With respect, I fail to see your point. The how is irrelevant to the fact it did survive and we can compare the German position of April 1917 to those of the Entente. According to the British, they would run out of money in April of 1917, grain in May of 1917, and Oil in June of 1917. The French, meanwhile, gave November 1917 as the absolute latest they could stay in the conflict. Germany did not seek terms until November of 1918. Simple math dictates what will happen here.
It's irrelevant when looking at HOW Germany survived. Had Germany NOT been at war and NOT been cut off from international trade that it was, it would NOT have engaged in the sort of inflationary spending that it did to fund their war effort. They were caught in blockade with only the resources of Germany and their conquered lands available to them. In this, if Germany was to win at all, they either A) had to win quick or B) simply print more money and fix the prices, despite the fact that this would into a highly inflationary currency that could become worthless the longer the war went on and this method of spending continued. And it's really this kind of spending that put Germany in the financial position it was in AFTER the war. In this, it was NOT the Versailles Treaty that gave Germany problems but its own means of survival in terms of funding the war.
And by April of 1917, that path was closing for the Anglo-French unless they got the U.S. involved....which shows the U.S. played the key role.
Maybe... maybe not. If Germany can simply print more money, so can Britain and France. It'd be risky and unwise from a financial standpoint, but given that both the French and British had committed themselves to victory, and that their armies were not broken in 1916 or 1917... it'd be quite likely that had the US not come in, they would have made decisions similar to Germany on the gamble that they could make up their losses through the spoils of the victory.
No, it was as depicted; otherwise, how did food rations increase year over year after the doldrums of 1916? And the battles that year had no effect, quite the opposite; under the Hindenburg Programme nearly a million men were demobilized, not sucked out of Germany.
But did they really increase? Germany might have a better harvest in 1917, but they were still having to feed a country that was at war on two fronts... and if it was increasing on its own... Germany would have had no reason for the terms that it demanded of Russia in 1917 in the negotiations of Brest-Litovsk, which would ultimately include massive financial compensation to Germany, showing the weaknesses in Germany's finances...
See:
The Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk - World War I Document Archive,
Including Appendices: Russia-Germany, Part I - World War I Document Archive (note Article 6 and 7),
Including Appendices: Russia-Germany, Part II - World War I Document Archive,
Including Appendices: The Russian Fleet - World War I Document Archive
Now, the appendices in Part II and regarding the Russian fleet may not be as valid... but if Germany was doing so well on its own in 1917, the importation of food from Russia/Ukraine would not have been part of the treaty. And in this, it is quite likely that any increase in German food rations had MORE to do with Russia surrendering and allowing the Germans to essentially loot what they needed to survive.
And while the Hindenburg Program may have brought people back to Germany... that doesn't make it success. And in fact from a certain point of view, the program was a failure...
The Hindenburg Program of 1916: A Central Experiment in Wartime Planning | T. Hunt Tooley. Which would again make 1916 a pivotal year and not one in which the war was in Germany's favor.
British grain runs out in May of 1917. Germany survived until November of 1918. Again, simple math dictates where the two sides were before American entry.
Again... you're ignoring the context of how Germany survived and assuming that Britain couldn't or wouldn't change its methods should America not enter the war.
Japan was already in the war versus Germany so, again, Japan had nothing to do with the telegram. If you have evidence, please cite it.
Japan was at war, yes, but that didn't mean that Germany wasn't about to try and use them. See:
The Zimmermann Telegram and here:
Telegram with a Translation of the Zimmermann Telegram | DocsTeach for the translation. Japan is clearly invited to work with Mexico in the proposed war with the US and to allow Mexico to mediate a separate peace between Japan and Germany.
Now... Japan may not have accepted it, and Mexico ultimately didn't either. But the fact still remains that Germany in desperation tried to get it to happen with the expectation that America would come into the war anyway.
Admiral Jellicoe was the British Admiral and he confirmed what Sims said. If you have a citation in this regard, please post it.
Jellicoe was a British Admiral, yes. And yes he did agree with Simms... but that agreement is not proof in and of itself. For Sims didn't invent the convoy system. He may well have argued for it, but that does NOT mean that he was the one who invented the system or that the Americans were the only ones capable of making it work. The fact that Jellicoe and Sims would agree on the need for convoys would also prove that. It would prove that they agreed on the tactic to answer the U-boats but not that America was so necessary that Britain could have transferred ships over if they had to.
And at the same time it should be kept in mind as to the personalities of the men in question when deciding to rely on them as sources. Sims, an American admiral, coming in late to the war is naturally going to try and play up America's involvement in the war. As the US Navy didn't really arrive in force until closer to late 1917 to 1918 with regard to front line ships to join in the British blockade. As such they'd missed the Battle of Jutland and the other north sea naval actions of 1916. Thus, Sims would want to play up America's role in fighting the U-boats and claim he'd saved Britain from starvation... based on Britain's practices at the time.
And Jellicoe... Keep in mind that with Jellicoe, a lot of his career was dogged by criticisms of his caution, particularly with regard to his pursuit of the Germans after the end of the Battle of Jutland in 1916. There he'd made the decision to essentially let the Germans go rather than rush into likely mine laden waters when the strategic objective for the British, the sustaining of their blockade was achieved. It may not have been bold... but the decision was realistic and could be described as sound. And that kind of caution likely remained with him. Thus by 1917 when the arguments over convoys began, he took Sims as an ally in arguing for convoys because it would mean he wouldn't have to transfer ships from blockade duty to anti-submarine duty. If the situation changes... it would be likely that ultimately the response would change.
This is self contradictory.
No. No it isn't.
Getting help from someone does not necessarily mean that that help was absolutely needed and that there were no other options.
