with any of this crap.
I have a (recently deceased) Grandfather who served with the ORPO in the East.
You're not really telling me much..."Opa" liked to talk too.
Difference is? He was there (and he has "pix to prove it").
And it sucked for him. He went to his grave a very troubled man.
You (on the other hand) have not really added anything to the discussion except dissention.

Consider this.
 
Jan 2015
3,244
Front Lines of the Pig War
#19
Germany attacked with a front that was to long to defend. If they had attacked with a more controlled front with better logistics. they may not have had so many forces, covering so wide a territory" fighting behind them.
"Better Logistics" weren't really an option.
The geography & infrastructure of Western Soviet Union heavily influenced the campaign planning, as Barbarossa would be heavily dependant on rail supply.
There were 3 primary eastbound rail corridors:
1. NE to Leningrad via Riga (some Baltic lines were standard gauge )
2. Central corridor - Moscow via Minsk & Smolensk
3. Southern corridor - Kiev via Lvov & Rovno
(Southern routes split East of Kiev, SE to Rostov and NE to Moscow)

Its no surprise that the Operation was split between Army Groups North, Central and South, and that the 3 primary eastbound rail corridors were the focus of German re-gauging efforts, but concentrating 3x the Deutsche-Reichsbahn on one route isn't going to be 3 times quicker
 
May 2019
5
greece
#20
I do not understand though, why so many historians consider the german invasion of Russia a doomed effort by definition. By 1941 the german economy(including it's conquered territores and allies) was much larger than that of the ussr, even if, obviously, not all of it could be used to attack Russia. Also every piece of densely populated land that germany captured from Russia became "lost" to them. In other words when Ukraine was conquered the ussr could no longer count on it as their breadbasket, could not longer count on it's population as soldiers etc The same is true for the Caucasus region

Also, what i never understood is why the Russians did not suffer a logistical problem. Especially during their counter attack starting from middle 1943