WW2 German Production Problems

[pugsville]

the full mobilization argument for Germany is the withdrawal of raw materials and coal from non military companies and the introduction of continuous work shift where they had not been used before
consumer goods were hard hit and pretty much ceased to be made

The allocation of raw materials was heavily controlled well before the war in Germany. And in no country was ALL raw material withdrawn from non military companies.

 

[sparky]

the US at war still had a large non military sector \
however it was the government who allocated any resources deemed "war materials"
this included pretty much everything including meat , coal and electricity
the US had such an abundance of resources that it could still afford consumers goods

the whole economy was run on pretty socialist lines by the war production board
some critical industries werer nationalized
there were bitter memories of the charges of profiteering during WW1
after the war the whole system was carefully dismantled and the state sold its factories back to the public sector

 

[caldrail]

How is that different from the British aircraft production under Beaverbrook?

It depends on how you view bureaucracies. The problem with British institutions was not so different from those experienced by the Germans, albeit theirs was mired in politics and factional rivalry. However, what neither the British nor Germans achieved was the overall governing of aircraft production in a cooperative manner.

The Germans are quite fascinating in their complex infighting. We have old guard Heinkel and new pretender Messerschmitt competing for a fighter contract in the late thirties - it became a very serious bone of contention with both projects bad mouthed by supporters of the other - and the only reason the 109 saw service at all was because Ernst Udet stepped in and eventually settled for the 109 as superior to the 112 (even though his comment on first seeing a 109 was "This will never make a fighter"). We have the Gunther brothers getting time off from Luftwaffe service to develop their ideas on flying wings by pulling favours from senior contacts. We have Kurt Tank sending pre-production Fw187 twin engine fighters to a squadron in Norway to gain acceptance unofficially (the RLM found out and sent them home again - no contract was forthcoming either way)

The British displayed their particular form of pecking order, and in one case, a superior fighter was never put into production for no other reason than the manufacturer wasn't a big name in the business. Beaverbrook improved the system but the British manner was still apparent.

The American system was designed to get around these sorts of issues by allotting contracts offered by the armed services after evaluation of prototypes. Although the British worked flat out from the start of the war, the Americans had the time to sort out administration and made good use of it. The Germans never saw the problem - they were too busy squabbling over bits of paper.

 

[pugsville]

It depends on how you view bureaucracies. The problem with British institutions was not so different from those experienced by the Germans, albeit theirs was mired in politics and factional rivalry. However, what neither the British nor Germans achieved was the overall governing of aircraft production in a cooperative manner.

The Germans are quite fascinating in their complex infighting. We have old guard Heinkel and new pretender Messerschmitt competing for a fighter contract in the late thirties - it became a very serious bone of contention with both projects bad mouthed by supporters of the other - and the only reason the 109 saw service at all was because Ernst Udet stepped in and eventually settled for the 109 as superior to the 112 (even though his comment on first seeing a 109 was "This will never make a fighter"). We have the Gunther brothers getting time off from Luftwaffe service to develop their ideas on flying wings by pulling favours from senior contacts. We have Kurt Tank sending pre-production Fw187 twin engine fighters to a squadron in Norway to gain acceptance unofficially (the RLM found out and sent them home again - no contract was forthcoming either way)

The British displayed their particular form of pecking order, and in one case, a superior fighter was never put into production for no other reason than the manufacturer wasn't a big name in the business. Beaverbrook improved the system but the British manner was still apparent.

The American system was designed to get around these sorts of issues by allotting contracts offered by the armed services after evaluation of prototypes. Although the British worked flat out from the start of the war, the Americans had the time to sort out administration and made good use of it. The Germans never saw the problem - they were too busy squabbling over bits of paper.

Which superoir fighter?

Beaverbrook was replaced and teh system over hauled once th eimmedite crisis was paced. beaverbrook's administration was just teh crisis management team.

And if you believe for a second that the American system of allocate massive government contracts was free of political and commercial manipulation , can I sell you a bridge,.

 

[caldrail]

Martin Baker MB5. The pilots liked it, the maintenance crews liked it, and it flew at cutting edge performance of the time.

Led by Donald Douglas, the council organised the distribution of wartime aircraft production in America from 1943 I believe. The whole point was reduce commercial and political interference which it managed successfully (after North America's strike which had to be put down with armed soldiers, but that was before the Council operated). I have no need for bridges, thank you.

 

[pugsville]

Martin Baker MB5. The pilots liked it, the maintenance crews liked it, and it flew at cutting edge performance of the time.

may 1944 prototype first flew, too late for the war. The RAF was rightly looking ahead to jet aircrfat.

NOT a superior aircraft. A technogolocal dead end. Waste of resources to put it into production.

Led by Donald Douglas, the council organised the distribution of wartime aircraft production in America from 1943 I believe. The whole point was reduce commercial and political interference which it managed successfully (after North America's strike which had to be put down with armed soldiers, but that was before the Council operated). I have no need for bridges, thank you.

reduce. So you admit there was some. politics can never be eliminated,

 

[caldrail]

may 1944 prototype first flew, too late for the war. The RAF was rightly looking ahead to jet aircrfat.
NOT a superior aircraft. A technogolocal dead end. Waste of resources to put it into production.

I expected that sort of dismissal. As it happens, the consensus of those who experienced the MB% was that it was a better aircraft. A good flyer, easy to maintain, the cockpit layout praised for its utility, and whether you like it or not, the performance was excellent for the time.

"In my opinion this is an outstanding aircraft, particularly when regarded in the light of the fact that it made its maiden flight as early as 23rd May 1944"-
Test pilot Capt. Eric Brown, 1948

It was quite possible with a speedy decision for the MB5 to have reached operational use at the closing stages of the war. It would have been a worthwhile export product as well. A technological dead end? That's not really the case, because the technology was till developing at that stage of aviation history, but regards the point made about jets - there was no decision made at the end of WW2 to build jets in favour of piston aircraft, and for that matter, the Air Ministry weren't so daft to put all their eggs in one untried basket. As it happens, only two fighter designs were approaching operational use in limited numbers (Gloster Meteor and De Havilland Vampire) for the RAF and the emphasis on jet technology demonstrated by the Third Reich (who were chasing war winning solutions) was not replicated by any of the Allies. But then, German jet engines were crude and unreliable. They needed overhauls every ten hours of use and needed replacement every twenty five hours. American engines were underdeveloped and unimpressive (although an abortive project by Lockheed in the late thirties would have gained them first place had they persisted). British engines had gone through many more development cycles and had the highest quality, albeit used in service later than the German products.

Politics is part of social behaviour at its roots. Boeing, as I recall, were the last major manufacturer to sign up, being somewhat wary of such oversight, but the reality was that the system ensured optimal production levels at all factories involved. Not for nothing was the American economy boosted by WW2.

 

[JakeStarkey]

Zu ashe zu staub

 

[sparky]

Jets were not yet mature as a weapon , they flew so fast that dogfights were problematic ,
not having much time to aim and shoot and bad turning characteristics , combat turned to be one fast pass and racing away , painfully getting set for another attempt
hoping the target was still around
the Arado Ar 234 was the lone jet bomber , it had aiming problem , plastering its load all over the place , if it wasn't a city they would miss more often than not
the only good use of jet fighters was to shoot bombers , they were big , steady targets

the problem with using jets were slowly overcome after the war by developing training and methodology
it's why there were still some piston propellers around ,
it took a lot of failure to make carrier landing by jets a reasonable proposition which was done by the Korean war

 

[pugsville]

I expected that sort of dismissal. As it happens, the consensus of those who experienced the MB% was that it was a better aircraft. A good flyer, easy to maintain, the cockpit layout praised for its utility, and whether you like it or not, the performance was excellent for the time.

"In my opinion this is an outstanding aircraft, particularly when regarded in the light of the fact that it made its maiden flight as early as 23rd May 1944"-
Test pilot Capt. Eric Brown, 1948

It was quite possible with a speedy decision for the MB5 to have reached operational use at the closing stages of the war. It would have been a worthwhile export product as well. A


technological dead end? That's not really the case, because the technology was till developing at that stage of aviation history, but regards the point made about jets - there was no decision made at the end of WW2 to build jets in favour of piston aircraft, and for that matter, the Air Ministry weren't so daft to put all their eggs in one untried basket. As it happens, only two fighter designs were approaching operational use in limited numbers (Gloster Meteor and De Havilland Vampire) for the RAF and the emphasis on jet technology demonstrated by the Third Reich (who were chasing war winning solutions) was not replicated by any of the Allies. But then, German jet engines were crude and unreliable. They needed overhauls every ten hours of use and needed replacement every twenty five hours. American engines were underdeveloped and unimpressive (although an abortive project by Lockheed in the late thirties would have gained them first place had they persisted). British engines had gone through many more development cycles and had the highest quality, albeit used in service later than the German products.

Politics is part of social behaviour at its roots. Boeing, as I recall, were the last major manufacturer to sign up, being somewhat wary of such oversight, but the reality was that the system ensured optimal production levels at all factories involved. Not for nothing was the American economy boosted by WW2.

Yeah but what other pistion engine fighter was developed at that late period in the war. To be a BETTER aircraft it has to be a better aircraft that an aircraft accepted into production from a siimilar stage and that aircraft to compare it against was what? The war was not going to last forever and those planning production knew it. Changing production introducing new designs takes resources, inevitably cost in type sin production right now.

There's a saying in computing papar is fatser than silicon. the MB5 was later development it should have been beter than aircraft in production. In the late war context a maybe somewhat better piston engine fighter it;s very argubale that it was not a good investiment of resources.

You have a handful and amntedoctal claims form a very small number of people. It's hardly definitive evidence.
Have you got the actual testing report? Or Why the it was not put into production?

The project might have faltered bcause James Martin was not good a finishing things quickly.,

"The trouble was that James Martin, the aircraft's sole designer, was a perfectionist, and the MB5's design and construction became a protracted process."

Or the design may have had flaws which meant pushing it into production before they were fixed was a bad call.,

"In fact, the MB5 made its maiden flight long before that, at RAF Harwell on May 23, 1944. The pilot, Bryan Greensted, Chief Test Pilot for airscrew manufacturer Rotol, found it directionally unstable, and it was not flown again until several months of lamentably slow work on the rear fuselage and tail services had remedied this."

History of the Martin-Baker MB5 Airplane

I use words like MIGHT and MAY because it is sketchy evidence. Do you really think the evdidence about this aircraft have is so clear cut and definative?


and what is the clear cut evidence that "a superior fighter was never put into production for no other reason than the manufacturer wasn't a big name in the business" to make your argument you have to show it was not only clealry superoir but the SOLE reaosn it was not put into procution immeidtely was the Martin Baker was not a big name in buisness.