European intervention in the American Civil War

[DuneSea]

During the American Civil War the Confederacy attempted to gain support from the UK and France. Do you believe Confederacy was likely to succeed in gaining European support? And if it was, what would have happened?

 

[AlpinLuke]

This is an interesting matter.
Anyway note that France showed not a great interest in that region of the world: it sold wide territories to young US without great hesitation [I'm making reference to the Louisiana Purchase]. If a power is not so interested in some territories, the only reason to take part to a local conflict would be to damage the interests of an other power.

This is why during the American Revolution France had a say ... but why to join the party of the American Civil War?
Overall on the side of the possible loser ... the industrial inferiority of the South didn't suggest to be on its side.

Actually it happened the contrary: the North asked help to Europeans [being Italian I could remind that Lincoln thought to ask to Garibaldi to become the commander of the Northern Army, but Garibaldi had other patriotic wars to fight ...].

But, if we think to diplomacy ...

France remained neutral, but it had some interests to help the South [overall to obtain aids to conquer Mexico], but the North told Paris that any aid to the South was going to be considered like a war declaration against the North. France didn't want to act alone and the British Empire wasn't interested in the matter, so ...

Russia was the only great power to declare a clear support for the Union [because Moscow saw the United States as a counterweight of the British Empire].
About this, it's interesting to remind that Russia sent a fleet in the American waters between 1861 and 1862. The Russian frigate Alexander Nevsky was still in American waters in 1864 ...

Historians are not in agreement about the real reasons of this. There is who says that Moscow sent there that fleet not exactly to support the Union, but to avoid the war between France and Britain. But many Americans considered this move a clear support for the Union.

 

[redcoat]

View attachment 57020
During the American Civil War the Confederacy attempted to gain support from the UK and France. Do you believe Confederacy was likely to succeed in gaining European support? And if it was, what would have happened?

The UK had no interest in involvement, it would endanger Canada and the West Indies for no real gain. Whoever won would still want to sell them cotton after the war.

 

[delta1]

The UK had no interest in involvement, it would endanger Canada and the West Indies for no real gain. Whoever won would still want to sell them cotton after the war.

The UK had an interest in creating two antagonistic American polities that could be played against each other and who wouldn't be strong enough to threaten Britain's global position. However, Palmerston's government was anti-slavery and they were never convinced that the Confederacy could win.

 

[Dentatus]

In early September 1862, when it seemed the War had reached a stalemate, Palmerston (the British Prime Minister) and Russell (the Foreign Secretary) tentatively scheduled a cabinet meeting for late September where a proposal to offer mediation between the American combatants would be discussed. When news of the Battle of Antietam arrived they decided to wait, and the proposal was not raised again.

In spite of the distress and unemployment caused by the loss of cotton imports, the European powers were mostly anxious to remain neutral in the American conflict because they were already distracted by troubles around the globe. The Crimean War, Franco-Austrian War and the Indian Mutiny had just ended and there were problems in Poland, Greece, Denmark, China, Indo-China, Mexico and elsewhere. And there were other economic issues besides cotton, such as the need for North American grain et al, on top of the strong anti-slavery feelings in UK.

 

[Cernunnos]

Was the confederacy even that popular in Europe?

Even among the aristocrats of Europe did they view the southern plantation class as kindred spirits or as nouveau-riche bourgeoisie?

 

[DuneSea]

I also believe that an intervention was highly unlikely. Slavery was unpopular in the UK and France. There would likely have been a massive political controversy and anti-recruitment riots. The Crimean war had been controversial. The UK did transfer troops to Canada during the Trent affair but this was likely mostly a defensive measure. The troops deployed would never have sufficed for offensive operations into the US. After the Emancipation Proclamation an intervention would have been politically impossible.

An intervention would likely not have succeeded from a practical point of view either. The French army was bogged down in Mexico. The British army had performed catastrophically during the Crimean War and the subsequent reforms had still not been completed during the American Civil War. The British Empire had been successful in other Victorian era conflicts, but the opponents had mainly been technologically inferior and mostly lacked navies. The logistics would have been immensely problematic.

 

[RandomRodent]

I also believe that an intervention was highly unlikely. Slavery was unpopular in the UK and France. There would likely have been a massive political controversy and anti-recruitment riots. The Crimean war had been controversial. The UK did transfer troops to Canada during the Trent affair but this was likely mostly a defensive measure. The troops deployed would never have sufficed for offensive operations into the US. After the Emancipation Proclamation an intervention would have been politically impossible.

An intervention would likely not have succeeded from a practical point of view either. The French army was bogged down in Mexico. The British army had performed catastrophically during the Crimean War and the subsequent reforms had still not been completed during the American Civil War. The British Empire had been successful in other Victorian era conflicts, but the opponents had mainly been technologically inferior and mostly lacked navies. The logistics would have been immensely problematic.

Except Trent would not have been an intervention. That is what made it so dangerous. The British did see their mobilisation and ultimatum as defensive and their plan was to take the naval offensive. The army being amassed in Canada was defensive, it was the vanguard of a British contribution to a force that was expected to amount to around 200,000 strong in order to resist an invasion of Canada by a US army of 200,000. The beginning of the problems for the Union was that they did not have 200,000 troops lying around free nor did they have long arms for them. They were also rather dependent on the British for gunpowder for the firearms and artillery they did have. In order to make new Springfields they were importing British 'gun iron' a quality of steel that the US could not at the time replicate. From Europe the Union were still in the process of transferring hundreds of thousands of rifles and muskets (yes smoothbore muskets). United States revenues were heavily dependent upon trade and even a small force of rebel raiders proved capable of jeopardising the equal largest merchant fleet (in terms of tonnage) on the globe. Imagine what the world's largest navy with bases astride every trade route could have done?

The French would have been keen to intervene and the Confederates would have jumped for joy to see the Yankees prove themselves such fools.

But, fortunately the British only wanted an apology and the return of the stolen Commissioners. They settled for a rather token somewhat apology by the US and the sending in their way of Mason and Slidell, whom they and the French promptly ignored.

Now it has been argued that Europeans were not interested in intervention and I think, with the exception of the French that was by and large true. That however was because war is expensive and for most European nations no urgent interests were at stake. Which is why the interception of the Trent and its bungled not seizure were taken so seriously, imperilling the Royal Mail Packet system touched a nerve with all the European polities as they used it for their diplomatic correspondence.

Trent was a singular instance when the Union was uniquely vulnerable and in danger of picking a casus belli calculated to motivate not just the British but lose the US any neutral support from Europe and the French would have been keen to back the Confederates once the British had cleared the way but their ostensible diplomatic position was one of full support for the British over the Trent "Outrage".

Actual intervention though was always a rather niche interest in European political and diplomatic circles, there were those for it but they found it hard to convince others even the gung-ho types like Palmerston were not that keen (and he had some distinctly anti-American prejudices) let alone cooler heads. Hence the slightest uptick in Union fortunes and the interest would cool. If the Europeans could do without cotton and British ships were by and large only carrying US grain home in lieu of cotton, they could certainly do without bloodshed. So long as Lincoln made sure his captains did not do anything too stupid (and in fairness to Wilkes he understood that impounding the Trent for assay by an admiralty court was the legally correct action), the Europeans would be unlikely to want to get involved.

 

[DuneSea]

Except Trent would not have been an intervention. That is what made it so dangerous. The British did see their mobilisation and ultimatum as defensive and their plan was to take the naval offensive. The army being amassed in Canada was defensive, it was the vanguard of a British contribution to a force that was expected to amount to around 200,000 strong in order to resist an invasion of Canada by a US army of 200,000. The beginning of the problems for the Union was that they did not have 200,000 troops lying around free nor did they have long arms for them. They were also rather dependent on the British for gunpowder for the firearms and artillery they did have. In order to make new Springfields they were importing British 'gun iron' a quality of steel that the US could not at the time replicate. From Europe the Union were still in the process of transferring hundreds of thousands of rifles and muskets (yes smoothbore muskets). United States revenues were heavily dependent upon trade and even a small force of rebel raiders proved capable of jeopardising the equal largest merchant fleet (in terms of tonnage) on the globe. Imagine what the world's largest navy with bases astride every trade route could have done?

The French would have been keen to intervene and the Confederates would have jumped for joy to see the Yankees prove themselves such fools.

But, fortunately the British only wanted an apology and the return of the stolen Commissioners. They settled for a rather token somewhat apology by the US and the sending in their way of Mason and Slidell, whom they and the French promptly ignored.

Now it has been argued that Europeans were not interested in intervention and I think, with the exception of the French that was by and large true. That however was because war is expensive and for most European nations no urgent interests were at stake. Which is why the interception of the Trent and its bungled not seizure were taken so seriously, imperilling the Royal Mail Packet system touched a nerve with all the European polities as they used it for their diplomatic correspondence.

Trent was a singular instance when the Union was uniquely vulnerable and in danger of picking a casus belli calculated to motivate not just the British but lose the US any neutral support from Europe and the French would have been keen to back the Confederates once the British had cleared the way but their ostensible diplomatic position was one of full support for the British over the Trent "Outrage".

Actual intervention though was always a rather niche interest in European political and diplomatic circles, there were those for it but they found it hard to convince others even the gung-ho types like Palmerston were not that keen (and he had some distinctly anti-American prejudices) let alone cooler heads. Hence the slightest uptick in Union fortunes and the interest would cool. If the Europeans could do without cotton and British ships were by and large only carrying US grain home in lieu of cotton, they could certainly do without bloodshed. So long as Lincoln made sure his captains did not do anything too stupid (and in fairness to Wilkes he understood that impounding the Trent for assay by an admiralty court was the legally correct action), the Europeans would be unlikely to want to get involved.

How could the British Army possibly have raised 200 000 soldiers? It never had anywhere near that strength during the Crimean War. Recruitment in the UK would, as mentioned before, have been extremely unpopular. Recruitment in India would have been even more risky so soon after the Mutiny of 1857. The logistics would also have been difficult. The Saint Lawrence estuary would have been vulnerable.

 

[RandomRodent]

How could the British Army possibly have raised 200 000 soldiers? It never had anywhere near that strength during the Crimean War. Recruitment in the UK would, as mentioned before, have been extremely unpopular. Recruitment in India would have been even more risky so soon after the Mutiny of 1857. The logistics would also have been difficult. The Saint Lawrence estuary would have been vulnerable.

Did you think to look up the establishment of the British Army at the time of Trent?

"The total number of men, therefore, including India and the Staff, is 228,973." Hansard 03 1862.

SUPPLY—ARMY ESTIMATES. (Hansard, 3 March 1862) (parliament.uk)

You might want to consider that the British commenced moving troops inland from Halifax to Canada proper via sledges during the winter of 1861-1862. Further the British merchant fleet in addition to the Royal Navy possessed 5 million tons of Gross Registered Shipping, this included the largest number of steamships of any nation in the world. The British would not be raising troops in India and you might want to show that you have made some effort to study the war fever the British experienced over the Trent Affair and at least try and plausibly substantiate your claim recruitment would be unpopular.

Further you need to consider that plans included raising 100,000 men for the Canadian militia for whom 105,000 stands of arms were sent prior to the resolution of the Trent crisis.

Edit: I realise that I have not detailed the number of men in the British Militia and Volunteers forces, the Militia alone having prior arrangements to send 22,000 men abroad to release regular troops from garrisons.

 

[Dentatus]

Apparently the plan in 1861 was to send ~12,500 troops to Canada.
Were there ever as many as 35,000 British troops in the Crimea?

The Royal Navy with 53 steam powered ships of the line, 128 steam powered cruisers, 4 sea-going ironclads (and 8 or 9 more under construction) would have been able to break the Federal blockade and sweep American commerce from the seas.

 

[RandomRodent]

Were there ever more than 35,000 British troops in the Crimea?

"I now come to the year with which I propose to institute a comparison—the year almost immediately preceding the Crimean war—the year 1852–3. In that year the number of men asked for was 119,519; and the total estimate for the army, including the Ordnance and Commissariat, was £9,021,394. I wish the Committee to observe that in consequence of the French war, which began in 1793 and ended in 1815, our military expenditure underwent a great increase, and thence remained tolerably stationary till the year preceding the Crimean war. There is no doubt that the deficiencies of our military system, as disclosed by the events of those wars, led to a considerable increase in the amount of our army, and in the expense of our establishments. This is shown by a comparison of the number of men to be voted in the present year, 145,450, and the amount of money, £15,302,870, with the figures which I have stated for the year almost immediately preceding the Crimean war.

957The lesson, then, I think, which this comparison teaches, is, that as the French war brought about a great development of our military system, showed the deficiencies under which our army then laboured, and, as a consequence, caused a great increase in the charge for the army; so the Crimean war produced similar results, and has led to a permanent increase in the cost of our military system, both by making a permanent addition to the strength of the army and also by rendering necessary certain improvements intended to provide for the efficiency of the army, to which I shall call attention."

Again Hansard 3 March 1862 the link to the entire debate is upthread.

The British Army was considerably expanded following the Crimean War. Further it should be noted that Canada and the Maritime Provinces unlike Crimea are friendly territory whose extensive agriculture (the surpluses of which were exported to support the Union OTL), draught animals (the supply of Canadian horses was again vital to the Union Army OTL) and other civilian infrastructure can support an extensive army, further remember the ports and shipping that were also required to support French, Ottoman and Piedmont troops can be focused entirely on British forces in this scenario.

 

[RandomRodent]

Apparently the plan in 1861 was to send ~12,500 troops to Canada.
Were there ever as many as 35,000 British troops in the Crimea?

The Royal Navy with 53 steam powered ships of the line, 128 steam powered cruisers, 4 sea-going ironclads (and 8 or 9 more under construction) would have been able to break the Federal blockade and sweep American commerce from the seas.

There were 28,500 more troops troops in addition to those already sent earmarked for embarkation at the time the American reply indicating their compliance with the release of Mason and Slidell was received. The strength of the Army at home was around 100,000 of these some 70,000 were considered deployable being over 18, having completed their 6 months basic training and having spent a year with their battalion or regiment. The 28,000 mentioned above could expect to be in Canada inside a month, then their transports would have returned the British government was also engaging the services of additional steam vessels for troop transport purposes. With the 16 steamers engaged historically and the steamers already servicing routes between Halifax and Britain there were already 30 steamers which already suggests the British could move 100,000 troops to Canada by April of 1862 when the campaign season would have ended.

The land forces would not all have come from Britain of the roughly 40,000 regulars deployed around the Empire outside of India some 22,000 would be replaced by Militia sent out from Britain. The freed up garrisons could then be redeployed to Canada. In addition British auxiliary forces had a long tradition of volunteering for regular service in Britain's major wars, this included during the Crimea and would also include the 2nd Boer War.

A point that is worth considering is the actual size of a US invasion force if any. Any soldiers drawn to the Canadian front have to come from those historically used against the rebel states. In addition there would have been the ongoing and acerbated shortage of arms. Between February and April 1862 alone OTL the US imported 23,000+ rifles from Britain and 126,000 from the rest of Europe, now while it cannot be assured that a British blockade would have stopped all of the European rifles from arriving the cessation of British supply would have hurt as domestic deliveries of rifles amounted to 40,000 (in the same time frame) any British interdiction would have been serious and given it is likely that even European arms often travelled on British hulls interdiction is more likely than not.

 

[DuneSea]

Only one single British troopship reached Quebec during the autumn of 1861 before the Saint Lawrence River froze. Troops could still disembark on Newfoundland but the logistics would have been extremely difficult for such a large force as 100 000 troops. Most would have to be conveyed during the sailing season of 1862. After that the Emancipation Proclamation was issued and all forms of support for the Confederacy would have been politically impossible.

Another problem would have been the purchasing of commissions in the British Army. This system had become very controversial following the Crimean War but it had still not been abolished.

Canadian fortresses were in a decaying condition and militias existed only on paper.

The Royal Navy was stronger than the US Navy in its total size but the latter would have operated far closer to home and in waters. Coaling and provisioning steam powered British warships would have been extremely difficult.

 

[Chlodio]

The Royal Navy with 53 steam powered ships of the line, 128 steam powered cruisers, 4 sea-going ironclads (and 8 or 9 more under construction) would have been able to break the Federal blockade and sweep American commerce from the seas.

The Royal Navy was stronger than the US Navy in its total size but the latter would have operated far closer to home and in waters. Coaling and provisioning steam powered British warships would have been extremely difficult.

I think Dentatus assumes the US Navy would be dispersed along the Confederate coast, enforcing its blockade of the South. A concentrated British fleet could have easily destroyed whatever force the US had on patrol off Charleston or any other random Confederate port. The Americans could only concentrate their fleet by raising their blockade of the Confederate coast and then only if they saw the British fleet coming early enough to affect that concentration. So long as they enforce their blockade the Americans are exposed to defeat in detail.

I agree logistics would be more difficult for the British than for the Americans. Another advantage for the Americans is that they know the local waters. Americans would have a better understanding of local winds, tides, and currents. Also Americans would be less likely to run aground on hidden shoals, shallows, and sandbars. If forced to resort to smuggling and guerre de course the Americans could take advantage of countless hidden bays and coves along the American seaboard. But these advantages are probably not enough to win a naval war against Britain.

 

[Leftyhunter]

Only one single British troopship reached Quebec during the autumn of 1861 before the Saint Lawrence River froze. Troops could still disembark on Newfoundland but the logistics would have been extremely difficult for such a large force as 100 000 troops. Most would have to be conveyed during the sailing season of 1862. After that the Emancipation Proclamation was issued and all forms of support for the Confederacy would have been politically impossible.

Another problem would have been the purchasing of commissions in the British Army. This system had become very controversial following the Crimean War but it had still not been abolished.

Canadian fortresses were in a decaying condition and militias existed only on paper.

The Royal Navy was stronger than the US Navy in its total size but the latter would have operated far closer to home and in waters. Coaling and provisioning steam powered British warships would have been extremely difficult.

Nations do intervene in civil wars frequently but only if there is a perceived need to do so. Yes there was tension during the Trent Affair but Lincoln said " one war at a time". Yes it was a stupid decision to stop a British mail packet on the high seas and seize two Confederate diplomats who in hindsight were no threat to the Union. Neither Lincoln nor Palmerston were eager to get in a shooting war and they were able to work things out as others mentioned.
Yes there was widespread unemployment in textile towns such has Manchester but cotton was available either from Confederate smugglers , from the Union after the Union seized the Seaward Islands off South Carolina plus from Union occupied Louisiana but also from India and French Senegal. Has mentioned there was more trade between Western Europe and the non Confederate states then with the Confederate states
It never made sense to intervene in the ACW plus plenty of money to be made selling arms to both sides on a cash and carry basis.
Leftyhunter

 

[Dentatus]

The most powerful ships in the US Navy in 1860 were the six wooden, steam-powered, screw frigates which mounted ~40 smooth-bore 9-11" guns. There were also ~11 smaller wooden screw sloops mounting 4-20 guns, with 5 more under construction and ~6 side-wheel sloops. There were no steam-powered ships-of-the-line and nothing remotely comparable to the new British sea-going, screw-driven ironclads like Black Prince and Warrior. The Royal Navy also possessed 28 screw frigates as, or more, powerful than the 6 US ships and ~100 other steam-powered wooden cruising ships.

The US could probably have defended its coast and ports, especially when the new Monitors were commissioned. But the British would control the high seas and prevent any blockade of Southern ports (which they could have used as bases) The only offensive possibility for the US Navy would have been commerce warfare. (even with the Russian fleets in New York and San Francisco?)

Somewhere I saw an article from the London Times that said in 1860 the British Army was budgeting for 212,000 men. But this number included recruits in training and those superannuated; and from that number garrisons had to be found for possessions around the world, including over 50,000 for India, and an expeditionary force for China et al.

Nevertheless, Britain already had plenty on its plate in 1860....concern over French, Russian and Prussian activities in Poland, central Asia, Morocco, Mexico, Italy and Denmark, unrest in India and Ireland et al was enough to occupy the fleet, army and foreign office. World-wide commitments, the potential danger to Canada, combined with anti-slavery opinion in Britain (even among the unemployed mill workers) made intervention unlikely without some outrage even worse than the "Trent Affair" or more Confederate victories.

 

[RandomRodent]

Only one single British troopship reached Quebec during the autumn of 1861 before the Saint Lawrence River froze. Troops could still disembark on Newfoundland but the logistics would have been extremely difficult for such a large force as 100 000 troops. Most would have to be conveyed during the sailing season of 1862. After that the Emancipation Proclamation was issued and all forms of support for the Confederacy would have been politically impossible.

Another problem would have been the purchasing of commissions in the British Army. This system had become very controversial following the Crimean War but it had still not been abolished.

Canadian fortresses were in a decaying condition and militias existed only on paper.

The Royal Navy was stronger than the US Navy in its total size but the latter would have operated far closer to home and in waters. Coaling and provisioning steam powered British warships would have been extremely difficult.

Look I am going to bluntly ask have you ever done any research on the British response to the Trent Affair or are you coming at this from a position of ignorance? Because if it is the latter I can understand some of your claims. To be fair we all start at some point at ignorant so if you are willing to learn I and other can help.

British Light Infantry Regiments

"
The 1st Bn Military Train was charged with the management of the transportation. The contract for this had been arranged by Assistant Commissary General Mahon at Fredericton and was awarded to three contractors who divided the route into three stages (Saint John to Fredericton, Fredericton to Little Falls and Little Falls to Rivière du Loup). These contractors provided roughly constructed two-horsed sleighs, which were capable of holding eight men facing each other. The Guards, being larger men, could only put six in each one. Each sleigh was provided with a small repair kit consisting of a saw, hammer, nails, clasp knife and cord for repairs or emergencies on the road plus an allocation of snow shovels and snowshoes. Many of the drivers and horses were normally employed in the lumber trade, or were local farmers, and so were familiar with the winter conditions that would be encountered. Similar sleighs were provided for the carriage of the eighteen Armstrong guns of the three Field Batteries.

The troops were divided into packets of approximately 160 men for movement. A typical packet consisted of a sleigh with half of the officers, baggage sleighs with an escort, sleighs with the main body of troops and the last sleigh with the remaining half of the officers. Prior to departing England, each soldier was provided with cold weather clothing consisting of: furcaps with ear lappets, woollen comforters, chamois waistcoats, a flannel shirt and drawers, warm gloves, a pair of long boots and thick woollen stockings. The men of the Military Train were also issued a pea jacket. In addition to this, the men were issued moccasins at Saint John and the contractors provided straw and buffalo robes for use in the sleighs. For further warmth, the men were provided with hot meals at breakfast, midday and supper. They were also encouraged to run alongside the sleighs in shifts to maintain circulation. Medical officers travelled with most groups and others were located at each of the halts."

From the linked page there are other accounts of the movement of British troops inland from Halifax during the winter months and then there is the further fact that Quebec de-ices before the campaign season actually opens in Canada. The lack of sea transport in winter beyond Halifax did not mean the British could not in fact send troops to the inland Canadian provinces. I am not sure why you talk about Newfoundland when Halifax is and was Canada's major winter port.

Again Trent led to a situation where the British believed themselves under attack, they were not mobilising to assist the Confederacy, had it gone to war it is likely the French would have used the cover of that conflict to render more direct assistance to the Confederacy but the Emancipation Proclamation not only was much later but it did not render the rebellion any more or less toxic in British eyes, it was if anything seen as mere posturing by even British abolitionists.

Perhaps we should compare the purchase of commissions in the British Army which at least required experience in grade before advancing to that of the officer appointments in the US Volunteers? I can bore at length on those subjects if you are genuinely interested?

Canadian fortresses were indeed in a sorry state but you might want to look at how quickly field fortifications and even more permanent works were constructed in several conflicts of the period including but not limited to the Crimean and American Civil Wars and the subsequent strength of those positions even in the face of deliberate siege warfare.

The Militia was in the process of being raised but the Canadian Militia (technically militias as the provinces were independent of each other) had a long tradition of turning out in numbers and had done so successfully in the face of the 1837 insurrections, given the pace of enlistment prior to the US climb down there is no reason to assume the target would not have been met. Further unlike US Volunteers and Militia the Canadians had access to both British military instructors and British military arms.

Finally while it should not be assumed the Royal Navy would simply crush all before it, it did in fact have many bases in the region including both Halifax and Bermuda and additional stations in the Caribbean. The British had already developed a system of global coaling stations including the North American and Pacific North West Stations and further still there was an actual coal mine at Halifax! Again if you are interested in doing research on the period I can direct you to some quite detailed stuff to be found on CivilWarTalk and there are some contributors there on this site who can help further enlighten anyone interested.

If you are genuinely interested in the circumstances of the Trent Affair and how things changed subsequently then yeah there is a lot to discuss. The problem is I have seen a lot of these Trent threads where someone tries to argue that the Americans could have, would have, should have won with ease and righteously conquered Canada into the bargain which is against the overwhelming balance of the evidence. Not that the US is necessarily doomed to defeat had Trent turned bloody but it would have had a mountain of problems and disadvantages to climb.

 

[DuneSea]

Look I am going to bluntly ask have you ever done any research on the British response to the Trent Affair or are you coming at this from a position of ignorance? Because if it is the latter I can understand some of your claims. To be fair we all start at some point at ignorant so if you are willing to learn I and other can help.

I base my skeptical interpretation of the opinions of the British commander in North America and the colonial secretary.

From the linked page there are other accounts of the movement of British troops inland from Halifax during the winter months and then there is the further fact that Quebec de-ices before the campaign season actually opens in Canada. The lack of sea transport in winter beyond Halifax did not mean the British could not in fact send troops to the inland Canadian provinces. I am not sure why you talk about Newfoundland when Halifax is and was Canada's major winter port.

I confused Nova Scotia and Newfoundland but this doesn't change my point. The colonial secretary lord Newcastle doubted that winter quarters were available for as many as 100 000 men.

Again Trent led to a situation where the British believed themselves under attack, they were not mobilising to assist the Confederacy, had it gone to war it is likely the French would have used the cover of that conflict to render more direct assistance to the Confederacy but the Emancipation Proclamation not only was much later but it did not render the rebellion any more or less toxic in British eyes, it was if anything seen as mere posturing by even British abolitionists.

A purely defensive deployment is off my point. I wanted to address the possibility of an offensive intervention.

Canadian fortresses were indeed in a sorry state but you might want to look at how quickly field fortifications and even more permanent works were constructed in several conflicts of the period including but not limited to the Crimean and American Civil Wars and the subsequent strength of those positions even in the face of deliberate siege warfare.

General Williams didn't believe this was possible.

The Militia was in the process of being raised but the Canadian Militia (technically militias as the provinces were independent of each other) had a long tradition of turning out in numbers and had done so successfully in the face of the 1837 insurrections, given the pace of enlistment prior to the US climb down there is no reason to assume the target would not have been met. Further unlike US Volunteers and Militia the Canadians had access to both British military instructors and British military arms.

Lord Newcastle didn't believe this was possible either.

Finally while it should not be assumed the Royal Navy would simply crush all before it, it did in fact have many bases in the region including both Halifax and Bermuda and additional stations in the Caribbean. The British had already developed a system of global coaling stations including the North American and Pacific North West Stations and further still there was an actual coal mine at Halifax! Again if you are interested in doing research on the period I can direct you to some quite detailed stuff to be found on CivilWarTalk and there are some contributors there on this site who can help further enlighten anyone interested.

Even with the coaling station in Halifax the distances would have been huge and completely unprecedented up until that point. Coal wasn't an issue in 1812 but it had become since.

If you are genuinely interested in the circumstances of the Trent Affair and how things changed subsequently then yeah there is a lot to discuss. The problem is I have seen a lot of these Trent threads where someone tries to argue that the Americans could have, would have, should have won with ease and righteously conquered Canada into the bargain which is against the overwhelming balance of the evidence. Not that the US is necessarily doomed to defeat had Trent turned bloody but it would have had a mountain of problems and disadvantages to climb.

My point isn't that the Union should have been able to win and conquered Canada with ease, but only that it could have defeated an offensive intervention.

Here's where I found my information including the opinions of the commander and the colonial secretary: Trent Affair - Wikipedia

There is a elephant in the room. If an intervention would have been easy and uncontroversial why didn't the UK actually do it?

 

[pikeshot1600]

I want to point out some numbers in regard to the US army in the 1860s:

Troops available in 1861 (not sure of date) were 186,845, up from 16,215 in 1860. The vast majority of course were inexperienced militia and volunteers.

In 1862, when the first advance of the CSA in the north was checked at Sharpsburg (Antietam), the army was 637,264.

By 1863, the number was 918,354. In July, 1863 the second advance was stopped at Gettysburg. Vicksburg surrendered at virtually the same time.

In 1864, troop strength was 970,905.

At the end of the war, troop strength was 1,000,692. The number going through the ranks of the army had been 2,128,948.

The numbers are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States (published periodically as applicable).

By July, 1863 the Confederacy had lost the war. How many troops Britain or France could deploy to North America, as posters here have mentioned, would not have mattered.