WW2 German Production Problems

Jul 2016
9,550
USA
#71
As long as it agrees with your point of view. I showed you that Hitler injected a major element of manpower into the German army through organizations he had in place before he came to power.... your only response

No he didn't
How else am I supposed to react? What you're claiming is as ridiculous as suggesting Hitler created a secret clone army in 1924 that he suddenly used to create the Wehrmacht in 1933, even though the Wehrmacht wasn't created until years later, and was still small until the late 30s.

The SA and SS, pre-33, didn't have combat units at the time and yet you think they constituted "major elements of manpower" injected into the German army. How the heck should anyone halfway knowledgeable about this subject respond to that? What did you expect? A standing ovation?

What was the first Waffen SS unit? When was it formed? I want to know how massive this force was, and how it contributed greatly to the Reichswehr (as the Wehrmacht wasn't even in existence until 1935).

Do you even know what the German army was? I know you probably think Wehrmacht means army, and I know you had no clue what the Reichswehr even was, but the actual ground force organization whose name means army is actually called the Heer. Do you know who the SA and SS operated under? Never the Heer. Not a single SS unit EVER was part of the Heer. At most, during the war, they fell under operational control of certain Heer units, corps, armies, army groups, theater commands, but they were separate organizations, just like how the Spanish, Italian, Hungarian, Romanian units included in Germany field armies were not part of the Heer.

I cannot believe you keep replying...
 
Mar 2019
1,457
Kansas
#74
Can we have some production figures for war materiel, and employment in war related industries from 1936-1944?
Employment numbers are very hard to put into any meaningful state. At one point in the mid 1930s it was actually illegal to be unemployed. Later once the war began the Nazis used massive amounts of slave labor I have seen numbers as high as 5 million. A further anomaly in the German economy no matter what era you are discussing was the lack of women drafted into the workforce as the available manpower shrank due to war service.

In terms of production. I will let Adolf explain that - from a speech in early 1933

The future of Germany depends exclusively and only on the reconstruction of the Wehrmacht. All other tasks must cede precedence to the task of rearmament” and “in case of conflict between the demands of the Wehrmacht and demands for other purposes, the interests of the Wehrmacht must in every case have priority.

The Nazis employed a neat trick called Privatization. Basically they would go to a business, tell them how production was to run. If the owns did not agree. The owners were replaced.

I posted an example of this earlier in the discussion showing how the Junkers aircraft company moved from commercial production to exclusively military production of aircraft overnight.
 
Likes: peccavi
Jul 2016
9,550
USA
#75
True. Unless we can get a figure for just German citizens.

Germans love bureaucracy, they most have kept meticulous records.
A lot of their records were destroyed in the war, especially involving employment, as so much of that paperwork was actually evidence for war crimes. What wasn't destroyed in bombings, or the city fighting, a lot of it was purposefully destroyed at the conclusion in the massive bonfires the SS and Wehrmacht were hosting in every govt building.
 
Dec 2013
41
Finland
#76
No. My assertion was that Germany didn't fully mobilize for war until 1943. Others content that, suggesting that Germany started mobilizing for war far earlier, even going to say it was 1933, years before the Wehrmacht even existed, before Hitler even had control over the military (which didn't happen until Hindenburg died in '34).
Your original message was written as a generalization, but anyway... how do you measure the degree of mobilization? E.g. German household consumption index (1939=100) was lower (80.3) in 1942 than it was in 1943 (85.9), so the Germans devoted more resources to households in 1943 than on the previous year (Johnson 2017). Industrial production was lower in 1942 than 1943 (Index 206.7 vs. 260 - note that production had already doubled from 1939 by 1942).

Johnson also suggests that up to half of manufactured consumer goods went to the military. She's not alone in this, but I use the text as I have the link to it. A simple example of this would be a civilian truck that was put to military use. This also illustrates the problem of distinguishing military and civil production from each other; e.g. if you build a shipyard and then build battleship Bismarck there, is the shipyard a civilian or military investment? I've seen it argued that Germany concentrated on building (military) production capacity, which they lacked, during the second four-year plan (1937-1941), which explains a lot of the rise in production statistics during the following 2-3 years. This has also influenced the interpretation that the Germans only went total in 1943.

True. Unless we can get a figure for just German citizens.Germans love bureaucracy, they most have kept meticulous records.
A further anomaly in the German economy no matter what era you are discussing was the lack of women drafted into the workforce as the available manpower shrank due to war service.
I mentioned Zdenka Johnson's article "Financing the German Economy during the Second World War", which includes data on German workforce, on page 2. The same post included one reason why women were not drafted in the workforce during the war - a lot of them were already there (in the workforce) before the war begun!

https://dspace5.zcu.cz/bitstream/11025/26236/1/Johnson.pdf
 
Jul 2016
9,550
USA
#77
Your original message was written as a generalization, but anyway... how do you measure the degree of mobilization? E.g. German household consumption index (1939=100) was lower (80.3) in 1942 than it was in 1943 (85.9), so the Germans devoted more resources to households in 1943 than on the previous year (Johnson 2017). Industrial production was lower in 1942 than 1943 (Index 206.7 vs. 260 - note that production had already doubled from 1939 by 1942).
Of course its a generalization, I wrote a post, not a book. And the point of this thread was to get individuals to watch the video I linked, which was to showcase problems in production, relating to economics and war mobilization during WW2.
 
Mar 2019
1,457
Kansas
#78
I mentioned Zdenka Johnson's article "Financing the German Economy during the Second World War", which includes data on German workforce, on page 2. The same post included one reason why women were not drafted in the workforce during the war - a lot of them were already there (in the workforce) before the war begun!

https://dspace5.zcu.cz/bitstream/11025/26236/1/Johnson.pdf
Some good information there - And women already over representing in agriculture. That had never occurred to me!
 

caldrail

Ad Honorem
Feb 2012
5,296
#79
The point is that in the US, business was given a free hand to find ways to increase production.
Sorry I couldn't answer this point sooner, but the US was unique in creating a council for aircraft production which allocated production contracts to factories serving the militaries needs rather than commercial pressure. It has been commented upon as a form of economic socialism far removed from American sensibilities, but it has to be said, the system worked and whilst I agreed with a lot of what you said, the minor updates issue was common to all mass production vehicles (and still is, ask any manufacturer). The US system tended to get around this because the regional sub-types had minor differences anyway.
 

tomar

Ad Honoris
Jan 2011
13,519
#80
Sorry I couldn't answer this point sooner, but the US was unique in creating a council for aircraft production which allocated production contracts to factories serving the militaries needs rather than commercial pressure. It has been commented upon as a form of economic socialism far removed from American sensibilities, but it has to be said, the system worked and whilst I agreed with a lot of what you said, the minor updates issue was common to all mass production vehicles (and still is, ask any manufacturer). The US system tended to get around this because the regional sub-types had minor differences anyway.
Well, given that (some) inferior aircraft continued to be produced throughout the war even when better aircraft were available I am not sure the system was that effective
(or else there were some pretty good salesmen)